Full Opinion

11/13/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 20, 2026 SHAWN RAFAEL BOUGH v. GRADY PERRY, WARDEN1 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Trousdale County No. 2025-CV-5177 Michael Wayne Collins, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-01390-CCA-R3-HC ___________________________________ The Petitioner, Shawn Rafael Bough, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he claims that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition for noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b)(4) and that his judgment of conviction for first degree felony murder is void for lack of jurisdiction because the jury convicted him on a greater predicate felony than what was charged in the indictment. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined. Olin Baker, Charlotte, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shawn Rafael Bough. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin L. Barker, Assistant Attorney General; and Jason L. Lawson, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTS This case has a lengthy procedural history. On the morning of December 20, 1998, the Petitioner and his codefendant shot and killed the front desk clerk at the Expo Inn in Knoxville. See State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 456-58 (Tenn. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn. 2024). In May 1999, the Knox County 1 Grady Perry was the warden when this case arose. Stanley Lovett is the current warden. Grand Jury indicted them for first degree premeditated murder in count one, first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of robbery in count two, and especially aggravated robbery in count three. The Petitioner went to trial in June 2001. The trial transcript reflects that during a discussion about the final jury charge, the State questioned the trial court’s plan to instruct the jury on first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of especially aggravated robbery when the predicate felony alleged in the indictment was robbery. The State, concerned that the proposed instruction would increase the State’s burden of proof, requested that the trial court instruct the jury on first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of robbery. However, the trial court refused, stating that “if they believe there was a robbery, there is absolutely no dispute that it is an especially aggravated robbery.” The jury found the Petitioner guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery but not guilty of first degree premeditated murder. Id. at 458-59. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life for felony murder and twenty-one years for especially aggravated robbery. Id. at 459. On direct appeal, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the Petitioner’s convictions but held that he waived most of his other issues because his original motion for new trial and his amended motions for new trial were untimely. Id. Our supreme court affirmed this court with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence but reversed as to the timeliness of the motions for new trial and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the issues this court had deemed waived. Id. at 465-66. On remand, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Bough, No. E2004-02928-CCA-RM-CD, 2005 WL 100842, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 23, 2005). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Bough v. State, No. E2007-00475-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 3026395, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008). One of the issues raised in the petition was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s instructing the jury on first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of especially aggravated robbery. Id. at *8. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and this court affirmed, concluding that the Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court’s instructing the jury on the greater predicate offense. Id. In March 2010, the Petitioner filed his first state petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the trial court’s incorrect jury instruction constructively amended the indictment after double jeopardy had attached. Bough v. Morrow, No. E2010-01194-CCA- R3-HC, 2011 WL 2118965, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2011), no perm. app. filed. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to -2- attach the judgments of conviction as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29- 21-107(b)(2) and, alternatively, because the issue was not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id. This court affirmed the lower court, stating that erroneous jury instructions did not form the basis for habeas corpus relief. Id. at *2 (citing Davis v. Carlton, No. E2007-01279-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 299067, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2008)). The Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence in the form of a sworn affidavit in which his codefendant claimed to be the sole perpetrator of the crimes. Bough v. State, No. E2017-00015-CCA-R3-ECN, 2017 WL 3017289, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017). The coram nobis court held a hearing in which the codefendant testified, but the court concluded that the codefendant was not credible. Id. at *5. The coram nobis court denied relief, and this court affirmed. Id. at *8. In 2018, the Petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming, in pertinent part, that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to properly challenge the felony murder instruction as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Bough v. Hampton, No. 19-5181, 2019 WL 4017414, at *1 (6th Cir. June 10, 2019). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the petition was time-barred and that the Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at *3. In November 2022, the Petitioner filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, raising the same claim that he raised in his prior state habeas corpus petition: The trial court constructively amended the indictment when it incorrectly instructed the jury on first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Bough, No. E2022-01788- CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 8716540, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2023), no perm. app. filed. The trial court denied the Petitioner’s 36.1 motion for failure to state a colorable claim, and this court again affirmed the denial. Id. at *2. On April 25, 2025, the Petitioner, through counsel, filed his second state petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is the subject of this appeal. In the petition, he claimed that his judgment of conviction for first degree felony murder was void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for the “greater, unindicted offense” of first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner asserted that his claim differed from the claim raised in his 2010 habeas corpus petition in that “[u]nlike the [2010] claim, which focused on a trial error (jury instruction issue), this petition challenges the court’s authority to convict [the Petitioner] of an offense not contained in the indictment.” The Petitioner further asserted that “[t]his distinction is crucial” because the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of especially aggravated robbery -3- rendered the judgment void. The Petitioner attached to his petition copies of the indictment, the judgment of conviction for felony murder, the trial and sentencing hearing transcripts, and his 2010 habeas corpus petition. On July 10, 2025, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition summarily on the bases that the petition was (1) procedurally deficient pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b)(4) because the Petitioner failed to attach the order dismissing the 2010 habeas corpus petition and (2) failed to assert a cognizable claim that, even if meritorious, would render the judgment void. The State attached a proposed order dismissing the habeas corpus petition to its motion. The habeas corpus court signed the order on July 17 and entered the order on the morning of July 18, 2025. That afternoon, the Petitioner filed a motion for leave to supplement the record with the missing 2010 order, claiming that the order was not available when he filed his habeas corpus petition. He attached a copy of the 2010 order to the motion. At the same time he filed the motion for leave to supplement the record, he also filed a response to the State’s motion to dismiss in which he asserted that he had “cured” the procedural deficiency by supplementing the record with the missing order. On August 21, 2025, the habeas corpus court entered a second order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus, stating that the Knox County Criminal Court appeared to have jurisdiction when the Petitioner’s case was tried, that the judgment was not facially void, that the Petitioner failed to allege a cognizable claim, and that he failed to comply with statutory pleading requirements. On September 11, 2025, the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, appealing the habeas corpus court’s August 21, 2025 order dismissing the petition. On February 9, 2026, the Petitioner filed written notice in the habeas corpus court that he was no longer seeking to supplement the record with the missing order and that he was withdrawing his motion for leave to supplement the record. On March 23, 2026, the habeas corpus court entered an order in which it “DENIED as moot” the motion for leave to supplement the record because the court dismissed the habeas corpus petition on July 18, 2025, before the Petitioner filed the motion. In a footnote, the court stated that the order entered on July 18, 2025, was “operative” and that the court did not remember it had entered the July 18 order when it entered the August 21 order. The court referred to the August 21 order as “a nullity.” 2 2 There is some confusion in the record about the date of the order. The habeas corpus court referred to the August 17th order and the August 21st order. The record shows that the order was signed on August 17 but was not entered until August 21. This is the same order. -4- ANALYSIS The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition due to procedural noncompliance because he filed the motion for leave to supplement the record and attached the missing 2010 order before the habeas corpus court entered its “final” order dismissing the petition on August 21, 2025. He further contends that the habeas corpus court incorrectly treated the petition as raising the same claim previously rejected in 2010, asserting instead that his present challenge is jurisdictional and, therefore, renders the judgment void. The State responds that we should dismiss the appeal because the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the interest of justice does not warrant our waiving the timely filing requirement. The State also argues that, regardless, the petition was procedurally deficient and meritless. We agree with the State’s latter arguments. Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right to seek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). As a prerequisite to habeas corpus relief, a petitioner “must be ‘imprisoned or restrained of liberty’ by the challenged convictions.” Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 n.7 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101). Additionally, “[s]uch relief is available only when it appears from the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings that a trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence a defendant or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101. In other words, habeas corpus relief may be sought only when the judgment is void, not merely voidable. Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. “A void judgment is one that is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007). Whether a petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief is a question of law reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 255. Initially, we must determine whether the Petitioner’s September 11, 2025 notice of appeal was timely. The habeas corpus court entered the first order dismissing the petition on July 18, 2025. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment unless a qualifying tolling motion is filed. Rule 4(c) identifies the motions that toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, and a motion to supplement the record is not one of them. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Lock, 839 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Thus, the Petitioner’s time to file a notice of appeal expired thirty days after July 18, 2025. Moreover, the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing the petition became final thirty days after entry so that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its August 21, 2025 order dismissing the petition. See Grooms v. State, No. E2014-01228-CCA-R3-HC, 2015 WL 1396474, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2015) (holding that order denying petition for -5- habeas corpus relief becomes final thirty days after entry and habeas corpus court loses jurisdiction to issue additional orders on the petition). Consequently, the Petitioner’s September 11, 2025 notice of appeal was untimely. A notice of appeal is not jurisdictional, and the requirement for a timely notice of appeal may be waived in the interest of justice. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). “In determining whether waiver is appropriate, this [c]ourt will consider the nature of the issues presented for review, the reasons for and the length of the delay in seeking relief, and any other relevant factors presented in the particular case.” State v. Broyld, No. M2005-00299-CCA- R3-CO, 2005 WL 3543415, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2005), no perm. app. filed. The appealing party “bears the responsibility to properly perfect his [or her] appeal or to demonstrate that the ‘interests of justice’ merit waiver of an untimely filed notice of appeal.” State v. Thomas, No. W2022-00109-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 328337, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 7, 2023). Here, the State moved for summary dismissal of the habeas corpus petition because the Petitioner failed to attach the order dismissing the 2010 habeas corpus petition to his new petition. The habeas corpus court entered the order dismissing the petition just eight days later on July 18, 2025, the same day the Petitioner filed a motion for leave to supplement the record with the missing order. To add to the confusion, the habeas corpus court then entered a second order dismissing the habeas corpus petition on August 21, 2025. We note that the Petitioner’s September 11, 2025 notice of appeal was timely in relation to the August 21 order. For these reasons, we choose to waive the timely filing requirement for the Petitioner’s notice of appeal. The Petitioner claims that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for procedural noncompliance because he cured the deficiency. We disagree. Although the Petitioner filed a motion for leave to supplement the record with the missing 2010 order, the habeas corpus did not rule on the motion. Moreover, even if the Petitioner’s notice of appeal had been timely, once he filed the notice of appeal, the jurisdiction of this court attached, and the habeas corpus court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003). We note that on February 9, 2026, the Petitioner inherently acknowledged that the habeas corpus court never ruled on the motion by notifying the habeas corpus court that he was no longer seeking to supplement the record with the missing order and that he was withdrawing the motion. The procedural requirements for habeas corpus relief are mandatory and must be strictly followed. Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 259. “A trial court properly may choose to summarily dismiss a petition for failing to comply with the statutory procedural requirements.” Id. at 260. Therefore, the habeas corpus court did not err by summarily dismissing the petition on procedural grounds. -6- In any event, we find no merit to the Petitioner’s claim that his judgment for first degree felony murder is void. Although he frames the issue for habeas corpus relief as one of a lack of jurisdiction, his claim that the jury instructions created a constructive amendment to the indictment is the sole underlying legal basis for the jurisdictional challenge. See Majors v. State, No. E2015-00400-CCA-R3-HC, 2015 WL 5656340, at *1- 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2015) (addressing petitioner’s claim that trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him because jury instructions constructively amended the indictment). Thus, nothing in the current petition for writ of habeas corpus warrants a departure from our previous ruling that his claim, even if true, would not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Bough, 2011 WL 2118965, at *2. CONCLUSION Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. s/ JOHN W. CAMPBELL JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE -7-