State of Tennessee v. Monica Black

11/09/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs October 6, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MONICA BLACK Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. W2500074 Raymond J. Lepone, Judge ___________________________________ No. W2025-01655-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ Defendant, Monica Black, entered an Alford plea1 to one count of reckless aggravated assault. The Shelby County Criminal Court accepted Defendant’s plea and, following a sentencing hearing, denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two- year sentence suspended to supervised probation. Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion. Upon review, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MATTHEW J. WILSON and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined. Joseph S. Ozment, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Monica Black. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Lauren Hutton, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION Factual and Procedural Background In January 2025, Defendant was charged by criminal information with reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. On April 24, 2025, Defendant entered an Alford plea to the charge as a Range I standard offender. At the plea submission hearing, the State recited the facts underlying the offense, as follows: 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  On April 16th of 2024, officers responded to a call regarding an aggravated assault at 26 Eastgate Avenue. When they arrived they spoke to Rochanda Tucker who stated that she was just shot at by her boyfriend’s child’s mother[,] [Defendant]. She stated that she was involved in a physical altercation with her boyfriend’s adult child just before the shooting occurred. While waiting for the police to arrive to report the assault, the child’s mother[,] [Defendant][,] arrived at the location making threats and causing a disturbance. [Ms.] Tucker left the scene in her vehicle to avoid further conflict but was followed by [Defendant] occupying her vehicle. [Defendant] followed her and pointed a black handgun out of the driver’s side window. Eventually [Defendant] fired a round at [Ms. Tucker] and missed. When announcing the plea agreement, the parties indicated that Defendant was entering an “open” plea and would be seeking judicial diversion at the sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant submitted a certification of eligibility for diversion from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, indicating that Defendant had not had a prior disqualifying felony or misdemeanor conviction and that Defendant had not been granted diversion previously. Defendant testified that she was a life-long Memphis resident, was married with one living daughter, and was a high school graduate. She reported no prior criminal record and a stable work history, including warehouse and hospital jobs. For the past nine years, she had worked as a school bus and coach bus driver. She held a Class B commercial driver’s license (CDL) and was pursuing a Class A CDL. Defendant stated that a felony conviction could negatively affect her employment opportunities and assured the court that she would comply with any probation conditions. Defendant denied having any conflict with Ms. Tucker but agreed that Ms. Tucker dated the father of Defendant’s daughter. Defendant disagreed with the State’s version of events and denied owning a firearm at the time of the alleged offense. On cross-examination, Defendant acknowledged that Ms. Tucker had photographed her vehicle—a 2006 Ford Fusion—and provided the photograph to police after the incident. She agreed that she was charged originally with a Class C felony aggravated assault in general sessions court and that she was allowed to enter a plea to a reduced charge of reckless aggravated assault. The victim, Ms. Tucker, testified that the incident arose after Defendant’s daughter allegedly took Ms. Tucker’s wallet. According to Ms. Tucker, she was parked on the side of the street waiting for police when Defendant pulled up beside her and confronted her -2- about the wallet, leading Ms. Tucker to drive away. Ms. Tucker testified that Defendant followed her vehicle, displayed a gun, and fired one shot in her direction before driving away. She stated that no one was struck and that witnesses nearby reported hearing the gunshot. Ms. Tucker expressly opposed Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. She testified that granting diversion would undermine accountability for the offense and could send the message that Defendant had “got away with it once” and might be encouraged to engage in similar conduct in the future. Ms. Tucker emphasized the seriousness of Defendant’s actions, noting that Defendant fired a gun in a residential area without regard for who could have been struck by the bullet. She expressed concern that an innocent bystander, including a child or other member of the community, could have been injured or killed. Ms. Tucker further testified that she was not threatening Defendant at the time of the shooting. According to Ms. Tucker, she had ended the confrontation and driven away when Defendant followed her and fired a shot. Based on those circumstances, Ms. Tucker stated that Defendant’s conduct warranted meaningful punishment rather than diversion and expungement of the conviction. Following argument of counsel, the trial court sentenced Defendant to two years at thirty-percent service but suspended the sentence to two years of supervised probation. The court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. In denying judicial diversion, the trial court noted that it had reviewed the presentence report and had considered the testimony of Defendant and Ms. Tucker. The court considered Defendant’s amenability to correction, the circumstances of the offense, Defendant’s criminal record, Defendant’s social history, her physical and mental health, the deterrent value to Defendant as well as others, and the interests of the public as well as Defendant. After considering the applicable factors, the court concluded that the factors weighing against diversion substantially outweighed those favoring relief. Although the court acknowledged that Defendant had no prior criminal history, maintained a positive social history, and presented no concerns regarding her physical or mental health, it found those considerations insufficient to justify diversion under the circumstances. The trial court expressed particular concern regarding Defendant’s amenability to correction, noting that despite her Alford plea, she had accepted no responsibility for the offense and had effectively denied any wrongdoing. The court found Defendant’s testimony not credible and credited Ms. Tucker’s testimony that Defendant followed her and fired a gun at her. The trial court assigned great weight to the circumstances of the offense. It emphasized that Defendant did not merely act impulsively during a confrontation but, -3- instead, followed the victim in a vehicle while armed with a loaded gun, pointed the weapon out of her window at Ms. Tucker, and discharged it. The court characterized those facts as especially troubling and concluded that they weighed heavily against diversion. The court also gave significant weight to the need for deterrence, observing the prevalence of gun-related violence in Memphis and the growing tendency of individuals to use firearms to resolve ordinary disputes. The court concluded that granting diversion under such circumstances would undermine both specific and general deterrence. Likewise, the court determined that the interests of the public would not be served by granting the “highest level of alternative relief” to a defendant who had followed another person and fired a weapon at her. After balancing all relevant factors, including Defendant’s lack of credibility and failure to accept responsibility, the court concluded that judicial diversion was not warranted and denied the request. This timely appeal follows. Analysis On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. She contends that the court placed undue emphasis on her refusal to admit guilt, despite her Alford plea; that the court’s deterrence rationale was generalized and conclusory; and that the circumstances of the offense did not outweigh the factors favoring diversion, including her lack of criminal history, stable employment, strong family and community ties, and the absence of any negative social history or health concerns. According to Defendant, the trial court’s rationale was largely conclusory, and it failed to meaningfully weigh the favorable evidence before denying relief. We disagree. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 governs judicial diversion procedure. “Judicial diversion is a form of ‘legislative largess’ available to qualified defendants.” State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting State v. Schindler, 986 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tenn. 1999). A “qualified defendant” means a defendant who was found guilty or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a Class C, D, or E felony; had not been previously convicted of a felony or Class A misdemeanor for which a sentence of confinement has been served; had not been previously granted judicial or pretrial diversion; and is not seeking deferral for a sexual offense, a DUI, certain offenses against elderly or vulnerable adults, or vehicular assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(i). Upon a finding of guilt, the trial court may place a qualified defendant on probation without entering a judgment of conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). Once a defendant successfully completes probation, the charge is dismissed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 313(a)(2). -4-  The State and Defendant agree that Defendant was a qualified defendant. However, being qualified for diversion does not entitle a defendant to judicial diversion; rather, it simply allows the trial court to grant diversion in appropriate cases. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A qualified defendant bears the burden of proving that he or she is a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. King, 432 S.W.3d at 323. In determining whether a qualified defendant should be granted or denied diversion, the trial court must consider the following factors: (a) the accused’s amenability to correction; (b) the circumstances of the offense; (c) the accused’s criminal record; (d) the accused’s social history; (e) the accused’s physical and mental health; and (f) the deterrence value to the accused as well as others. Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 958. In State v. Electroplating, Inc., this court added a seventh factor that must be considered: (g) “whether judicial diversion will serve the interests of the public as well as the accused.” 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Although the record must reflect that the trial court considered the relevant factors, it need not recite every Parker and Electroplating factor. The court may confine its analysis to the factors applicable to the case and still obtain the presumption of reasonableness. King, 432 S.W.3d at 327. In addition to considering the Parker and Electroplating factors, the trial court must weigh the relevant factors against each other and provide an explanation of its ruling on the record. Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 229. Under the standard of review promulgated in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707-10 (Tenn. 2012), when the trial court considers the relevant Parker and Electroplating factors and places its reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion on the record, the appellate court “must apply a presumption of reasonableness and uphold the grant or denial so long as there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 327. The trial court’s determination should be given a presumption of reasonableness on appeal and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 319. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that -5- causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Tenn. 2015) (citation omitted). Here, the record reflects that the trial court considered the applicable Parker and Electroplating factors and explained its reasoning on the record. As to Defendant’s amenability to correction, the court observed that, although Defendant had entered an Alford plea, she testified at the sentencing hearing and denied the conduct underlying the offense. The court found Defendant’s testimony not credible, credited Ms. Tucker’s testimony, and concluded that Defendant had not accepted responsibility for the conduct at issue. The court considered those findings in assessing Defendant’s amenability to correction, a factor it weighed against the grant of diversion. Citing State v. Leone, No. 02C01-9206-CR-00148, 1993 WL 379204 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 1993),2 Defendant asserts that her Alford plea precluded the trial court from relying upon her refusal to admit guilt when considering judicial diversion. Defendant’s reliance on Leone, however, is misplaced. In Leone, the defendant entered an Alford plea, and at a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion and his application for probation. Id. at *1-2. The trial court’s denial of judicial diversion was based upon “the nature of the offense and whether diversion would serve the ends of justice[,]” with the trial court finding that the defendant was “dishonest and unrepentant.” Id. at *2. On appeal, this court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion but remanded the case for the trial court to further consider other alternatives to incarceration. Id. at *2, 5. The court determined that the defendant’s lack of candor, standing alone, was insufficient to support a complete denial of alternative sentencing; however, the court rejected the proposition that a sentencing court could never consider a defendant’s refusal to acknowledge guilt or demonstrate remorse when sentencing a defendant who entered an Alford plea. Id. at *3-4. Upon remand, the trial court ordered a split confinement sentence, and the defendant again appealed. State v. Leone, No. 02C01-9404-CR-00058, 1994 WL 716244, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1994). On appeal, this court reiterated that a defendant’s refusal to accept responsibility remains a relevant consideration notwithstanding the entry of an Alford plea. This court observed of its earlier opinion, “[o]ur previous holding should not be read to indicate that appellant’s lying and refusal to accept responsibility are irrelevant. On the contrary, as we acknowledged, a defendant’s untruthfulness and lack of repentance or remorse have long been factors considered in determining the appropriateness” of alternatives to incarceration. Id. at *1. 2 We note that Leone was decided prior to the 2005 amendments to our Sentencing Act, which significantly increased a trial court’s discretionary authority in imposing sentences, and prior to our supreme court’s adoption of the abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness standard of review in Bise and King. -6-  The trial court likewise placed significant weight on the circumstances of the offense. Crediting Ms. Tucker’s testimony, the court found that she attempted to disengage from the encounter and leave the scene, yet Defendant pursued her and escalated the situation. The court emphasized that Defendant not only pointed a firearm at Ms. Tucker but discharged it. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the circumstances of the offense weighed “heavily” against the grant of judicial diversion. The trial court further found that the need for deterrence weighed strongly against judicial diversion. The court emphasized the persistent problem in Memphis and Shelby County of individuals resorting to firearms to resolve routine disputes and concluded that granting diversion under these circumstances would undermine the deterrent purpose of sentencing. Given Defendant’s conduct in pursuing the victim, brandishing a firearm, and ultimately discharging it, the court determined that denial of diversion was necessary to discourage Defendant from engaging in similar conduct and to send a clear message that such dangerous behavior will not be met with the extraordinary relief afforded by judicial diversion. See King, 432 S.W.3d at 323. Thus, the court concluded that denying diversion was necessary to deter future similar conduct and to protect the public from similar acts. The trial court determined that Defendant’s amenability to correction, the circumstances of the offense, the need to deter Defendant and others from similar conduct, and the interest in protecting the public all weighed against judicial diversion and outweighed the factors that weighed in Defendant’s favor, such as her criminal history, social background, mental health, employment record, and ties to the community. Because the court considered the relevant Parker and Electroplating factors in denying judicial diversion, its decision is afforded a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 327. There is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision, and Defendant has not shown the court abused its discretion in denying diversion. Id. She is not entitled to relief. Conclusion Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. s/Robert L. Holloway, Jr. ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE -7-