Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00146-CR James Keylan Willis, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Thomas C. West, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2023-406-C1 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found James Keylan Willis guilty of capital murder. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03. The trial court assessed his punishment at life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole and sentenced him accordingly. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31. This appeal ensued. We will affirm. A. Background In December of 2022, Stanley Wilcox failed to appear at his family’s Christmas celebrations. Waco Police officers went to Wilcox’s home for a welfare check and encountered Willis, who had been renting a room with his girlfriend in Wilcox’s home. When police first encountered Willis, he was driving Wilcox’s white Ford Escape. Police found blood in the trunk of the vehicle and in Wilcox’s home. Wilcox’s body was later found in a creek on Baylor University’s campus. He had been shot five times, including three times in his head. Investigators recovered evidence connecting Willis to the killing. Cell phone location data showed Willis had been at the location where Wilcox’s body was dumped. Police discovered messages between Willis and a friend discussing plans to rob and kill Wilcox. The contemplated plan, however, was not carried out as described in the messages: there was no evidence that Wilcox’s bank accounts were drained or that a PIN was used, and the vehicles were not taken as planned. Additionally, police recovered the murder weapon from another of Willis’s friends in Dallas, as well as video of Willis retrieving that gun just before the murder and returning it soon afterwards. Willis v. State Page 2 B. Issue One In his first issue, Willis argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder. 1. Standard of Review The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows: When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial Willis v. State Page 3 evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 2. Authority A person commits capital murder if he intentionally commits murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit other specific felony offenses, including robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2). A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02. A person commits a robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another or intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent Willis v. State Page 4 bodily injury or death. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02. The intent to rob must be formed before or at the time of the murder. Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When establishing the underlying crime of robbery or attempted robbery in a capital murder prosecution, the State is not required to prove that an appellant completed a theft. Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 3. Analysis Willis argues that “the evidence reveals a disjointed sequence: planning, followed by murder, followed by an opportunistic taking of property.” He states that there was no evidence that he “intended to steal at the time of the murder” and that there was no proof that the intent to rob motivated the killing, therefore the evidence was insufficient to support his capital murder conviction. The evidence shows that Wilcox had posted an eviction notice in Willis’s room and gave him until December 23, 2022 to either pay his rent or face eviction. In the days leading to the murder, Willis exchanged numerous messages with Bradon Stephens and A.J. Benson discussing plans to use masks and guns to drain bank accounts and steal vehicles from Wilcox. On December 14, Willis texted Stephens that he needed some muscle and guns. Willis v. State Page 5 Willis told Stephens and Benson that they had “a week at most” to carry out their plan. When discussing how to get Wilcox’s PIN to access his bank accounts, Willis texted that he would “put a bullet in him until he gives us what we need.” Willis asked Stephens to get a sleeping bag or industrial sized trash bags from Kroger. Late in the evening on December 21, Willis also texted Stephens that they would get Wilcox’s bank account information, drain his accounts, then split everything in the house including Wilcox’s guns. Stephens asked whether Wilcox slept with the guns, and Willis responded that even if he did, Wilcox would not have time to react because they will “run in” while he is asleep. Early in the morning of December 22, Willis drove Wilcox’s white Ford Escape to Dallas, picked up Stephens, then drove to a nearby McDonald’s where Benson worked. Benson wrapped what appeared to be a gun in a bag and brought it out to Willis, who then left the McDonald’s and drove back to Wilcox’s house with Stephens. Early in the morning of December 23, video evidence showed Willis and Stephens return to the same McDonald’s in Wilcox’s white Ford Escape, where Willis handed a small item wrapped in a bag to Benson through the drive-thru window. Willis and Stephens then drove back to Waco and drove to the intersection of 9th Street and Interstate 35. Willis v. State Page 6 On January 6, 2023, police discovered Wilcox’s body under a bridge at the intersection of 9th Street and Interstate 35, and an autopsy showed Wilcox had been shot five times, including three times in his head. Police located the gun used to shoot Wilcox in Benson’s possession. Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have reasonably inferred that Willis had committed the murder during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. See Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to support Willis’s conviction for capital murder. Therefore, we overrule Willis’s first issue. C. Issue Two In his second issue, Willis argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder when the evidence raised a fact issue as to whether Willis committed murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. 1. Standard of Review and Authority A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser–included offense if it is established “by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove the offense charged.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1). Texas courts apply a two–step test to determine if such an instruction is required. Hall v. Willis v. State Page 7 State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The first step is to “compare the statutory elements of the alleged lesser offense and the statutory elements and any descriptive averments in the indictment.” Ritcherson v. State, 568 S.W.3d 667, 670–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Because the first step in the analysis is purely a question of law, appellate courts conduct a de novo review. See Palmer v. State, 471 S.W.3d 569, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The second prong asks whether there is some evidence in the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser–included offense. Bullock v. State, 509 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The second step of the analysis is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Palmer, 471 S.W.3d at 570. 2. Analysis Both parties agree that the first step is clearly satisfied here: murder is a lesser–included offense of capital murder. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As to the second step, Willis argues that since the evidence did not show that Willis followed through on the details of the pre-offense plans to rob Wilcox, the statutory nexus between murder and theft was severed. Therefore, Willis contends that the jury could have concluded that if guilty, Willis was Willis v. State Page 8 only guilty of the lesser-included murder. However, failure to prove a completed theft would not, in and of itself, entitle Willis to a lesser-included charge of murder. Llamas v. State, 270 S.W.3d 274, 278-279 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2008, no pet.). We must review the evidence to determine if there is more than a scintilla of evidence that would allow a rational jury to conclude that, if Willis is guilty, he is guilty of only the lesser included offense. Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). There must be some affirmative evidence from which a rational juror could infer that Willis did not intend to rob Wilcox when he killed him. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Meeting this threshold requires more than mere speculation—it requires affirmative evidence that both raises the lesser- included offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense. Id. The mere fact that a jury might disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense is not enough to warrant an instruction on a lesser-included offense. See Bignall, 887 S.W.2d at 24. As previously discussed, the record clearly shows that Willis and his co-defendants exchanged many messages formulating a plan to rob and kill Wilcox. Willis points to the testimony of the officer conducting the welfare check that Willis claimed Wilcox had given him permission to use Wilcox’s vehicle as affirmative evidence rebutting or Willis v. State Page 9 negating a robbery. However, planning to steal vehicles, divide all the property in the house among the co-defendants, and “put a bullet” in Wilcox until he discloses the PIN to access his bank accounts, shooting Wilcox in the leg and hip before shooting him in the head three times, and later telling police that he had permission to use Wilcox’s vehicle does not rationally support an inference that Willis, if guilty, is only guilty of murder. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the instruction on the lesser included offense of murder. See Palmer, 471 S.W.3d at 570. Therefore, we overrule Willis’s second issue. D. Issue Three In his third issue, Willis argues that the mandatory sentence of life without parole for an “emerging adult” violates the prohibition against “cruel or unusual” punishment under the United States and Texas constitutions. 1. Standard of Review and Authority The interpretation of the Texas Constitution is a question of law reviewed de novo. Vexler v. State, 620 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The constitutionality of a criminal statute is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo after presuming that the statute is valid. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Willis v. State Page 10 Section 12.31(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code provides that “[a]n individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the state does not seek the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment ... for ... life without parole, if the individual committed the offense when 18 years of age or older.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §12.31(a)(2). 2. Analysis Willis makes three arguments in support of his assertion that, as applied to him, the mandatory life without parole sentencing scheme for “emerging adults” is unconstitutional. First, Willis argues that the sentencing scheme violates the “cruel and unusual” standard of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. Willis contends that the characteristics considered in Roper v. Simmons which make juveniles categorically “less deserving of the most severe punishments” are shared by emerging adults. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). However, the Roper court recognized criticisms of drawing a bright-line rule and rejected them: Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn.... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we Willis v. State Page 11 conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Relying on Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the same categorical rule with the line of demarcation between juvenile and adulthood at a defendant’s eighteenth birthday in Miller v. Alabama, which specifically addresses a mandatory life-without parole sentencing scheme. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (holding that the imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a defendant who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment). The Miller Court specifically noted that its ruling would not undermine precedent upholding mandatory sentences of life without parole for adult offenders. See id. at 482 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991)). Second, Willis argues that the Texas Constitution, which prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment” provides greater protection than the United States Constitution's prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.” Compare TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 13, with U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. The Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected such a distinction. See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding no significance in differences between Willis v. State Page 12 Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” phrasing and Texas Constitution’s “cruel or unusual” phrasing). Third, Willis argues that applying the “cruel and unusual” and “cruel or unusual” standards to his sentence demonstrates that his punishment is constitutionally excessive. As previously discussed, this argument has repeatedly been rejected by the courts. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2701-702, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (mandatory life sentence does not violate Eighth Amendment); see also Cormier v. State, 540 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref ’d) (mandatory life sentence not in violation of prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in U.S. or Texas Constitution); Lewis v. State, 448 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref ’d), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 136 S.Ct. 52 (2015) (mandatory sentence for capital murder does not violate right to due process or prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under U.S. or Texas Constitution); Simms v. State, No. 06-18-00181-CR, 2019 WL 2479845, at *11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 14, 2019, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Speers v. State, No. 05-14-00179-CR, 2016 WL 929223, at *5-7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (mandatory sentence for capital murder does not Willis v. State Page 13 violate right to due process or prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in U.S. or Texas Constitution). Therefore, Willis’s third issue is overruled. E. Issue Four In his fourth issue, Willis argues that the trial court erred in admitting presumptive blood testing evidence because the State failed to establish scientific reliability. 1. Standard of Review The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). 2. Authority Scientific evidence must satisfy three criteria to be considered reliable: (a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Seven non–exclusive factors guide the trial court’s determination Willis v. State Page 14 of whether the reliability criteria have been satisfied: (1) the extent to which the underlying theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; (2) the qualifications of the expert testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person who applied the technique on the occasion in question. Id. 3. Analysis Willis contends that testimony concerning Bluestar, a chemical spray used to identify trace amounts of blood not visible to the naked eye, should not have been admitted because the State failed to meet the reliability standards for scientific evidence set forth in Kelly. The State counters that even if the evidence was erroneously admitted, Willis was not harmed because investigators saw visible blood stains in most areas where Bluestar was used and subsequent lab tests confirmed the Bluestar results. Ashley Roy, a Crime Scene Investigator for Waco Police Department, testified that she observed significant blood stains in the trunk of Wilcox’s car that were visible without the use of Bluestar. Additionally, Josef Andrew Willis v. State Page 15 Lopez, a DNA analyst for the DPS Crime Lab, testified that lab testing confirmed that the blood Roy saw in the trunk belonged to Wilcox. Bloodstains were also observed in various locations in the house, including in Wilcox’s bedroom and on a towel and sheet found in Willis’s bedroom. Bluestar was used in these locations, and lab testing confirmed the blood was Wilcox’s. Willis obtained a running objection as to testimony about the use of Bluestar but did not object to evidence of visible bloodstains or lab test confirmation of the presence of Wilcox’s DNA from the samples taken from the bloodstained areas. In light of the foregoing evidence, assuming without deciding that the admission of the Bluestar results was error, the error was harmless. See Dean v. State, No. 12-11-00267-CR, 2013 WL 4680510, at *10 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 29, 2013, pet. ref ’d); Cf. Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (error harmless when other evidence at trial is admitted without objection and it proves the same fact as inadmissible evidence sought to prove). Accordingly, Willis’s fourth issue is overruled. F. Conclusion Having overruled Willis’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Willis v. State Page 16 MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 30, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM Willis v. State Page 17