Antoneo Williams v. State of Tennessee

11/12/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE October 27, 2026 Session ANTONEO WILLIAMS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 129242 Hector Sanchez, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01565-CCA-R3-HC ___________________________________ The petitioner, Antoneo Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Criminal Court for Knox County, arguing the habeas corpus court erred in the denial of his petition due to factual errors and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREEHOLTZ and STACY L. STREET, JJ., joined. Gerald L. Gulley, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Antoneo Williams. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Takisha Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION Facts and Procedural History A Knox County jury convicted the petitioner of attempted second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment.1 In addition, the defendant’s sentence was enhanced based on the jury’s finding that he was a member of a gang who engaged in criminal gang related offenses. At sentencing, the trial court classified the petitioner as a 1 We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the petitioner’s issue on appeal. Range II offender and imposed a total effective sentence of fifty-three years in confinement with the Tennessee Department of Correction.2 In finding the petitioner to be a Range II offender, the trial court considered two juvenile adjudications that occurred prior to 2010. In 2015, the petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by relying on his juvenile criminal history to increase his offender classification. State v. Williams, No. E2014-01076-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5023136, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2016). Specifically, he contended Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-106(b)(3)(B), which allowed for the consideration of a juvenile conviction if the conviction would constitute a class A or class B felony if committed by an adult, was antithetical to the longstanding constitutional protection of minors. Id. at *11. This Court recognized, however, that while the Tennessee Code had not previously allowed trial courts to use a defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication to establish offender classification, the legislature had amended the Code in 2010, approving the use in limited circumstances. Id. at *11. The amendment was to apply to “all defendants committing offenses on or after July 1, 2010.” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (Compiler’s Notes)). In affirming the defendant’s sentence, this Court noted it had already addressed the statutory change in State v. Fusco by recognizing that the Legislature had made the choice to reduce the protection given to juvenile adjudications. Id. (citing State v. Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504, 544-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012)). Accordingly, this Court affirmed the trial court’s use of the petitioner’s juvenile adjudications as the basis for his Range II classification. Id. On May 26, 2024, the petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he asserted for the first time that the trial court’s use of his prior juvenile adjudications was a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. After the appointment of counsel and a hearing, the habeas corpus court entered an order denying the petition on July 15, 2025. In its order, the habeas corpus court, citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b), noted the petitioner’s failure to comply with statutorily mandated procedures: failure to attach the challenged judgments, failure to provide an adequate record, failure to state that he had already challenged the legality of his detention in other actions, and failure to state that this was his first application for the writ. Ultimately, the habeas corpus court held that “[c]hallenging the use of prior juvenile 2 In 2018, the trial court entered an amended judgment reflecting the criminal gang enhancement was no longer applicable to the petitioner. The petitioner’s sentence was modified to an effective thirty- eight-year sentence. -2- adjudications for sentence enhancement through habeas corpus is not appropriate unless the petitioner can demonstrate that the judgment itself is void or unconstitutional.” On October 6, 2025, the petitioner filed a pro se motion seeking permission to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. This Court remanded the matter to the trial court for determination of the petitioner’s representation status. After determining the petitioner was, in fact, represented by counsel and after counsel filed a subsequent motion asking this Court to waive the timeliness of the notice of appeal, this Court concluded that the interest of justice required waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal and granted the petitioner’s motion. Analysis In this appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas corpus court erred in denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. More specifically, the petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court made factual errors in its order by finding that the petitioner had not complied with the statutorily mandated procedures required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b). Further, the petitioner argues that his sentence is void because it was imposed using his juvenile adjudications, a process which was not allowed when his juvenile offense occurred, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The State contends the habeas corpus court’s denial was proper as the petition failed to state a cognizable claim. We agree with the State. Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right for prisoners to seek habeas corpus relief. In Tennessee, “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatsoever . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101. A writ of habeas corpus will only be granted in the case of a void judgment or to free a prisoner held in custody after his term of imprisonment has expired. Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tenn. 1992). Because the principal issue in this case is whether the habeas corpus court erred in denying the petitioner’s application, the question is one of law, which we review “de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the conclusion of the court below.” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. 2010). Thus, the scope of the writ is narrow. Its successful prosecution “has long been limited to showing that the original judgment of conviction was void due to a lack of jurisdiction by the convicting court or to showing that the sentence has expired.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000). That limitation is not merely procedural; it reflects a considered constitutional boundary. A judgment that is merely irregular, or one that might have been challenged on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, does not cross that threshold. -3-  Habeas corpus procedural requirements “are mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Bateman v. Smith, 194 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tenn. 1946)). One such requirement is that the petitioner must verify that “the legality of [his] restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding of the same character.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107(b)(3). A judgment that “might have been challenged on direct appeal” cannot be “collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Woodley v. Holloway, No. M2025-01383-CCA-R3-HC, 2026 WL 1208986, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2026). Although the petitioner now challenges the trial court’s use of his juvenile adjudications as a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, his direct appeal in 2015 disputed the same issue. In 2015, the petitioner’s direct appeal challenged the trial court’s use of his juvenile adjudications as the basis of his offender classification, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Williams, 2015 WL 5023136, at *11. “Petitioners may not utilize habeas corpus proceedings to continuously relitigate previously determined issues.” Griffin v. Adams, No. W2025-00743-CCA-R3-HC, 2025 WL 3089774, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2025) (citing Myers v. State, 462 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970)), perm. app. denied (Mar. 30, 2026). While the petitioner’s argument has altered, the issue of whether the trial court’s use of the petitioner’s juvenile convictions to determine his offender classification was proper, has not. Therefore, the petitioner has attempted to relitigate an issue that this Court has already determined. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this issue. Further, habeas corpus relief cannot be granted where the petitioner’s claim would render his sentence voidable, not void. As noted by the State, errors in offender classification cannot be corrected through habeas corpus relief. Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tenn. 2008). Because a trial court’s decisions involving offender classification are appealable errors, relief must be sought on direct appeal. Woodley, 2026 WL 1208986, at *2 (citing Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011), superseded by rule on other grounds, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1). A trial court’s factual mistake or inaccuracy in determining an offender classification does not render a sentence illegal or void. Id. Additionally, ex post facto “constitutional infirmities create voidable judgments not void judgments unless the face of the record establishes that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict or sentence the petitioner.” Morris v. Fortner, No. M2008-01022-CCA-R3-HC, 2009 WL 690304, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2009). Therefore, the petitioner’s claim, even if true, would render his sentence voidable, not void, and thus, not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the habeas corpus court’s denial was proper. -4-  Moreover, even if this Court were to address this issue on the merits, our supreme court has held that statutes increasing a punishment upon a repeat offender are not a constitutional violation “even where the prior convictions occurred before the effective date of such statute.” State ex rel. Ves. v. Bomar, 376 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tenn. 1964). Generally, for a law to “fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective – that is, ‘it must apply to events occurring before its enactment’ –and it ‘must disadvantage the offender affected by it,’ . . . by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” State v. Pruitt, 510 S.W.3d 398, 416-17 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997)) (alteration in Pruitt). Habitual or repeat offender statutes that stiffen the penalty on a current offense because of past convictions are not “additional penalties for the earlier crimes.” Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S.728, 732 (1948). Because such statutes “do not undertake to punish for crimes previously committed and for which the offender has paid the penalty imposed by law,” they do not have a retroactive effect or force. McCummings v. State, 134 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tenn. 1939). Therefore, the petitioner’s argument has no merit. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. S/ J. ROSS DYER __ _______ J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE -5-