Full Opinion

11/02/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 20, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JIMMIE CLINTON UHL Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County No. 22CC-2023-CR-384 Larry J. Wallace, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-01222-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The Defendant, Jimmie Clinton Uhl, entered open guilty pleas in the Dickson County Circuit Court to tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; and solicitation of tampering with evidence, a Class E felony, with the agreement that the two counts would run concurrently with each other and that the trial court would determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to the maximum term of six years for the tampering with evidence conviction and to the maximum term of two years for the solicitation of tampering with evidence conviction. Finding the Defendant to be an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive, the trial court ordered the effective six-year sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s twelve-year-sentence in an aggravated sexual battery case for which the Defendant was incarcerated at the time of the commission of the instant offenses. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence for tampering with evidence to the maximum in the range and in ordering consecutive sentences based on its finding that the Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined. Mark C. Odle, Dickson, Tennessee (on appeal), Matthew T. Mitchell, Public Defender, and Michael Tyler Howard, Assistant Public Defender, Ashland City, Tennessee (at sentencing hearing), for the appellant, Jimmie Clinton Uhl. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Senior Assistant Attorney General; W. Ray Crouch, Jr., District Attorney General; and Stanley Brooks, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTS The Defendant entered his guilty pleas in the instant case on February 24, 2025. Although the victim of the Defendant’s 2023 aggravated sexual battery case was present at the Defendant’s June 18, 2025 sentencing hearing in the instant case, she did not want to testify, and the only evidence introduced was the Defendant’s presentence report and a certified copy of the Defendant’s February 24, 2023 jury conviction in Dickson County Circuit Court for aggravated sexual battery. The narrative of facts in the presentence report reflects that the victim of the aggravated sexual battery was the Defendant’s biological daughter, who was less than thirteen at the time of the incident. While incarcerated and awaiting sentencing for that offense, the Defendant placed recorded jail phone calls to his brother, Ricky Uhl, in which the two “constructed and carried out a plan to get [the Defendant’s] conviction overturned” by creating a fake Facebook profile of the victim and posting fake messages from the victim stating that she had fabricated her allegations against the Defendant. The Defendant’s brother followed the Defendant’s “step by step directions” on how to create the fake Facebook profile, posted the fake messages, and sent hard copies of the fake messages to the Defendant’s attorney, who filed a motion for extraordinary bond relief based on the alleged newly discovered evidence. The Defendant’s brother confessed his role in the crimes during an interview with law enforcement. The Defendant’s presentence report further reflects that the fifty-three-year-old Defendant had a 2018 conviction for violation of a restraining order and a 1992 conviction for driving under the influence. The Defendant had three disciplinary infractions while incarcerated: in 2023 for possession of a deadly weapon, and in 2023 and 2024 for refusing cell assignments. The Defendant refused to participate in the presentence report in the instant case. In the presentence report prepared in his aggravated sexual battery case, the Defendant stated that he had quit high school after being kicked off the school bus for having a knife. The State requested an effective six-year sentence for the offenses, proposing the following enhancement factors: the Defendant had a history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish his range; the Defendant was the leader in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors; and that the Defendant committed the offenses while incarcerated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114 (1), (2), (13). The State further proposed that the trial court order the six-year sentence served consecutively to the twelve-year aggravated sexual battery sentence by finding that the Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-115 (b)(2). The State argued that the Defendant’s behavior was egregious and pointed out that, absent consecutive sentencing, the Defendant would not -2- have to serve any additional time for the crimes. The State also noted that the Defendant had committed the two instant offenses within two months of having been convicted of the Class B felony of aggravated sexual battery, and while incarcerated for that offense. The Defendant conceded that the above enhancement factors were applicable but argued that the trial court should apply the following mitigating factors: the Defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury; the Defendant, although guilty of a crime, committed the offense under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated his conduct; and the Defendant, by pleading guilty, did not put “anyone through the trouble of reliving these events” or the State through the expense and burden of a trial. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-113 (1), (11), (13). As for consecutive sentencing, the Defendant argued that it was not a “fair characterization” to say that his criminal history was extensive, asserting that the only thing on his record other than what had brought the parties to the current hearing was a “minor offense some 27 years ago.” The Defendant also asserted that he had, in effect, already been punished for the tampering with evidence offenses because the trial court had relied on those offenses in enhancing his sentence to the maximum in the aggravated sexual battery case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court applied the three enhancement factors proposed by the State. The trial court placed great weight on the enhancement factors and found that there were no appliable mitigating factors. The trial court, therefore, sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to the maximum of six years for the Class C felony of tampering with evidence, and to the maximum of two years for the Class E felony of solicitation of tampering with evidence. Finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive, the trial court ordered that the six-year sentence be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction consecutively to the twelve- year sentence he was serving for aggravated sexual battery. The trial court based its finding that the Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive on the Defendant’s having committed the two instant offenses within two months of his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, the Defendant’s convictions for DUI and violation of a restraining order, the Defendant’s juvenile behavior on the school bus, and the Defendant’s possession of a deadly weapon during his recent period of incarceration. ANALYSIS On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider or apply factors in mitigation and by ordering consecutive sentences. The State argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by applying multiple enhancement factors -3- to enhance the sentences and by finding that the Defendant’s record of criminal activity is extensive and ordering the sentences for these convictions to be served consecutively to his aggravated sexual battery sentence. We agree with the State. This court reviews a sentence imposed by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012). This standard is applied to decisions regarding the length, range and manner of service of a sentence, including the trial court’s decision regarding consecutive sentencing “so long as [the sentence] is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709- 10; State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 2013) (applying deferential Bise standard of review to consecutive sentencing decisions). In determining a defendant’s sentence, the trial court considers the following factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement by the Defendant in his own behalf; and (8) the result of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the department and contained in the presentence report. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(b); see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 697-98. In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court should consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines: (1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence that should be imposed, because the general assembly set the minimum length of sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of each criminal offense in the felony classifications; and (2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). The burden is on the Defendant to demonstrate the impropriety of the sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sent’g Com’n Cmts. -4- The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider any mitigating factors, asserting that “[t]he very nature of the charges would support a finding that [mitigating] factor one applied, even if the court gave it little to no weight, as the conduct quite literally neither caused, nor threatened serious bodily injury.” However, although the trial court should consider enhancement and mitigating factors, the statutory factors are advisory only. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114; see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 701; State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2008). “[A] trial court’s weighing of various mitigating and enhancement factors [is] left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. Moreover, appellate courts are “bound by a trial court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of the Sentencing Act.” Id. at 346. The record reflects that, although the trial court did not address each proposed mitigating factor individually, it considered the proposed mitigating factors and found that none applied. At the same time, it found that three enhancement factors were applicable and entitled to substantial weight. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in enhancing the sentences to the maximum within the Defendant’s range. A trial court has the broad discretion to impose consecutive sentences if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that any one of the criteria in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) is satisfied, including the one found by the trial court: that the defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2). This court must give “deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on the record establishing at least one of the . . . grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b).” Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 861 (citation omitted). “So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be presumed reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” Id. at 862 (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705). The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive sentences under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115 (b)(2) because it failed to make sufficient findings regarding the considerations set forth in State v. Perry, 656 S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. 2022), as to whether a defendant’s record of criminal activity is extensive. What constitutes an extensive record of criminal activity is not defined in the Sentencing Act, but our supreme court in Perry provided the following guidelines: [I]n making the finding that an offender has an extensive record of criminal activity, courts should look to those facts from which they can determine that the defendant’s record of criminal activity is considerable or -5- large in amount, time, space, or scope. . . .This appeal presents an opportunity for this court to offer guidance on relevant considerations that ordinarily will inform the determination of whether an offender’s record of criminal activity is extensive. To that end, and with the general definitions of “extensive” in mind, courts should look to the following non-exclusive considerations in evaluating whether the proof establishes that the defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive: (1) The amount of criminal activity, often the number of convictions, both currently before the trial court for sentencing and prior convictions or activity; (2) The time span over which the criminal activity occurred; (3) The frequency of criminal activity within that time span; (4) The geographic span over which the criminal activity occurred; (5) Multiplicity of victims of the criminal activity; and (6) Any other fact about the defendant or circumstance surrounding the criminal activity or convictions, present or prior, that informs the determination of whether an offender’s record of criminal activity was considerable or large in amount, time, space, or scope. Id. at 129-30. A defendant does not need to have prior criminal convictions or activity apart from those for which he is being sentenced to qualify as an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Id. at 131. However, “prior convictions or criminal activity may demonstrate a consistent pattern of operating outside the confines of lawful behavior and provide some stronger measure of justification for finding that a defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Although the trial court did not explicitly address the Perry factors, it clearly articulated its reasons for finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive, and the record supports that finding. Specifically, the trial court outlined the Defendant’s prior criminal activity and convictions and gave emphasis to the offenses at issue here, which were committed after the Defendant was incarcerated for his prior conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that -6- the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering the Defendant’s six-year sentence to be served consecutively to his twelve-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery. CONCLUSION Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. S/ JOHN W. CAMPBELL _ JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE -7-