State of Tennessee v. Jack Vigliotti

10/30/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs August 19, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JACK VIGLIOTTI Appeal from the Circuit Court for Campbell County No. 17859 John D. McAfee, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01360-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ A Tennessee Highway Patrol trooper cited the Defendant, Jack Vigliotti, for speeding in Campbell County, and the general sessions court clerk recorded a disposition of guilty after he paid the citation. The Defendant appealed to the Campbell County Circuit Court, which entered an order dismissing the case without explaining the basis for its ruling or stating whether it dismissed the appeal or the underlying charge. This appeal presents two threshold questions: (1) whether this court should waive the timely filing of the Defendant’s notice of appeal; and (2) whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s appeal from the general sessions court. Upon our review, we waive the timely filing requirement for the Defendant’s notice of appeal. However, because the record does not establish the nature of the general sessions court’s disposition or the basis for the circuit court’s dismissal, we cannot determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the Defendant’s appeal or whether its dismissal was proper. Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the circuit court’s order of dismissal and remand the case for the circuit court to determine its jurisdiction, enter appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and conduct any further necessary proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated; Case Remanded TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined. Jack Vigliotti, Syracuse, New York, Pro Se. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; and William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND On July 7, 2024, a Tennessee Highway Patrol trooper cited the Defendant, a resident of Syracuse, New York, for speeding in Campbell County. The citation charged him with violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-152 and directed him to appear in the Campbell County General Sessions Court on September 26, 2024. On October 9, 2024, the Defendant paid $298.00 to the general sessions court clerk by cashier’s check. Although the Defendant maintains that he paid the citation under protest to reinstate his driver’s license following a suspension for failing to appear, the court’s record reflects a disposition of guilty upon payment in full. The record also contains a request, dated that same day, to withdraw the failure-to-appear entry because the court had been satisfied. The Defendant then sought to appeal. In an undated letter, the circuit court clerk responded to his request for information and advised that he could file an appeal through the Campbell County Circuit Court. The letter identified October 9, 2024, as the date he paid the citation in full. The Defendant prepared a handwritten notice of appeal to the circuit court. In it, he asserts that he did not receive the general sessions court’s decision until October 16, 2024, and that this date should control the time for his appeal. The notice states that he mailed it on October 23, 2024, and the circuit court clerk filed it on October 29, 2024. The next day, the circuit court entered an order allowing the Defendant to proceed as an indigent party. The clerk also notified him that his appeal “has been late-filed” and that the court had set the case for a hearing in December 2024. The circuit court’s rule docket lists a motion for an extension of time to appeal among the Defendant’s initial filings, but it reflects no ruling on that motion. -2-  Before the December hearing, the Defendant moved to waive his personal appearance. The circuit court continued the matter to February 2025 and directed both the Defendant and the citing trooper to appear. The Defendant subsequently renewed his request to waive his personal appearance. On March 5, 2025, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the case “[a]fter hearing proof in [the] matter.” Six months later, on September 8, 2025, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order of dismissal in the Tennessee Court of Appeals. In that notice, he states “under penalty of perjury” that he did not receive the order until August 11, 2025. The Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to this court under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 17. ANALYSIS In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the general sessions court denied him due process by failing to consider his motion to dismiss and by failing to address his claim that the citation was insufficient. He further contends that the clerks of the general sessions and circuit courts failed to notify him of their courts’ decisions and that cumulative error entitles him to relief. The State responds with two threshold arguments. First, it argues that the Defendant’s notice of appeal to this court was untimely and that the interest of justice does not warrant waiving the timely filing requirement. Second, it argues that the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over the Defendant’s appeal from the general sessions court and that this appeal should therefore be dismissed. Following the parties’ initial briefing, we directed them to address additional questions concerning the circuit court’s jurisdiction and the basis for its dismissal order. Both parties submitted supplemental briefs addressing those questions. We begin by considering whether to waive the untimely filing of the Defendant’s notice of appeal. We then examine the circuit court’s jurisdiction and whether the record permits meaningful appellate review of its ruling. A. T IMELINESS OF THE D EFENDANT ’ S A PPEAL TO THIS C OURT We first address the timeliness of the appeal to this court. Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), a notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed with the -3- appellate court clerk within thirty days after entry of the judgment appealed from. However, this requirement is not jurisdictional in criminal cases, and this court may waive it “in the interest of justice.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). In determining whether a waiver is appropriate, we consider the nature of the issues presented, the reasons for the delay, the length of the delay, and any other relevant circumstances. See State v. Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). The appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating that the interest of justice warrants a waiver. See State v. Thomas, No. W2022-00109-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 328337, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 7, 2023). Here, the circuit court entered its dismissal order on March 5, 2025. The Defendant filed his notice of appeal on September 8, 2025, approximately five months after the thirty- day filing period expired. This substantial delay weighs against granting a waiver. The reasons for the delay, however, weigh in the Defendant’s favor. The Defendant declared under penalty of perjury that he did not receive the dismissal order until August 11, 2025. The State does not dispute that representation, and nothing in the appellate record contradicts it. Nor does the record suggest that the Defendant was responsible for the delay in receiving the order. By the time he received the order, the thirty-day filing period had already expired. He filed his notice of appeal twenty-eight days after receiving the order, within the period Rule 4(a) would ordinarily allow. We have recognized that delayed receipt of an adverse order, followed by reasonably prompt action in seeking appellate review, weighs in favor of waiving the timely filing requirement. See, e.g., State v. Miller, No. M2023-01067-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 2797376, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2024), no perm. app. filed; State v. Bennington, No. E2021-01163-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2966264, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2022). Other circumstances also support a waiver. The Defendant has addressed the timeliness issue in his appellate filings and explained why he believes the delay should not preclude review. Moreover, this appeal presents substantial questions concerning the circuit court’s jurisdiction and the legal effect of a dismissal order whose basis is unclear. Considering all of these circumstances, we conclude that the interest of justice warrants a waiver. See Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d at 214. Accordingly, we waive the timely filing requirement under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and proceed to consider the remaining threshold questions. -4-  B. T HE C IRCUIT C OURT ’ S J URISDICTION As a threshold matter, the State urges this court to dismiss this appeal because the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over the Defendant’s appeal from the general sessions court. The State argues that the Defendant did not perfect his appeal within ten days, did not properly swear to his affidavit of indigency, and could appeal only his sentence. In response, the Defendant maintains that the circuit court had jurisdiction. He asserts that the clerks directed him to file his appeal in that court and that the court recognized its jurisdiction by hearing the case. He also contends that he sought permission to file late and should not be held responsible for any timing defects. We agree with the State that we must consider the circuit court’s jurisdiction. We respectfully disagree, however, that we can resolve that question on this record. 1. Governing Principles Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s authority to hear a particular class of cases and is conferred only by constitutional or legislative authority. State v. Yoreck, 133 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tenn. 2004). The parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or their participation in the proceedings, and a judgment entered without it is void. Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 843-44 (Tenn. 2013). Accordingly, an appellate court must consider subject matter jurisdiction even when the parties have not raised the issue. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); see also State v. Scott, 619 S.W.3d 196, 203 n.4 (Tenn. 2021). Our obligation to consider jurisdiction, however, does not expand our authority as an appellate court. Our jurisdiction is appellate only. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-5-108(a). We are therefore “not authorized to conduct hearings and determine disputed issues of fact.” State v. Williams, 52 S.W.3d 109, 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). Instead, we consider “those facts established by the evidence in the trial court and set forth in the record.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(c). Although subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, its resolution may depend on facts that the trial court has not determined. See State v. Cawood, 134 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tenn. 2004). The trial court is ordinarily the proper forum for resolving those factual questions. Indeed, a court has “jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a -5- basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and it must have authority to decide that question in the first instance.” New v. Dumitrache, 604 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The party invoking jurisdiction also bears the burden of establishing it. See Johnson, 432 S.W.3d at 844. Thus, although we must independently consider the circuit court’s jurisdiction, we cannot resolve factual questions that the circuit court has not addressed and that the appellate record does not establish. 2. The Order of Dismissal The circuit court’s dismissal order does not reveal the basis for its ruling. It states only that, “[a]fter hearing proof in this matter,” the court ordered that “the above-styled case be dismissed.” The order contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Nor does it explain whether the circuit court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal or the underlying charge. That distinction matters because a properly perfected appeal from the general sessions court results in a trial de novo. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108(c). In such a proceeding, “the matter is tried anew as if no other trial had occurred,” and “[t]he judgment of the general sessions court is abrogated.” State v. Osborne, 712 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (citations omitted). The circuit court must then enter its own judgment. See State v. Kirk, 392 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). The dismissal order permits at least three interpretations. The circuit court may have concluded that the Defendant failed to perfect his appeal and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the court may have heard proof and dismissed the underlying charge on its merits. Or it may have dismissed the appeal because the Defendant failed to appear in person, as the court had directed. The last possibility raises a separate concern. If the Defendant properly perfected his appeal, the general sessions judgment was abrogated, and his failure to appear would not ordinarily permit the circuit court simply to dismiss the appeal. See State v. Winebarger, 70 S.W.3d 99, 101-02 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). These possible dispositions have materially different legal consequences. A dismissal of the Defendant’s appeal would leave the general sessions court’s disposition in place, while a dismissal of the underlying charge could implicate the continued viability of the prosecution. Because neither the dismissal order nor the remaining record establishes -6- what the circuit court decided, we cannot determine whether its disposition was legally proper. 3. The Jurisdictional Questions The ambiguity in the dismissal order would matter less if the record itself answered the jurisdictional questions. It does not, though, and two questions remain open: what disposition the general sessions court entered, and whether the Defendant timely appealed from it. a. The General Sessions Disposition We begin by examining the general sessions court’s disposition, which determines whether the Defendant had a judgment from which he could appeal. At least two procedures may account for the guilty disposition recorded in this case. The first is a written guilty plea. A general sessions court may render final judgment in a misdemeanor case when the defendant “enters a plea of guilty in writing” or requests a trial on the merits and expressly waives indictment, presentment, grand jury investigation, and jury trial. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-109.1 The record contains no such plea or waiver. Although the copy of the citation includes a printed guilty-plea form, the signature line is blank. In State v. Salyer, this court held that a general sessions conviction was void because the defendant had not signed the required written waiver. No. E2008-01461-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1798381, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 24, 2009), no perm. app. filed. Here, however, the general sessions file is not part of the appellate record. We therefore cannot conclude from the absence of a waiver in our record that the Defendant never executed one. The second procedure is payment of the citation. Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-207(f) permits a person cited for a traffic offense to elect not to contest the charge and pay the fine and costs instead of appearing in court. See State v. Kolimlim, No. M2020- 1 The offense of speeding under Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-152 is a Class C misdemeanor, which carries a potential sentence of confinement. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-103, 55-10- 301(a), 40-35-111(e)(3). It is therefore not a “small offense” that a magistrate may try without a jury waiver. See State v. Dusina, 764 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1989); State v. Powell, No. M2001-02955-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 708047, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2002), no perm. app. filed. -7- 01363-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 16736974, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2023). The statute requires court approval and provides that the election must occur before the scheduled court appearance. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10- 207(f). Such a payment is “very closely analogous to a plea of nolo contendere,” Williams v. Brown, 860 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tenn. 1993), and may result in a judgment of conviction, State v. Morgan, No. E2017-00532-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1391629, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2018), no perm. app. filed. The circumstances of the Defendant’s payment complicate this possibility. The citation directed him to appear on September 26, 2024, and he asserts that the court suspended his driving privileges when he failed to appear. He paid the citation on October 9, 2024, the same day the clerk requested withdrawal of the failure-to-appear notice. Thus, his payment occurred after the scheduled court date, rather than before it as section 55-10- 207(f) contemplates.2 The record does not establish how the general sessions court treated the Defendant’s payment. It does not show whether the court approved the payment, entered a judgment of forfeiture under section 55-10-207(g), or accepted a written plea. Each procedure may have different consequences for the validity of the judgment and the Defendant’s right to appeal. Without knowing which procedure the general sessions court followed, we cannot determine what judgment, if any, the Defendant appealed. b. Entry of Judgment and Timeliness Even if the general sessions court entered a valid judgment, we must still determine whether the Defendant timely appealed from it. Section 27-5-108 “allows an appeal as of right to the circuit (or criminal) court within ten (10) days from the date of the judgment.” Osborne, 712 S.W.2d at 491. Before such an appeal may be taken, “there must have been a final judgment entered in the general sessions court.” Id. Moreover, timely perfection of the appeal “is no mere technical formality: it is in fact a mandatory requirement, and if it is not complied with the court has no jurisdiction over the case.” Love v. College Level Assessment Servs., Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. 1996). The circuit court’s jurisdiction 2 Although the defendant in Kolimlim likewise paid the ticket after his scheduled appearance, that opinion did not address the effect of the statute’s timing requirement. See 2022 WL 16736974, at *1, *3. -8- therefore depends on whether, and when, the general sessions court entered a final judgment. The record does not conclusively establish either matter. The general sessions clerk’s printout reflects a disposition of “Guilty (Traf Ticket Paid in Full)” dated October 9, 2024. Although this entry identifies the date of the recorded disposition, it does not establish whether or when the general sessions court entered a valid, appealable judgment. Assuming that a valid judgment was entered on October 9, 2024, the ten-day appeal period expired on Monday, October 21, 2024. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-102. The Defendant mailed his notice of appeal on October 23, and the clerk filed it on October 29. Under either date, the appeal would have been untimely. But that conclusion depends on the existence of a valid October 9 judgment, which the record does not establish. Nor did the circuit court resolve whether the Defendant otherwise satisfied the requirements for perfecting his appeal. The record reflects no ruling on his motion for an extension of time or any determination as to whether his indigency papers satisfied the statutory requirements for an appeal. Although the clerk advised that the appeal “has been late-filed,” that notice was not a judicial determination. Thus, the record does not establish whether the Defendant properly invoked the circuit court’s jurisdiction. c. The Source of the Circuit Court’s Jurisdiction Our notice of issues also asked whether the Campbell County Circuit Court or the Campbell County Criminal Court had statutory authority to hear this appeal. The State argues that the two courts share concurrent jurisdiction. We do not decide that question. If the Defendant did not perfect an appeal from a valid general sessions judgment, the circuit court would lack jurisdiction regardless of which court ordinarily hears such appeals. The statutory question may therefore be unnecessary to the disposition of this case, and we express no opinion on its resolution. 4. Remand Rather Than Dismissal The State nevertheless argues that these uncertainties do not warrant a remand and that this court should dismiss the appeal for three reasons. First, the State argues that jurisdiction is a question of law, leaving this court “in as good a position as the circuit court” to decide it. Although we review jurisdictional questions de novo, that standard -9- does not permit us to find the facts on which jurisdiction depends. See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 121. Here, those facts include the nature of the general sessions disposition, whether and when the court entered judgment, and the basis for the circuit court’s dismissal. The record does not establish these facts, and the circuit court made no findings concerning them. Second, the State argues that the Defendant bore the burden of preparing an adequate appellate record. We agree that an appellant must prepare a fair, accurate, and complete record of the proceedings below. State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993). In Kolimlim, this court applied that principle and dismissed an appeal because the record did not establish whether an unsigned general sessions judgment was valid. See Kolimlim, 2022 WL 16736974, at *3. Unlike in Kolimlim, the incomplete general sessions record is not the only obstacle to appellate review. The circuit court’s own order does not disclose whether it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, dismissed the underlying charge, or acted on another ground. These possible dispositions have materially different legal consequences, yet the order leaves us unable to identify the judicial action under review. Remanding for clarification of that ruling does not relieve the Defendant of his burden to establish jurisdiction or provide an adequate record. Rather, it permits the circuit court to identify the basis for its disposition and to determine the jurisdictional questions necessary to support it. Third, the State argues that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(c)(1)(C)(ii) limited the Defendant’s appeal to his sentence and that, because he challenged only his conviction, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. This argument assumes that the general sessions court entered a judgment based on a guilty plea governed by Rule 5. As discussed above, however, the record does not establish the nature of that disposition. Without that determination, we cannot decide whether Rule 5 limits the scope of the Defendant’s appeal or whether any such limitation affects the circuit court’s jurisdiction. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) directs us to “grant the relief on the law and facts to which the party is entitled or the proceeding otherwise requires.” Under the circumstances presented, further proceedings are necessary for the circuit court to determine its jurisdiction on a developed record and explain its ruling. The parties received notice that we might order such a remand and had an opportunity to respond. See State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 165 (Tenn. 2018). Accordingly, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings. - 10 -  C. R EMAND I NSTRUCTIONS On remand, the circuit court should ensure that the District Attorney General receives notice and that both parties have an opportunity to present evidence and be heard. The court should review the general sessions file, if available. It should then first determine, on the record developed, whether it possessed jurisdiction over the Defendant’s appeal. That determination should address: x General Sessions Court Disposition: whether the general sessions disposition resulted from a written plea and waivers under section 40-1-109 and Rule 5(c), an approved election under section 55-10-207(f), a disposition entered after the Defendant failed to appear, or another procedure; x Entry of Judgment: whether and when the general sessions court entered a valid, signed judgment; x Perfection of the Appeal: whether the Defendant perfected his appeal within ten days of that judgment, including the legal effect, if any, of his motion for an extension of time and his indigency papers; and x Statutory Jurisdiction: if necessary, whether any statutory authority permitted the circuit court to hear a criminal appeal from the general sessions court. As the party invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, the Defendant bears the burden of establishing it. See Johnson, 432 S.W.3d at 844. If the circuit court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction, it should enter an order explaining that determination and properly disposing of the appeal. If the circuit court determines that it has jurisdiction, the court should determine the permissible scope of the appeal, conduct any further proceedings required by law, and enter an appropriate judgment. See Kirk, 392 S.W.3d at 624. We express no opinion on how the circuit court should resolve the questions presented on remand. Whatever its disposition, however, the court should enter a written order setting forth its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for its ruling to facilitate meaningful appellate review. - 11 -  D. P RETERMITTED I SSUES Because we vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings, we do not reach the Defendant’s remaining claims concerning due process, the sufficiency of the citation, the clerks’ failure to provide notice, and cumulative error. We likewise do not address the State’s arguments that the Defendant waived his claims by paying the citation or that this court lacks jurisdiction over his claims against the clerks. The parties may raise these issues on remand to the extent the circuit court determines that they are properly before it. Our remand does not enlarge the scope of any appeal properly before the circuit court or revive any claim otherwise waived or forfeited. CONCLUSION In summary, we hold that the interest of justice warrants waiving the timely filing requirement for the Defendant’s notice of appeal. We further conclude that the record does not establish the nature of the general sessions court’s disposition or the basis for the circuit court’s dismissal. We therefore cannot determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction, and we do not reach the Defendant’s remaining issues. Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the circuit court’s order of dismissal and remand the case for the circuit court to determine its jurisdiction and to conduct any further necessary proceedings consistent with this opinion. S/ Tom Greenholtz TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE - 12 -