State of Tennessee v. Christopher Weaver

11/02/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 27, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER WEAVER Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 130680 G. Scott Green, Judge1 ___________________________________ No. E2026-00078-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The Defendant, Christopher Weaver, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 and to theft of a firearm. The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation after a period of split confinement. Shortly thereafter, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant alleging that the Defendant had been charged with aggravated assault after a fight in the Knox County jail. The Defendant admitted the violation, and after later hearings, the trial court ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his suspended sentences rather than ordering substance-use treatment. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and STACY L. STREET, JJ., joined. Rachel L. Wolf, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher Weaver. 1 The trial judge, the Honorable G. Scott Green, passed away on October 30, 2026, while this appeal was pending. We extend our condolences to his family and colleagues, and we acknowledge his faithful service to the people of Tennessee and to its judiciary. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Julia A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Christy Caviness and Ta Kisha Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. T HE D EFENDANT ’ S C ONVICTION AND THE V IOLATION On June 18, 2025, the Defendant pled guilty to theft of property and to theft of a firearm. As part of the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years, suspended to supervised probation after a period of split confinement. Six days later, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant. The warrant alleged that the Defendant had been charged with aggravated assault after a fight in the Knox County Jail. In September 2025, the Defendant admitted under oath that he had violated his probation. At defense counsel’s request, the trial court deferred deciding the consequence of the violation. In the meantime, it referred the Defendant to a substance abuse case manager for an assessment. B. T HE R EVOCATION P ROCEEDINGS In October 2025, the trial court heard proof about the jail incident. The State called one witness, Corporal Arden Deatherage of the Knox County Sheriff’s Office, who was familiar with the Defendant and the victim. During his testimony, the State introduced a video recording of the fight. Corporal Deatherage testified that the incident occurred in a dayroom at the Knox County Jail when inmates came out for recreation. Those inmates included the Defendant, the victim, and another inmate. According to Corporal Deatherage, as the inmates entered the dayroom, the other inmate walked to the back area near the shower, and the victim approached him. The two -2- men began fighting while the Defendant stood behind the victim and watched. Eventually, the Defendant joined the fight. The corporal testified that, at one point, the victim appeared unable or unwilling to continue. The Defendant and the other inmate nonetheless kept punching and kicking him for a significant period. The State also introduced photographs of the victim’s facial injuries. On cross-examination, Corporal Deatherage acknowledged that the encounter appeared to begin as a mutual fight between the other inmate and the victim. He agreed that the victim later stood up and re-engaged his two assailants. He further testified that the jail disciplinary board found the victim guilty of fighting. Following the testimony, the trial court ordered a post-sentence investigation report (the “post-sentence report”) so that it could review the Defendant’s criminal history. It then reset the hearing for January 9, 2026. The post-sentence report, filed in December 2025, showed that the Defendant had four prior felony convictions and seven misdemeanor convictions. The report also reflected that the Defendant had entered a recovery program in January 2025 but did not complete it. The accompanying risk and needs assessment indicated that he left that program voluntarily. In addition, the report’s account of the underlying thefts stated that the Defendant admitted using money from stolen items to buy drugs. When the parties reconvened on January 9, 2026, neither party presented additional testimony. Defense counsel asked the court to adopt the case manager’s recommended treatment plan, which called for a twenty-eight-day inpatient program followed by placement in a residential halfway house. She also stated her understanding that the Defendant had not previously received substance abuse treatment. The State asked the court to revoke the suspended sentences and order the Defendant to serve the sentences in custody. In the State’s view, the Defendant had many opportunities since 2018 to address his substance abuse but had failed to do so. C. T HE T RIAL C OURT ’ S A NNOUNCEMENT After hearing arguments, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The court began with the Defendant’s history, observing that he had received “multiple opportunities -3- to be successful on probation.” Yet, as the court put it, “nothing seems to stick to this point.” Turning to the violation, the court found from the video that the Defendant and the other inmate “violently beat” the victim. Defense counsel then noted that, to her knowledge, the Defendant had never been on probation before. The court responded that the Defendant had shown “a repetitive pattern” of breaking the law after completing his sentences. The court explained that, if the Defendant had merely failed drug screens, it would be willing to work with him. Here, however, the court found that the Defendant and the other inmate “violently beat another human being for an extended period of time[.]” It also observed that the victim “was basically just helpless.” The trial court filed its revocation order on January 9, 2026. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal six days later. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW For every issue raised on appeal, we must first determine the appropriate standard of appellate review. State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tenn. 2022). The principal issue in this case is whether the trial court properly revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentences. We review this issue for an “abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness so long as the trial court places sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the consequence on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). However, if the trial court does not make such findings, then this court “may conduct a de novo review if the record is sufficiently developed for the court to do so, or [we] may remand the case to the trial court to make such findings.” Id. In this case, the trial court placed sufficient findings on the record to support both its violation and consequence determinations. Accordingly, we review those determinations for an abuse of discretion, applying a presumption of reasonableness. -4-  ANALYSIS The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his suspended sentences. He does not dispute that he violated his probation, and he challenges only the consequence determination. In support of his position, he advances three arguments. First, he contends that the trial court based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof by giving undue weight to the testimony of a witness who did not see the fight. Second, he asserts that the trial court reached an illogical conclusion by separating his conduct from his addiction. Third, he argues that the trial court’s reliance on his prior record to deny treatment contravenes the purposes of the Sentencing Act. The State responds that the trial court “properly exercised its discretion in fully revoking the defendant’s probation after he admitted to a non-technical violation.” We agree with the State. When a trial court imposes a sentence for criminal conduct, the court may suspend the sentence for an eligible defendant and place that defendant on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103; -303(b) (2025). The trial court “may also require the defendant to comply with conditions of probation that are reasonably suited to facilitate rehabilitation or protect the safety of the community.” State v. Noel, 729 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1) (2025). As long as a defendant complies with the conditions of the suspended sentence, the defendant will remain on probation until the sentence expires. See State v. Rand, 696 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024). However, if a defendant violates a condition of probation, then the trial court may address the violation as it “may deem right and proper under the evidence,” subject to various statutory restrictions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 311(d)(1) (2025). A probation revocation proceeding therefore involves a two-step process with “two distinct discretionary decisions.” Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 757. The court first determines whether the defendant violated a condition of probation and then determines the appropriate consequence of that violation. Id. We address each step in turn. -5-  A. T HE V IOLATION D ETERMINATION As to the first step, the violation report alleged that the Defendant violated his probation by committing an aggravated assault in the Knox County Jail. At the September 2025 hearing, the Defendant admitted under oath that he had violated the conditions of his probation. Defense counsel later explained that, through this admission, the Defendant acknowledged that he had gotten into a fight at the jail. A defendant’s admission is sufficient to support a finding that a violation occurred. See State v. Johnson, 15 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999); see also, e.g., State v. Penny, No. W2023-00912-CCA- R3-CD, 2024 WL 1803264, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2024), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2024). Based on the admission, the trial court found that the Defendant was in material violation of his probation. However, the trial court did not base its view of the violation on the admission alone. At the October 2025 hearing, the court heard Corporal Deatherage’s testimony and watched the surveillance video of the incident. When it later revoked the Defendant’s probation, the court tied the violation to what it saw in the video. Its written revocation order then found that the Defendant “has been guilty of violating the laws of this State.” The record also shows that the violation was non-technical. A non-technical violation includes the commission of a new felony offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 311(g). The Defendant was on probation for two felony convictions. The State identified the aggravated assault as a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(d)(1)(A)(i)(a) (2025). On appeal, the Defendant does not dispute that he violated his probation or that the violation was non-technical. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation and that this violation was non-technical. See State v. Moore, No. E2025-00278-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 3731533, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2025), no perm. app. filed. The non-technical nature of this violation is significant because it defines the scope of the trial court’s authority. When a felony probationer commits a non-technical violation, the trial court has broad authority to choose the consequence. The court may fully revoke the suspended sentence even if the probationer has no history of prior violations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(e)(2); Rand, 696 S.W.3d at 103-04. The trial court therefore had authority to order the Defendant’s sentences into execution. The remaining question is whether it properly exercised that authority. We turn to that question now. -6-  B. T HE C ONSEQUENCE D ETERMINATION As to the second step, “the consequence determination essentially examines whether the beneficial aspects of probation are being served and whether the defendant is amenable to continued probation.” Rand, 696 S.W.3d at 106 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As our supreme court observed in Dagnan, a trial court may consider factors relevant to the nature and seriousness of the present violation, the defendant’s previous history on probation, and the defendant’s amenability to future rehabilitation. See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5. Factors important to a defendant’s amenability to correction may include the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and genuine remorse, as well as whether the defendant will comply with orders from the court meant to ensure his or her effective rehabilitation. Rand, 696 S.W.3d at 106; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(C) (2025). The trial court “may also consider whether the defendant poses a danger to the community.” Noel, 729 S.W.3d at 326; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1). Our review of the trial court’s announcement shows that its consequence determination rested on two considerations. First, the trial court found that the nature and seriousness of the violation weighed against further probation. Second, it found that the Defendant’s criminal history showed a “repetitive pattern” of reoffending. The Defendant’s first two arguments challenge the court’s assessment of the violation, and his third challenges its reliance on his criminal history. We address each argument with the consideration to which it relates. 1. The Nature and Seriousness of the Violation The trial court first considered the nature and seriousness of the violation. It found that the Defendant and the other inmate “violently beat another human being for an extended period of time.” It also found that the victim “was basically just helpless.” The court explained that it would be willing to work with a probationer who had failed drug screens, but it found that this case was different. In this way, the court separated the Defendant’s violent conduct from the kinds of violations that it would address through further efforts in the community. The nature and seriousness of the violation are proper factors to consider in the consequence determination. See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5. Moreover, the Public Safety Act of 2016 contemplates revocation when a violation “constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the community at large and cannot be -7- appropriately managed in the community.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1). We have recognized that violence against another person, even in a custodial setting, may reflect this kind of risk. See Moore, 2025 WL 3731533, at *4 (recognizing the seriousness of a probationer’s assault on a corrections officer while incarcerated). Accordingly, the trial court properly gave significant weight to the violent character of the Defendant’s conduct. The record supports the trial court’s view of the violation. The trial court watched the surveillance video itself. Corporal Deatherage also testified that the victim appeared unable or unwilling to continue, yet the Defendant and the other inmate kept punching and kicking him “for quite a significant amount of time.” The State introduced photographs of the victim’s injuries, and the victim later went to the hospital. This proof bore directly on whether the Defendant posed a danger to others. See Noel, 729 S.W.3d at 326; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1). The Defendant challenges this conclusion in two ways. He contends that the proof of the assault was unreliable and that the trial court misunderstood the role of his substance- use addiction. We address these arguments in turn. a. The Reliability of Corporal Deatherage’s Testimony The Defendant first argues that the trial court based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof. He notes that Corporal Deatherage did not witness the fight. He also notes that the State did not call the victim to testify about the “circumstances, provocation, or context of the fight.” In his view, the trial court relied “so heavily on un- cross-examined hearsay” that its decision was unreasonable. We respectfully disagree. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010); see Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 758. In making its findings, the trial court resolves questions concerning the credibility of witnesses. State v. Owens, No. E2021-00814-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2387763, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2022), no perm. app. filed. Thus, the question is not whether the Defendant can offer another way to view the proof. The question is whether the trial court’s view of the proof finds support in the record. For three reasons, we conclude that it does. -8-  First, the trial court did not rely only on Corporal Deatherage’s account. The State played the surveillance video during the corporal’s testimony and introduced it as an exhibit. In revoking the Defendant’s probation, the trial court referred specifically to what it had seen on the video. The court’s findings thus rested on its own review of the recording, not merely on a witness’s narration of it. Second, the corporal’s testimony did not go untested. Defense counsel cross- examined him at length. On cross-examination, the corporal acknowledged that the incident appeared to begin as a mutual fight between the victim and the other inmate. He also agreed that the victim later stood up and re-engaged his two assailants. At the disposition hearing, the trial court recalled the video as showing a fight that was “pretty one-sided.” Although defense counsel argued that the victim re-engaged the two men numerous times, the trial court heard the competing characterizations and resolved them. Resolving those competing accounts was the trial court’s task, not ours. See Owens, 2022 WL 2387763, at *5. Third, the Defendant’s description of this proof as “un-cross-examined hearsay” is not supported by the record. The State offered no statement from the victim, who, according to the corporal, “did not want to say anything about the matter whatsoever.” Instead, the corporal described what the surveillance video depicted, and the State introduced the video itself. The Defendant acknowledges that the strict rules of evidence are relaxed in revocation hearings, and he does not argue that this proof was inadmissible. As a result, the trial court’s findings rested on the video and on testimony the Defendant had a full opportunity to test, not on an out-of-court statement from an absent witness. In short, the trial court’s findings about the assault rested on the video, the corporal’s tested testimony, and the photographs, not on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof. Having concluded that the record supports the trial court’s view of the violation, we next consider whether the court properly separated that violation from the Defendant’s substance-use addiction. b. The Defendant’s Substance-Use Addiction The Defendant next argues that the trial court reached an illogical conclusion by separating his violent conduct from his substance-use addiction. He contends that the court’s statement about failed drug screens “demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of severe addiction.” He also asserts that long-term opioid use produces “deeply ingrained -9- behavioral instability, impulsivity, and chaotic decision-making.” For three reasons, we respectfully disagree. First, the record contains no proof that the Defendant’s substance use caused or contributed to this particular assault. To be sure, the post-sentence report documents a history of opioid use and suggests a link, in general terms, between that use and his past criminal conduct. But these observations alone do not show that his addiction played any role in his decision to join the assault. Nor does the Defendant’s brief fill this gap; although it describes the behavioral effects of long-term opioid use, nothing in the record supports that description as applied to him. Second, the trial court’s distinction between violent conduct and substance use was proper in this context. As we have already noted, a trial court may weigh the nature and seriousness of a violation when it considers an appropriate consequence. See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5. A court may recognize the possible causes of a probationer’s criminal conduct while still giving weight to the danger that conduct poses to others. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1). Far from reflecting a misunderstanding of addiction, the court’s emphasis on the seriousness of the violation reflects a proper concern for the risk it revealed to others. Third, contrary to the Defendant’s argument, the trial court meaningfully considered his request for substance-use treatment. A probationer’s rehabilitative needs are an important part of the consequence determination. But a trial court “must necessarily also consider whether those needs, including substance-use treatment, can be effectively addressed in the community rather than in custody.” State v. Banning, No. E2022-00188- CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 10225186, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2022) (emphasis in original), no perm. app. filed. For this reason, “a trial court is not required to order substance-use treatment before fully revoking a suspended sentence where the court also finds that community-based efforts are no longer appropriate or are unlikely to be successful.” Id. (emphasis in original). The trial court followed this approach here. After the Defendant admitted the violation, the court referred him to a substance abuse case manager for an assessment. At the October hearing, the court questioned whether community-based options were appropriate, but it stated that it “may be amenable” to treatment if presented with options. At the disposition hearing, the court heard defense counsel’s request to adopt the case manager’s treatment plan. It then weighed that request against the violent nature of the - 10 - violation and the Defendant’s criminal history, and it concluded that further community- based efforts were not warranted. This was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Having resolved the Defendant’s challenges to the nature and seriousness of the violation, we turn to the Defendant’s second argument regarding his criminal history. 2. The Defendant’s Criminal History and Amenability to Rehabilitation The trial court also considered the Defendant’s criminal history. The court found that the Defendant had been given “multiple opportunities to be successful on probation.” It found that he had either completed his sentences and reoffended or violated the law while on probation. The court concluded that “nothing seems to stick to this point.” It added that the time had come to say, “enough is enough.” The trial court thus viewed the Defendant’s history as evidence that further efforts in the community were unlikely to succeed. This, too, was a proper consideration. Our supreme court has recognized that a defendant’s criminal history is relevant to the consequence determination. See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5 (“We recognize, however, that consideration of past criminal history is only appropriate in the second part of the two-step analysis.”). Indeed, a defendant’s history of criminal conduct may help show “whether the beneficial aspects of probation [are] being served and whether the defendant is amenable to continued probation.” State v. Evans, No. E2024-00392-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 354637, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), no perm. app. filed. Because the rehabilitative goals of probation are directed toward lawful conduct and public safety, this court “has long recognized that where the probationer continues to commit new crimes, the beneficial aspects of probation are not being served.” State v. Graham, No. W2024-01223- CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1013957, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), no perm. app. filed. A record of repeated offenses after earlier opportunities therefore bears directly on whether another opportunity for community-based rehabilitation is likely to succeed. The post-sentence report supports the trial court’s conclusion that the Defendant has shown a “repetitive pattern” of returning to criminal conduct. Since 2018, the Defendant has committed four felony and seven misdemeanor offenses in multiple counties, and some of those offenses occurred while he was on probation for other crimes. This history shows - 11 - that earlier sentences did not deter further criminal conduct. The trial court acted within its discretion in considering this history as part of the consequence determination. Pushing against these conclusions, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s reliance on his prior record contravenes the purposes of the Sentencing Act. He contends that “traditional incarceration has repeatedly failed to rehabilitate him, and intensive, secure treatment has never been meaningfully attempted.” Two responses are in order. First, the record does not fully support the Defendant’s premise that intensive treatment “has never been meaningfully attempted.” At the disposition hearing, defense counsel stated her understanding that the Defendant had not received substance abuse treatment before. The post-sentence report before the trial court showed otherwise. The Defendant told the post-sentence investigator that he entered a recovery program in January 2025 but did not complete it. The risk and needs assessment likewise reflects that he enrolled in a treatment program and left it voluntarily before completion. The record does not show whether that program was comparable to the inpatient treatment and halfway- house placement that defense counsel proposed. Even so, the Defendant’s earlier departure from treatment bears on whether further community-based treatment was likely to succeed. Cf. State v. Drake, No. E2024-00165- CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4719132, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2024) (recognizing that a trial court may consider the history of a defendant’s participation in treatment in assessing his amenability to future rehabilitation), no perm. app. filed. Indeed, when a trial court weighs a request for treatment, it must consider whether the probationer’s needs can be effectively addressed in the community. See Banning, 2022 WL 10225186, at *5. As a result, the Defendant’s argument does not show that the trial court abused its discretion. Second, the Defendant’s description of himself as a “first-time probation violator” does not change the analysis. As we explained above, his non-technical violation gave the trial court authority to fully revoke his suspended sentences, even without a prior violation on this particular docket. See Rand, 696 S.W.3d at 103-04; see also Drake, 2024 WL 4719132, at *6 (rejecting a probationer’s argument that full revocation was inappropriate for a “first violation” when the violation was non-technical). Because the trial court had that authority, the Defendant’s remaining arguments come down to a disagreement with how the court weighed the relevant considerations. - 12 -  However, that disagreement does not establish an abuse of discretion. When we review a revocation decision for an abuse of discretion, our task is not to determine whether the trial court selected the “best” available option. See State v. Thompson, No. M2023- 01424-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3549189, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2024) (citing State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 729 (Tenn. 2016)), no perm. app. filed. Instead, we ask whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard and made a reasoned choice within the range of acceptable alternatives. See Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). Here, the trial court applied the correct standard, made findings supported by the record, and reached a reasoned decision. The Defendant is therefore not entitled to relief. CONCLUSION In summary, we hold that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation and that this violation was non-technical in nature. We also hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in fully revoking the Defendant’s suspended sentences as a consequence of that violation. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. S/ Tom Greenholtz TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE - 13 -