State of Tennessee v. Travei Pryor

11/05/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs August 18, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TRAVEI PRYOR Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 128422 D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Senior Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-02048-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ Defendant, Travei Pryor, was convicted after a jury trial of multiple drug and firearm offenses. Defendant also entered open guilty pleas to other drug and firearm offenses. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Defendant was a career offender and imposed an effective sentence of forty-five years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a search of his apartment; (2) admitting evidence of prior drug transactions; and (3) imposing an excessive and out-of-range sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed; Case Remanded ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined. Mary L. Ward, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Travei Pryor. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie Renee Byrd, Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha M. Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.  OPINION Factual and Procedural History This case arises from the Knox County Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”) investigation into suspected drug activity at the Knoxville apartment Defendant shared with his girlfriend (“apartment 536”). Following an August 2022 controlled drug buy, officers searched the apartment in October 2022 and seized drugs, drug paraphernalia, a pistol, and nearly $10,000 in cash. In August 2024, the Knox County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for drug offenses, related firearm offenses, unlawful possession of a firearm following qualifying felony convictions, maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances were used, kept, or sold, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Motion to Suppress Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from apartment 536, arguing that the warrant relied largely on a controlled drug buy conducted forty-five days before the warrant application and that the supporting affidavit omitted the amounts of drugs and money exchanged. At the hearing, the State introduced the warrant and Sergeant Khristian Pickett’s supporting affidavit; no witnesses testified. The warrant was issued on October 7, 2022, and executed on October 12, 2022. In the supporting affidavit, Sergeant Pickett sought a warrant to search apartment 536 based on information obtained from a controlled buy of substances believed to be heroin and fentanyl, surveillance of the apartment, reports from two staff members of the apartment complex, and a traffic stop. Sergeant Pickett described a controlled drug buy at apartment 536 “[b]etween the dates of August 23rd, 2022, and August 27th, 2022.” He stated that he saw Defendant arrive in a black Dodge Charger (“the Charger”), unlock the front door, and signal the confidential informant (“CI”) to come inside. The CI purchased heroin or fentanyl and then surrendered the drugs to Sergeant Pickett. After the controlled drug buy, Sergeant Pickett saw a woman in a blue GMC truck arrive at apartment 536. Defendant signaled for her to come inside; she entered the apartment and left after about thirty seconds. Sergeant Pickett described the CI as “untested” but knowledgeable about street drugs and explained that she was assisting police in exchange for consideration on pending charges. The CI acknowledged purchasing heroin from Defendant, whom she knew as “LA,” several times a week for eighteen months. The CI stated that Defendant sold heroin -2- from the Charger and a silver Infiniti SUV. The CI provided LA’s telephone number to Sergeant Pickett. Two apartment staff members reported frequent, brief visits by people to apartment 536. One confirmed that Defendant lived there with his girlfriend, who had leased the apartment since April 2022. The other provided vehicle descriptions and photographs and reported recurring short visits, including a visit by a man in a charcoal gray BMW on October 2 and a visit by a person in a red SUV and a person in a gold Saturn on October 5. The staff member reported seeing two different Infiniti sedans at the apartment on numerous occasions. On October 6, a maintenance worker observed a red SUV and gold Saturn arrive at apartment 536 and then leave a few minutes later. On October 5 and 6, 2022, Sergeant Pickett observed suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions involving Defendant at apartment 536. On October 6, he observed a person, later identified as Jessica Chavis, exit from the passenger side of a black Infiniti and enter the apartment. He stated that “[w]ith the door still open, [Defendant] conducted a suspected hand to hand drug transaction.” He then followed the black Infiniti and, after observing the vehicle cross the center line three times and exceed the speed limit, conducted a traffic stop. The driver, Carrie Roe, surrendered approximately 1.46 grams of suspected heroin or fentanyl, which field-tested positive for fentanyl, and said that Ms. Chavis had purchased it from “LA.” Ms. Chavis told Sergeant Pickett that she had been purchasing heroin from LA three days a week for about a year and provided his telephone number. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court found that Sergeant Pickett’s observations of “the same thing by different people” twice in two days “with [] Defendant in the . . . doorway,” together with the information obtained from the October traffic stop, “freshen[ed] the information” obtained from the August controlled drug buys “dramatically.” The court concluded that this information established a sufficient nexus to apartment 536 and a reasonable likelihood of ongoing unlawful activity there involving Defendant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. 404(b) hearing At a jury-out hearing, the State sought to introduce evidence of the August controlled buy and October 6 transaction under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) to establish Defendant’s intent to sell. Sergeant Pickett described his observations during both incidents and the recovery of suspected drugs following the October transaction. He testified that these observations helped establish Defendant’s intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture the drugs later found in apartment 536. Sergeant Pickett also testified for the -3- first time that, during his October 5 surveillance, he did not see who opened the door to apartment 536. The trial court found that Sergeant Pickett’s observations during the August 2022 controlled drug buy—specifically, that he sent the CI to apartment 536, watched the CI approach the door, saw Defendant open the door, and saw the CI leave one minute later— “ha[d] probative value and [were] not unfairly prejudicial.” The court also ruled that evidence concerning the October 6, 2022 traffic stop was admissible. However, the court excluded “everything that happened after” the controlled drug buy, finding that the testimony was “too dependent” on the CI’s credibility and had not been sufficiently established to be admissible. The court also excluded the text messages between the CI and Defendant. Jury Trial The State moved to dismiss one count of possession of alprazolam (Count 3) and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of dangerous felonies related to alprazolam (Counts 6 and 9) and one count of possession of methamphetamine (Count 12). Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we will briefly summarize the evidence presented at trial. Sergeant Pickett, testifying as an expert in narcotics investigations, described the controlled buy, subsequent surveillance, and search of apartment 536. During the controlled buy, Defendant retrieved a blue backpack from the Charger and entered the apartment with the CI. Officers later found that backpack, Defendant’s identification and personal documents, and men’s clothing in the master bedroom, where Defendant was located during the search. Officers also recovered suspected drugs, a loaded handgun, digital scales, packaging materials, and nearly $10,000 in cash. Sergeant Pickett opined that the fentanyl and cocaine were possessed with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture. On cross-examination, Sergeant Pickett acknowledged that the controlled substance had not been tested, that some seized items had legitimate uses, and that Defendant’s mail listed other addresses that he had not investigated. DEA forensic chemist Gregory Burgess identified cocaine, fentanyl, and metonitazene in fourteen powder samples. The parties stipulated that Defendant had prior conviction prohibiting firearm possession. The jury convicted Defendant as charged in Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, and 13. After the jury announced its verdict, Defendant chose to enter an open guilty plea as charged to Counts 7, 8, and 14 in lieu of continuing to a bifurcated proceeding with the jury. The plea -4- form contained a notation under the “possible punishments” section that the charge in Count 14 was a Class C felony, and it appeared that the letter “D” had been crossed out. Further down on the plea form, it was noted that Count 14 was “poss. of firearm during commission of dangerous felony w/a prior conviction for 39-17-1324.” Sentencing The presentence report reflected that Defendant was thirty-three years old, had belonged to the Crips gang since age fourteen, and had juvenile adjudications for misdemeanor vandalism, assault, and an offense involving violation of a valid court order. His adult record included federal drug and firearm convictions and the convictions in Case No. 96358B discussed below. He received sixty-six disciplinary infractions while in Tennessee Department of Correction custody from November 2011 to October 2020. Defendant also had pending charges involving assault, reckless endangerment, theft, weapons, drugs, contraband, and violations of a no-contact order. He reported graduating from high school, having good physical and excellent mental health, and using marijuana and opioids until October 2022. He had never held legal employment. His STRONG-R assessment rated him “high violent.” Defendant’s prior convictions in Case No. 96358B arose from offenses against six victims at a Knoxville residence on September 17, 2010. State v. Pryor, No. E2012-02638- CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9271433, at *1, *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2015). Following appellate review, this court reversed four aggravated kidnapping convictions involving two victims and remanded those counts for a new trial. This court affirmed the remaining convictions and directed entry of corrected judgments reflecting merger of the alternative aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions, leaving one conviction for each offense against each corresponding victim. The State introduced certified copies of the original, pre-merger judgment forms and corrected judgments for Counts 8 and 10 reflecting their respective mergers into Counts 7 and 9. The judgments for the remanded aggravated kidnapping counts were not introduced; however, the presentence report reflected that Defendant was convicted of false imprisonment on all four counts. The State noted that Count 4 should merge with Count 7 and Count 5 should merge with Count 8. The State noted that Count 14 carried a mandatory consecutive fifteen-year sentence at 100% service and was “a mandatory stack on top of [C]ounts 1 and 2.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(e)(1) (providing that a sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony “shall be served consecutive to . . . any other sentence the person is . . . sentenced to serve for conviction of the underlying dangerous felony”). -5-  The trial court found that Defendant had six prior Class B felony convictions and qualified as a career offender for the current Class B and Class D felonies. Defendant asserted that he was a Range II offender, arguing that the prior aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery convictions should not count separately because they arose from the same events. He also asserted that the court had previously indicated that it would exclude the kidnapping convictions involving the robbery victims. The trial court explained that offenses involving violence or threatened violence count separately for offender classification even when committed at the same time. The trial court found that Counts 1, 2, and 10 had a mandatory 30-year sentence and that Count 14 had a mandatory 15-year sentence that had to be served consecutively. The trial court stated that it had no discretion and that it was mandated by statute to impose an effective sentence of forty-five years. The sentences were as follows: Count Offense Classification Sentence Possession with intent to sell, deliver, or 30 years at 60% service 1 Class B felony manufacture 15 grams or Concurrent with Count 10 more of fentanyl Possession with intent to sell, deliver, or 30 years at 60% service 2 Class B felony manufacture 0.5 grams or Concurrent with Count 10 more of cocaine Possession of a firearm 12 years at 60% service 4 during the commission of a Class D felony Merged with Count 7 dangerous felony (fentanyl) Possession of a firearm 12 years at 60% service 5 during the commission of a Class D felony Merged with Count 8 dangerous felony (cocaine) Possession of a firearm during the commission of a 12 years at 60% service 7 dangerous felony with a Class D felony Consecutive to Count 1 prior conviction for a dangerous felony (fentanyl) Possession of a firearm 12 years at 60% service 8 during the commission of a Class D felony Consecutive to Counts 2 and dangerous felony with a 10 -6-  prior conviction for a dangerous felony (cocaine) Possession of a firearm 10 with prior violent felony Class B felony 30 years at 85% service conviction Unlawfully keeping or maintaining a dwelling 12 years at 60% service 11 where a controlled Class D felony Concurrent with Count 10 substance was used, kept or sold Possession of drug Class A 11 months, 29 days 13 paraphernalia misdemeanor Concurrent with Count 10 Possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony with prior 15 years at 100% service felony convictions for Concurrent with Counts 7 and 14 Class D felony employing and possession 8; Consecutive to Counts 1, 2, of a firearm during the and 10. commission of a dangerous felony Defendant’s motion for new trial was denied. Defendant timely appealed. Analysis On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to suppress and “in executing the search warrant when the investigating officer lied in his affidavit”; (2) by admitting evidence of the “prior drug transactions”; and (3) by sentencing him as a career offender and imposing an excessive sentence. Motion to Suppress Defendant raises two challenges to the search warrant: that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause and that Sergeant Pickett supplied misleading information. We first address probable cause. We then consider whether Defendant preserved his misleading information claim and whether plain error review is warranted. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. The trial court resolves questions of credibility, evidentiary weight, conflicts in the evidence, and the prevailing party receives the strongest -7- legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). We review the trial court’s conclusions de novo. State v. Carter, 160 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). The federal and state constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and require a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that probable cause supports a search warrant. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7; State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 299 (Tenn. 2017). Probable cause requires more than suspicion but less than absolute certainty or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014). The inquiry is fact-dependent, and we give great deference to the issuing magistrate’s determination. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300. A sworn, written affidavit is an “indispensable prerequisite” to a search warrant. State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 205-06 (Tenn. 2009) (citation omitted). It must contain facts, rather than conclusory allegations, permitting the magistrate to exercise independent judgment and reasonably conclude that evidence will be found in the place to be searched. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300. This nexus between the criminal activity, the place, and the items sought depends on such considerations as the nature of the crime and items, normal inferences about where evidence would be kept, whether the activity was isolated or ongoing, and the opportunity to dispose of evidence. Id. at 300-01. Only information within the affidavit’s four corners may support the probable cause determination. State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tenn. 1998). The affidavit must provide a substantial basis for that determination; the bare conclusions of others are insufficient. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 (1983). In Tuttle, our supreme court overruled State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tenn. 1989) “insofar as it retained the Aguilar/Spinelli1 test” for informant reliability and adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983). Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 301, 303-04. The magistrate makes a practical, commonsense determination whether the circumstances establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in a particular place; the reviewing court ensures that a substantial basis supports that determination. Id. at 303-04. An informant’s basis of knowledge and credibility remain highly relevant, intertwined considerations. Id. at 307- 08. Defendant argues that “there was nothing in the affidavit to support the investigator’s statement that illegal narcotics were sold in the apartment and he could not 1 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). -8- establish ongoing criminal activity.” The State responds that the affidavit established probable cause. Defendant cites State v. Archibald, 334 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010), concerning the required nexus between an apartment and criminal activity and the duration of that nexus, but does not apply it to this case. His second citation provides only a case name and a nonexistent appellate case number. He also supplies the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims, which he has not raised, rather than suppression issues. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) (requiring supporting argument, citations to authority and the record, and the applicable standard of review). Nevertheless, the affidavit established a nexus between apartment 536 and ongoing drug activity. Sergeant Pickett began surveillance in August 2022 and arranged a controlled buy through a CI seeking consideration in a pending criminal case. The CI reported buying heroin from Defendant, known as LA, two to three times weekly for about eighteen months. Sergeant Pickett saw Defendant open the apartment door and the CI follow him inside. The CI left shortly afterward and surrendered suspected drugs. Apartment employees reported that Defendant lived in apartment 536 and that frequent, brief visits had prompted complaints and were consistent with drug activity. One employee had previously provided information to police; Sergeant Pickett deemed the other reliable after questioning that employee about drug culture. On October 5 and 6, 2022, he observed two suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions. After the October 6 encounter, he stopped Ms. Roe’s vehicle. Ms. Roe said that Ms. Chavis had purchased drugs from Defendant on her behalf, and Ms. Chavis reported buying heroin from LA three times weekly for about a year. The trial court found that, although the August buy alone was too remote from the October warrant application, the October observations and traffic stop “freshen[ed] the information,” establishing a nexus between Defendant, apartment 536, and evidence of drug dealing. See Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this ground. Defendant also argues that Sergeant Pickett supplied “misleading information” about observing Defendant engage in hand-to-hand transactions because he later acknowledged that he did not see who opened the door on October 5 or observe any such transactions. The State responds that Defendant first raised this issue on appeal, provided an inadequate record, and did not seek plain error review. Defendant filed no reply brief. Defendant learned at the pretrial Rule 404(b) hearing that Sergeant Pickett had not seen Defendant open the door on October 5, but he neither objected nor sought to reopen -9- the suppression motion then or at trial. Relief is not required when a party fails to take reasonably available action to prevent or nullify an error. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Failure to make a contemporaneous objection waives appellate review. State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The record also lacks the motion for new trial hearing transcript and the trial court’s findings and conclusions. The written motion for new trial asserts only that the court erred by denying suppression. Thus, nothing in the record establishes that Defendant presented the inconsistent testimony claim to the trial court. See State v. Vance, 596 S.W.3d 229, 253 (Tenn. 2020) (limiting appellate review to properly preserved issues). Defendant must provide a fair, accurate, and complete record of proceedings relevant to the issues on appeal; an incomplete record precludes review of an issue requiring the omitted material. State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Tenn. 1993). In that circumstance, we presume the trial court’s ruling was correct. State v. Richardson, 875 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). We may nevertheless review an unpreserved error affecting substantial rights when necessary to do substantial justice. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 (Tenn. 2010). Defendant bears the burden of establishing plain error and generally must raise and argue that basis for relief in his briefing. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 48-49 (Tenn. 2014); State v. Ruiz, 716 S.W.3d 439, 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024); State v. Nunez, No. M2024-00179-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1892446, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2025). Defendant neither requests plain error review nor addresses the factors supporting relief. He also filed no reply to the State’s waiver argument. When a defendant fails to respond to such an argument, “only particularly compelling or egregious circumstances could typically justify our sua sponte consideration of plain error relief.” Ruiz, 716 S.W.3d at 454 (quoting State v. Thompson, No. W2022-01535-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4552193, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2023)). No such circumstances appear here, and we decline plain error review. 404(b) Evidence Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting “404(b) evidence of the CI and [Ms. Roe]’s controlled buys in which the probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.”2 Defendant argues, 2 We note that the incident involving Ms. Roe was not a controlled drug buy. - 10 -  [T]he admissibility of this evidence that [Defendant] engaged in a hand to hand transaction with these two individuals was not only contrary to the facts at trial but there was no evidence of the quantity of drugs, these drugs were never tested and the investigator did not observe that it was [Defendant] that even opened the door. Defendant submits that the possibility that his girlfriend or “an unnamed individual” opened the apartment door lessened the probative value such that it was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Defendant’s brief does not contain a standard of review for the issue, and his discussion of the applicable law is limited to one sentence: “Tennessee Rule 403 [sic] permits the admissibility of evidence of prior conduct if the evidence of other acts is relevant to a litigated issue such as identity, intent or rebuttal of accident or mistake and the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” The State responds that Defendant has waived consideration of this issue for failure to adequately brief it. The State correctly notes that “simply raising an issue is not sufficient to preserve it for appellate review.” State v. Gooch, No. M2022-01395-CCA- R3-CD, 2024 WL 2814624, at *4 n.4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2024), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2024). Defendant’s brief fails to set out the standard of review, cite to applicable authority, or discuss specific facts in the record to support his argument. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b) (stating that “[i]ssues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court”). Defendant has not filed a reply brief to respond to the State’s waiver argument. We agree with the State that Defendant’s brief is inadequate and conclude that this issue is waived. In addition, Defendant’s motion for new trial referenced his “prior conviction for drug dealing” and did not discuss the controlled drug buy. The transcript of the motion for new trial hearing and any written order from the trial court denying the motion are not in the record. Because this issue has otherwise been waived, we will briefly note that, on the record before us, it appears that Defendant failed to preserve his issue by not including it in the motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (stating that, “in all cases tried by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be predicated upon error in the admission . . . of evidence . . . unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as waived”). Finally, we note an additional, one-sentence argument in Defendant’s brief that because “the CI and [Ms. Roe] did not testify, it violated the [C]onfrontation C[l]ause because Defendant, through his counsel, was not allowed to cross[-]examine these individuals.” Defendant has waived any confrontation issue for failure to raise it in the court below, include it in his motion for new trial, include it in his statement of the issues - 11 - in his brief, or adequately brief it as a separate issue. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b). Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. Sentencing Defendant argues that his prior convictions “were all part of one event” and that his sentence was “excessive and improper and contrary to the sentencing statute.” Although the State urges waiver for inadequate briefing, we will consider the sentencing issue, consistent with this court’s traditional reluctance to waive sentencing issues. Defendant cites no supporting statutes, case law, transcript references, or facts, and four of the seven cases in his Table of Authorities have either an incorrect citation or case name. We caution counsel that inadequate briefing of any issue, including sentencing, may result in waiver. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b). The trial court must state on the record the factors it considered and its reasons for the sentence imposed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e); State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012). We review a within-range sentence reflecting a proper application of the purposes and principles of sentencing for an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707. Defendant bears the burden of establishing that his sentence was improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. A defendant convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony qualifies as a career offender if the defendant has six or more prior Class A, B, or C felony convictions. A defendant convicted of a Class D or E felony qualifies if the defendant has six or more prior felony convictions of any classification. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-108(a)(1), (3). The presentence report, certified judgments, and this court’s opinion in the direct appeal of Case No. 96358B support the trial court’s finding that Defendant had six prior Class B felony convictions—two for aggravated robbery and four for aggravated kidnapping—and two prior Class C felony convictions—aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-108(b)(4), although multiple felonies committed within twenty-four hours generally count as one conviction, the statute excepts aggravated burglary and offenses whose statutory elements include bodily injury, serious bodily injury, or threatened bodily injury or serious bodily injury. Defendant’s aggravated burglary conviction falls within the express exception. His aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions involved the possession and employment of a firearm, threatening bodily injury to the victims. The use of a deadly weapon necessarily creates “a great potential for bodily injury.” State v. Cunningham, No. W2001-02941- CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21729423, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2003) (citing State v. Nix, 922 S.W.2d 894, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). These eight convictions therefore - 12 - count separately and establish Defendant’s career-offender status, regardless of whether they arose from one event. A career offender must receive the maximum sentence within Range III. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-108(c). The maximum Range III sentence is thirty years for a Class B felony and twelve years for a Class D felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(c)(2), (4). The trial court therefore properly imposed thirty-year sentences for the Class B felonies in Counts 1, 2, and 10 and twelve-year sentences for the Class D felonies in Counts 4, 5, 7, 8, and 11. Count 14, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, carried a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years at 100 percent service because Defendant had prior convictions under the same firearm statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-1324(j). That sentence must run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying dangerous felony, here, possession of fentanyl and cocaine with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture in Counts 1 and 2. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The minimum permissible effective sentence was therefore forty-five years: the concurrent thirty-year sentences plus the consecutive fifteen-year sentence in Count 14. Counts 7 and 8 ran concurrently with Count 14, and Counts 4 and 5 merged into Counts 7 and 8, respectively. The sentences in Counts 11 and 13 ran concurrently with Count 10. Because the trial court could not have imposed a shorter effective sentence, Defendant has not established that his sentence was excessive. He is not entitled to relief. Clerical Error The judgment form in Count 14, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, reflects that Defendant was convicted of a Class C felony, and the statutory citation is to Code section 39-17-1324(j). However, he was indicted and convicted of a violation of Code section 39-17-1324(a), which provides, “It is an offense to possess a firearm or antique firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.” Code section 39-17-1324(g) states, “A violation of subsection (a) is a Class D felony[.]” Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 14 reflecting that Defendant’s conviction is for a violation of Code section 39-17-1324(a), a Class D felony. Defendant’s sentence in Count 14 will remain the same pursuant to Code section 39-17-1324(j), which mandates that Defendant serve a sentence of fifteen years at 100% service because he has prior convictions for violating Code section 39-17-1324(a) and (b). - 13 -  Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed, and the case is remanded for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14. s/Robert L. Holloway, Jr. ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE - 14 -