United States v. Jones

Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 23, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 24-5034 (D.C. Nos. 4:20-CV-00202-CVE-CDL & DAROWE JUNIOR JONES, 4:18-CR-00128-CVE-1) (N.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________ Before TYMKOVICH, ROSSMAN, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Darowe Junior Jones, proceeding pro se, filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court dismissed it in part as an unauthorized 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and denied it in part on the merits. Mr. Jones now appeals. To the extent Mr. Jones challenges the district court’s dismissal, he must obtain a certificate of appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring a COA to appeal a final order entered in a § 2255 proceeding). But he has not made the requisite * This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 2 showing, so we deny a COA. We otherwise exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court’s judgment. I Mr. Jones is serving a 211-month sentence for gun and drug offenses. We upheld his convictions and sentence, United States v. Jones, 802 F. App’x 325, 330 (10th Cir. 2020), and the district court denied his § 2255 motion. Mr. Jones then filed a motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), claiming he had “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to reduce his sentence. He argued: 1) his sentence was based on drug quantities wrongfully attributed to him in his presentence investigation report, rather than proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013); 2) his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) violated the Second Amendment and Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023), vacated and remanded, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (2024); and 3) there were unwarranted sentencing disparities between his sentence and the sentences of other defendants convicted of similar crimes. The district court construed the first two arguments as substantive challenges to Mr. Jones’ convictions and sentence, which must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Wesley, 60 F.4th 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[A]n 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion may not be based on claims specifically governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255”). Because Mr. Jones had already filed a § 2255 motion, and had not obtained our authorization to bring a second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court dismissed this portion of his motion for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. 2  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 3 Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In order to file a second or . . . successive § 2255 motion, a petitioner must first move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to hear the motion.”). The district court denied Mr. Jones’ third argument on the merits, concluding it did not provide a basis for compassionate release. 1 Mr. Jones appealed. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the dispositive issue governing Mr. Jones’ first two arguments: “Whether a combination of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Fernandez v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025). We abated this case pending a decision in Fernandez. The Supreme Court in Fernandez has since ruled “[a] prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not 18 U.S.C. § 3582.” 146 S. Ct. 1292, 1298 (2026). We lifted the abatement and now take up the appeal. 1 Mr. Jones contends his first two arguments were not ripe when he filed his § 2255 motion. But Apprendi and Alleyne were decided years before he was sentenced in 2019, and although Range had not yet been decided, Mr. Jones does not explain why, even without these cases, he would have been unable to challenge the constitutionality of either his sentence or his § 922(g) convictions in his § 2255 motion. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588-89 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that nothing prevented a habeas petitioner from making an argument before the Supreme Court resolved the issue in a different case). 3  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 4 II Mr. Jones’ challenge to the dismissal of his first two arguments requires that he obtain a COA to appeal. See Wesley, 60 F.4th at 1279-80 (requiring a COA to appeal the dismissal of a § 3582(c) motion as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion); see also Harper, 545 F.3d at 1233 (construing a motion styled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion and holding that “dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion is a final order in a proceeding under [§] 2255 such that § 2253 requires [a prisoner] to obtain a COA before he or she may appeal”). To obtain a COA, Mr. Jones must show “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). That is, he must show it is reasonably debatable that the district court correctly construed his first two arguments as seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his convictions or sentence under § 2255. See Wesley, 60 F.4th at 1280. 2 As we explain, he cannot make this showing. 2 On appeal, Mr. Jones repeats, verbatim, the same merits arguments he asserted in the district court. Compare Aplt. Opening Br. at 20-30 with R. vol II at 682-96. This approach fails to directly address the governing standards of review or explain why the district court mistakenly characterized the relevant portions of his motion. See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 555 F.3d 1182, 1186 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting plaintiffs’ appellate brief, which was a verbatim copy of their summary judgment response, “inherently fail[ed] to address in a direct way the decision under review and, as a result, [did] not effectively come to grips with the district court’s analysis of the deficiencies in their case”). 4  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 5 1. Drug Quantities Mr. Jones first challenged his sentence under Apprendi and Alleyne. Those cases generally hold that any fact used to increase a defendant’s prescribed penalty must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476; Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103. Mr. Jones contended his sentence was based on drug quantities attributed to him in the presentence investigation report, rather than proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, so Apprendi and Alleyne required resentencing. This argument confirms the relief Mr. Jones was seeking implicated § 2255. “It is the relief sought, not [the] pleading’s title, that determines whether the pleading is a § 2255 motion.” United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006). “Challenges close to the core of habeas corpus must be brought . . . under the specific federal habeas statute . . . designed to provide the means for a . . . prisoner to attack the validity of his confinement.” Fernandez, 146 S. Ct. at 1301 (internal quotation marks omitted). A § 2255 motion seeks to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. See Wesley, 60 F.4th at 1281. “If a federal prisoner ‘claims the right to be released upon the ground that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,’ [§ 2255] allows him to ‘move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (brackets and ellipsis omitted)). Mr. Jones should have invoked § 2255 because that is the specific federal statute designed to provide the relief he requested: resentencing based on an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, consistent with Alleyne and Apprendi. But he invoked § 3582(c), 5  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 6 which “permits prisoners to seek compassionate release” based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Fernandez, 146 S. Ct. at 1300 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court recently explained, § 3582(c) is “focus[ed] on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs.” Id. at 1303. To obtain compassionate release, a § 3582(c) movant must demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling reasons that might warrant an early release from prison—age, illness, a child left with no guardian— [circumstances that] bear no resemblance to the grounds for relief under § 2255.” Id. at 1304. After Fernandez, it is not reasonably debatable that, to seek resentencing based on alleged constitutional error, Mr. Jones had to proceed under § 2255 not § 3582(c). We therefore deny a COA on Mr. Jones’ drug-quantity challenge. 2. Felon in Possession Convictions Mr. Jones next challenged his convictions for being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He argued his convictions were invalid under the Second Amendment and Range. The district court determined this argument was a collateral attack on the validity of Mr. Jones’ firearms conviction and therefore must be brought under § 2255. That conclusion, too, is not reasonably debatable. “Collateral attacks on federal convictions are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Fernandez, 146 S. Ct. at 1300. “Whether a prisoner’s request for relief challenges a conviction turns on the nature of the arguments presented.” Id. at 1305. “[T]he supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the extraordinary and compelling reasons that justify compassionate release” under § 3582(c). Id. at 1302. 6  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 7 Mr. Jones argued his § 922(g) convictions violated the Second Amendment based on Range. He did not claim, for example, that his age or some severe illness constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying his early release from prison. Rather, he focused solely on the legal question of the constitutionality of § 922(g) under Range. This argument confirms § 3582(c) was not the proper vehicle for the relief sought. After Fernandez, reasonable jurists would not debate the dismissal of Mr. Jones’ challenge to his § 922(g) convictions. 3 3. Sentencing Disparities Last, Mr. Jones sought compassionate release based on sentencing disparities among defendants convicted of similar offenses. The district court considered this argument on its merits and concluded it did not support granting compassionate release. On this issue, Mr. Jones does not need a COA to appeal. We thus proceed to review the merits of the district court’s decision. A district court may grant compassionate release, if 1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction; 2) a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission, and 3 Mr. Jones resists this conclusion, contending the district court should have warned him of the procedural implications of recharacterizing this portion of his motion as seeking relief under § 2255. In support, he relies on Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), but that case does not help him. Castro requires courts to warn a pro se litigant of the implications of recharacterizing a pleading as a first § 2255 motion and allow the litigant an opportunity to withdraw or amend it. See id. at 377. But Castro does not apply here, where a litigant has already filed a § 2255 motion, see Nelson, 465 F.3d at 1149 (“[T]he reason for this restriction on recharacterization does not apply where, as in this case, [the litigant] previously filed a § 2255 [motion].”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 8 3) the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support a reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 941 (10th Cir. 2021). District courts have authority to determine whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction. United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 832 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1332 (2026). We review the denial of compassionate release for an abuse of discretion, which occurs, for example, when the district court relies on an incorrect legal conclusion or a clearly erroneous factual finding. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). Mr. Jones argued he received a higher sentence than “those comparable offenders who have been sentenced following the passage of the First Step Act.” R. vol. II at 693. “[T]he First Step Act of 2018 . . . [is] a landmark piece of legislation that changed the federal criminal-sentencing system in numerous respects.” Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1327 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Among other things, before the First Step Act, “a defendant convicted of two § 924(c) counts was subject to a mandatory 25-year sentence of imprisonment for the second offense that would be ‘stacked’ upon—that is, run consecutively to—the first offense’s mandatory penalty.” Id. at 1326. The First Step Act eliminated “§ 924(c)’s 25-year stacking requirement for first- time offenders: A 25-year consecutive sentence is now required only for a violation that occurs after a prior conviction under [§ 924(c)] has become final.” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). 8  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 9 Mr. Jones argued that, under Maumau, United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Va. 2020), he should get a sentence reduction, apparently because he had been convicted under § 924(c). 4 In Maumau, Owens, and Redd, the defendants sought to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction based, in part, on sentencing disparities created by the “stacking” provision in § 924(c). See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 824; Owens, 996 F.3d at 756-58; Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 722-23. But unlike those defendants, Mr. Jones has only one § 924(c) conviction for which he was sentenced after passage of the First Step Act, so he was not subject to the former stacking regime. Accordingly, on the record before us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Jones failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. III We deny a COA and dismiss this matter to the extent Mr. Jones sought to appeal the dismissal of his first two claims that 1) his sentence was based on drug quantities that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and 2) his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was unconstitutional. We affirm the denial of 4 Mr. Jones also cited other cases for the proposition that courts may consider sentencing disparities among comparably situated defendants. The district court interpreted Mr. Jones’s citations as raising a separate, undeveloped argument comparing himself to his co-defendants. At any rate, affording Mr. Jones’s pro se brief a liberal construction, we construe his citations as generally supporting his argument comparing himself to all “comparable offenders who have been sentenced following the passage of the First Step Act.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 28. 9  Appellate Case: 24-5034 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 10/23/2026 Page: 10 compassionate release based on Mr. Jones’ third claim that the nonretroactive changes to § 924(c)’s anti-stacking regime created unwarranted sentencing disparities. Entered for the Court Veronica S. Rossman Circuit Judge 10