Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH November 20, 2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 25-5141 PROPHET KELLY LAMAR CLARK, Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 4:24-CR-00382-JDR-1) _________________________________ Submitted on the briefs: * Julia L. O’Connell, Federal Public Defender; Barry L. Derryberry, First Assistant Federal Public Defender; and Brynn N. Barton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. Clinton J. Johnson, United States Attorney and Elliot P. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. _________________________________ Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. *After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 2 _________________________________ FEDERICO, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Prophet Kelly Lamar Clark was prohibited from lawfully possessing a firearm by virtue of a prior state felony conviction. This appeal centers on whether Clark knew of his prohibited status. On October 8, 2024, law enforcement responded to reports of a domestic disturbance at the Savannah Landing Apartments in Tulsa, Oklahoma. At the scene, officers approached Clark and asked if he had a gun. Clark responded that he did. Officers then asked Clark if he had any prior felony convictions, which he denied. Thereafter, Clark was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Clark was convicted after a jury trial. On appeal, Clark challenges: (1) the exclusion of statements he made at the time of his arrest on hearsay grounds; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for felon in possession; and (3) the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based on the Second Amendment, for preservation purposes only. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we reverse. 2 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 3 I On October 8, 2024, Officer Robertson, along with other officers, reported to Savannah Landing Apartments after receiving an emergency call. 1 At the scene, a neighbor informed officers that Clark’s girlfriend asked for help because Clark had physically assaulted her and Clark threatened them. The neighbors assisted Officer Robertson in identifying Clark. Officer Robertson then approached Clark and noticed a gun magazine in Clark’s hand. Officer Robertson asked Clark if he had a gun. Clark stated that there was a gun in his right pocket, and Officer Robertson then retrieved an unloaded purple 9mm SCCY model CX1 pistol. At that point, Officer Watkins ran a records check, which revealed that Clark had a previous conviction in Oklahoma state court, but there was some confusion on whether the conviction was a felony. The officers asked Clark if he had any prior felony convictions. Clark vehemently denied having a felony conviction and made the following statements: (1) “I ain’t got no drugs felony possession”; (2) “They dropped that, I have the proof on 1 “Because this appeal is before this court following a jury verdict, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s decision.” Little v. Budd Co., Inc., 955 F.3d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 2020). The facts are derived from the appellate record. 3 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 4 my phone. It was dismissed”; (3) “That case was dismissed . . . . That’s not the case.” R. I at 142; R. III at 72–73. Ultimately, Clark was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). The underlying state felony conviction was for unlawful possession of a controlled drug for which he received a suspended sentence in 2011. 2 After a jury trial, Clark was found guilty and thereafter sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Before trial, the district court held a pretrial conference, at which time it addressed several evidentiary issues raised by the parties. 3 Particularly, the Government objected to the admission into evidence the three statements Clark made at the time he was arrested and argued the statements were hearsay. Clark argued the statements were not hearsay because they were not being offered for their truth – that Clark was not a convicted felon. Instead, the statements were being offered to show what 2 Clark was convicted for possessing marijuana. Because he had a prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana, this second offense was considered a felony in Oklahoma. 3 The district court also addressed Clark’s hearsay objections to the officer’s testimony that he was called to the scene for a domestic violence dispute based on his girlfriend and the neighbor’s statements. The district court restricted the officer’s testimony to say that he was dispatched on complaints there was somebody with a gun. 4 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 5 Clark knew or thought at the time the statements were made. The district court deferred a ruling and instructed Clark’s counsel to approach the bench before engaging in that line of questioning. But the court also noted: “[t]hat sure seems to me to be self-serving hearsay, that this – then not subject to any kind of cross-examination. It allows Mr. Clark to testify without testifying. . . . I don’t think it goes to the non-hearsay issue.” R. III at 26– 27. At a subsequent pretrial conference, the district court revisited the hearsay issue. Clark once again argued the statements were not hearsay because they were being offered to show lack of knowledge and not their truth. He also argued that the statements were critical to the defense’s theory of the case – that Clark did not know he was a convicted felon. The district court rejected this argument and ruled: I think that’s the purpose of it being offered. And there’s obviously – the reason for it is because it’s an out-of-court statement for which there is no possibility to do cross- examination on. I mean, that’s the whole point of this and why it’s self-serving hearsay. I mean, the – because it allows him to put on this defense through a hearsay statement for which nobody can cross-examine him on. *** It’s self-serving hearsay. And without an exception[.] R. III at 77–78. At trial, the Government presented three witnesses. First, Officer Robertson testified to the circumstances leading to Clark’s arrest. Relevant 5 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 6 here, Officer Robertson testified that he asked Clark if he was a felon at the time of his arrest. Clark’s counsel then asked Officer Robertson how Clark responded. The Government objected, and the district court sustained the objection based on its prior ruling. Therefore, the jury never heard Clark’s statements where he denied having any felony convictions. Officer Robertson also testified that from his review of the records, he did not see any record to indicate that Clark had been to prison. Clark offered to stipulate that he in fact had an underlying felony conviction. But he contested having any knowledge of a prior felony conviction at the time he possessed the firearm and ammunition in question. The case then hinged on the state court records. So, the Government called Marc Dreyer, the third deputy clerk in the Tulsa County Clerk’s office. Dreyer testified about the various case documents and orders from Clark’s state case. Dreyer’s testimony included: (1) that Clark’s case number began with “CF” indicating the case concerned a felony, (2) that Clark waived his preliminary hearing, which only applies to felony charges, and (3) that Clark was represented by counsel and attended several hearings. The procedural history leading to Clark’s conviction was somewhat convoluted. For instance, Clark pled guilty in 2010, and the state court 6 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 7 entered an Order of Deferred Sentence. 4 Therefore, Clark was not yet convicted. Then, on June 6, 2011, Clark failed to report to the District Attorney’s Office as required by his probation terms. But his probation was reimposed, and he was still not convicted. Clark had several more violations, which required numerous court appearances. But it was not until a hearing on a violation of his conditions that occurred on September 30, 2011, that the state court imposed a suspended five-year sentence. At this point Clark became a convicted felon. Then, on December 15, 2011, he violated the terms of his supervision again, and he was sentenced to ninety days in custody for the violation. His supervision was also transferred to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. At no point did the state court inform Clark that he was convicted of a felony. In all, he served ninety days in custody following his probation violations. To explain the legal intricacies of these proceedings, and to prove Clark knew he was a felon, the Government relied on the state court docket sheet and case documents. But the paperwork underlying the conviction was riddled with mistakes. 4 Dreyer explained: “[a] deferred sentence is, in effect, a pause in the middle of the prosecution that allows the defendant, if he completes the terms of the deferment, to avoid being convicted of a felony.” R. III at 192. Thus, although Oklahoma refers to a “deferred sentence,” no conviction or sentence, in the traditional sense, has been imposed. 7 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 8 For instance, the guilty plea form, also known as a Lumpkin form in Oklahoma, which explains the charges against a defendant and the consequences of entering a guilty plea, had a blank page and no mention of “felony.” Of note, the question “what is the charges to which the defendant is entering a plea today?” was blank. R. III at 241. And the section delineating the range of punishment was not filled out. The Order of Deferred Sentence, which also identified the charge but was not yet a conviction, could only be viewed at the court clerk’s office. There was no evidence that Clark saw this document. Lastly, the state court Judgment and Sentence, which finalized the felony conviction, was also only accessible at the clerk’s office. As the Judgment and Sentence was created days after the hearing, there is no record that Clark received that document. And at the hearing, the state court judge did not announce in open court that Clark was convicted and thus became a felon. The Government’s third and final witness was Jason Taylor, an assistant regional supervisor in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. Although Taylor was not responsible for Clark’s supervision, he testified that after Clark’s release in 2011, Clark signed probation documents acknowledging that he was under the supervision of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. 8 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 9 At the close of the Government’s case, Clark moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) based on insufficient evidence. The district court denied the motion finding that there was “substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” R. III at 333. Clark then called three witnesses of his own. First, Brian Rayl, the chief of the criminal division of the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office. Rayl testified about the plea infirmities and that Clark’s state defense counsel had a poor reputation. Next, Casey Reynolds and Yvonne House, secretaries of the Tulsa and Washington county election boards, testified that Clark registered to vote in Tulsa in 2020, was previously registered in 2009, and that he ran for office in Washington county in 2014. In doing so, he attested that he was not a convicted felon. That concluded the presentation of evidence, and Clark renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. During its closing argument, the Government highlighted the importance of the circumstantial evidence presented and the lack of direct evidence: Now, the judge just instructed you there are two ways to prove a defendant’s knowledge. You can prove it with direct evidence or you can prove it with circumstantial evidence. Now, direct evidence would be, for example, if when Officer Robertson pulled the gun out of the defendant’s pocket, the defendant said, “I am 9 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 10 a felon. I have a prior felony.” Of course, we don’t have a statement like that in this case. R. III at 446. The jury found Clark guilty. He was sentenced to fifteen months in custody and three years of supervised release. He timely appealed. II Clark brings three claims of error on appeal. He contends that the district court erred by excluding the three statements he made at the time of his arrest on hearsay grounds. Clark argues this error was not harmless because it prevented the jury from considering direct evidence of his knowledge and understanding of his criminal history. He also contends that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felon in possession. And, finally, he challenges the constitutionality of the criminal statute as applied to him, for preservation purposes only. We address each claim of error in turn. A Clark first challenges the district court’s evidentiary ruling excluding three statements, recorded on video by a bodycam, where he denied having any felony convictions at the time of his arrest. The district court excluded the statements reasoning that they were “self-serving hearsay” because they were made out of court and thus did not provide a possibility of cross 10 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 11 examination of Clark regarding his statements. R. III at 78. Clark argues the statements were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but instead were offered to show Clark’s subjective belief or knowledge of his status (or not) as a felon. And, he argues, whether a statement is “self-serving” does not influence the hearsay analysis. “[W]e review district court determinations on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion[.]” United States v. Channon, 881 F.3d 806, 810 (10th Cir. 2018). Hearsay determinations are afforded an even “more deferential review.” Id. “A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (citation omitted). When a successful challenge to a hearsay ruling rests solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court applies a harmless error standard of review. United States v. Collins, 575 F.3d 1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A harmless error is one that does not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial; nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Collins, 575 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 11 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 12 801(c)). The matter asserted “is the fact being asserted by the declarant in uttering the statement[,]” and may not be “the matter that the party offering the statement into evidence is trying to prove with the statement.” United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010). Statements not offered for their truth are thus not hearsay, and do not require an inquiry into hearsay exceptions. See Kenneth S. Broun, Jasmine E. Harris, Edward J. Imwinkelried, David H. Kaye & Kit Kinports, 2 McCormick On Evidence § 246 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 9th ed. 2025). To obtain a conviction under the felon in possession statute, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark knew that he was prohibited from lawfully possessing a firearm due to his status as a felon. See Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 230–31 (2019). With that in mind, Clark sought to introduce the statements to illustrate what he knew and believed – regarding his felon status – at the time he possessed a firearm and ammunition. We first apply the hearsay definition to Clark’s statements. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Clark made three statements: (1) “I ain’t got no drugs felony possession,” (2) “They dropped that, I have the proof on my phone. It was dismissed,” and (3) “The case was dismissed. . . . That’s not the case.” R. I at 142; R. III at 72–73. To be offered for their truth, Clark must have sought to use the statements to prove that he did not have a felony drug possession 12 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 13 conviction, that his state charges were dropped or dismissed, or that he had proof on his phone. But Clark did not offer the statements for those purposes. Rather, Clark offered the statements to support his belief that he did not know he was a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms. To that end, Clark did not dispute at trial that he was in fact a convicted felon. Instead, Clark disputed having knowledge of his status as a felon. Nevertheless, the district court excluded these statements because they were “self-serving hearsay . . . without an exception” and “for which nobody can cross-examine [Clark] on.” R. III at 77–78. This conclusion was erroneous. Certain statements, even when made or uttered out of court, can be admissible if they are not hearsay. This is a distinct inquiry from whether a statement is hearsay but still admissible under a hearsay exception. Here, there was no need to search for hearsay exceptions because the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and therefore did not fit the definition of hearsay from the outset. And whether a statement is “self-serving” is not part of the hearsay calculus at all. Statements that go directly to a person’s knowledge or belief are not hearsay when they are not offered for their truth. United States v. Ibisevic, 675 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1090 (10th Cir. 2001) (“It is 13 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 14 true that an out-of-court statement may be admitted over a hearsay objection if the statement is offered not for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement but merely to show that a party had knowledge of a material fact or issue.” (citations omitted)). By way of example, in United States v. Ibisevic, the defendant appealed his convictions arising from his attempt to travel internationally without reporting the correct amount of cash in his possession to customs authorities. 675 F.3d at 344. Ibisevic argued that his initial failure to report the correct amount of cash stemmed from his difficulty understanding English. Id. at 347–48. Ibisevic challenged the district court’s exclusion of his mother’s testimony. Id. at 349. His mother was present when he was stopped by customs and would have testified that at the time Ibisevic was questioned by officers, he told her that the agents asked for the insurance value of their checked luggage. Id. at 347. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s evidentiary ruling was erroneous because the excluded statement was not offered “‘to prove the truth of the matter asserted,’ i.e., that he was actually being asked the value of his checked luggage. Rather, he offered it ‘merely to prove that he expressed his belief’ that he was being asked about the value of his luggage.” Id. at 349 (citation modified). Under the circumstances, the statement was not hearsay. 14 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 15 Similarly, Clark did not seek to admit his statements into evidence to prove that he was not a convicted felon. Instead, he offered the statements to show that he believed he was not a felon when he possessed a firearm and ammunition. In other words, he did not know of his prohibited status. Because Clark’s statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead to show his knowledge or lack thereof, the statements were not hearsay. Cf. United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 330–31 (5th Cir. 1984) (statement offered to infer knowledge rather than for its truth was not hearsay); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 294–95 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2023) (statement offered to show belief was not hearsay). The district court erred in excluding Clark’s proffered testimony. B Having found error in the exclusion of Clark’s three statements, we must now determine whether the district court’s error was harmless. “A non-constitutional error, such as a decision whether to admit or exclude evidence, is considered harmless ‘unless a substantial right of [a] party is affected.’” United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). A party’s substantial rights are affected when the error “had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had 15 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 16 such effect.” United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). In making this determination, we review “the record as a whole de novo to evaluate whether the error was harmless, examining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted [or excluded] evidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted evidence.” United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1067 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation modified); see also United States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d 1178, 1204 (10th Cir. 2020). “The burden is on the government to establish the harmlessness of any error.” United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The Government made no harmless error argument in this appeal, as it wholly failed to include any mention of this analysis in its brief to this court. Accordingly, it has failed to carry its burden. See United States v. Yarbrough, 527 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2008). Even if this court were to exercise its discretion to proceed with harmless error review, 5 the district court’s error was not harmless. The excluded statements were direct evidence of the only element of the charged offense that was at issue during trial. The importance of these statements 5 This court has discretion to engage in harmless error review in appropriate cases, even if the government waives the argument. United States v. McFadden, 116 F.4th 1069, 1094 (10th Cir. 2024). 16 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 17 is underscored by the Government’s closing statement. In closing, the Government highlighted the lack of direct evidence, pointing out that there were no statements by Clark speaking to the knowledge-of-status element. Although it is undisputed that Clark was a felon, whether he knew of his status at the relevant time is heavily contested. This left the excluded statements that expressed his belief he did not know of his felon status on the one hand, and the state court documents from which to infer knowledge on the other. Given the centrality of the statements to the ultimate question of guilt, and in light of the series of inferences required to find guilt through the remaining documentary evidence, we cannot say Clark’s substantial rights were not affected. Cf. Yarbrough, 527 F.3d at 1100–03 (substantial rights were affected when district court excluded “important evidence relevant to a sharply controverted question going to the heart of [defendant’s] defense[.]”); Ibisevic, 675 F.3d at 354. At the very least, it leaves us “in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” Roach, 582 F.3d at 1207 (quotation omitted). Because the district court’s error prevented the jury from considering the only direct evidence supporting Clark’s defense, his substantial rights were affected, and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse Clark’s conviction. 17 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 18 C Although we have reversed Clark’s conviction, we must still consider his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. That is because “[i]f the evidence [was] insufficient to convict, the government could not retry” him. See United States v. Spradley, 146 F.4th 949, 962–63 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). In the district court, Clark twice moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which was denied. Clark argues that the Government did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm and ammunition. “We review legal sufficiency of evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Kaspereit, 994 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Wagner, 951 F.3d 1232, 1255 (10th Cir. 2020)). “[W]e may reverse only if no rational trier of fact” could have found the government met its burden of proof. United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Ramos-Arenas, 596 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis added). 18 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 19 Clark was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Again, and in relevant part, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark knew of his status as a felon. 6 Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 227–231. Put another way, the Government had to establish that Clark knew he was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in custody at the time he possessed the gun. Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 505–06 (2021). To prove that Clark had knowledge of his felony conviction, the Government primarily relied on the testimony of Marc Dreyer, the third deputy in the Tulsa County Clerk’s Office. Dreyer’s testimony purported to explain what Clark should have known from (1) the state court docket sheet, (2) the state court guilty plea form, and (3) the state court orders. First, Clark entered a guilty plea in 2010, at which time the state court withheld a finding of guilt, placed Clark under the district attorney’s supervision, and deferred sentencing for five years. Clark did not become a convicted felon when he entered his guilty plea. Clark then had several 6 The parties stipulated to the interstate commerce element, and Clark conceded that his prior conviction was for an underlying felony and that he did knowingly possess the firearm and ammunition. Thus, only one element – whether Clark had knowledge of his felon status – was contested at trial. 19 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 20 hearings over multiple dates to accelerate his sentence for failing to comply with his conditions of supervision. But it was not until a hearing in September 2011 that Clark was officially convicted, and the state court imposed a suspended five-year sentence. As best we can tell, there was no pronouncement by the court at that hearing that Clark was at that point convicted of a felony offense. 7 Indeed, nothing changed when Clark became a convicted felon; he was not immediately required to serve any time in custody, and his conditions of supervision remained the same. Later, in December 2011, after Clark violated the conditions of his supervision, the state court ordered Clark to serve ninety days in the Tulsa County jail. 7 The dissent points to a statement made by the prosecutor in open court with Clark and his counsel present that, “[i]t’s the State’s position that unfortunately Mr. Clark is the only one refusing to help keep us from making him a convicted felon at this time” and requesting Clark’s conviction be accelerated. Dissent at 6–7 (citing Supp. R. I at 76). In the dissent’s view, this supports a reasonable inference that Clark knew he became a felon. Id. at 7. But the statement was the prosecutor’s request, not a pronouncement by the court. Indeed, in “adopt[ing] the prosecutor’s recommendation” the court did not mirror the prosecution’s language, nor did it state Clark was now a felon. Id. at 7; Supp. R. I at 80. Our point remains that the court never pronounced Clark to be a convicted felon at any point during the multitude of court hearings. 20 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 21 The documentary evidence had many flaws varying in importance. 8 For instance, the “Order of Deferred Sentence,” misstated the offense: “Possession of Controlled Frug.” R. III at 223, 225; Supp. R. I at 32. The Order of Deferred Sentence, which was entered days after Clark’s first court appearance, did identify the charge as a felony. But the document was only accessible at the county clerk’s office, and in any event, Clark was not convicted when this order was entered. More importantly, the Lumpkin form had a blank page and no mention of “felony.” The question “what is the charges to which the defendant is entering a plea today?” was blank. R. III at 241. And the section delineating the range of punishment was not filled out. As for the Judgment and Sentence, which accurately reflected the 8 The dissent takes issue with our characterization that the documentary evidence had many mistakes, while we only point to two as examples. Dissent at 8. The two mistakes are highlighted because they represent the range of the collective errors – small (“frug”) and big (critical blank page) – and undermine the reliability of the case documents in the totality. But other mistakes existed too. The preliminary hearing form and the Order of Deferred Sentence had different variations of Clark’s name. R. III at 220–21 (Kelly Lamar Clark versus Prophet Kelly Clark). The guilty plea form also appeared to incorrectly answer questions beyond the blank second page. On the first page, the question “[d]oes the State move to dismiss or amend any case(s) or count(s) in the information or on page 2 of the information?” was marked “yes” but the follow up, “[i]f so, set forth the cases/counts dismissed or amended” was not filled out. R. III at 239–40; Supp. R. I at 37. Similarly, the third page had a question about the defendant’s understanding of the plea agreement, which was hard to read and understand based on the handwriting and abbreviations used. And question thirty-one on the third page, which was to be answered “if [] entering a plea to a felony offense,” was also left blank. Supp. R. I at 39. 21 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 22 conviction, it was similarly inaccessible to Clark, and there is no evidence that he ever saw or possessed the judgment. In all, the Government’s evidence required the jury to draw inferences about whether Clark knew that he became a felon at some point in the process. In our analysis, “we do not give the government the benefit of every potential inference but rather, only those inferences reasonably and logically flowing from the other evidence adduced at trial.” United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d 250, 258 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). In Clark’s case, there was no other evidence. Of course, there are some cases in which the fact of the conviction may be sufficient to prove the knowledge-of-status element. This is because a person “ordinarily knows he is a felon.” Greer, 593 U.S. at 508. But records establishing a prior conviction are sufficient evidence only when supported by something more. See id. at 518 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Standing alone, the fact of a prior felony conviction is hardly enough[.]”). Take United States v. Sjodin, for example. There, Sjodin served a prior sentence of eight years, stipulated that the underlying conviction was a felony, and the government presented records of the prior conviction. 139 F.4th 1188, 1201 (10th Cir. 2025). On appeal, Sjodin also challenged the knowledge-of-status element. Id. We held that this evidence was “more than 22 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 23 enough for a factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sjodin knew of his prohibited status at the time he possessed the rifle.” Id. That is because, since Sjodin was imprisoned for eight years in relation to his crime, it logically followed that he knew the prior conviction led to a prison term exceeding one year. Id. But that is not Clark’s situation. At the onset of his state court criminal process, he entered a guilty plea with the understanding that he was not yet convicted. The records surrounding the guilty plea process were riddled with mistakes and left critical information blank. Ultimately, Clark served ninety days total in custody. Ninety days is well short of a year, and unlike Sjodin, the length of incarceration here cannot support the knowledge-of-status element. Thus, the jury had to infer that Clark obtained this knowledge at some other point in the proceedings through records. “An inference is unreasonable if it requires the jury ‘to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its findings a guess or mere possibility.’” United States v. Goldesberry, 128 F.4th 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted). Here, the jury had to assume that after Clark entered his guilty plea in 2010, where he was told he was not convicted, he was then at some point told his deferred sentence became a conviction. There was no direct evidence presented to the jury that this fact 23 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 24 was ever communicated to Clark. To reach this conclusion, the jury had to draw a series of inferences. First, the jury had to rely on the possibility that Clark saw the Judgment and Sentence, entered days after his court appearance. Second, the possibility that he understood that although the state court reimposed his probation in September 2011 and all conditions remained the same, he was now a felon. Third, the possibility that he understood his ninety-day sentence, imposed at a different time from his conviction, was for the underlying conviction rather than for violating his supervision conditions, as he was told. Finally, although his sentence was for ninety days, the possibility he knew his sentence could have exceeded one year. The dissent correctly reminds us that “we must draw inferences in favor of the Government.” Dissent at 9. The dissent concludes that “the inferences here are reasonable and derive from statements made . . . and documents considered at multiple court proceedings” and are unaffected by the “imperfections” in the state court records. Id. at 8–9. But to be reasonable, such inferences cannot require the jury to engage in pure speculation. Goldesberry, 128 F.4th at 1192. Again, the documentary evidence was the Government’s key to establishing Clark’s knowledge. When critical parts of the documentary evidence do not provide information as to Clark’s knowledge and understanding at the time, even when 24 Appellate Case: 25-5141 Document: 51 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 25 prompted to do so by standardized forms, the universe of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence is significantly reduced. Especially when, as here, the Government does not point to any part of the record indicating the state court informed Clark he was charged with or con