Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 17, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 25-2124 DANIEL JESUS TRUJILLO, a/k/a Jesus Trujillo, a/k/a Daniel Baca, a/k/a David Coche, a/k/a Edward Baca, a/k/a Manuel Trujillo, Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:24-CR-00242-MLG-1) _________________________________ J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. James R.W. Braun, Assistant United States Attorney (Todd Blanche, Attorney General, and Ryan Ellison, First Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. _________________________________ Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 2 This appeal raises a sentencing issue that our court has not previously considered. A New Mexico statute credits the time a defendant has spent on probation pre-revocation against his maximum sentence. In this way, the probation is credited like incarceration. We must decide what effect the probation credit has on our calculation of the “sentence imposed” under § 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. That section covers illegal-reentry offenses and provides a scale of offense-level enhancements for felony convictions occurring before the illegal reentry. Section 4A1.2(b), incorporated by § 2L1.2, defines “sentence imposed” as the maximum sentence for the defendant’s earlier felony conviction minus any suspended time. So in applying the sentencing guidelines—and particularly § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A)—to resolve this appeal, we need look no further than the New Mexico court’s sentencing order for Daniel Trujillo’s consecutive sentences for three state felony convictions (armed robbery with a deadly weapon, 9 years; conspiracy to commit armed robbery, 3 years; and bribery of a witness, 3 years). The sentencing orders tell us the two things we need to know to decide this appeal under the sentencing guidelines: (1) the maximum sentence was 15 years, and (2) the total “not suspended” time was almost 6 years (2,188 days). Because the not-suspended time exceeds 5 years, the district court was correct to impose the 10-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 2 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 3 BACKGROUND I. The Prosecution In February 2024, a grand jury sitting in the District of New Mexico indicted Trujillo with a single count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). 1 The indictment alleged that Trujillo had knowingly entered and been found in New Mexico “contrary to law in that the defendant had been previously deported, excluded and removed and departed from the United States on or about August 11, 2021, while an Order of Exclusion, Deportation and Removal was outstanding.” R. vol. I at 14. In May 2024, without a plea agreement, Trujillo pleaded guilty to the charged offense. In June 2005, Trujillo was first ordered removed or deported from the United States to Mexico. That deportation came after his 2004 New Mexico felony conviction for armed robbery with a deadly weapon. In January 2023, after committing more illegal reentries and crimes, Trujillo threatened a neighbor in New Mexico with a knife and tried to run him over with his car. The authorities found Trujillo’s damaged car with a live shotgun shell inside it, but no Trujillo. Months later, in November 2023, Trujillo resurfaced as part of a traffic stop and was arrested. The instant illegal-reentry charge followed. Trujillo was deported in 2011 and again in 2021. It is unclear when he 1 returned to the United States. 3 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 4 II. The length of a prior felony’s “sentence imposed” helps set the total offense level for illegal reentry. Section 2L1.2 of the federal sentencing guidelines applies to Trujillo’s conviction for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). At issue is one specific offense characteristic included in Trujillo’s sentencing calculations. Under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A), the district court imposed a 10-level enhancement based on Trujillo’s New Mexico armed-robbery conviction after determining that its associated “sentence imposed” exceeded 5 years. The guidelines set a roadmap for calculating the “sentence imposed” for § 2L1.2(b)’s purposes. The journey begins with § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A), which reads as follows: If, before the defendant was ordered deported or ordered removed from the United States for the first time, the defendant engaged in criminal conduct that, at any time, resulted in—(A) a conviction for a felony offense (other than an illegal reentry offense) for which the sentence imposed was five years or more, increase by 10 levels . . . . U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (emphasis added). As seen next, § 2L1.2’s commentary incorporates Chapter 4 of the sentencing guidelines in defining “sentence imposed”: “Sentence Imposed” has the meaning given the term “sentence of imprisonment” in Application Note 2 and subsection (b) of § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History). The length of the sentence imposed includes any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release, regardless of when the revocation occurred. 4 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 5 Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2. In turn, § 4A1.2(b) defines “sentence of imprisonment” this way: (b) Sentence of Imprisonment Defined (1) The term “sentence of imprisonment” means a sentence of incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence imposed. (2) If part of a sentence of imprisonment was suspended, “sentence of imprisonment” refers only to the portion that was not suspended. Id. § 4A1.2(b)(1)–(2). Finally, because the § 2L1.2 commentary references it, we quote Application Note 2 of § 4A1.2: Sentence of Imprisonment.—To qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence (or, if the defendant escaped, would have served time). See § 4A1.2(a)(3) and (b)(2). For the purposes of applying § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), the length of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated maximum (e.g., in the case of a determinate sentence of five years, the stated maximum is five years; in the case of an indeterminate sentence of one to five years, the stated maximum is five years; in the case of an indeterminate sentence for a term not to exceed five years, the stated maximum is five years; in the case of an indeterminate sentence for a term of not to exceed the defendant’s twenty-first birthday, the stated maximum is the amount of time in pre-trial detention, plus the amount of time between the date of sentence and the defendant’s twenty-first birthday). That is, criminal history points are based on the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served. See § 4A1.2(b)(1) and (2). A sentence of probation is to be treated as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) unless a condition of probation requiring imprisonment of at least sixty days was imposed. Id. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2. As seen, when a prisoner has actually served a term of imprisonment, as Trujillo did twice, the result is a “sentence of imprisonment.” In contrast, 5 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 6 where a defendant receives a sentence of probation, the defendant simply has a “prior sentence”: “A conviction for which the imposition or execution of sentence was totally suspended or stayed shall be counted as a prior sentence under § 4A1.1(c).” Id. The commentary provides that “[a] sentence of probation is to be treated as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) unless a condition of probation requiring imprisonment of at least sixty days was imposed.” Id. III. The Sentencing A. Trujillo was convicted of an aggravated felony before he was first deported in 2005. In 2004, Trujillo was convicted in New Mexico for armed robbery with a deadly weapon. 2 The guidelines dispute now at issue depends on the length— under § 2L1.2(b)(2)—of the “sentence imposed” for this conviction. The state court originally sentenced Trujillo to 15 years’ imprisonment, crediting him with 712 days of presentence confinement against that maximum and suspending the remainder. So the § 4A1.2(b)(2) “not-suspended” time was originally 712 days, far less than § 2L1.2(b)(2)’s 5-year threshold. The state court imposed a term of probation of 3 years and 20 days. For 746 days, Trujillo complied with his probation conditions but then absconded as a fugitive. After Trujillo was apprehended, the state court revoked his probation. In accordance with a governing New Mexico statute, the Trujillo was convicted of (1) armed robbery, (2) conspiracy to commit 2 armed robbery, and (3) bribery of a witness. 6 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 7 state court credited against Trujillo’s maximum sentence the 746 days of successfully completed probation. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-15(B). After subtracting 1,458 days (712 days served and 746 days successfully completed on probation) from the 15-year (5,475-day) maximum sentence imposed, the court had 4,017 days remaining. From the remaining time, the court imposed an additional 730 days’ imprisonment for the probation violation, leaving 3,287 days suspended, this time subject to a 5-year probationary term. So under § 4A1.2(b)(2), 2,188 days (almost 6 years) of Trujillo’s 15-year sentence was not suspended. As explained below, that information resolves this appeal. B. The probation office recommends a 10-level enhancement. After Trujillo pleaded guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b), the probation office prepared a presentence report (PSR). Under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A), as quoted above, the PSR recommended a 10-offense-level enhancement, because the “sentence imposed” for his armed-robbery conviction exceeded 5 years. Based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of V, Trujillo’s advisory guidelines range was 70 to 87 months. C. The parties’ requests diverge at sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the government requested 87 months’ imprisonment. Trujillo requested a downward variance to 22 months’ time served. After carefully listening to counsels’ arguments, the district court sentenced Trujillo to 70 months’ imprisonment. Trujillo timely appealed. 7 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 8 DISCUSSION On appeal, Trujillo argues that the district court procedurally erred by applying § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A)’s 10-level enhancement. He contends that the “sentence imposed” under that subsection for his armed-robbery-with-a-deadly- weapon conviction was less than 5 years and merited only an 8-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(B). Trujillo’s position is that the “sentence imposed” was less than 5 years because he spent less than 5 years incarcerated. We agree with him that his actual incarceration was less than 5 years (the 712 and 730 days referenced above). And we agree with him that New Mexico’s credit for successfully completed probation time isn’t incarceration time, but this latter fact doesn’t matter. As the government argues, the § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) enhancement applies even though Trujillo wasn’t incarcerated for more than 5 years. What matters under § 4A1.2(b)(2) is that the maximum sentence imposed (15 years) minus the suspended time is more than 5 years. We affirm. 3 3 Trujillo’s New Mexico sentences are at the heart of this appeal. The parties didn’t introduce the combined state-sentencing orders as an exhibit at the sentencing hearing, likely because Trujillo didn’t object to the 10-level enhancement in the district court. And the parties did not make the state- sentencing orders part of the record in this federal appeal. Instead, Trujillo attached them to his reply brief, noting “[t]he PSR accurately reflects the orders” and “we may exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of publicly- filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.” Reply Br. at 1 n.1 (quoting United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007)). The government hasn’t objected to Trujillo’s production of the orders, nor has it (footnote continued) 8 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 9 I. Procedural Reasonableness A. Standard of Review “When a party challenges a sentence for procedural reasonableness, our standard of review is ordinarily abuse of discretion, under which we review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the guidelines and review its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012). When we review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we consider “whether the district court committed any error in calculating or explaining the sentence.” United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239, 1248 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). “A miscalculation in the Guidelines range runs the risk of affecting the ultimate sentence regardless of whether the court ultimately imposes a sentence within or outside that range.” United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). Trujillo’s procedural-unreasonableness claim is that the district court improperly applied § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A)’s 10-level enhancement. As explained below, we disagree. Because Trujillo did not preserve his procedural claim below, he must show plain error to prevail. Id.; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To satisfy this standard, Trujillo must prove that (1) the district court committed an error; (2) the error is “plain,” meaning clear or obvious, under the law; and (3) the challenged the substance of the orders as authentic. We accept Trujillo’s informal request to take judicial notice of the New Mexico sentencing orders. 9 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 10 error affected his substantial rights. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d at 1258. If proven, we may “correct the error if (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). B. Interpreting the Guidelines We review the “Guidelines according to accepted rules of statutory construction.” United States v. Tony, 121 F.4th 56, 61–62 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). “As with general statutory interpretation, our analysis must begin with the language of the guidelines in question.” Id. at 62 (quoting United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001)). Guidelines commentary also governs “unless it runs afoul of the Constitution or a federal statute or is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline provision it interprets.” 4 United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795, 805 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). C. The “Sentence Imposed” for § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A)’s Purposes The New Mexico sentencing order for the armed-robbery conviction provides us the two things that matter under §§ 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) and 4A1.2(b)(2)—the maximum sentence is 15 years, and the suspended time is 3,287 days. We simply plug the time periods into § 4A1.2(b)(2). 4 The Supreme Court recently heard argument on the legal effect of guidelines commentary and the viability of Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). See Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343 (argued Oct. 13, 2026). 10 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 11 We honor the New Mexico court’s calculation of suspended and unsuspended time, which it reached by applying the state statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-15(B). New Mexico courts have interpreted this statute as requiring application of probation credit against deferred and suspended sentences on revocation. 5 State v. Reinhart, 439 P.2d 554, 557 (N.M. 1968); see also State v. Ordunez, 283 P.3d 282, 284 (N.M. 2012). Because Trujillo’s 15- year sentence was suspended, except for the 712 days he served in presentence confinement, the court credited him the 746 days he served on probation. When the court credited this time, it could no longer be suspended. In calculating § 4A1.2(b)(2)’s “sentence imposed,” we subtract the time the New Mexico court suspended (3,287 days) from the 15-year maximum term of imprisonment (5,475 days). That leaves as the “sentence imposed” for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) a period of 2,188 days not suspended, which exceeds 5 years. That means the district court correctly applied the 10-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A). In affirming, we also rely on sentencing-guidelines history. From November 2001 to November 2003, the commentary read this way: “If all or any part of a sentence of imprisonment was probated, suspended, deferred, or 5 This statute benefits New Mexico state defendants by limiting the amount of time that courts can suspend for probation violations. Giving credit for probation days successfully completed lowers the possible sentence for future violations. But increasing the time no longer available to be suspended— so the “not suspended” time—can lead to a higher enhancement under § 4A1.2(b)(2), as it does for Trujillo. 11 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 12 stayed, ‘sentence imposed’ refers only to the portion that was not probated, suspended, deferred, or stayed.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(iv) cmt. n.1 (emphasis added), amended by U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendment 658 (2003). If Trujillo’s federal sentencing had occurred in 2002, he would have likely prevailed in his appeal. But not after November 1, 2003. We affirm the district court’s sentence as procedurally reasonable. II. Substantive Reasonableness Trujillo next claims the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by failing to adequately consider mitigating factors. The government responds that Trujillo has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness given to in-range sentences. We again agree with the government. A. Standard of Review Even though he did not raise it below, we review Trujillo’s claim of substantive unreasonableness for abuse of discretion. That’s because “so long as the defendant did not invite the error in the district court, we do not require a defendant to object at sentencing to preserve a claim that the sentence length is substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th 1174, 1190 n.13 (10th Cir. 2025); accord United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). But “the defendant [must] have at least made the argument for a lower sentence before the district court.” United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 2007). Because Trujillo argued 12 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 13 for a lower sentence before the district court and now challenges the length of his sentence, we review his substantive-reasonableness claim for abuse of discretion. To determine the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, “we focus on whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1091 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), district courts must consider seven factors to ensure sentences are sufficient but not greater than necessary: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) “the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely (a) ‘just punishment’ (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, and (d) rehabilitation,” United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2017); (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established in the guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). We presume a sentence is reasonable if it falls within the advisory guidelines range. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). Though the district court does not need to weigh the § 3553(a) factors equally, we have cautioned against relying on a single factor too heavily. Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1093–94. But when a sentence falls within the guidelines range, a district court 13 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 14 need not discuss every § 3553(a) factor or every argument the parties make in favor of leniency at sentencing. United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1266 (10th Cir. 2014). We note that because Trujillo’s sentence was within his guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, “we must reject his claim of substantive unreasonableness unless he can overcome the presumption that the sentence was reasonable.” Id. at 1267. As we will explain, he has not overcome this presumption. B. The District Court’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Analysis Trujillo argues that the district court highlighted his criminal history without considering that much of it occurred in his youth. In support, he notes that the court said his criminal history was “the most significant consideration in this particular instance.” Opening Br. at 25 (quoting R. vol. III at 26). And he says the court did not try to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities because it did not meaningfully consider the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing Information data. But the district court discussed the mitigating factors and the § 3553(a) factors, too. Aware of the Judiciary Sentencing Information data presented to it, the court expressed concern that a time-served sentence would vary from other sentences in the district. The district court’s concern is consistent with our statement that “the national average doesn’t ordinarily shed light on substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Naranjo-Aguilar, 154 F.4th 1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1855 (2026). 14 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 15 The district court explained its concerns about Trujillo’s persistent and violent criminal history. Trujillo argued that he was no longer violent, but the court noted Trujillo’s violent encounter with his neighbor in 2023 that led to his illegal-reentry prosecution. Simply put, the court considered Trujillo’s asserted mitigating factors but settled on a low-end sentence. His criminal history was one reason why. We see no error. Trujillo “cites no authority for the proposition that merely because a sentencing court could have stated on the record how certain facts played into his decision-making process, the failure to do so renders the sentence substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion and reject Trujillo’s claim of substantive unreasonableness. CONCLUSION The district court did not err when it applied U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A)’s 10-level enhancement to Trujillo’s offense level. And the district court’s low-end sentence, which we presume was reasonable, was not substantively unreasonable. 6 6 For preservation purposes, Trujillo argues his sentence violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because his prior conviction was not treated as an element of his offense that needed to be proved to the jury. He contends “that the existence and timing of a prior aggravated felony conviction is an element of an aggravated offense defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1).” Opening Br. at 8. He claims because he was “only indicted for and only pleaded guilty to the simple form of the offense in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),” he cannot be punished under (footnote continued) 15 Appellate Case: 25-2124 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 16 We affirm. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Opening Br. at 8. Trujillo acknowledges that the Supreme Court has rejected this argument. Id. at 28–29 (citing Almendarez- Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 233–35 (1998)); see Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 837–38 (2024) (noting that Almendarez-Torres remains good law). Trujillo may preserve this issue for appeal under the plain-error standard, but we are bound by precedent to reject his argument. 16