State of Tennessee v. Daniel Lemay Sanders
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 13, 2026
DocketM2025-01809-CCA-R3-CD
JudgeJudge Steven W. Sword
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/13/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs November 10, 2026
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DANIEL LEMAY SANDERS
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County
No. 74CC4-1993-CR-3681 Robert Bateman, Judge
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No. M2025-01809-CCA-R3-CD
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Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant, Daniel Lemay Sanders, pled guilty
to one count of first degree premediated murder in the Circuit Court for Robertson County
and received an agreed-upon sentence of life without the possibility of parole in 1995. In
2025, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee
Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed after a brief
hearing. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing
his motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
STEVEN W. SWORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,
JR., J., joined. ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., not participating.
Daniel Lemay Sanders, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Robert J. Nash, District Attorney General; and Jason C. White, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
The Circuit Court for Robertson County created a new numbering system after the Defendant was
indicted. The original case number was 8994, which was renumbered to case number 74CC4-1993-CR-
368. We will reference the new case number in this opinion.
On October 27, 1993, a Robertson County grand jury returned a one-count
indictment charging the Defendant and a codefendant with the September 17, 1993 first
degree premeditated murder of Barbara Sanders, the Defendant’s wife. On January 12,
1994, the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty against both the
Defendant and the codefendant, citing three aggravating circumstances. The Defendant
was also charged in Montgomery County indictment number 33351 with aggravated
kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder relating to the victim’s murder.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant pled guilty to first degree
murder on October 16, 1995. The parties agreed to dismiss the Defendant’s pending
charges in Montgomery County and that the Defendant would receive a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. The trial court accepted the Defendant’s guilty plea and
entered a judgment of conviction consistent with the Defendant’s negotiated plea
agreement that same day.
Subsequently, the Defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in
Robertson County, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Sanders v. State, No. 01C01-9712-CC-00586, 1999 WL 810151, at
*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2000). The post-
conviction court denied relief; this court affirmed; and the Tennessee Supreme Court
denied review. Id.
On September 29, 2025, the Defendant filed a “Rule 36.1 [Motion] to Correct Illegal
Sentence.” In his motion, the Defendant argued that his judgment of conviction was illegal
because it did not include mandatory pretrial jail credits and because the trial court erred
in imposing a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole without first finding
that the State had proven the presence of at least one aggravating circumstance warranting
such a sentence. The trial court held a brief hearing on October 17, 2025, with the parties
present to review the motion. At the hearing, the Defendant confirmed the issues raised in
his motion, and the State responded that the Defendant’s motion did not qualify for relief
pursuant to Rule 36.1. The trial court advised the Defendant that it agreed with the State,
and on September 30, 2025, it denied the Defendant’s motion by written order, concluding
that the motion did not state a colorable claim for relief under Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing
his September 29, 2025 motion. The Defendant raises the following issues in this brief:
(1) Whether [the trial court] erred in ruling that [the Defendant] did not state
a colorable on the issue of [p]retrial [j]ail [c]redits, and therefore ruled that
the trial court did[ not] have to award them.
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(2) Whether [the trial court] erred in ruling that [the Defendant] did not state
a colorable claim on the issue of the original [t]rial [c]ourt imposing the
sentence of [l]ife [w]ithout the [p]ossibility of [p]arole without the State
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the mandatory, statutory requirement of
a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance.
(3) Whether [the trial court] erred by interrupting the [Defendant], twice, as
he attempted to bring up the fact that the original [t]rial [c]ourt lacked
[s]ubject-[m]atter [j]urisdiction over him because the [Defendant] never
signed a valid waiver[] of his right to [t]rial by [j]ury.
(4) Whether [the trial court] erred in refusing to acknowledge, or investigate,
the evidence, that was sent up to the bench, by the [Defendant], proving the
original [t]rial [c]ourt’s [l]ack of [s]ubject-[m]atter [j]urisdiction over the
[Defendant], which[] by law must be investigated.
(5) Whether [the trial court] erred by not immediately reversing the
[Defendant’s] conviction, being that [the trial court] admitted that the
[Defendant] did not have a trial, which clearly amounts to the [Defendant]
being punished under a “Bill of Attainder,” which is contrary to the manifest
tenor of the United States Constitution, which clearly forbids any State from
passing a Bill of Attainder.
(6) Whether or not trial by jury is waivable in felony cases[] in this State, as
it is in contrary to the manifest tenor of Tennessee’s [C]onstitution[,]
Art[icle] 1[, section] 6.
(7) Whether [the trial court] is guilty of changing [its o]rder denying the
[Defendant] Rule 36.1 motion, or whether [the trial court] is guilty of
allowing his [c]lerk to make his judicial decisions for him.
The State responds that the trial court appropriately dismissed the claims presented in the
Defendant’s motion for failing to state a colorable claim for relief and that the Defendant
is not entitled to relief on the remainder of his claims because he raises them for the first
time on appeal. We agree with the State.
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 provides both the criminal defendant
and the State an avenue to seek the correction of an illegal sentence at any time before the
sentence has expired. “[A]n illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable
statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2);
see State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594 (Tenn. 2015). A motion to correct an illegal
sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 “must state with
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particularity the factual allegations on which the claim for relief from an illegal sentence is
based.” Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594. “If the motion states a colorable claim that the
unexpired sentence is illegal, . . . and if the defendant is indigent and is not already
represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant.” Tenn.
R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)(3). On the other hand, if the trial court, after reviewing the motion,
any response thereto, and the record, “determines that the motion fails to state a colorable
claim, it shall enter an order summarily denying the motion.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)(2).
A colorable claim is “a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most
favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.”
Wooden, 478 S.W.2d at 593. Whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 states a colorable claim for relief is a question
of law which this court reviews de novo. Id. at 589 (citing Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d
251, 255 (Tenn. 2007)).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized three categories of sentencing errors:
clerical errors, which involve clerical mistakes in a defendant’s judgment sheet and which
may be corrected through Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36; appealable errors, for
which the Sentencing Act provides a right of direct appeal; and fatal errors, which are “so
profound as to render the sentence illegal and void.” Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 595 (citing
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011)). Rule 36.1 authorizes the
correction of only fatal errors. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 595; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a).
A. PRETRIAL JAIL CREDITS
First, the Defendant argues that his judgment of conviction was illegal because it
did not include mandatory pretrial jail credits. However, our supreme court has held that
“a trial court’s failure to award pretrial jail credits does not render the sentence illegal and
is insufficient, therefore, to establish a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1.” State v.
Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tenn. 2015) (emphasis in original). Rather, “a trial court’s
failure to award pretrial jail credits is a clerical error that is corrected pursuant to Tennessee
Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.” State v. Sawyers, No. M2023-01781-CCA-R3-CD,
2024 WL 3355279, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2024), no perm. app. filed.
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that the Defendant’s argument about his pretrial
jail credits did not state a colorable claim under Rule 36.1. The Defendant is not entitled
to relief on this issue.
B. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Next, the Defendant asserts that his judgment of conviction was illegal because the
trial court erred by imposing a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole
without first finding that the State had proven the presence of at least one aggravating
circumstance warranting such a sentence. The State responds that the Defendant has not
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stated a colorable claim for relief because he entered a guilty plea to an agreed-upon
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, which both statute and Tennessee
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 allow. We agree with the State.
Our statutes provide that “[t]he defendant and the State of Tennessee may enter into
a plea agreement whereby the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for life without
possibility of parole pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-208(d) (1993). Rule 11 governs the trial
court’s consideration and acceptance of pleas by defendants and states that “[b]efore
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court shall determine that there is a factual basis for
the plea.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
At the October 16, 1995 plea hearing, the State submitted the factual basis for the
Defendant’s guilty plea. The parties also discussed the agreed-upon sentence in the plea
agreement and the dismissal of the Defendant’s other charges. The State also implicitly
withdrew its notice of intent to seek the death penalty by agreeing to the sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. This issue illustrates the differences between an open and
a closed guilty plea. A defendant entering an open guilty plea agrees to plead guilty but
reserves the issue of sentencing for the trial court to determine at a separate sentencing
hearing. On the other hand, a defendant entering a closed guilty plea agrees to plead guilty
to the charges as provided in his or her plea agreement and to receive an agreed-upon
sentence. See generally Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). Importantly, the Defendant entered a
closed guilty plea, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, in which he agreed to receive
a sentence of life incarceration without the possibility of parole, and the trial court accepted
that guilty plea. The sentence in a closed plea agreement, as the Defendant entered into
here, is not part of the factual basis for a guilty plea and does not require the inclusion of
findings, such as for enhancement and mitigating factors at a sentencing hearing after a
trial or an open guilty plea with the sentence to be determined, even for a sentence of life
in prison without the possibility of parole. Moreover, the Defendant’s agreed-upon
sentence was clearly a statutorily authorized sentence for first degree murder. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-204(a) (providing that first degree murder carries a sentence of death,
life in prison without the possibility of parole, or life in prison). Accordingly, the
Defendant’s sentence is not illegal, and the trial court properly determined that this issue
does not state a colorable claim for relief. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this
issue.
C. UNPRESERVED ISSUES
The State argues that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on his remaining claims
because he raises them for the first time on appeal. We agree with the State.
Our basic rules of appellate procedure require that issues be presented to the trial
court first to preserve them for appellate review. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in
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this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error
or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the
harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tenn. 2022)
(“It has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be
entertained on appeal.”); State v. Rowland, 520 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tenn. 2017) (“Generally,
issues raised for the first time on appeal are [forfeited].2”). This rule of issue preservation
“ensure[s] that the defense and the prosecution are afforded an opportunity to develop fully
their opposing positions on an issue.” State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tenn. 2018)
(citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009)). By requiring the parties to
preserve their claims by fully litigating them below, the rule “may obviate altogether the
need for appellate review.” Minor, 546 S.W.3d at 65 (citing State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d
1, 57-58 (Tenn. 2010)). Because the Defendant did not present these issues first to the trial
court for determination, they are not preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, the
Defendant is not entitled to relief on these issues.
III. CONCLUSION
Following our review of the record and based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
S/ Steven W. Sword________________
STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE
2
Our supreme court in Rowland used the term “waived” to describe the failure to properly preserve
an issue in the trial court for later appeal. This court has traditionally used “waived” to describe such
inadequacies. However, our supreme court recently distinguished between the terms waiver and forfeiture
stating, “Waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ Forfeiture, by
contrast, is the failure to timely assert a right. The ‘distinguishing feature’ between waiver and forfeiture
is ‘intentionality—waiver is purposeful; forfeiture is inadvertent.’” State v. Baylis --- S.W.3d ---, 2026 WL
3033430, at *6-7 (Tenn. 2026) (citations omitted). Thus, we now substitute “forfeited” for “waived.”
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