State of Tennessee v. Keith Douglas Garrett

05/27/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE February 11, 2026 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KEITH DOUGLAS GARRETT Appeal from the Criminal Court for Macon County No. 2022-CR-1 Brody N. Kane, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2024-01925-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Keith Douglas Garrett, of one count of unlawful photography and one count of observation without consent. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days and to register as a sexual offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the prosecution was void due to alleged defects in the arrest process and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to investigators under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). He also challenges the admission of digital evidence extracted from his cell phone and alleges that the State failed to disclose an additional forensic extraction report. In addition, he contends that the State engaged in an improper closing argument. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s sentencing determinations, including the denial of judicial diversion and alternative sentencing and the requirement that he register as a sexual offender. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined. Peter J. Strianse, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Keith Douglas Garrett. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney General; Jason Lawson, District Attorney General; and William A. Calla and Thomas H. Swink, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.  OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND This case began when the Defendant’s wife discovered nude images of her eighteen- year-old daughter, the Defendant’s stepdaughter, on the Defendant’s cell phone. At the time, the Defendant was employed as a trooper with the Tennessee Highway Patrol (“THP”). Federal authorities investigated the matter, with some involvement by THP personnel assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) task force. The investigation ultimately resulted in two recorded interviews with the Defendant, the seizure and forensic examination of his cell phone, and a jury trial that concluded with convictions for unlawful photography and observation without consent. Because the Defendant raises issues arising from the investigation, the suppression hearing, the proof at trial, and the sentencing hearing, we recount the relevant facts as they developed at each stage of the proceedings. A. D ISCOVERY OF THE I MAGES In April 2020, the Defendant lived in Macon County with his wife, J.M., 1 and her three children, including the victim. One day, while the Defendant was outside mowing the lawn, J.M. accessed his cell phone using his passcode. After opening the phone’s photo application, she observed a nude image of her daughter. J.M. then opened the phone’s “favorites” folder and discovered recordings of her daughter in the shower. J.M. contacted her brother, who worked for the FBI, for advice. An FBI agent later instructed her to document what she had discovered on the Defendant’s phone. Using her own cell phone, J.M. recorded portions of the Defendant’s phone screen to preserve the images and recordings she observed. On June 18, 2020, federal law enforcement officers seized the Defendant’s cell phone from his patrol vehicle. FBI investigators first conducted what they described as an “on-scene preview,” during which they obtained the passcode needed to unlock the phone. 1 Because identifying the victim’s mother by name could tend to identify the victim, we refer to her by the initials “J.M.” -2- Investigators later performed a more extensive forensic extraction using Cellebrite software. B. T HE J UNE 2020 I NTERVIEWS In June 2020, an FBI special agent and a detective with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) conducted two recorded interviews of the Defendant as part of the ongoing criminal investigation. Before the interviews, the THP placed the Defendant on discretionary leave pending an internal investigation into the allegations. Both interviews occurred on the same day at the THP headquarters and concerned only the criminal investigation. During the first interview, after being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving them, the Defendant initially denied any wrongdoing. After the interview concluded, the investigators learned that a search team had discovered holes drilled above a bathroom shower at the Defendant’s residence. They conducted a second interview, and the Defendant acknowledged that he had previously received and waived his Miranda rights. During the second interview, the Defendant admitted that he knew holes existed in the ceiling above the shower and that he used those holes to observe and record the victim while she showered. The interview ended after the Defendant invoked his right to counsel. The following day, the THP conducted a separate administrative interview. During that interview, the Defendant was advised of his protections under Garrity v. New Jersey. The THP terminated the Defendant’s employment three days later, on June 22, 2020. C. T RIAL P ROCEEDINGS On February 7, 2022, a Macon County grand jury charged the Defendant with unlawful photography and observation without consent. Before trial, the Defendant sought to suppress his statements to the FBI, arguing that the circumstances surrounding the interviews created a penalty situation that effectively compelled his statements within the meaning of Garrity v. New Jersey. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the case proceeded to a jury trial in October 2023. At trial, the State introduced images and recordings recovered from the Defendant’s cell phone. The jury also heard testimony from J.M., law enforcement officers involved in -3- the investigation, and the Defendant. At the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of both offenses. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. The court also ordered that the Defendant register as a sexual offender pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201 et seq. The Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied by a written order entered on December 16, 2024. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal fourteen days later. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). ANALYSIS The Defendant raises five groups of issues on appeal. He first argues that defects in the arrest process rendered the prosecution void from the outset. He next asserts that the trial court should have suppressed his statements to investigators because they were compelled in violation of Garrity v. New Jersey. Third, the Defendant challenges the admission of digital evidence extracted from his cell phone and alleges that the State failed to disclose an additional forensic extraction report. Fourth, he argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s sentencing decisions, including the denial of judicial diversion and alternative sentencing and the requirement that he register as a sexual offender. We address each of these issues in turn. A. E FFECT OF A RREST WARRANT ON P ROSECUTION The Defendant first argues that the prosecution was void from its inception because, in his view, the arrest process was defective. He asserts that law enforcement could not arrest him for misdemeanor offenses committed outside an officer’s presence and that the affidavit of complaint failed to establish probable cause. The State responds that any defect in the arrest warrant or affidavit of complaint did not invalidate the later indictment returned by the grand jury. We agree with the State. -4-  As background for this issue, THP Trooper Al Seitner filed an affidavit of complaint in the Macon County General Sessions Court in March 2021, alleging that the Defendant had committed the offenses of unlawful photography and observation without consent. The court issued an arrest warrant the following day, and the Defendant was arrested. In February 2022, a Macon County grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging the Defendant with unlawful photography and observation without consent. Assuming, without deciding, that there were defects in the arrest process, those alleged defects would not invalidate the subsequent indictment in this case. State v. Campbell, 641 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that the State may choose to obtain an indictment to cure any defects in the charging procedure, including a defective warrant). Indeed, our supreme court has long held that the finding of an indictment forecloses “all questions as to the sufficiency of the warrant.” Jones v. State, 332 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tenn. 1960). Stated another way, “[t]he proceedings by the Grand Jury in finding an indictment or presentment against a person are not affected by the mode or manner of his arrest.” Shaw v. State, No. M2018-00686-CCA-R3-HC, 2019 WL 410706, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2019) (citing Nelson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971)), no perm. app. filed. Here, a Macon County grand jury returned a true bill charging the Defendant with unlawful photography and observation without consent in February 2022. Once that indictment was returned, the prosecution proceeded on the indictment itself. Any alleged defect in the earlier arrest process did not render the prosecution void. To the extent the Defendant also challenges the search warrant or the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting it, that issue is not properly before us. The Defendant’s argument focuses on the arrest warrant and affidavit of complaint. His brief adds only a conclusory assertion that the affidavit supporting the search warrant for his residence “suffered from the same deficiency,” with a footnote stating that the affidavit did not include a statement from the alleged victim. He does not develop a separate argument explaining why the search warrant or its supporting affidavit was defective, nor does he explain how any such defect would render the prosecution void or otherwise entitle him to relief. Simply raising an issue is not sufficient to preserve it for appellate review. See State v. Hamilton, No. W2023-01127-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4130757, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2024), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2025). Instead, a party must also present “argument in support of this issue in his brief” and cite to “any authorities [and] appropriate references in the record.” State v. Molthan, No. M2021-01108-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL -5- 17245128, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2022), no perm. app. filed. By failing to do so here, we conclude that the Defendant has waived appellate review of this claim. As such, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. B. T HE G ARRITY C LAIM The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The motion concerned statements he made to FBI Special Agent Brett Shields and MNPD Detective Keith Sutherland during two interviews on June 18, 2020. The Defendant asserts that the circumstances surrounding those interviews created a penalty situation that effectively compelled his statements within the meaning of Garrity v. New Jersey. The State responds that no penalty situation arose because the THP did not conduct the interviews and did not expressly or implicitly condition the Defendant’s employment on his cooperation with the FBI. The State further notes that the THP maintained a written policy protecting a trooper’s right to invoke the Fifth Amendment during an outside criminal investigation without adverse employment consequences. We agree with the State. 1. Background The facts relevant to the motion to suppress arise from events occurring on the morning of June 18, 2020, at the THP’s Nashville District Headquarters. Sixteen days earlier, the FBI notified the THP that the Defendant was the subject of a federal criminal investigation. Although the THP’s established practice upon receiving such notice is to place the subject trooper on discretionary leave, the THP took no formal employment action during the intervening period. On the morning of June 18, 2020, a supervisor directed the Defendant to report to the THP Nashville District Headquarters without providing a reason. Upon his arrival at headquarters, the Defendant was escorted to a conference room. There, THP Captain Chris Ray and Major Roy Brown served him with a Discretionary Leave Notice and collected his service firearm and security credentials. Captain Ray informed the Defendant that another agency had initiated an investigation and that the THP was placing him on discretionary leave pending an internal investigation. The captain could not recall whether he used the word “criminal” during that exchange. -6-  Soon after the THP placed the Defendant on discretionary leave, he was escorted to a nearby conference room to meet Agent Shields and Detective Keith Sutherland. At the outset of the interview, the interviewers identified themselves, advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights, and informed him that they were investigating a criminal matter. The record does not show that any Garrity advisement was administered. Following the first interview, Special Agent Shields received information that investigators executing the residential search warrant had discovered a hole drilled above the shower. He returned to headquarters and conducted a second interview with the Defendant. The second interview lasted about twenty minutes and concluded when the Defendant invoked his right to counsel. The record does not show that any Garrity advisement was administered before or during the second interview. The following day, June 19, 2020, the THP conducted a separate administrative interview. Before that interview, the THP administered the Admonition of Rights form for the first time, advising the Defendant of his Garrity protections. The Defendant declined to participate in that administrative interview, and the THP terminated the Defendant’s employment on June 22, 2020. At the suppression hearing, Captain Ray testified about the events of the morning of June 18, 2020. He stated that the plan to place the Defendant on discretionary leave with pay and to have the FBI conduct its interview had been arranged in advance. Captain Ray further testified that the THP had the option of placing the Defendant on discretionary leave after the FBI interview but did not do so. He also said that discretionary leave is the first step in a disciplinary process that may, but does not necessarily, result in termination. Captain Ray also testified at the suppression hearing regarding THP policies and practices governing employees in the Defendant’s circumstances. He testified that an explicit THP policy prohibits any adverse employment consequences against a trooper who asserts Fifth Amendment rights in response to an outside criminal investigation. He also stated that this policy is communicated to all employees at the training academy and that each employee must acknowledge the policy in writing. Captain Ray further testified that the THP did not order the Defendant to cooperate with the FBI’s investigation, and that the THP exercised no supervisory authority over the FBI task force other than providing assigned member troopers. The Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he had the impression that the THP and the FBI were working together that morning. He further testified that he felt -7- compelled to cooperate with the FBI or risk his employment. The Defendant also stated that, although he had a general understanding of Garrity protections, no one had advised him of those protections on June 18, 2020. On cross-examination, the Defendant acknowledged that no discussion of his employment occurred during either interview. He also admitted that, although he felt compelled to cooperate, he did not tell the truth during the interviews because it was a “risk [he] was willing to take.” Additionally, the Defendant testified at trial that he was served with a search warrant listing THP Trooper Al Seitner as the affiant. The Defendant stated that, upon seeing the trooper designation on the warrant, he concluded that the THP was directing the investigation and the FBI was providing assistance. Special Agent Shields testified at the suppression hearing that Trooper Seitner was a member of the FBI Violent Crimes Task Force under his direction. The THP’s involvement in the task force consisted solely of Trooper Seitner’s membership. The trial court denied the motion to suppress by written order entered September 25, 2023. In that order, the court made several factual findings. First, the court found that the THP placed the Defendant on discretionary leave while he was present at headquarters due to safety concerns. The court found that this action was not taken to pressure the Defendant to cooperate with the FBI. Second, the court found that the FBI interviews were not part of an internal or administrative investigation. The court noted that no discussion of the Defendant’s employment occurred during either interview. Finally, the court found that the FBI was not the Defendant’s employer, exercised no supervisory authority over him, and had no authority to sanction or terminate his employment. The court also addressed the Defendant’s conduct during the interviews. It found that the Defendant had no reservation about lying to Special Agent Shields, despite knowing that doing so constitutes a federal crime. The court characterized this conduct as evidence that the Defendant could exercise rational judgment during the interviews. Finally, the court addressed the relationship between the THP and the FBI task force. The court found that the FBI was “wholly separate and apart” from the THP. It also found that the presence of one THP member on the ten-to-twelve-member FBI task force was “of no consequence to the interviews which were taken.” -8-  Based on these findings, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 2. Standard of Appellate Review In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, “we uphold the trial court’s findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Washington, __ S.W.3d __, No. W2022-01201-SC-R11-CD, 2025 WL 2847585, at *3 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2025) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Green, 697 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tenn. 2024); State v. McKinney, 669 S.W.3d 753, 764 (Tenn. 2023). The party prevailing in the trial court “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing[,] as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” McKinney, 669 S.W.3d at 764. “[I]n evaluating the correctness of a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress, appellate courts may consider the proof adduced both at the suppression hearing and at trial.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Washington, __ S.W.3d __, 2025 WL 2847585, at *3. Nevertheless, we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of correctness, despite the deference afforded to its factual findings. See Green, 697 S.W.3d at 640; Washington, __ S.W.3d __, 2025 WL 2847585, at *3. 3. Governing Principles The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. This protection extends to pretrial government conduct as well as to the trial itself. It prohibits the government from “penaliz[ing] assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony which has not been immunized.” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977). In certain situations posing a heightened risk of coercion, the Supreme Court has developed prophylactic rules to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege. The most familiar of these rules was established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda is not the only prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege, and it is not the rule at issue here. A different rule was articulated the following year in Garrity -9- v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768 n.2 (2003) (plurality opinion) (describing the Garrity rule as “a prophylactic rule we have constructed to protect the Fifth Amendment’s right from invasion”). Whereas Miranda addresses the coercive pressures associated with physical custody, Garrity addresses a distinct form of compulsion: the government’s use of threatened employment consequences to extract incriminating statements from public employees. In Garrity, the Supreme Court held that police officers could not be forced to choose between surrendering the privilege against self-incrimination and forfeiting their employment. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98. As such, when the government creates this type of “penalty situation,” any resulting statements are considered compelled and may not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984). The Supreme Court elaborated on the Garrity doctrine in Minnesota v. Murphy. The Court explained that a penalty situation arises when the government, “either expressly or by implication,” asserts that invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege will lead to a penalty. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. At the same time, Murphy made clear that the mere requirement that a person appear and answer questions does not, standing alone, create such a situation. Id. Without an accompanying express or implied threat of an adverse employment consequence, the Fifth Amendment privilege must be affirmatively invoked. The Court emphasized that there was no reasonable basis for the defendant to believe that his silence would be penalized. Id. at 437. Murphy thus recognizes that a penalty situation may arise when the government expressly or implicitly links the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege to an adverse employment consequence. Neither the Supreme Court nor our Tennessee courts have developed a framework for determining when such an implied penalty exists. The lower federal courts, however, have developed analytical approaches for resolving such claims when there is no direct threat of an adverse employment consequence. One such approach is the subjective- objective framework articulated in United States v. Friedrick, 842 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and later applied by the Sixth Circuit in McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 2005). This framework reflects the principles described in Murphy and provides a structured method for evaluating implied-compulsion claims. Under Friedrick, a defendant invoking Garrity protection must establish two elements. First, the defendant must show that he or she subjectively believed his statements were compelled by the threat of a substantial employment penalty. Second, the defendant - 10 - must show that this belief was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Friedrick, 842 F.2d at 395. The subjective element focuses on the defendant’s actual belief, whereas the objective element asks whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have formed that belief given the surrounding circumstances. Id. The Sixth Circuit later applied and refined this framework in McKinley v. City of Mansfield. The court confirmed that a Garrity claim requires both a subjective belief of compulsion and an objectively reasonable basis for that belief. McKinley, 404 F.3d at 435- 36. The court also clarified that the objective element does not require proof that termination was specifically threatened. Instead, the relevant question is whether the defendant reasonably believed that “substantial penalties were likely to result from his refusal to answer.” Id. at 436 n.20. We acknowledge that a minority of courts have required an explicit or automatic threat of termination as a threshold condition for Garrity protection. See United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 715-16 (1st Cir. 1980). That approach is difficult to reconcile with Supreme Court precedent, as Garrity itself did not turn on the existence of an automatic termination rule. Instead, the Court emphasized the broader principle that forcing an employee to choose between self-incrimination and a significant penalty is constitutionally intolerable. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497. Likewise, Murphy recognized that a penalty situation may arise “either expressly or by implication.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. Several courts have therefore questioned whether the Indorato line of cases can be reconciled with Murphy, and we find those questions well taken. See United States v. Trevino, 215 F. App’x 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Although Indorato did rely on the fact that Garrity dealt with an explicit threat of termination, neither Indorato [nor] Garrity rules out the possibility that implied threats could violate a defendant’s Garrity rights.”); United States v. Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1031 (D. Or. 2014). We therefore decline to follow the Indorato approach. Instead, we adopt the framework articulated in Friedrick and McKinley for evaluating implied-compulsion claims under Garrity. Under this framework, a defendant invoking Garrity protection must establish two elements. First, the defendant must show that he or she subjectively believed his statements were compelled by the threat of a substantial employment penalty. Second, the defendant must show that this belief was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Friedrick, 842 F.2d at 395; McKinley, 404 F.3d at 435-36. - 11 -  This approach faithfully implements the Supreme Court’s instruction in Murphy that a penalty situation may arise “either expressly or by implication.” It also ensures that Garrity protection extends only to circumstances in which the government, acting as employer, has effectively linked the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege to a threatened adverse employment consequence. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. The mere fact that a public employee is questioned in a criminal investigation does not, standing alone, trigger Garrity protection. A penalty situation arises only when the government, acting in its capacity as employer, communicates—either expressly or by implication—that the employee’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment will result in a substantial employment penalty. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 437. Without such a government-created link between silence and an adverse employment consequence, the privilege must be affirmatively invoked, and the resulting statements are not considered compelled within the meaning of Garrity. See United States v. Smith, 821 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016). With these principles in mind, we turn to the Defendant’s claim that his June 18 statements were obtained in violation of Garrity. 4. Application a. The Defendant’s Subjective Beliefs Turning first to the subjective element, the question is whether the Defendant subjectively believed, at the time of the FBI interviews, that remaining silent would result in an adverse employment consequence. To satisfy this element, defendants must demonstrate through credible testimony that they genuinely held such a belief—not merely that they operated under general professional pressure to cooperate. See Friedrick, 842 F.2d at 395; United States v. Hill, No. 1:09-CR-199-TWT, 2010 WL 234798, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2010). We are also mindful that coercion and deception are not mutually exclusive; the Supreme Court in Murphy treated a defendant’s conduct during questioning as “relevant” to the subjective inquiry without treating it as independently dispositive. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437-38. A person operating under genuine coercive pressure may still make deliberate choices about what to say and what to withhold. We apply these principles here. - 12 -  The trial court found that the Defendant had no reservation about lying to Special Agent Shields, despite knowing that doing so constitutes a federal crime, and that this conduct reflected the Defendant’s “ability to make a rational choice” during the interviews. The Defendant disputes these findings, asserting that he participated in the FBI interviews only because he believed remaining silent would result in adverse employment consequences, including termination. We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s findings. A general professional inclination to cooperate is not the same as a sincere belief that remaining silent will cost one’s employment. The existence of the former does not establish the latter. See Hill, 2010 WL 234798, at *7 (distinguishing between a defendant who “considered it part of his job to submit to the interview” and one who believed “he would lose that job, or be significantly sanctioned, if he refused”). Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the Defendant’s participation provide an independent and competing explanation for his conduct: it is just as reasonable to infer that his decision to cooperate was motivated by an awareness of the evidence against him as by any employment-related pressure. See United States v. Van Buren, No. 1:16-CR-243-ODE- JFK, 2017 WL 814258, at *7, *9 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2017) (finding that explaining the strength of the evidence to a defendant and affording him the opportunity to cooperate did not constitute improper inducement, and declining to speculate about the defendant's reasons for cooperating where the record was silent on that point), report and recommendation adopted 2017 WL 810285 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2017). The Defendant’s own testimony at the hearing reinforces the inference of his awareness of the evidence against him and undermines his claim of compulsion. On cross- examination, the Defendant confirmed that he denied filming his stepdaughter when directly asked and acknowledged that the denial was false. He further explained that the lie was “the chance [he] was willing to take . . . to protect [his] family.” He also acknowledged that he understood the interview to be criminal, rather than administrative, in nature. A defendant who understands that he is participating in a criminal interview, gives false answers to protect his personal interests, and later characterizes that choice as a calculated risk provides limited support for a claim that he believed silence was unavailable. The trial court’s conclusion is further supported by the Defendant’s conduct the following day. When the THP administered an explicit Garrity admonition, thereby removing any legitimate basis for the employment penalty he claimed to fear, the Defendant chose termination over cooperation. On this record, we agree with the trial court - 13 - that the Defendant’s decision to participate in the FBI interviews appears more consistent with a deliberate personal choice than with a genuine belief that silence would cost him his job. The Defendant has not carried his burden of establishing, through credible testimony, that he subjectively believed his participation was compelled by a threat of substantial employment penalty. As such, the Defendant’s claim that his statements were compelled under Garrity fails on the subjective element alone. b. The Objective Reasonableness of the Defendant’s Beliefs The Defendant’s failure to establish the subjective element is sufficient to resolve the claim. However, because this case presents a question of first impression for Tennessee courts, we also address the objective element. That analysis likewise confirms that the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. The objective inquiry asks whether a reasonable employee in the Defendant’s position would have believed that invoking the Fifth Amendment during the FBI interviews would result in a substantial employment penalty. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435; McKinley, 404 F.3d at 436 n.20. The question, therefore, is whether the THP—acting as the Defendant’s employer—communicated, expressly or by implication, that his continued employment depended on cooperating with the FBI investigation. We evaluate that question in light of the totality of the circumstances. See McKinley, 404 F.3d at 436 n.20; United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). Several considerations are relevant here: whether any employment consequences were communicated; the department’s policies governing invocation of the Fifth Amendment; the context of the investigation; and the operational relationship between the FBI investigation and the THP’s authority as the Defendant’s employer. i. The Absence of Any Communicated Employment Consequence The first consideration is whether the THP communicated any adverse employment consequences for invoking the privilege. The indispensable predicate for Garrity protection is that the government, acting in its capacity as employer, created a link between - 14 - the exercise of the privilege and a threatened employment penalty. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98; Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. On this record, that predicate is absent. The undisputed facts establish the absence of any such communication. No one told the Defendant that his cooperation with the FBI was a condition of his continued employment. Indeed, Captain Ray testified that the THP never ordered the Defendant to cooperate with the FBI’s investigation. No THP supervisor was present during either interview. The FBI itself had no authority over the Defendant’s employment status, could not sanction him, and did not purport to do so. The trial court found expressly that no discussion of the Defendant’s employment occurred during either session and that the THP had no participation in the FBI interview. Those findings are supported by the interview record and by a preponderance of the evidence. The Defendant argues that the THP’s decision to serve the discretionary leave notice immediately before the interview commenced created an implied link between the two events sufficient to transform the FBI questioning into a penalty situation. That argument would require an inference that the record does not support. The trial court found as a factual matter that the THP placed the Defendant on leave for safety reasons. Those reasons arose from the concurrent execution of a residential search warrant. The court further found that this action was not taken to pressure the Defendant to cooperate with the FBI. Captain Ray testified that placing an employee on discretionary leave upon the initiation of any criminal investigation was the THP’s standard departmental practice. It was not a circumstance-specific signal directed at this Defendant. The Defendant has not demonstrated that the evidence in the record preponderates against these findings. A leave notice served under standard departmental procedures, even one served shortly before an FBI interview, does not by itself create an implied penalty situation under Murphy. See United States v. French, 216 F. Supp. 3d 771, 776 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (finding no objectively reasonable belief of compulsion where placement on administrative leave and relinquishment of equipment was standard procedure and no one indicated the officer’s job would be in any greater jeopardy for refusing to answer), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 205 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Trevino, 215 F. App’x at 321 (finding the same; supervisors not present and never indicated job would be in any greater jeopardy if officer failed to cooperate). Where there is no direct threat, the mere possibility of future discipline, however understandably perceived, is not enough to trigger Garrity protection. Smith, 821 F.3d at 1302. - 15 -  ii. The THP’s Policies and Procedures A second consideration concerns the THP’s policies and practices regarding the invocation of the Fifth Amendment during outside criminal investigations. A distinguishing feature of this case is not merely the absence of an express threat to the Defendant’s employment, but that the THP’s policies expressly protected the Defendant’s right to invoke the Fifth Amendment without an adverse employment consequence. Captain Ray testified on redirect examination that the THP policy explicitly permits an employee who is the subject of an outside criminal investigation to invoke the Fifth Amendment without adverse employment consequence. He further testified that this policy is communicated to every trooper at the training academy and that each employee is required to acknowledge the policy in writing, with that acknowledgment maintained in departmental records. The Defendant was a twenty-three-year THP veteran who acknowledged general familiarity with Garrity protections at the suppression hearing. These policies and practices cut against any inference that the THP’s conduct on June 18 was calibrated to coerce the Defendant’s cooperation with the FBI’s criminal investigation. We do not rest the objective conclusion on the policy alone, nor do we hold that an employee’s awareness of a protective policy, without more, is sufficient to neutralize circumstances that are pressure-laden in fact. The policy is one significant consideration in the overall pi