Jacoby Dejuan Roberts Jr. v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00250-CR ___________________________ JACOBY DEJUAN ROBERTS JR., Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 396th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1782383 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel  MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction Appellant Jacoby Dejuan Roberts Jr. appeals his conviction for the capital murder of his cousin Jailon Freeman (the victim) while committing terroristic threat for which he was sentenced to confinement for life without parole. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). In two points, Appellant argues (1) that the trial court erred in the court’s charge by failing to apply the law of self-defense to the particular facts of his case and that he was egregiously harmed as a result of that error and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his custodial statement because he had not received his Article 38.221 and Miranda 2 warnings and had not voluntarily waived them. Because we conclude that there was no charge error or alternatively that Appellant was not egregiously harmed by the self-defense instruction in the charge and because Appellant was not in custody when he made the challenged statement and thus no warnings were required, we affirm. 1 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.22. 2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 2  II. Background3 A. The State’s Case Appellant killed the victim when he arrived at a fake drug buy that Appellant had set up. Jordan Thurman, who was indicted as a co-conspirator for the victim’s capital murder, testified that he was friends with Draylon Gowans (the buyer); he had never personally met Appellant nor the victim. On April 4, 2023, the buyer called him and asked him to take him to purchase narcotics and directed him to the victim’s apartment. After they arrived at the apartment complex, Thurman saw somebody wearing a mask and blue gloves shoot the victim in the back of the head, so he drove off. Thurman did not see the victim with a firearm at any point, though he said that he had not been paying attention the whole time. Thurman opined that the victim did not see the shooter. 3 Appellant’s brief includes a three-sentence “Statement of Facts” despite that the trial lasted four days. Although Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(g) allows the facts to be stated concisely, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), we note that Appellant’s statement of facts does not include any facts relevant to his self-defense argument beyond two conclusory statements—that he admitted shooting the victim in self- defense and that he did not rob the victim. We do not condone counsel’s practice of omitting relevant facts, and we remind counsel that he owes this court a duty of candor. See Standards for Appellate Conduct, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court ¶ 3, Texas Rules of Court (State) 336 (West 2026), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/ 1437423/standards-for-appellate-conduct.pdf (“Counsel should not misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or miscite the factual record . . . .”); Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.03 (explaining the duty of candor toward the tribunal). 3  Keshawn Lighten (the driver)4 testified that he knew that Appellant sold drugs, specifically cocaine, and that the victim was his supplier. The driver believed that Appellant and the victim had an agreement in place and that the victim was not “doing his part” regarding payment. The driver recalled that Appellant and the victim had a falling out because the victim had not paid Appellant. Appellant planned to rob the victim of the drugs and sell them in order to get some money for his son. The driver said that it was not Appellant’s conscious objective to kill the victim, but if it came down to it, Appellant was willing to kill the victim “over the drugs.” The driver testified that Appellant called him on FaceTime on April 4, 2023, and said that he had done it, which the driver interpreted as Appellant’s having robbed the victim. Appellant later told the driver that he had robbed the victim and “had to kill him.” The driver testified at trial that Appellant had told him that the victim “knew what was going on” and had tried to pull a gun first but that Appellant had ended up shooting him first. The driver understood that Appellant had taken drugs from the victim. The driver picked up Appellant and planned to take him somewhere so that he could clear his head. Shortly after they left the neighborhood, the police stopped the vehicle. The driver could not recall if Appellant was read his rights or if the police 4 We use the term “the driver” because he was the one who was driving when the police stopped the car in which Appellant was riding. 4 controlled his movements, but he did not think that Appellant would have felt free to leave because he knew what he had done. Fort Worth Police Detective Jerry Cedillo, along with five other detectives, responded to the Woodmont Apartments on April 4, 2023. The victim’s girlfriend identified the body and said that Appellant might have been involved. Detective Cedillo saw two cell phones, a firearm, and a cartridge casing near the victim’s body. One of the cell phones was on and had messages on the screen, and those messages helped identify persons of interest. Surveillance cameras showed (1) an individual who was wearing all black, a ski mask covering most of his face, and blue latex gloves and was walking through the parking lot and (2) two cars that left shortly after the shooting. Because they had a person of interest, officers set up surveillance at Appellant’s house and saw a vehicle pull up to the house; a man came out of the house and left in the vehicle, which officers subsequently stopped for an expired vehicle registration. One of the detectives who responded to the Woodmont Apartments went to the scene of the traffic stop and spoke with Appellant. Detective Cedillo arrived later and said that neither Appellant nor the driver were arrested or handcuffed. They agreed to speak with Detective Cedillo, and separate patrol officers transported them to the interview room at the homicide office. Detective Cedillo spoke with the driver first and then Appellant. Detective Cedillo said that Appellant was not handcuffed and that he had told Appellant that he 5 was free to leave. Appellant initially denied that he was at the Woodmont Apartments and said that someone named Larry might have killed the victim. Appellant changed his story when Detective Cedillo mentioned that they knew his car had been at the apartment complex. Appellant claimed that the victim had pulled a gun on him and that he had panicked and had taken the victim’s gun, but not his cocaine, before leaving the scene. Detective Cedillo seized Appellant’s cell phone during the interview, and another detective performed an extraction on Appellant’s cell phone. Detective Cedillo reviewed the contents of the “cell phone dump” after the interview and learned that Appellant and the buyer were associates and that the two had planned the robbery. Texts messages between Appellant and the buyer revealed that the two had started planning on April 1 to sneak up on the victim and come out from between two buildings. The two formalized the plan, with the buyer bringing his friend (Thurman) on the day the victim was murdered. Based on Detective Cedillo’s investigation, he concluded that the buyer was going to act as a “fictitious customer,” while Appellant was the one who was going to commit the robbery. The text- message thread revealed that the buyer and Appellant kept each other updated on their locations, and at 2:23:05, the texts showed that the victim was on the way. At 2:28, the buyer asked if Appellant had retrieved the victim’s phone, and he replied, “He reached first.” Detective Cedillo interpreted that to mean that the victim had reached for his gun first. 6  Detective Cedillo testified that the text messages demonstrated that “this was a preplanned event” and that Appellant “was there to rob [the victim].” When asked why he did not believe Appellant’s claim of self-defense, Detective Cedillo said because of what was previously stated in the interview. You know, the way he’s dressed. He’s got a gun. I had already learned that he was meddling some deals with [the victim], and even through his own statement, he admits that this was all over money. It was $500 that he was upset about [the fact] that [the victim] hadn’t been paying him. So all this contributed to a robbery that took place that was planned. Although Appellant claimed that there was no robbery and no plan to rob and that this was just supposed to be a confrontation in which he told the victim that he needed his money, when the buyer had texted Appellant, “My potna [Thurman] don’t kno that you finna to rob dude,” Appellant did not refute that statement but instead responded in a way confirming that was the plan. Moreover, according to Detective Cedillo, Appellant admitted the robbery when he said that he had taken the victim’s gun, and the evidence showed that he had also taken the victim’s cocaine.5 Dr. Kendall Crowns, the Chief Medical Examiner at the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office who performed the victim’s autopsy, testified that the victim had a single gunshot wound to the left side of the back of his head slightly behind his left ear. The bullet proceeded from the left hemisphere of the cerebellum 5 When officers executed a search warrant on Appellant’s home, they collected blue rubber gloves, black clothes, and a backpack. The backpack contained a Smith & Wesson SD40 with a magazine inside it, a box of “blue throwaway gloves,” Hornady 9 mm Luger ammunition, and a grocery sack filled with 146 grams of a white powdery substance. 7 and continued until it lodged in the right parietal lobe of the brain; there was no exit wound. Due to the absence of soot and stippling near the gunshot wound entrance, she opined that the gun was fired at a range of more than two feet away from the victim. She believed that the shooter had been behind the victim, specifically back and to the left, but she stated that because the human body is a three-dimensional object, “he could [have been] turned in a number of ways that could discount that.” She noted that the victim had multiple abrasions to the right side of his face and opined that they were probably from falling after he was shot. Dr. Crowns further opined that the victim’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head and that the manner was homicide. B. The Defense’s Case The defense called one of the paramedics who had responded to the Woodmont Apartments. He testified that the victim had what appeared to be a gunshot wound above his right eyebrow and a wound behind his left ear. Appellant testified at trial and said that he and the victim had entered into a drug conspiracy. The two agreed that Appellant would receive fifty percent of whatever profit they made. When making drug sales, the victim carried a gun and advised Appellant to get a gun. The victim kept the drugs at his aunt’s apartment, and one of Appellant’s interactions with the victim at that apartment caused him to believe that the victim was becoming violent. According to Appellant, the victim said that he was “ready for 8 someone to play with him just so he [could] kill someone.” Appellant said that the victim’s energy at the time frightened him because he had never seen the victim like that before. Despite Appellant and the victim’s agreement to split the profit, the victim refused to pay Appellant. So Appellant set up the transaction involving the buyer in order to put money into the victim’s hands. Appellant testified that his intention in going to the victim’s apartment on April 4, 2023, was to talk to him to see if he could get the money he was owed and that he carried a gun “just in case.” Appellant claimed that he did not intend to threaten, hurt, rob, or kill the victim. Appellant further said that he had not made any statements to the buyer that he was going to rob the victim but that the buyer was under that impression because Appellant had told him that the victim was avoiding him. Appellant testified that his face was not covered when he met with the victim. According to Appellant, he asked the victim if he had the money he was owed, and the victim turned around and pulled his gun from his hoodie pocket;6 Appellant “reacted and defended [him]self” because he was in fear for his life. Appellant admitted that he had shot and killed the victim. Other places in the record, Appellant testified that as the victim reached for 6 his gun in his hoodie pocket, Appellant reached for his gun and shot the victim. And Appellant clarified that the victim did not shoot because his gun “got caught up in his hoodie pocket.” 9  Afterwards, Appellant dropped his gun. He picked up the victim’s gun because he thought it was his own and also picked up a white bag; he then put his ski mask over his face and took off running. After Appellant got back in his car, he texted the buyer that the victim had reached first. Appellant went home and showered and then called the driver. Appellant wanted the driver to pick him up and get away from the area because he was in fear for his life; he believed that his family might retaliate against him. Appellant testified about when he and the driver were stopped. He said that he was not read his rights, that he did not feel like he was free to leave, that one of the officers had his hand on his gun when he asked Appellant to step out of the car, that he was frisked multiple times, that he was put up against a wall and photographed, that an officer had put a hand on him when he had given him to another officer, and that there were no handles on the doors inside the patrol vehicle. He further testified that an officer accompanied him at the station and that he did not feel free to leave even though Detective Cedillo told him that he could. During cross-examination, Appellant was adamant that he had not planned on robbing the victim and that he did not rob the victim. When it was pointed out that one of the exhibits showed him running with the cocaine and the victim’s gun that he had taken, Appellant said, “I did not plan on doing that. That was something that happened after the fact.” And when confronted with his testimony that the victim’s gun never came out because it had gotten caught in his hoodie pocket, Appellant said, 10 “I knew where he kept his gun, and he’s always showed me.” Appellant initially said that he wore gloves “[j]ust in case [the victim] wanted to pay [him] in cocaine” but later admitted that he had told Detective Cedillo that he had worn gloves because he did not know where the gun had come from. He also admitted that he had texted the buyer beforehand about where they should position themselves. But Appellant did not feel like it was necessary for him to correct the buyer when he texted, “My potna don’t kno that you finna rob dude”; Appellant stated that the buyer was not his friend and that he did not think he needed to tell him what was actually going on. But when asked why Appellant had texted the buyer that the victim had reached first, Appellant said that his thinking was frantic because he was scared for his life. Appellant denied having committed capital murder but admitted that he had pulled the trigger and had shot the victim in the head. Appellant said that when he shot his gun, he was looking at the victim’s face; he claimed that he did not shoot the victim in the back of the head. C. The Outcome After hearing the evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment, and Appellant received an automatic life sentence without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed. III. Jury-Charge Challenge In his first point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in the court’s charge by failing to apply the law of self-defense to the particular facts of his case and 11 that he was egregiously harmed as a result of such failure. Based on our review of the charge and the record, we conclude that the charge was not erroneous and alternatively that any error did not cause Appellant egregious harm. A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We must review “all alleged jury-charge error . . . regardless of preservation in the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “Preservation of charge error does not become an issue until we assess harm.” Thanh Cuong Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. “When the defendant fails to object or states that he has no objection to the charge, we will not reverse for jury-charge error unless the record shows ‘egregious harm’ to the defendant.” Id. at 743–44 (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)). “Thus, we review alleged charge error by considering two questions: (1) whether error existed in the charge; and (2) whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to compel reversal.” Id. at 744. Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14, the trial court must deliver a written charge to the jury that sets forth the law applicable to the case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. “Because the charge is the instrument by which the jury convicts, [it] must contain an accurate statement of law and must set out all the essential elements of the offense.” Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim. 12 App. 2012) (quoting Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). The charge must make clear to the jury the circumstances under which it should convict and the circumstances under which it should acquit the defendant. Gray v. State, 152 S.W.3d 125, 127–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). “Generally, a jury charge that tracks statutory language is not erroneous.” Lewis v. State, 693 S.W.3d 453, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref’d). An application paragraph should apply the specific charges alleged against the defendant to the evidence presented at trial. Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367; Davis v. State, No. 09-15-00148-CR, 2017 WL 1535102, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The application paragraph must (1) specify all conditions that must be met before a conviction is authorized, (2) “authorize a conviction under conditions specified by other paragraph[s] of the jury charge to which the application paragraph necessarily and unambiguously refers,” or “(3) contain[] some logically consistent combination of such paragraphs.” Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367 (inner quotation marks omitted) (quoting Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); Davis, 2017 WL 1535102, at *5. In short, the charge must “apply the law to the facts adduced at trial.” Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 127; Davis, 2017 WL 1535102, at *5. 13  Texas courts have held that when a defendant claims self-defense, his rights are fully preserved when a jury charge (1) states that a defendant’s conduct is justified if he reasonably believed that the deceased was using or attempting to use unlawful deadly force against the defendant and (2) correctly defines “reasonable belief.” Bundy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing Valentine v. State, 587 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)); Baty v. State, No. 09-24-00252-CR, 2026 WL 1476548, at *14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 27, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “Reasonable belief” is a belief that an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the defendant would hold. Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(42). B. The Jury Charge During the charge conference, the trial court stated that it had prepared a proposed jury charge using the State Bar’s Pattern Jury Charges and that it had included “some anticipated instructions,” one of which was “a self-defense charge with a presumption.” Both sides’ counsel were given an opportunity to review the proposed charge. The remainder of the charge conference occurred off the record. At the end of the conference, the trial court summarized the changes that had been made to the proposed charge, specifically that they had “tweaked self-defense with additional definitions. It has . . . presumption language that the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply in this case, and then apply self-defense to the facts of the case.” Defense counsel asked 14  for some proposed language that if we deal with self-defense, we request the language to the effect of the reasonableness of a particular use of force by the actor must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable actor at the time of the offense or act committed rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight. The trial court denied that request. In the final version of the jury charge, after instructing the jury that if it agreed that “the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements for one of the offenses listed above, you must next consider whether [Appellant] is not guilty because his use of force was justified by self-defense,” the charge explained self- defense as follows: SELF-DEFENSE You are instructed that a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree that the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other person’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. A person is justified in using deadly force against another if the actor would be justified in using force against the other, as set out above, and when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other person’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Self-defense does not cover conduct in response to verbal provocation alone. [Appellant] must have reasonably believed the other person had done more than verbally provoke [Appellant]. The law of self-defense may apply either to the charged offense of capital murder or the lesser-included offense of felony murder. The jury charge set forth definitions for “reasonable belief” and “deadly force” as follows: 15  • “Reasonable belief” means the reasonableness of the actor’s belief must be viewed from the actor[’s] viewpoint at the time [he] acted. .... • “Deadly force” means force that is intended or known by the person using it to cause death or serious bodily injury or force that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. After setting forth definitions, the jury charge included sections on presumption, burden of proof, and application of law to facts: PRESUMPTION Under certain circumstances, the law creates a presumption that [Appellant’s] belief—that the deadly force he used was immediately necessary—was reasonable. A presumption is a conclusion the law requires you to reach if certain other facts exist. Therefore, you must find [Appellant’s] belief—that the deadly force he used was immediately necessary—was reasonable unless you find the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one of the following elements. The elements the State must prove are that[] 1. [Appellant] provoked the person against whom the force was used; or 2. [Appellant], at the time the deadly force was used, was engaged in criminal activity other than a [C]lass C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic. If you find the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, element 1 or 2 listed above, the presumption does not apply[,] and you are not required to find that [Appellant’s] belief was reasonable. Whether or not the presumption applies, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense does not apply to this case. 16  BURDEN OF PROOF [Appellant] is not required to prove self-defense. Rather, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense does not apply to [Appellant’s] conduct. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS To decide the issue of self-defense, you must determine whether the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the following two elements. The elements the State must prove are that[] 1. [Appellant] did not believe his use of force was immediately necessary to protect himself against [the victim’s] use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or 2. [Appellant’s] belief was not reasonable. Before you may find [Appellant] guilty, you must all agree that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either element 1 or 2 listed above. You need not agree on which of these elements the State has proved. If you find that the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either element 1 or 2 listed above, you must find [Appellant] “not guilty.” If you all agree [that] the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements of the charged offense of capital murder or the lesser-included offense of murder, and you all agree [that] the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either element 1 or 2 listed above, you must find [Appellant] “guilty.” C. Analysis Here, Appellant concedes that “[t]he abstract portion of the court’s charge instructed the jury on some of the elements of self-defense,” but he argues that the application portion of the charge did not apply the law of self-defense to the particular facts of his case. Appellant ignores that the application portion of the 17 charge tracks the “Application of Law to Facts” model given in the Texas Criminal Pattern Charges for self-defense involving deadly force. See Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges—Criminal Defenses CPJC 32.2 (2018); cf. Trejo v. State, No. 03-18-00221-CR, 2020 WL 1313735, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (setting forth self-defense charge, including application-of-law-to-facts section; noting that the charge tracked the instructions and definitions set forth in the Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges as to a defendant’s claim of self-defense for an offense involving the use of deadly force; and holding that such charge did not “misle[a]d the jury” or “improperly limit[ ] his claim of self-defense” through a merging of jury instructions on provocation and seeking an explanation while carrying a weapon); Preston v. State, No. 03-16-00573-CR, 2018 WL 3447713, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Austin July 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that defendant was not egregiously harmed by inclusion of self-defense instruction that tracked instruction from criminal pattern jury charge); cf. Mateen v. State, No. 03-22-00516-CR, 2024 WL 2741290, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin May 29, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that the Texas Pattern Jury Charges are not law but are heavily relied on by both the bench and the bar). Appellant also claims that “[t]he court’s charge merely informed the jury that they were to find [him] guilty if they found that the State disproved the presumption that [he had] acted reasonably.” It is clear, however, from the two-and-a-half pages of 18 the charge that are set forth above that it did not “merely” inform the jury about finding him guilty if the State disproved the presumption but instead explained self- defense, set forth definitions, and applied the law to the facts. Furthermore, the charge stated that “[w]hether or not the presumption applies, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense does not apply to this case.” Appellant’s brief then includes seven paragraphs that each start with the following: “The court’s charge failed to apply the law to the facts in instructing the jury . . . .” For example, Appellant’s brief states, The [court’s] charge failed to apply the law to the facts in instructing the jury [it] must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant provoked the occasion in question before [it] could find he was not presumed to have acted in self-defense [if the victim] used force or deadly force against him or was committing or attempting to commit murder. But as noted by the State, “Appellant does not favor the State or [the c]ourt with an explanation of how the trial court could have better applied ‘the factual circumstances of the case’ without commenting on the weight of the evidence.” 7 [Brief reference omitted.] See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14 (requiring judge to deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case; not 7 Within one of these paragraphs, Appellant mentions his having a right to be present at the location and his not being required to retreat before using deadly force. We agree with the State that no instruction on “no duty to retreat” was required. See McDow v. State, No. 05-17-01201-CR, 2019 WL 2590968, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he no[-]duty[-] to[-]retreat provisions do not apply if the defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time he used deadly force.”). 19 expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury”); Beltran De La Torre v. State, 583 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (stating that the court may not express an opinion on the weight of the evidence or draw the jury’s attention to particular facts). Having reviewed the charge, we cannot say that the trial court’s instruction on self-defense contained error, especially when Appellant does not challenge the law it set forth on self-defense. See Baty, 2026 WL 1476548, at *15 (holding that trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense and that the jury charge was not erroneous when the instructions tracked the statute’s definition regarding self- defense, deadly force, and reasonable belief); see also Perkins v. State, No. 08-19-00068- CR, 2021 WL 754344, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 26, 2021, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding no error in charge when appellant failed to specify the particular instruction that the trial court should have given and when the charge specifically identified the person who believed that force was immediately necessary to protect himself or others and the person using or attempting to use the unlawful force). Even if there were error in the charge, Appellant failed to object to the charge on the ground asserted here. That failure would require an additional finding of “egregious harm” in order to justify reversal. See Thanh Cuong Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 20 743–44. In making an egregious-harm determination, we must consider “the actual degree of harm . . . in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel[,] and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. See generally Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 708–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (applying Almanza). Errors that result in egregious harm are those “that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and significantly more persuasive.” Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172).8 We therefore conduct an egregious-harm determination using the Almanza factors: • Here, the actual degree of harm in light of the jury charge in its entirety is minimal, if any. The charge made clear that the jury must find Appellant not guilty if the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the elements negating self-defense. This correct statement of law militates against finding any actual harm. • The state of the evidence presented the jury with ample bases to reject Appellant’s self-defense claim: the autopsy showed that the victim had been shot from behind, Appellant’s texts to the buyer showed that he had planned to rob the victim, and the driver’s testimony demonstrated that Appellant would kill if necessary to get the money he was owed. 8 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently applied Almanza to objected-to error in submitting the presumption involving the use of deadly force when it was not raised by the evidence. See Cuevas v. State, 735 S.W.3d 17, 27–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2026). 21  The record evidence also militates against a finding of actual egregious harm. • During closing arguments, the State made clear that it was the jury’s job to follow the law and focused on the elements of capital murder. The State emphasized the inconsistencies in Appellant’s testimony and the planning that was demonstrated in his text messages. The State briefly touched on self-defense, noting that the victim’s force was never unlawful because he was ambushed by a person wearing a ski mask with a gun in his hand. Appellant’s counsel argued that the theory of self- defense was not something they had concocted in representing Appellant nor was it something that Appellant had concocted when he was in front of the homicide detectives but instead was based on what Appellant had texted from the scene—that the victim drew first. Appellant’s counsel stated, “If you believe self-defense doesn’t fit, that’s your decision. We just ask you to consider it.” Defense counsel later reiterated that the victim had reached for his gun—had “started pulling it out”—after Appellant had asked him for the money he was owed, and that was why Appellant had reacted “in what he said was self-defense.” Defense counsel closed by reminding the jury “to decide on the facts if self-defense applie[d].” The State emphasized in rebuttal that self- defense could not apply because “in your jury charge it says you don’t get self-defense if you provoke somebody, which he did, or you’re committing a crime. . . . Aggravated robbery. You don’t get self- defense.” Both sides thus emphasized applying the law to the facts, so this further militated against any egregious harm. • Regarding any other relevant information, we consider whether the jury sent requests for clarification during deliberations. See Smith v. State, 515 S.W.3d 423, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). The record reveals that the jury sent two notes requesting, among other things, copies of the charge, the coroner’s report, photos of the victim’s body and evidence related to its location, phone-message history, and security footage of Appellant and the victim. The record does not indicate that the jury sought any clarification regarding self-defense. This final factor weighs against a conclusion of egregious harm. After considering and weighing all the relevant factors, we conclude that the self-defense instruction did not cause actual harm to Appellant. See Perkins, 2021 WL 22 754344, at *5; Linden v. State, 347 S.W.3d 819, 823 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (concluding that the jury charge did not cause appellant egregious harm when “the jury was given a general instruction on the law of self-defense—and specifically told that it should find [appellant] not guilty if it believed or had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense—and [when appellant’s] counsel discussed self-defense in his argument before the jury”); Barrera v. State, 10 S.W. 3d 743, 745 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, no pet.) (holding that the failure to include self-defense in the application paragraph did not cause egregious harm where the appellant relied on self-defense as a defensive theory at trial, it was urged in closing arguments, and a separate instruction on self- defense was given explaining how to properly apply the defense). We overrule Appellant’s first point. IV. Noncustodial Statement In his second point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting his video-recorded statem