State of Tennessee v. Mario Christopher Martin

11/03/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs August 11, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARIO CHRISTOPHER MARTIN Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County No. 30069 David Allen, Judge No. M2025-00551-CCA-R3-CD The Defendant, Mario Christopher Martin, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon, a Class B felony, for which he is serving a thirty-year sentence at 85% as a career offender. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while his privilege was cancelled, suspended or revoked; speeding; and violating the open container law. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his unlawful firearm possession conviction, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting cross- examination of a defense witness about a prior false report, for which the witness had successfully completed judicial diversion, and (3) the court erred in declining to give a special instruction on constructive possession. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined. L. Samuel Patterson, Jr., Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mario Christopher Martin. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brent Cooper, District Attorney General; Ross M. Boudreaux, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION The Defendant’s convictions arise from a speeding-related traffic stop, in which the Defendant drove his then-girlfriend’s car with a nine-millimeter handgun under the driver’s seat. The Defendant also possessed a green-leafy substance in his pants pocket. An officer smelled the odor of marijuana on the Defendant’s person or coming from the car, and an officer found an open container of alcohol inside the car. The Defendant spoke with his then-girlfriend by telephone during the stop, and she came to the scene and spoke with a police officer. The Defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, second offense driving on a revoked license, possession of an open container of alcohol, and speeding. He pleaded guilty to driving while the privilege was cancelled, suspended, or revoked; possession of an open container of alcohol; and speeding. The State entered a nolle prosequi on the marijuana possession charge. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon. At the trial, the defense theory was that the Defendant’s wife, who had been his girlfriend at the time of the offenses, owned the handgun found under the driver’s seat of her car after the Defendant was stopped for speeding and that the Defendant had no knowledge before the stop that the gun was under the seat. Therefore, the defense theorized, the Defendant did not knowingly possess the gun. At the trial, Lewis County Sheriff’s Deputy Elston Bridges testified that, in the course of his former employment as a Mount Pleasant Police officer, he conducted a speeding-related traffic stop involving the Defendant on July 8, 2022. Deputy Bridges said that, while the Defendant was gathering his documents, the Defendant began a cell phone call with the Defendant’s girlfriend, Kimberly Collins. Deputy Bridges noticed an odor of marijuana. Deputy Bridges agreed that he stepped away from the car and that the Defendant and Ms. Collins remained on a telephone call, out of Deputy Bridges’s hearing. After Deputy Bridges returned to the driver’s side of the car, he asked the Defendant to step out of the car, and the Defendant complied. Deputy Bridges said he advised the Defendant of the odor, asked if there was anything else in the car “that [he] needed to know about,” and requested permission to search the car. Deputy Bridges said the Defendant stated that a pistol was under the driver’s seat. Deputy Bridges confirmed that the Defendant made this statement after speaking with Ms. Collins during the time Deputy Bridges had stepped away from the car. Deputy Bridges said that he asked the Defendant to show him the location of the marijuana and that the Defendant pointed to his left pants pocket. Deputy Bridges identified “a green leafy substance” that he took from the Defendant’s pocket, and it was received as an exhibit. He identified a black, nine- millimeter handgun and magazine containing ammunition, which he said he found under the driver’s seat of the car the Defendant had driven. Deputy Bridges said the magazine had been loaded into the handgun and that a round of ammunition was in the gun’s chamber when he found the gun. Photographs of images from Deputy Bridges’s body camera video recording, which depicted evidence he recovered, were received as an exhibit. Referring to the photographs, Deputy Bridges identified a liquor bottle in a brown bag, a handgun, an ammunition magazine, and a bullet. -2-  Deputy Bridges testified that he determined that the Defendant’s operator’s license was revoked and that the Defendant had a prior felony conviction. A certified copy of the Defendant’s August 6, 2013 conviction for aggravated burglary was received as an exhibit. Officer Bridges said he determined that the car the Defendant drove was registered to “Kimberly” and that her voice could be heard on a cell phone call in his body camera recording. Officer Bridges identified his body camera video recording from the traffic stop, from which some of the audio had been redacted, and it was received as an exhibit and played for the jury. In the recording, the Defendant was the only occupant of a car and sat on the driver’s seat looking through papers as Officer Bridges shined a flashlight into the car. A female voice can be heard from a cell phone. Officer Bridges asked the Defendant to get out of the car, and the Defendant complied. Officer Bridges asked the Defendant if he had anything in the car that was “not supposed to be in there,” and the Defendant replied, “I have a pistol,” but stated, “I’m not a felon or nothing.” Officer Bridges stated that he smelled marijuana and asked when the Defendant had last smoked it. The Defendant stated that he had smoked “before he came up here” but that he had some “on” him. When asked where it was, the Defendant touched his left pants pocket and stated that it was in the pocket. Officer Bridges performed a patdown and removed a plastic bag from the Defendant’s pocket. Officer Bridges asked where the handgun was located, and the Defendant said it was under the seat and gestured toward the driver’s side of the car. Officer Bridges requested permission to search the car, and the Defendant consented and asked to “talk to her” and gestured to his cell phone, which was on the back of the car. Another officer took the cell phone and escorted the Defendant away from the car. Officer Bridges recovered a black handgun from the car and removed a magazine and a bullet from it. He also recovered a brown bag containing a bottle partially filled with liquid. Officer Bridges continued to search the car. He eventually approached the Defendant, who was seated in the back of a patrol car and asked about the offenses with which he was being charged. Officer Bridges reviewed the charges. A woman appeared at the scene and spoke with Officer Bridges, although the audio of their conversation was redacted from the video recording. Officer Bridges testified that the two other officers visible in the recording were Maury County Sheriff’s Deputy Houston Paul and Mount Pleasant Police Sergeant Gray. Officer Bridges said that, based upon his conversations at the scene with the Defendant and Ms. Collins and his investigation, he had no information to believe that the gun belonged to anyone other than the Defendant. Officer Bridges acknowledged that he did not have the gun tested to determine if it contained the Defendant’s DNA or fingerprints. Officer Bridges said Ms. Collins did not claim ownership of the gun when he spoke to her but did not know if she spoke with the other officers at the scene and claimed to own the gun. -3-  Maury County Sheriff’s Deputy Houston Paul testified that he assisted Officer Bridges with a traffic stop of the Defendant on July 8, 2022. Deputy Paul agreed that he and Officer Bridges found a handgun and an open container of alcohol when they searched the car the Defendant had driven. When shown an excerpt of Officer Bridges’s body camera recording, Deputy Paul identified Ms. Collins. Deputy Paul thought he and Officer Bridges asked Ms. Collins to come to the scene to take possession of the car because the Defendant did not have a valid operator’s license. Deputy Paul did not recall how long he spoke with her or if she made any statements about owning the handgun found in the car. He said that if she had made a statement about owning the handgun, he would have relayed the information to Officer Bridges. Kimberly Collins1 testified for the defense that, in 2022, she allowed the Defendant to drive her car when he needed to do so. She said that the Defendant came to her house on July 8, 2022, and borrowed her car while she slept. She said she had not told him before he borrowed the car that her gun was inside the car. She said he later called to inform her that he had been stopped by the police and that he needed the car’s insurance and registration information. She said that, during this call, she told the Defendant that she “accidentally” left her gun under the driver’s seat of the car after she worked a double shift and took her daughter shopping, although her usual habit was to take the gun into her house. She said that she could hear the officers stating that the car would be towed and that she walked to the scene one-half to one mile away. She said she and the Defendant remained on the call until it was disconnected when he got out of the car and that she called him back and they resumed the call until after he was handcuffed and placed in the police car. Ms. Collins testified that she told the Defendant about the gun because she knew he was not supposed to be around guns. She said, “He was never around the gun.” She said July 8, 2022 was the first time she forgot to take her gun out of her car and the first time the Defendant drove the car with the gun inside. Ms. Collins testified that she spoke with an officer at the scene and that she had to show him proof of car insurance to avoid having her car towed. She said the Defendant left the scene in a police car about fifteen to twenty minutes after she arrived. She said that while she searched her cell phone for proof of her car’s insurance, she told the officer with whom she spoke that the gun was hers. She did not identify the officer other than to state that he was not Officer Bridges. She said the officer was focused on whether she could prove that she had insurance before allowing her to drive her car from the scene and did not ask any follow-up questions about her gun. She said the gun was not returned to her and agreed that it was a trial exhibit. 1 Ms. Collins testified that, since the date of the Defendant’s traffic stop, she and the Defendant had married and that she was now known as Kimberly Martin. For clarity, we will continue to refer to her as Ms. Collins. -4-  On cross-examination, Ms. Collins agreed that she loved her husband, the Defendant, and that she did not want him to be convicted. When asked if she pleaded guilty in 2009 to filing a false report and received judicial diversion, she acknowledged that this was correct. She said that defense counsel in the present case had been her attorney in the matter. She later said that she did not recall the details but that the charge was related to her refusal to testify against someone. She agreed that she knew on July 8, 2022, that the Defendant was a felon. After receiving the proof, the jury found the Defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon. The trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence to be served at 85% as a career offender for the unlawful possession conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for second offense driving while his privilege was cancelled, suspended, or revoked; and fined the Defendant $50 each for the convictions of violating the open container law and speeding. The effective sentence was thirty years. This appeal followed. I The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon. The State counters that the evidence is sufficient. We agree with the State. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences” from that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The appellate courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given the evidence . . . are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984). “A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). -5-  “A person commits an offense who unlawfully possesses a firearm . . . and . . . [h]as been convicted of a felony crime of violence[.]” T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The term “crime of violence” includes aggravated burglary. Id. at § 39-17-1301(3) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The Defendant’s challenge is limited to the possession element of the offense. Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001). Constructive possession requires a showing that a defendant had “the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over . . . [the item] either directly or through others.” State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “‘In essence, constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession.’” State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1979)). “Constructive possession depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case” and “may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tenn. 2013) (citing T.C.A. § 39-17-419 (2006) (subsequently amended)). The Defendant argues that the State failed to obtain fingerprint or DNA evidence from the gun and did not conduct forensic testing on the gun. He also argues that Officer Bridges stated that he did not establish the gun’s owner and that the Defendant was not the owner of the car in which he had been driving. He points out that the gun was not in plain view inside the car. He claims that he knew about the gun from the telephone conversation with Ms. Collins at the beginning of the traffic stop and that he relayed the information about the gun to Officer Bridges afterward. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the Defendant drove Ms. Collins’s car and advised Officer Bridges that the gun when Officer Bridges asked if the car contained anything “that [he] needed to know about.” The gun was under the driver’s seat, where the Defendant could easily reach it while seated in the car. Although Ms. Collins claimed that she told an officer other than Officer Bridges that the gun was hers while she was at the scene, Officer Bridges testified that no other officer reported this to him. Deputy Paul testified that he spoke with Ms. Collins at the scene and that he did not recall her claiming ownership of the gun, which he said he would have reported to Officer Bridges if she had. The Defendant’s argument invites this court to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, neither of which we may do. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; see also Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d at 547. The jury had before it the conflicting testimony of Ms. Collins and the officers, and the jury observed the demeanor and assessed the credibility of these witnesses. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant -6- actually or constructively possessed the firearm unlawfully and that he had a prior conviction of a crime of violence, aggravated burglary. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. II Cross-Examination about a Witness’s Prior Filing of a False Report The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to cross-examine Ms. Collins about her filing a false report, for which she was charged criminally, pleaded guilty, and successfully completed judicial diversion. The Defendant also contends that the form of a question posed by the prosecutor was improper because it suggested an answer as to whether the witness pleaded guilty and received diversion. The State counters that the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence and that the Defendant has waived any issue related to the form of the question because he did not object on the basis at the trial. We agree with the State on both points. The State filed a notice of intent to impeach Kimberly Collins, a prospective defense witness, about her prior guilty plea to the offense of filing a false report, which was related to conduct which occurred in November 2008, more than ten years before the Defendant’s June 2024 trial. According to a statement made on the record by the prosecutor, he had been informed by the court clerk that Ms. Collins received judicial diversion and successfully completed its terms, but she had not had the records of the charge and the prior guilty plea expunged. The State filed its notice June 20, 2024, the day jury selection began, and a certificate of service dated June 19 reflected service by mail on defense counsel. Four days later, on June 24, 2024, after the State had rested its case and before the defense began its case-in-chief, the trial court conducted a jury-out hearing related to the notice. The defense argued that the State’s notice had been untimely, in that it had only received the notice by email the previous afternoon, June 23. The State responded that it had only learned in a telephone call within the past week that Ms. Collins might testify. The State argued at the hearing that the evidence was admissible to impeach the Ms. Collins’s character for truthfulness as a specific instance of conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b). The defense countered that Ms. Collins’s prior conduct occurred more than ten years earlier and that no prior conviction existed because she had received judicial diversion. The defense also argued that Rule 608(b) did not permit proof of prior conduct through extrinsic evidence and that it limited any use of specific instances of prior conduct to cross-examination of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness based upon the prior conduct. The court found that the State became aware “about a week ago” that Ms. Collins might testify and sent an email to the defense around 4:00 p.m. the previous day that it intended to impeach the witness with the prior conduct. The court found that -7- public records were equally available to both parties relative to the prior conduct. The court found, as well, that Ms. Collins was married to the Defendant and, if called to testify as a defense witness, would be a favorable witness “and someone that would communicate openly with [defense counsel.]” Thus, the court concluded that the State’s notice had been adequate under the circumstances. The court found that “the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The court ruled that the State could question Ms. Collins about the prior conduct but could not offer extrinsic evidence, consisting of the certified records related to the guilty plea and diversion. Evidence is relevant and generally admissible when it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Questions regarding the admissibility and relevancy of evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts will not “interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless a clear abuse appears on the face of the record.” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 809 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007)). Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides, in relevant part: Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking . . . the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than convictions of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following conditions, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . . The conditions which must be satisfied before allowing inquiry on cross- examination about such conduct probative solely of truthfulness or untruthfulness are: (1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence and must determine that the alleged conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists for the inquiry; [and] (2) the conduct must have occurred no more than ten years before commencement of the action or prosecution, but evidence of a specific instance of conduct not qualifying under this paragraph (2) is admissible if the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence and the court determines in the interests of justice that the probative value of that evidence, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect[.] -8-  We begin our analysis with the Defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State to impeach Ms. Collins for her having filed a false report because the State provided untimely notice of its intent to do so. The admissibility hearing focused significantly on the timing of the State’s notice, given that the conduct occurred more than ten years earlier. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b)(2). The court found that the State had learned one week earlier that Ms. Collins was a potential defense witness and that the State had given notice of its intent to impeach her the previous day. The court noted that Ms. Collins was married to the Defendant and was likely cooperative with defense counsel and that the information about her prior conduct was available to both parties as a matter of public record. Upon consideration, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the evidence was not barred based upon the timing of the State’s notice. Rule 608(b)(2) requires that the opposing party have “a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence,” which was fulfilled in the present case with the State’s notice the day before the trial began and the court’s conducting a hearing on the issue the following day. Thus, we will consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling on the merits of the State’s motion. To be admissible, the evidence must have been “probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). The act of filing a false report inherently represents an act of dishonesty. See T.C.A. § 39-16-502 (2025) (criminalizing false reports to a law enforcement officer). Because the evidence related to an act which occurred more than ten years earlier, it was admissible only if the court determined “in the interests of justice that the probative value of that evidence, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Id. at (b)(2). The court found that the evidence related to Ms. Collins’s false report was probative and that its probative value substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect. The State did not offer evidence at the hearing about the underlying conduct, and the court did not make findings as to the “specific facts and circumstances” indicative of the evidence’s probative value. However, evidence that a witness filed a false police report is highly probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The prior conduct related directly to dishonesty. At the trial, Ms. Collins acknowledged the prior proceedings. She did not deny that she had been involved in the prior matter about which the prosecutor inquired. She later explained that the incident related to her unwillingness to testify against someone. The prejudicial effect of the evidence was to undermine the witness’s credibility by demonstrating her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, a permissible purpose for impeachment evidence. This use of the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. See State v. Foust, 482 S.W.3d, 20, 48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015) (“‘Unfair prejudice’ is an ‘undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” (quoting State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978)). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to cross-examine Ms. Collins about her prior conduct related to having filed a false report. -9-  Next, we consider the Defendant’s argument that the prosecutor cross-examined Ms. Collins about the prior conduct with an improper question which communicated, by innuendo, inadmissible information about the prior charge and diversion. The Defendant did not object contemporaneously to the form of the question, and the issue was not raised in the motion for a new trial. The State argues that this issue is waived, and the Defendant has elected not to respond to the waiver argument. To the extent that the Defendant now objects to the form of the question, we conclude that our consideration of the issue is waived at this late juncture.2 See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000) (A trial court . . . generally has no duty to exclude evidence or to provide a limiting instruction to the jury in the absence of a timely objection.”); see also T.R.A.P. 3(e). That said, we are constrained to comment that the State, the defense, and the trial court focused in the trial proceedings on the prior charge and diversion, rather than on the underlying conduct. As contrasted with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609, which permits a party to attack a witness’s credibility with the fact of either a prior felony conviction or a misdemeanor conviction involving dishonesty or false statement, Rule 608(b) permits impeachment with specific instances of conduct “other than convictions of crime as provided in Rule 609.” At the admissibility hearing, the State sought to introduce the certified documents as evidence of the prior charge and diversion, and the defense argued that the documents were inadmissible under Rule 608(b). The court summarized the controversy before it as follows: “The evidence to be offered is the certified conviction,3 the plea paperwork, and the indictment relating to Kimberly Eastep, who, it is my understanding, is the Kimberly Collins testified to -- about earlier in this case, and who is now currently the wife of [the Defendant].” The court made its findings and ruled, “I will admit the evidence if [Ms. Collins] testifies” but did not clarify precisely what the “evidence” entailed. Defense counsel responded, “I don’t know that he can ask her about the paper. He can ask her about it, but I don’t know that he can submit extrinsic evidence of it.” The court agreed, stating, “Actually, I think you’re right. I think [the prosecutor is] stuck with her answer. . . . So 2 Because Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e) uses the term “waiver,” we use that term. See State v. Baylis, --- S.W. ---, ---, No. E2023-00886-SC-R11-CD, 2026 WL 3033430, at *6-7 (Tenn. 2026) (distinguishing between a waiver and a forfeiture). 3 Although not in the record, we presume that this document was, in fact, a uniform judgment form noting that the charge had been disposed by placing Ms. Collins on diversion. Because no conviction results from a grant of judicial diversion, the term “conviction” was, necessarily, a misnomer. See T.C.A. § 40-35- 313(a)(1)(A) (2025) (providing that the court placing a defendant on judicial diversion shall do so “without entering a judgment of guilty”). -10- the documents I referred to, which are 15 years old, would not be admissible and he is stuck with her answer.” Thereafter, during defense counsel’s direct examination of Ms. Collins, he asked, “Now, I’m going to ask you about this, and I think the State is probably going to ask you about this. About 15 years ago, did you get charged with a crime?” The prosecutor objected, stating, “Judge, the rules state this is only appropriate for cross-examination.” The trial court sustained the objection. Then, on cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired of Ms. Collins, “[O]n March 19th of 2009, did you enter into a conditional plea to a false report, receiving judicial diversion?” Ms. Collins responded affirmatively. No objection was made at this point, either to the form of the question or to the evidence being outside the bounds of Rule 608(b) because it focused on the charge and disposition, rather than the underlying conduct. On redirect, defense counsel elicited that Ms. Collins had been charged but not convicted, had received judicial diversion, and had completed four years of probation. When asked if she recalled the details of the prior incident, she said she did not recall but that the situation involved her unwillingness to testify against someone. In the motion for a new trial and at the hearing on the motion, the defense focused on whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine Ms. Collins about an expunged charge. The issue raised at the motion for a new trial was not focused on the admission of evidence about the charge and conviction or on the form of any question posted by the prosecutor in cross-examining Ms. Collins.4 As we noted above, the Defendant has not requested relief as a matter of plain error based upon its issue related to the form of a question asked by the prosecutor. In the trial court, the Defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence of Ms. Collin’s prior incident pursuant to Rule 608(b), but it made no objection, both at the trial and in the motion for a new trial, to the nature of the evidence actually elicited when the prosecutor questioned Ms. Collins. Moreover, the defense asked Ms. Collins during her direct examination whether she had been “charged with a crime” fifteen years earlier, although the State interposed an objection before she answered. Thus, the Defendant now complains about the jury’s having heard the prosecutor ask a question which communicated, by innuendo, 4 When the trial court ruled during the trial on the Rule 608(b) issue, it had before it documents related to the prior charge and diversion, although the documents were not made exhibits and are not otherwise in the record. In ruling on the motion during the trial, the court found that the records related to the charge had not been expunged. The court did not revisit the expungement issue in its ruling on the motion for a new trial. In any event, expungement of public records related to a charge is not a bar to the cross-examination of witness about the underlying conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b). See, e.g., State v. Dishman, 915 S.W.2d 458, 463-64 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). -11- inadmissible information about the prior charge and diversion, notwithstanding the fact that defense counsel had questioned Ms. Collins on direct examination in a manner which implied information about the charge. Because, the Defendant has not requested relief as a matter of plain error based upon the parties’ and the court’s focus on evidence related to the charge and diversion, rather than the underlying conduct. We decline to engage in a plain error analysis of this aspect of the issue. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. III Denial of a Special Jury Instruction The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in declining to give a special jury instruction on the definition of constructive possession, which was relevant to the question of whether the Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm after being convicted of a violent felony. The State counters that the Defendant waived the issue by failing to file a written request and that, in any event, the instruction adequately informed the jury of the applicable law. We conclude that the issue is waived. The Defendant orally requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the “mere presence in the vicinity of the contraband is not, alone sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession.” The State countered with its own proposal that the court instruct the jury, “Knowledge may be inferred from control over the vehicle in which the contraband is secreted.” The trial court offered to give both special instructions, and defense counsel stated that he preferred that the court give no special instruction, rather than giving both. Thereafter, the trial court gave the following instruction relative to possession, which did not include either party’s requested language: Possession may be actual or constructive. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over an object at any given time is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and intention at any given time to exercise dominion and control over an object is then in constructive possession of it. Possession may also be sole or joint. If a person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons have actual or constructive possession of a thing, their possession is joint. The law provides that a criminal defendant has “a right to a correct and complete charge of the law.” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000)). As a result, a trial court has a duty “to give -12- proper jury instructions as to the law governing the issues raised by the nature of the proceeding and the evidence introduced at trial.” State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011)); see State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tenn. 1975). The court has a duty to provide accurate instructions on the relevant legal principles, without any request. State v. Benson, 600 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Tenn. 2020); Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129. “This obligation extends to general defenses, such as self-defense, defense of another, or defense of a habitation.” Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129 (footnote omitted). “The refusal to grant a special request for instruction is error only when the general charge does not fully and fairly state the applicable law.” Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 280. An erroneous jury instruction, though, may deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to a jury trial. See Garrison, 40 S.W.3d at 433-34. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a) provides that requests for special instructions are to be made in writing. See State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). Oral requests for such instructions are insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Britton, 710 S.W.3d at 217; Leath, 461 S.W.3d at 107; State v. Mackey, 638 S.W.2d, 830, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). The record in the present case reflects that the defense made an oral request for a special instruction on the definition of constructive possession, but the record does not contain a written request. The State argues that the issue is waived, and the Defendant has elected not to respond to the waiver argument. We conclude that our consideration of the issue is waived.5 See, e.g., Britton, 719 S.W.3d at 217. In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. s/ Robert H. Montgomery, Jr. ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE 5 We use the term “waived” in accord with the language of Britton, 710 S.W.3d at 217, and Leath, 461 S.W.3d at 107. See Baylis, --- S.W.3d at ---, 2026 WL 3033430, at *6-7 (distinguishing between a waiver and a forfeiture). -13-