State of Tennessee v. Kyeisha Alazae Dalton

11/02/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE July 21, 2026 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KYEISHA ALAZAE DALTON Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 122884 Hector I. Sanchez, Judge No. E2025-00814-CCA-R3-CD The Defendant, Kyeisha Alazae Dalton, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2025) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder); 39-13-103(a), (b)(2) (2025) (reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon). The trial court imposed a sixteen-year sentence at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by limiting her cross-examination of witnesses, which allowed the State to refer to the victim as an innocent third party and which resulted in the denial of her right to present a complete defense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., and STACY L. STREET, JJ., joined. Mike Whalen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kyeisha Alazae Dalton. Johnathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General, Rachel Hill and Danielle Jones, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION This case arose from the July 18, 2022 shooting death of Tianja Duff. The victim, who sat inside her car, was shot during an altercation involving the Defendant and Tobias Billingsley. Shyteasa Hill, who was also seated inside the car, was endangered by the shooting.1 Before jury selection, the State, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404, sought to preclude the defense from questioning any of the witnesses about items the police found inside the victim’s car. The prosecutor stated that “drugs” and money were found in the car. The State argued that the evidence had no connection to the victim’s killing, that the evidence played no role in the shooting, and that, as a result, the evidence was irrelevant. The Defendant argued that the evidence involved “contemporaneous bad acts” of possession of a white powdery substance and $3,000. The Defendant sought to question witnesses about whether an investigation was conducted relative to the identity of the substance and the source of the money and drugs. Defense counsel told the trial court that the discovery materials did not reflect that the witnesses, who had been present when the victim was shot as she sat inside her car, had been questioned about “whose that was or where it came from.” Counsel said the discovery materials also did not reflect that the powdery substance had been analyzed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. Defense counsel told the trial court that before the shooting, the victim and Shyteasa Hill sat inside the victim’s car while Mr. Billingsley assaulted the Defendant and robbed the Defendant of her cell phone. Counsel argued that the evidence of “dealing drugs” was relevant to the credibility of Ms. Hill and Mr. Billingsley. Counsel argued that the evidence of selling drugs was not a prior bad act but rather “bad acts in the commission of this offense.” Counsel asserted that preventing the defense from questioning the witnesses about the evidence would be the equivalent of precluding the defense from questioning Mr. Billingsley about robbing the Defendant of her cell phone, which was “what the whole case is about.” The court permitted the defense to make an offer of proof. Knoxville Police Department (KPD) Investigator Chas Terry testified that, after the shooting, “drugs” were found inside the victim’s car, which included 37.3 grams and 17.7 grams of two unidentified substances and $2,933 in small denominations. He agreed that the amount of drugs and the money could have been charged as a felony drug offense but that he was not interested in the evidence because he did not investigate drug-related offenses. He agreed that, during his investigation, he learned that the shooting stemmed from Mr. Billingsley’s robbing the Defendant but stated that he did not charge Mr. Billingsley with robbery because he only investigated homicides. Investigator Terry said that any offense he uncovered during his homicide investigations was usually “picked up by another investigator.” When asked if he considered whether evidence of other unlawful conduct, including possession of unlawful drugs, could be related to a homicide investigation, Investigator Terry testified that each investigation was different. He stated that Ms. Hill and Mr. Billingsley were not questioned about the drugs and money found inside the victim’s car. When asked if he knew whether the drugs and money had any bearing on the shooting, 1 We refer to Ms. Duff as the victim for clarity, although Ms. Hill was endangered by the shooting and named in the indictment as the reckless endangerment victim. -2- Investigator Terry stated that he only investigated the homicide and that he did not investigate the drugs and money. He later stated that the Defendant had already confessed to the shooting when he learned of the drugs and money inside the victim’s car. On cross-examination, Investigator Terry testified that the Defendant admitted that she shot the victim. He said during her police interview, the Defendant stated that Mr. Billingsley “showed up” at her home and banged on the door and that she asked him to leave. Investigator Terry said the Defendant stated that Mr. Billingsley refused to leave, that there was a physical altercation, that Mr. Billingsley took the Defendant’s cell phone during the altercation, and that Mr. Billingsley left in the victim’s car. Investigator Terry said the Defendant stated that she immediately entered her car and followed the victim’s car, that the victim’s car stopped at some point, and that Mr. Billingsley got out of the victim’s car. Investigator Terry said the Defendant stated that she remained inside her car, that Mr. Billingsley “smashed” her cell phone, and that she attempted to hit Mr. Billingsley with her car. Investigator Terry said the Defendant admitted that she fired a gun at the victim’s car and that she knew two people were inside the victim’s car. Investigator Terry testified that the Defendant’s statement did not suggest that the drugs and money found inside the victim’s car were the Defendant’s motivation for the shooting. Investigator Terry said that the Defendant had not been aware of the drugs and that Ms. Hill’s and Mr. Billingsley’s accounts of the shooting did not reflect that the drugs and money were related to the shooting. The trial court precluded the Defendant from questioning witnesses about the substances and the money pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). In reaching its conclusion, the court found, based upon Investigator Terry’s testimony, that the investigator learned the victim’s car contained approximately $3,000 and an alleged controlled substance. The court found clear and convincing evidence that a substance was inside the vehicle but that the proof did not establish the identity of the substance. The court found that a material issue other than conformity with a character trait existed. The court determined that the evidence showed that the shooting was motivated by a cell phone, which was “forcibly taken” from the Defendant. The court determined that the evidence posed a “real danger of unfair prejudice towards the victim.” The trial evidence established that Shyteasa Hill and the victim were best friends. On July 18, 2022, Ms. Hill and the victim made plans to meet at a restaurant, and when Ms. Hill arrived, Tobias Billingsley was with the victim. Mr. Billingsley spoke on his cell phone with the Defendant, whom Ms. Hill had met previously. Ms. Hill recalled that about five days before the shooting, she and Mr. Billingsley were on a video call and that the Defendant was visible during the call. Ms. Hill recalled that the telephone call between Mr. Billingsley and the Defendant was “a little loud” but not “too agitated” and that Mr. Billingsley appeared to be upset. -3-  After the telephone call ended, Mr. Billingsley told Ms. Hill and the victim to drive him to the Defendant’s home. Ms. Hill gathered from the conversation with the Defendant that Mr. Billingsley wanted to retrieve his dog from the Defendant’s home, although he did not mention the dog when they arrived at the home. At the victim’s request, Ms. Hill drove the victim’s car to the Defendant’s home. The victim sat on the back seat behind Ms. Hill, and Mr. Billingsley sat on the front passenger seat. The Defendant arrived approximately four minutes after the others. The Defendant remained inside her car, and Mr. Billingsley left the victim’s car and approached the Defendant’s car, at which time Mr. Billingsley and the Defendant argued. The Defendant remained seated in her car as the argument escalated. Mr. Billingsley then “snatched” the Defendant’s cell phone and returned to the passenger seat of the victim’s car. The Defendant approached the victim’s car, screamed at Mr. Billingsley, and demanded he return her phone. The Defendant asked Ms. Hill and the victim to tell Mr. Billingsley to return the Defendant’s phone, and they told Mr. Billingsley to return it. Mr. Billingsley did not return the phone to the Defendant, and he left the victim’s car again. Although the Defendant was “already heading back to [the Defendant’s] car,” Mr. Billingsley ran toward the Defendant and grabbed her hair, at which time the Defendant “flew and the wig flew in the opposite direction.” When asked if Mr. Billingsley “beat” the Defendant, Ms. Hill stated, “He put his hands on her because he snatched her wig off[.]” Ms. Hill considered snatching off the Defendant’s wig as a “form of beating somebody.” Ms. Hill and the victim yelled at Mr. Billingsley to get in the car because they wanted to leave. Mr. Billingsley returned to the victim’s car, and Ms. Hill drove the victim’s car away from the Defendant’s home. As Ms. Hill drove the victim’s car away from the home, the Defendant entered the Defendant’s car and followed them. Ms. Hill described the Defendant’s driving as “semi- blocking us in,” and Ms. Hill stopped the car in a barbershop parking lot because she did not want anyone to be harmed by the Defendant’s driving and because she did not want the victim’s car damaged. The Defendant stopped her car, as well, and Mr. Billingsley left the victim’s car and told Ms. Hill that he was going to drive. The Defendant, whom Ms. Hill described as upset, continued to ask Mr. Billingsley to return her cell phone, and Mr. Billingsley “yelled” at the Defendant. Ms. Hill moved to the front passenger seat of the victim’s car, and the victim remained on the backseat. Mr. Billingsley drove the victim’s car from the parking lot, and the Defendant followed them in her car. Mr. Billingsley stopped the victim’s car in the middle of the street and left the car. Ms. Hill testified that the Defendant drove her car “up and down the street, trying to hit [Mr. Billingsley] with the car.” Mr. Billingsley threw the Defendant’s cell phone on the ground, picked up a cinder block, and placed it in the victim’s car. Ms. Hill said, though, that Mr. Billingsley ran toward the Defendant’s car with the cinder block, and the Defendant backed up her car quickly. Ms. Hill yelled at Mr. Billingsley to remove the cinder block from the car, and he removed it. Ms. Hill then heard a “[w]hoosh” noise, saw a shattered driver’s side window, and saw the victim had been shot in the head, although the victim was still alive. The Defendant sat on the driver’s seat of her car at the time of -4- the shooting. Mr. Billingsley drove the victim’s car to the hospital, and the victim later died from her injuries. The victim’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was homicide. The Defendant left the scene, as well. Ms. Hill testified that she and the victim did not possess a firearm at the time of the shooting and that she did not see Mr. Billingsley display a firearm. Ms. Hill did not hear Mr. Billingsley threaten to kill the Defendant. Ms. Hill agreed that she told the police that the Defendant “chased” them because of Mr. Billingsley and that the Defendant did not mean to shoot the victim. A video recording obtained from a security system at a home near the scene of the shooting was played for the jury. Referring to the recording, Ms. Hill identified the Defendant’s car. In the recording, the Defendant’s car turned into a driveway, drove in reverse, and came to a stop in the middle of the road. A person who stood in the road threw an unidentifiable object onto the ground, and the Defendant’s car moved forward a short distance. KPD Officer Caleb Coffey responded to 9-1-1 calls on the day of the shooting related to a domestic dispute in the area near the Defendant’s home, and the Defendant “flagged down” the officer. The Defendant reported that her “boyfriend” had assaulted her, had pushed her against a fence, and had taken her cell phone. She, likewise, reported that she entered her car and “chased after him” to retrieve her phone. Officer Coffey described the Defendant’s demeanor as “forced as far as emotions” and said she appeared more concerned about her phone than the assault, although he conceded that people reacted differently to trauma and that he had not met the Defendant previously. Officer Coffey’s body camera recording was played for the jury. Officer Coffey testified that at the time he spoke to the Defendant, he did not connect the shooting to the incident reported by the Defendant. When Officer Coffey asked if the Defendant had heard any gunshots, she denied “pretty nonchalantly” hearing any gunshots. Later in the evening, Officer Coffey and other investigators went to the Defendant’s home, at which time the Defendant denied shooting the victim. Officer Coffey recalled that the Defendant was “less emotional.” The body camera video recording from that night was played for the jury. In the recording, the Defendant denied that she shot anyone and denied that she had a gun. Photographs of the victim’s car taken at the hospital after the shooting reflected a single bullet hole to the rear driver’s side window, which former KPD crime scene technician Jessica Geiger described as an entrance hole. Photographs also reflected a single bullet hole to the rear passenger-side window, which Ms. Geiger described as an exit hole. Blood was visible on the back seat. A cell phone was found inside the car, and the victim’s cell phone was found on the hood of the car. Photographs from the scene of the shooting -5- reflected a piece of a cell phone. Photographs of the Defendant reflected that she did not have visible injuries on her face, arms, hands, legs, or back. The Defendant underwent a gunshot residue test, and the results of the analysis showed the presence of gunshot primer residue, indicating a “link to a [firearm] discharge,” not that the person fired the weapon. The handgun was found inside the Defendant’s home, and a search of the Defendant’s car showed a cartridge casing under the front passenger seat. An analysis of the cartridge casing and the handgun showed that the cartridge casing was fired from the handgun. The twenty-three-year-old Defendant testified that she and Mr. Billingsley began a romantic relationship in 2020, that he became “controlling and abusive,” and that he “put hands” on her. She recalled the first time Mr. Billingsley assaulted her at his home. She said that she was in the bathroom, that Mr. Billingsley entered the bathroom, and that he choked her and shoved her head into a wall. She said he became angry because “some guy” sent her a text message. The Defendant called her mother, who picked up the Defendant. The Defendant did not call the police because she “got away from him.” She said that after the incident, she did not “want any dealings with him.” She admitted, though, that she gave him a ride home at an unspecified time and said that he was upset and refused to leave her car because she no longer wanted to continue the relationship. She said the incident escalated, that he choked her, and that she called the police. Mr. Billingsley was arrested when the police found a gun in his possession during the investigation of the assault. She said that Mr. Billingsley had bought the Defendant a dog, who lived with her, and that he wanted the dog “every time he gets mad about something.” The Defendant denied that she was with Mr. Billingsley during his video call with Ms. Hill on July 13, 2022, and testified that she was not in contact with Mr. Billingsley at this time. On the day of the shooting, she worked until 4:30 p.m. and later received telephone calls that showed “no caller ID.” The Defendant knew the caller was Mr. Billingsley because she had his telephone number blocked. The Defendant declined to answer the calls and went to the store to purchase items for her mother. While at the store, she continued to receive calls that showed no caller ID, but she also received a call from an unknown number, which she answered. The Defendant said that Mr. Billingsley was the caller and that he cursed her and threatened “to put a bullet to [her] mother’s house.” Mr. Billingsley did not mention the dog during the call. The Defendant left the store and returned home to find Mr. Billingsley knocking on her front door. She remained in her car, partially lowered the driver’s side window, and told him to leave. She called her mother, who was inside the home, to inform her of Mr. Billingsley’s presence. As the Defendant spoke to her mother, Mr. Billingsley approached the Defendant’s car, “snatche[d]” her cell phone, and returned to the victim’s car. -6-  The Defendant left her car, approached the victim’s car, and “nicely” asked the victim and Ms. Hill to instruct Mr. Billingsley to return the cell phone. The Defendant said that the women did not respond and did not instruct Mr. Billingsley to return the phone. The Defendant walked away from the victim’s car, and Mr. Billingsley approached her from behind, pulled off her wig, and punched her on “the face, in the head -- I don’t really know. I, like, blacked out,” which she described as “everything was a blur.” She recalled that the women inside the victim’s car watched. Mr. Billingsley returned to the victim’s car, and Mr. Billingsley and the women left. The Defendant followed them in her car, and she admitted that she “wasn’t thinking” and wanted her phone. When the victim’s car stopped in the parking lot, the Defendant blocked the victim’s car. Mr. Billingsley left the victim’s car and approached the Defendant’s car while he held her phone. Although the Defendant thought Mr. Billingsley was going to return her phone, he struck the car’s window with the phone and returned to the victim’s car. She said that Mr. Billingsley’s conduct left her “confused” and that he was “playing games” and “toying” with her. Mr. Billingsley drove the victim’s car from the parking lot, and the Defendant left the area. She denied following the victim’s car. When both cars arrived at the scene of the shooting, Mr. Billingsley left the victim’s car and walked toward the Defendant’s car with her cell phone. Mr. Billingsley walked toward an area of rocks and picked up a cinder block. The Defendant said that as Mr. Billingsley picked up the cinder block, she drove forward, turned into a driveway, and drove her car in reverse. She said that Mr. Billingsley ran toward her with the cinder block and that she drove the car in reverse until Mr. Billingsley stopped. The Defendant was scared because she thought he was going to throw it through the windshield of her car. Mr. Billingsley “smashed” her cell phone in the roadway and began to walk back toward the victim’s car. The Defendant said that she drove her car toward him as he stood in the middle of the road to “scare him” and that he “jumped out of the way.” She admitted, though, that she told the police she tried to hit him with her car. She said she wanted to “scare him out of the way.” The Defendant did not hit Mr. Billingsley with her car, but she drove her car past the victim’s car and turned her car around because she “was trying to see what he did with [her] phone.” She said Mr. Billingsley stood beside the victim’s car, threatened to kill her, and reached inside the victim’s car. The Defendant then “pulled up, and [she] shot the gun.” She said she fired the gun because she believed Mr. Billingsley when he said he was going to kill her. She knew Mr. Billingsley generally carried a gun and said she was trying to protect herself from Mr. Billingsley. She admitted, though, that she did not see Mr. Billingsley with a gun at the time of the shooting. She said she did not aim the gun at him and denied she knew she had shot anyone. She said she did not intend to hurt the victim. She understood, though, that firing a gun at a car with people inside could result in someone being shot. After the shooting, the Defendant returned home. She admitted that she did not tell the police that she fired the gun because she did not know the victim had been shot and because she had been scared of what might happen. She said her “head was everywhere.” -7- She ultimately admitted to the police that she fired the gun but stated that she did not have any intention to shoot anyone when she left her home. Although the trial court provided a self-defense jury instruction, the jury found the Defendant guilty of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. She received a sixteen-year sentence. This appeal followed. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by limiting her cross-examination of the State’s witnesses in connection with the suspected drugs and money found inside the victim’s car, which allowed the State to refer to the victim “as an innocent third party” during closing argument and which resulted in the denial of her right to present a complete defense. The State responds that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the defense’s cross-examination of the victim’s “potential drug possession.” The State asserts that the Defendant has “waived” appellate review of the State’s closing argument because she did not object contemporaneously and, alternatively, that she is not entitled to plain error relief. The State argues that the Defendant has waived appellate review of her constitutional claim because she failed to raise the issue at the evidentiary hearing and in her motion for a new trial. Alternatively, the State argues that she is not entitled to plain error relief. A. Scope of Cross-Examination on Alleged Drugs and Money “[C]ross-examination is a fundamental right.” State v. Dishman, 915 S.W.2d 458, 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “[A] denial of the right to an effective cross-examination is ‘constitutional error of the first magnitude and amounts to a violation of the basic right to a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hill, 598 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)). “The propriety, scope, manner, and control of cross-examination of witnesses, however, remain within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 285 (Tenn. 2012). Evidence is relevant and generally admissible when it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Relevant evidence, however, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. 403. Questions regarding the admissibility and relevance of evidence, aside from matters involving hearsay evidence, generally lie within the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts will not “interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless a clear abuse appears on the face of the record.” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 809 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007)). A trial court abuses its -8- discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard or reaches a conclusion that is “illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006). Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the admission of otherwise admissible evidence related to other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to show a character trait in order to establish that a person acted in conformity with the trait. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence, though, “may . . . be admissible for other purposes,” including, but not limited to, establishing identity, motive, common scheme or plan, intent, or absence of mistake. Id.; see State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). We begin our analysis with the threshold determination of whether the evidence was relevant. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. The record reflects that, at the time of the shooting, the victim’s car contained two powdery substances and nearly $3,000. Before the trial, the State sought to preclude the defense from questioning the witnesses about the items pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404. At the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor conceded that the untested powdery substances were drugs but argued that the evidence had no connection to the victim’s killing, that the evidence did not play a role in the offenses, and that, as a result, the evidence was irrelevant. The Defendant, however, argued that the evidence involved “contemporaneous bad acts” and sought to question the witnesses about whether an investigation was conducted into the identity of the substances and the source of the money and suspected drugs. The record reflects that Investigator Terry testified that 37.3 grams and 17.7 grams of unidentified substances and $2,933 in small denominations were found inside the victim’s car. Investigator Terry testified that he did not investigate the source of the money or alleged controlled substances and that he did not question Ms. Hill or Mr. Billingsley about the evidence. Investigator Terry said that the Defendant had confessed to shooting the victim before he learned of the potential contraband. His investigation showed that the Defendant confessed to shooting the victim and that the shooting was unrelated to the items found inside the victim’s car. The Defendant told Investigator Terry that Mr. Billingsley came to her home and refused to leave, that a physical altercation ensued, that Mr. Billingsley took the Defendant’s cell phone during the altercation, and that Mr. Billingsley left the scene in the victim’s car. The Defendant admitted during her police interview that she followed the victim’s car, that Mr. Billingsley “smashed” the Defendant’s phone in a roadway, that she attempted to hit Mr. Billingsley with her car, and that she fired the gun in the direction of the victim’s car while knowing the victim and Ms. Hill were inside the car. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the scope of the Defendant’s cross-examination because the evidence was not relevant. The evidence adduced at the hearing neither showed the identity of the powdery substances nor the identity of the owner of the substances and money. As a result, none of the evidence -9- established that the substances were, in fact, unlawful controlled substances, although the parties appeared to have presumed otherwise despite the lack of evidence. None of the evidence at the evidentiary hearing connected the victim to the evidence, albeit the evidence was found inside her car, and none of the evidence established a bad act had occurred with regard to the evidence. The parties speculated that the substances were unlawful controlled substances and that the money was from unlawful drug sales. Speculation is not evidence. Further, Investigator Terry’s credited testimony showed that the shooting was not motivated by or the result of an alleged drug-related offense, and the trial evidence, including the Defendant’s testimony, was consistent in that the offenses were not drug related. The evidence established the incident began as a domestic- and robbery-related incident that ultimately culminated in the Defendant’s firing a gun toward the victim’s car, which resulted in the victim’s death. Thus, evidence of the unidentified substances and the money were irrelevant to the shooting, which rendered the evidence inadmissible. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked that the trial court and the parties did not address the threshold of relevance and analyzed the admissibility of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) in connection with evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the victim. See T.C.A. § 24-7-125 (2017) (expanding Rule 404(b) protections to any person, including a deceased victim, a defendant, a witness, or any other third party); see also State v. Moon, 644 S.W.3d 72, 82-83 (Tenn. 2022) (noting that Code section 24-7-125 expanded Rule 404(b) “protections to all witnesses in a criminal case”). However, evidence of the alleged bad acts of a victim, deceased or living, must be shown to be relevant because relevancy is the threshold requirement for admissibility. Tenn. R. Evid. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. B. Reference to the Victim as an Innocent Third Party During the State’s Closing Argument The Defendant contends that, as an extension of her allegation regarding the trial court’s limiting cross-examination about the alleged drugs and the money found inside the victim’s car, the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to argue to the jury that the victim was an innocent third party bystander. The State responds that the Defendant has waived plenary review of this claim because she did not object contemporaneously during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument and that she is not entitled to plain error relief. Alternatively, the State responds that the prosecutor’s argument was “merely a request for the jury to accredit the State’s evidence” and to conclude that the victim was not a participant in the robbery of the Defendant’s cell phone. -10-  As a preliminary matter, the Defendant does not allege prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Rather, she argues that because the trial court precluded her from questioning the witnesses about the victim’s alleged bad acts involving the alleged drugs and the money, the State, as a result, was permitted to argue to the jury that the victim was an innocent bystander, which precluded a successful self-defense claim. The Defendant points to a brief portion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, in which she stated that self-defense is not available “if the victim was an innocent third party who was recklessly killed by the defendant’s use of force. Tianja Duff is an innocent third party that [the Defendant] didn’t care a thing about.” The record reflects that the Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument. Throughout the defense’s closing argument, defense counsel argued that the Defendant was an “innocent third party” because the victim and Ms. Hill came to the Defendant’s home uninvited, that Ms. Hill and the victim knew Mr. Billingsley was angry at the Defendant, and that Mr. Billingsley assaulted and robbed the Defendant of her cell phone. Counsel further argued that the victim and Ms. Hill acted in concert with Mr. Billingsley and were not innocent parties. The record reflects that the State’s rebuttal argument was in response to the defense’s argument. The defense’s argument, likewise, focused on the Defendant’s testimony that Mr. Billingsley threatened to kill the Defendant while reaching for the cinder block, a deadly weapon, and that the Defendant had the right to defend herself. The State’s theory of the case was that the Defendant fired the gun out of anger after Mr. Billingsley assaulted her and took her phone, that the victim and Ms. Hill were not participants in Mr. Billingsley’s conduct, and that the Defendant fired the gun toward the car while knowing Ms. Hill and the victim sat inside. In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that the victim remained in the back seat of her car during the entire incident, instructed Mr. Billingsley to return the Defendant’s cell phone, and was shot fatally when the Defendant fired the gun toward the car. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. C. Alleged Denial of the Right to Present a Complete Defense The Defendant contends that because she was prohibited from questioning the witnesses about the alleged drugs and money inside the victim’s car, she was denied the right to present evidence to the jury related to “the circumstances around the appearance of these three individuals.” She asserts that the evidence was “central” to her claim of self- defense because the evidence contradicted the prosecution’s “portrayal” of the victim and Ms. Hill as innocent third parties who did not participate in the assault and the taking of the Defendant’s cell phone, thus depriving her of the constitutional right to present a complete defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (holding that the exclusion of evidence related to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession deprived him of the right to a fair trial); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (The Due -11- Process Clause requires that “criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973). The State responds that the Defendant has “waived” appellate consideration of the issue because she failed to raise it at the evidentiary hearing and in the motion for a new trial. Again, any evidence related to the alleged drugs and the money inside the victim’s car was not probative of the offenses at issue in this case and was, therefore, inadmissible. None of the proffered evidence showed, even minimally, that the alleged drugs were related to the shooting death of the victim nor that the alleged drugs were, in fact, unlawful controlled substances. In any event, the Defendant failed to argue at the evidentiary hearing that prohibiting her from questioning the witnesses about the alleged drugs and money would deprive her of her rights to present a complete defense or to a fair trial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 103. Further, the Defendant did not raise the constitutional claim in her motion for a new trial. “‘Before a defendant may raise an issue on appeal as the basis for seeking a new trial, the defendant must present the issue to the trial court in a timely, written motion for a new trial.’” State v. Tony Lamons Gooch, III, No. M2022-01395-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 2814624, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2024) (quoting State v. Christopher James Funk, Sr., No. E2022-01367-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 7130289, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2023)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2024); see T.R.A.P. 3(e); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b).2 Therefore, all issues not raised in a motion for a new trial are considered waived, except for sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing. State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 460 (Tenn. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn. 2024); see T.R.A.P. 3(e). The Defendant has waived plenary review of this issue, and we decline to review it for plain error. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. s/ Robert H. Montgomery, Jr. ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE 2 Because the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure use the term “waiver,” we use that term. See State v. Baylis, --- S.W. ---, ---, No. E2023-00886-SC-R11-CD, 2026 WL 3033430, at *6-7 (Tenn. 2026) (distinguishing between waiver and forfeiture). -12-