State of Tennessee v. Berenice A. Martinez

11/09/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs July 15, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BERENICE A. MARTINEZ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County No. 22CC-2020-CR-167 Larry J. Wallace, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-00906-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Berenice A. Martinez, of possession of cocaine in an amount of 300 grams or more with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises nine issues in three broad categories. First, she raises two challenges to the jury’s verdict: (1) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support her conviction; and (2) whether the trial court properly exercised its role as thirteenth juror. Next, she raises four evidentiary issues. She challenges whether the trial court erred in admitting (3) evidence suggesting that the Defendant had illicit sources of income; (4) testimony concerning the “best route” from New Mexico to Indiana based on mapping software searches; (5) testimony associating physical observations of the co- defendant with nervous behavior seen in prior drug interdictions; and (6) testimony concerning an EPIC report that the Defendant had recently crossed the border from Mexico. Finally, she raises three sentencing issues: (7) whether the trial court erred in applying an enhancement factor based on her prior criminal behavior; (8) whether the trial court erred in applying an enhancement factor based on the inherent dangerousness of cocaine; and (9) whether the trial court should have classified her as an especially mitigated offender. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined. Lynsie M. York, Charlotte, Tennessee (on appeal) and Leonard G. Belmares, II, Dickson, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Berenice A. Martinez. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant Attorney General; W. Ray Crouch, Jr., District Attorney General; and Erin D. Bryson, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. T HE T RAFFIC S TOP On July 10, 2020, Agent Nathanael Proctor of the 23rd Judicial District Drug Task Force was traveling on Interstate 40 in Dickson County. He observed a gold Ford F-150 with darkly tinted windows that was following another vehicle too closely. He stopped the truck and verified that the window tint violated Tennessee law. The Defendant was the driver and registered owner of the vehicle, and her eventual co-defendant, Jesus Emmanuel Bilbao, accompanied her. Agent Proctor later testified that both occupants appeared nervous during the stop and that the Defendant’s nervousness increased rather than subsided as the stop continued. He described the Defendant’s heartbeat as visible through her neck and asked whether she had a medical condition. He also testified that red splotches appeared on Mr. Bilbao’s neck, noting that he had observed similar signs during prior drug interdictions. The Defendant told Agent Proctor she was traveling from Hatch, New Mexico, to Indianapolis, Indiana. The agent testified that, based on his review of mapping software— either Google or MapQuest—none of the most direct routes between those cities passed through Tennessee. On cross-examination, Agent Proctor acknowledged that he had not prepared the route maps himself and could not verify the settings used to generate them. He also acknowledged that travelers may choose routes for various personal reasons. During the stop, Agent Proctor contacted the El Paso Intelligence Center (“EPIC”), an intelligence resource operated by the Drug Enforcement Administration. An EPIC -2- operator informed him that the Defendant had crossed the border from Mexico into the United States less than forty-eight hours before the stop. The State introduced no certified border-crossing records into evidence. The Defendant gave verbal consent to search the vehicle. Officers did not immediately locate contraband. However, Agent Proctor noticed that the panels around the back of the cab and rear seat showed signs of prior removal and that the weatherstripping had not been repositioned correctly. He then used a handheld X-ray device to scan the rear wall of the truck’s cab. The scan revealed dense, kilo-shaped packages concealed behind the rear seat. Officers dismantled the rear interior paneling and accessed a non-factory hidden compartment. Inside, they found seventeen tightly wrapped packages of a white rock-like substance. Agent Proctor testified that the compartment was not visible without removing the interior panels and that it was equipped with electronic pistons. He acknowledged that he could not identify who had constructed or loaded the compartment. Neither Agent Proctor nor any other officer fingerprinted the packages or requested latent print analysis from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. B. T HE T RIAL , S ENTENCE , AND A PPEAL On August 18, 2020, a Dickson County grand jury charged the Defendant and Mr. Bilbao by presentment with knowingly possessing cocaine of 300 grams or more with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. After Mr. Bilbao’s case was severed, the Defendant’s case proceeded to trial in November 2023. During the trial, the State presented three witnesses: Agent Proctor; Special Agent Rebecca Stout of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”); and Agent Reggie McCullough of the 23rd Judicial District Drug Task Force. Special Agent Stout testified that she conducted a chemical test on one of the seized packages. The package tested positive for cocaine and weighed approximately 995.8 grams. She further testified that the remaining packages had a gross weight of approximately 46.3 pounds, though she did not chemically test them. -3-  Agent McCullough testified that he interviewed the Defendant following the arrest. The Defendant described herself as a seasonal field worker who earned approximately $21,000 annually, as reported on her tax return. She told Agent McCullough that she had purchased the truck about a month and a half before the stop, though she could not identify the dealership that sold it to her. She initially reported paying $1,300 for the vehicle, then corrected the figure to $13,000, and said she had used savings to make the purchase. As to the Defendant’s travels, she acknowledged in the interview that she had traveled to Mexico to see family approximately two weeks before the stop. However, she could not provide the name of the family she said she intended to visit in Indianapolis. In her case, the Defendant called Mr. Bilbao as a witness, but he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to testify. The Defendant elected not to testify. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. At a sentencing hearing held in January 2024, the State presented evidence of the Defendant’s prior criminal history or conduct. The trial court applied enhancement factor (1), finding that the Defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior. The court also applied enhancement factor (10), finding that the offense involved a high risk to human life. The court imposed the minimum Range I sentence of fifteen years and declined to classify the Defendant as an especially mitigated offender. The Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied by a written order entered on May 21, 2025. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal twenty-one days later. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). ANALYSIS In this appeal, the Defendant raises nine issues for our consideration in three broad categories. First, the Defendant raises two challenges to the jury’s verdict. More specifically, she argues that (1) no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly possessed the cocaine; and (2) the trial court failed to properly exercise its role as thirteenth juror. -4-  Next, the Defendant raises challenges to various evidentiary decisions made by the trial court. More specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting (3) testimony and argument suggesting she had illicit income, in alleged violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (4) testimony regarding the “best route” of travel from New Mexico to Indiana based on mapping software; (5) testimony associating physical observations of the co-defendant with nervous behavior from prior drug interdictions; and (6) testimony that a federal intelligence center reported the Defendant had recently crossed the border. Finally, the Defendant raises three challenges to her sentence. More specifically, she argues that the trial court erred in (7) applying an enhancement factor based on her prior criminal behavior; and (8) applying an enhancement factor based on the inherent dangerousness of cocaine. She also argues that the trial court erred by (9) declining to classify her as an especially mitigated offender. We address each of these issues in turn. A. C HALLENGES TO THE J URY ’ S V ERDICT In her first group of issues, the Defendant challenges the jury’s verdict. She first argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction, contending that no direct evidence connected her to the cocaine. More specifically, she contends that the State failed to prove she knowingly possessed the cocaine found in a hidden compartment within the vehicle. She points to the absence of direct evidence connecting her to the cocaine, such as a confession, some forensic link, or proof that she accessed the compartment. The Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to properly exercise its role as thirteenth juror. She contends that the trial court should have granted a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In response, the State asserts that the totality of the circumstantial evidence— including the Defendant’s ownership and control of the vehicle, her suspicious travel route, and her escalating nervousness during the stop—was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of knowing possession. The State further responds that the trial court properly fulfilled its -5- duty as thirteenth juror, and that this court’s review is therefore limited to the sufficiency of the evidence. We agree with the State as to both issues. 1. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence We first address whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, beginning with an identification of the elements of the offense. State v. Rimmel, 710 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tenn. 2025). The Defendant was convicted of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. To sustain a conviction under that statute, the State was required to prove that (1) the Defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance; (2) the Defendant intended to sell or deliver it; and (3) the controlled substance was cocaine, a Schedule II drug. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (2025). “[A] person . . . acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(b) (2025). When the amount of cocaine possessed is 300 grams or more, the offense is a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(j)(5). The Defendant does not dispute that the State proved the cocaine exceeded the statutory threshold of 300 grams. Special Agent Stout testified that one tested package contained cocaine and weighed approximately 995.8 grams. Instead, the Defendant challenges only the element of knowing possession. As such, we limit our review to that single element. See State v. Hart, 676 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023) (limiting a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to the elements challenged by the defendant). a. Standard of Appellate Review For every issue presented on appeal, this court must be mindful of the standard of appellate review. State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tenn. 2022). “The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Miller, 638 S.W.3d 136, 157 (Tenn. 2021) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard is “highly deferential” in favor of the jury’s verdict. See State v. Lyons, 669 S.W.3d 775, 791 (Tenn. 2023). The State “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.” Rimmel, 710 S.W.3d at 645 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). -6-  “We do not reweigh the evidence, because questions regarding witness credibility, the weight to be given the evidence, and factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the jury as the trier of fact.” State v. Curry, 705 S.W.3d 176, 183 (Tenn. 2025) (citations omitted). “The standard of review is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). b. Knowing Possession This court has long recognized that the element of possession concerns control over an item or property. See State v. Chism, No. E2023-00620-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4824881, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2024) (citing Peters v. State, 521 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 17, 2025). That control may be actual—meaning direct physical control—or constructive, meaning the defendant has the ability to reduce an object to his or her physical control. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 845-46 (Tenn. 2001). Constructive possession rests on the totality of the circumstances and may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tenn. 2013). Importantly, a defendant need not exercise exclusive control over an object; criminal liability may exist where possession is joint. Chism, 2024 WL 4824881, at *4. As a threshold matter, several circumstances bearing on the Defendant’s knowledge are also the subject of separate evidentiary challenges on appeal. These include testimony concerning the Defendant’s finances and truck purchase, the route of travel, Agent Proctor’s observations of Mr. Bilbao’s appearance and nervousness-related behavior, and the information received from EPIC. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, however, we consider all evidence presented to the jury, including evidence whose admission is separately challenged or later found to be inadmissible. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1988); State v. McLawhorn, 636 S.W.3d 210, 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020). Thus, our consideration of these facts for sufficiency purposes does not resolve whether the trial court properly admitted the evidence. We address the Defendant’s separate evidentiary challenges later in this opinion. The proof of the Defendant’s knowledge was circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence alone may support a conviction. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. -7-  i. The Defendant’s Ownership and Operation of the Truck When a defendant is charged with possession of contraband found in a vehicle, knowledge may be inferred from the defendant’s control over that vehicle. See State v. Siner, No. W2020-01719-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 252354, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2022) (quoting State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), no perm. app. filed), no perm. app. filed. But a defendant’s ownership and control of a vehicle is a relevant, but not an independently sufficient, circumstance. See State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 n.3 (Tenn. 2001) (“Ownership alone does not indicate that one is in constructive possession of contraband inside a vehicle.”). When contraband is found in a location under the control of more than one person, “incriminating circumstances other than the defendant’s mere occupancy, ownership, or presence have contributed to findings of sufficient evidence of constructive possession.” Siner, 2022 WL 252354, at *6 (quoting State v. Porter, No. W2004-02464-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2333569, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2005)); see also State v. Nolen, No. W2023-01487-CCA-R3-CD, 2026 WL 1470251, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2026) (requiring “some additional proof from which a jury can legitimately infer that the defendant was aware of the drugs”), no perm. app. filed; State v. Reyna, No. W2004-00365-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2726019, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (affirming where the defendant owned and drove the vehicle and other circumstances, including the odor of a masking agent and the substantial value of the cocaine, supported an inference of knowledge), no perm. app. filed. Here, it is undisputed that the Defendant owned the truck and was driving it when officers stopped it. This circumstance did not, standing alone, require a finding that she knew about cocaine hidden from plain view. See Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903 n.3. But the Defendant’s ownership and control of the truck remained relevant factors that the jury could consider together with the other circumstantial evidence described below. Considered with that evidence, a rational juror could infer that the Defendant’s ownership and operation of the truck supported, in part, her knowledge of the cocaine found inside it. ii. The Quantity and Value of the Drugs Being Transported A jury may also consider the quantity and value of hidden contraband when determining whether a defendant knowingly possessed it. See Reyna, 2004 WL 2726019, -8- at *3 (relying, in part, on the cocaine’s estimated value of approximately $200,000). In this case, officers found some seventeen packages inside a hidden compartment in the Defendant’s truck, including the tested package that contained 995.8 grams of cocaine. The remainder of the untested substance, which was packaged in the same way as the confirmed cocaine, had a gross weight of approximately 46.3 pounds. Agent Proctor testified that the street value of the cocaine was “[o]ver two million dollars” and “[a]t least two million dollars.” From this evidence, a rational juror could infer that a person transporting such a large and valuable quantity of cocaine would likely know that the truck contained contraband. This inference did not by itself establish the Defendant’s knowledge, but the jury could weigh it with the other circumstantial evidence. iii. The Defendant’s Reaction to Law Enforcement’s Presence A defendant’s conduct during a law-enforcement encounter may also inform the jury’s assessment of knowledge. See Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903 (relying, in part, on evidence that the defendant “appeared to be extremely nervous before and after he was asked to produce his driver’s license”); State v. Martinez, 372 S.W.3d 598, 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (identifying the defendant’s “shaking during the stop” as circumstantial evidence of his knowing mental state), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012). Here, Agent Proctor testified that the Defendant showed “extreme signs of nervousness” beyond that of the average motorist and that her nervousness increased as the encounter continued. He further testified that he could see her heartbeat through her neck, prompting him to ask whether she had a medical condition or needed medical assistance. From this evidence, a rational juror could infer that the Defendant’s visible and escalating nervousness reflected consciousness of the cocaine hidden in her truck. Nervousness alone would not establish knowledge. But the jury could consider it together with the other circumstances in deciding whether the Defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine. iv. Evidence of Alterations to the Truck A jury may consider evidence of alterations to a vehicle as part of the totality of circumstances bearing on knowledge. See Robinson, 400 S.W.3d at 534; Martinez, 372 S.W.3d at 608 (treating, as circumstantial evidence of the vehicle owner’s knowing mental -9- state, “the extensive alteration of his vehicle to make the compartments used to hide the heroin”). In this case, the Defendant was the truck’s registered owner and had purchased it approximately a month and a half before the stop. Agent Proctor testified that the rear passenger area showed visible signs of disassembly. The weatherstripping had not been repositioned correctly, the seatbelt-cover bolts appeared to have been loosened or “tooled,” and the rear interior trim was loose enough to move by hand. He further testified that this looseness was “not normal” and indicated that the trim “has been apart.” In addition, photographs showed stuffing coming from the rear seat and a screw in the seat. On cross-examination, Agent Proctor agreed that the screw was not a factory screw for the truck, and he testified that it was similar to the screws used for the hidden compartment. From these facts, a rational juror could infer that the Defendant, as the recent purchaser, owner, and driver of the truck, was aware that the rear portion of the cab had been altered or disturbed. Standing alone, this inference did not prove that the Defendant knew of the cocaine. It was, however, a circumstance the jury could weigh with the rest of the proof in determining whether she knowingly possessed the cocaine concealed inside the hidden compartment. v. The Defendant’s Travel History A jury may also consider a defendant’s travel history when it bears on the circumstances surrounding the transportation of hidden contraband. See Martinez, 372 S.W.3d at 608. Here, the Defendant acknowledged in her recorded interview that she had traveled to Mexico to see family approximately two weeks before the stop. Taken in isolation, this evidence would not support a finding of knowing possession. But a rational juror could consider the Defendant’s recent international travel, together with her stated destination and unusual travel route, her recent purchase and control of the truck, and the hidden compartment containing cocaine, in deciding whether she knowingly possessed the cocaine. - 10 -  vi. The Defendant’s Implausible Travel Plans Finally, a jury may infer a defendant’s awareness of contraband from unusual or implausible travel plans when those plans are considered with other circumstantial evidence. Martinez, 372 S.W.3d at 608 (concluding that a jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge, in part, from his “unusual travel” from Tacoma, Washington, to Mexico City, then to Charlotte, North Carolina, before driving “across country” back to Tacoma). In this case, the Defendant told Agent Proctor that she was traveling from Hatch, New Mexico, to Indianapolis, Indiana. The Defendant could not provide the name of the family she claimed to be visiting in Indianapolis. Agent Proctor testified that, based on mapping searches, the most direct routes between those locations did not pass through Tennessee. He further testified that the route through Tennessee added approximately three hours to the trip when compared with other available routes. Agent Proctor also testified that Interstate 44, one of the more direct routes, was then being heavily monitored by interdiction officers. From these facts, a rational juror could infer that the Defendant’s stated travel plans were implausible and that her route reflected an effort to avoid interdiction. Considered with the other evidence, that inference supported a finding that she knew of the cocaine in her truck. c. Defendant’s Arguments Pushing against these inferences, the Defendant contends that Mr. Bilbao’s presence in the vehicle raises a reasonable inference that the cocaine was his rather than hers and that the State failed to rebut that inference. This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, the State was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 380-81. Instead, when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict and discard all countervailing evidence. State v. Weems, 619 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2021). Thus, while the Defendant properly advanced this argument to the jury, we do not choose between competing reasonable inferences anew on appeal. We determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, permitted a rational juror to draw the inference of knowing possession. Second, the possible existence of another possessor does not negate the Defendant’s own constructive possession. Chism, 2024 WL 4824881, at *4; State v. Davis, No. W2008- - 11 - 00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 160927, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The jury was instructed that possession may be joint, meaning that more than one person may possess the same contraband simultaneously. Thus, even if the jury believed that Mr. Bilbao also possessed the cocaine, that conclusion did not foreclose a finding that the Defendant possessed it as well. The Defendant further argues that the absence of fingerprint or forensic evidence linking her to the packages renders the conviction infirm. We respectfully disagree. The sufficiency standard does not require forensic evidence that physically connects a defendant to contraband. A conviction is not undermined by the lack of such evidence where the remaining proof is otherwise legally sufficient. See Hart, 676 S.W.3d at 109. Viewed as a whole, the proof allowed a rational juror to draw several mutually reinforcing inferences. The Defendant recently purchased, owned, and drove the truck in which officers found the cocaine. The cocaine was present in a large quantity and had a value of more than two million dollars. The Defendant showed visible and escalating nervousness during the stop. The rear cab area showed visible signs of alteration or disturbance, including loose trim, tooled bolts, displaced weatherstripping, and a non- factory screw similar to screws on the hidden-compartment door. The Defendant also had recently traveled to Mexico, and her stated route from New Mexico to Indiana was materially longer than other available routes and passed through Tennessee without a direct-route explanation. In assessing this evidence, the jury “must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities.” Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 380 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)). Indeed, “jurors are free to use their common knowledge and judgment derived from experience, observation, and reflection to decide whether a fact is logically deducible or reasonably inferred from the evidence.” State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 886 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Cavette, 700 S.W.3d 116, 124-25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024). Taken together, these circumstances permitted a rational juror to conclude that the Defendant knowingly had the power and ability to exercise control over the cocaine found in her truck. Importantly, the “only question under Jackson is whether [the jury’s] finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012) (emphasis added); State v. Parker, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. M2022- - 12 - 00955-SC-R11-CD, 2026 WL 2564584, at *9, *12 (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2026). We conclude that the evidence presented by the State and the reasonable inferences drawn by the jury clear that threshold. See also Lyons, 669 S.W.3d at 791 (“Although the evidence is not overwhelming, our standard of review does not require it to be.”). No single circumstance, including the Defendant’s ownership and operation of the truck, would have established her knowledge by itself. But considered together under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence permitted the jury’s finding that the Defendant knew of the cocaine hidden in her truck and had the ability and intent to exercise control over it. Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 2. Approval of the Verdict as Thirteenth Juror We next address the Defendant’s second, though related, issue: whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial in its role as thirteenth juror. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) authorizes a trial court to grant a new trial after a guilty verdict if it “disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.” This rule requires the trial court to act as the “thirteenth juror” by independently evaluating the proof, considering the issues, and determining whether the evidence supports the verdict. State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tenn. 1995). The rule functions as a safeguard against jury error, and the trial court’s approval of the verdict as thirteenth juror is a prerequisite to the entry of a valid judgment. Id. at 434; State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the trial court failed to “satisfy its obligation to act as the thirteenth juror”). At the same time, this court has long recognized that the Rules of Appellate Procedure restrict our review of a trial court’s weighing of the evidence. See State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Once the trial court fulfills its duty as thirteenth juror, “appellate review is limited to sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Rule 13(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.” State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). An appellate court “‘may presume that the trial court approved the verdict as the thirteenth juror’ when it has overruled a motion for new trial without comment.” State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 115 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting State v. Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006)). It is only when the record contains statements by the trial court expressing dissatisfaction with the weight of the evidence, or evidence that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty, that an appellate court may reverse on that ground. State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995). - 13 -  In this case, the trial court did not merely overrule the motion for a new trial without comment. Its written order expressly stated, “[t]he Court has independently weighed the evidence and agrees with the Jury’s verdict.” That language confirms the trial court understood and carried out its thirteenth-juror obligation. The Defendant does not dispute that the trial court performed this function; she disputes only the result. An appellate court may remand when the trial court fails to perform its thirteenth-juror duty. Once the trial court properly performs that function, however, “appellate courts may only affirm the proper exercise of the thirteenth juror function[.]” State v. Dankworth, 919 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889, 910 n.12 (Tenn. 2015). The Defendant’s challenge, therefore, is limited to contesting the legal sufficiency of the convicting evidence, which we have already addressed. See State v. Deshields, No. W2024-01694-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 3023733, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2025) (same), no perm. app. filed. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. B. E VIDENTIARY I SSUES The Defendant next raises four evidentiary challenges. First, she contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony suggesting that she had illicit income, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Second, she argues that the trial court erred in permitting Agent Proctor to testify about driving routes he researched using Google or MapQuest, because the testimony was speculative, lacked proper foundation, and was irrelevant to any material issue. Third, she contends that the trial court erred in allowing Agent Proctor to testify that her passenger displayed red splotches on his neck and to associate that observation with nervousness. Finally, she argues that the trial court erred in permitting Agent Proctor to testify that EPIC reported that she had crossed the border within forty-eight hours of the traffic stop, because the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. We address each issue in turn. 1. Admission of Illicit Income Evidence The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to exclude testimony concerning her income, the cost of her vehicle, and her purchase of the vehicle - 14 - with cash. She argues that this evidence allowed the jury to infer that she had a prior source of illicit income. From that inference, she asserts, the jury could then conclude that she knowingly possessed the cocaine found in the vehicle. She further argues that the State failed to establish clear and convincing proof of any prior bad act and that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value. The State responds that the Defendant’s income and vehicle purchase were not crimes, wrongs, or acts within the meaning of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). It also argues that the trial court properly admitted the evidence because it was probative of the Defendant’s knowledge, motive, and intent. We agree with the State that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence. a. Background On the morning of trial, the Defendant moved to exclude testimony or argument concerning her income, the cost of her vehicle, or her purchase of that vehicle with cash. She argued that the State intended to imply that she could not have afforded the truck on her reported income. According to the Defendant, the State would then ask the jury to infer that she must have obtained the funds from prior drug activity. The State responded that the evidence did not constitute proof of a bad act under Rule 404(b). It also argued that the evidence bore on the Defendant’s knowledge of, and motive for possessing, the cocaine found in the vehicle. In considering the Defendant’s motion, the trial court stated that it was not convinced the evidence fell within Rule 404(b). Nevertheless, the court elected to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis out of an abundance of caution and to develop the record for appellate review. The court determined that the evidence related to material issues other than propensity, including motive, intent, and guilty knowledge. The court also concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the court withheld a final ruling until it could hear the proof offered at trial. Before Agent McCullough testified, the trial court conducted a jury-out hearing. Agent McCullough testified that the Defendant reported working as a field worker and earned approximately $21,000 per year. He also testified that the Defendant said she had - 15 - purchased the vehicle approximately a month and a half before the stop. According to Agent McCullough, the Defendant initially stated she paid $1,300 for the vehicle and later corrected it to $13,000. She said that she paid for the vehicle using savings and COVID stimulus funds. After hearing this testimony, the trial court again stated that it was unsure whether Rule 404(b) governed admission of the evidence, though it addressed those factors for the record. Eventually, the court concluded that the evidence related to intent, motive, plan, and absence of mistake. It also concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Finally, the court found that Agent McCullough’s account of the Defendant’s statements was clear and convincing. The court then admitted the evidence, and Agent McCullough testified before the jury. b. Standard of Appellate Review Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered to prove a defendant’s character and action in conformity with that character. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Before admitting such evidence, the trial court must hold a jury-out hearing, determine that a material issue exists other than conduct conforming with a character trait, find clear and convincing proof of the other act, and conclude that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)-(4). When the trial court substantially complies with Rule 404(b)’s procedural requirements, we review its evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 45 (Tenn. 2017). If the trial court fails to substantially comply with those requirements, we review the admissibility of the evidence de novo. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 287 (Tenn. 2014). Here, the trial court held a pretrial hearing and a later jury-out hearing before admitting the evidence. The court also deferred a final ruling until it heard the actual proof offered through Agent McCullough. At the jury-out hearing, the court addressed the Rule 404(b) factors on the record before admitting the testimony. We conclude that the trial court substantially complied with the rul