Lynn Frank Bristol v. State of Tennessee

10/30/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE July 15, 2026 Session LYNN FRANK BRISTOL v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County No. 23-CR-49134 Robert Thomas Carter, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-01264-CCA-R3-PC ___________________________________ A jury convicted the Petitioner, Lynn Frank Bristol, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery for incidents involving his stepdaughter. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. During an evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed that the petition was timely, and the State did not object to the absence of verification of the petition as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40‑30‑104(d) and (e). The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. The State asserts for the first time on appeal that the petition was time-barred, the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to consider it, and it should therefore be dismissed. The Petitioner acknowledges that his certificate of service was neither sworn to nor notarized. He nevertheless asserts that the certification of service was adequate proof of prison mailbox rule compliance; therefore, his petition was timely. At oral argument in this case, the parties requested and this court granted supplemental briefing on whether the absence of verification under section 40‑30‑104(d) and (e) required dismissal of the petition. We now hold that the verification requirement is a mandatory procedural rule. Because the State failed to invoke its procedural-based verification claim until after the evidentiary hearing, we conclude this issue has been forfeited, and dismissal of the petition is not warranted. We also conclude that the Petitioner presented sufficient proof for a threshold showing of compliance with the prison mailbox rule pursuant to Butler v. State, 92 S.W.3d 387, 390- 91 (Tenn. 2002) (concluding that petitioner’s claim that he delivered pro se petition to a prison official for filing within the statute of limitations was sufficient for him to be given the opportunity at an evidentiary hearing to meet his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence his compliance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, § 2(G)). Therefore, we reverse and vacate in part the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed, Vacated in Part and Remanded CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined. Corey A. Spearman, Tullahoma, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lynn Frank Bristol. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Craig Northcott, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION A jury convicted the Petitioner of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. The Petitioner appealed his convictions and his sentences. This court reversed the Petitioner’s convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. See State v. Bristol, No. M2019-00531-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1697914, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2021). The State appealed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed this court and reinstated the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917, 930 (Tenn. 2022). The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion was filed on October 7, 2022. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The penultimate page of the petition contains the Petitioner’s signature, which is not witnessed, sworn to, or notarized. The last page of the petition provides as follows: -2-  The certificate of service was neither sworn to nor notarized. The pro se petition was filed with the court clerk on October 11, 2023. On October 30, 2023, the post- conviction court appointed counsel. Counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief on January 4, 2025. The amended petition was not verified under oath. The amended petition claimed that the “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is timely filed within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal was taken, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102.” In his amended petition, the Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to object to expert bolstering and hearsay and that he was entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.1 The State filed its answer to the amended petition for post-conviction relief on March 26, 2025, denying all allegations. The State also asserted that the pro se petition for post-conviction relief had been filed timely. The State made no mention of the fact that neither the original pro se petition nor the amended petition was verified. At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the post-conviction court stated the following: Very good. All right. We’re ready to go. This case stems from a 2018 criminal trial in which your client was convicted. The case has gone through the appellate process. I’d make a finding that the petition was timely filed and then – the petition was filed on October the 11th of 2023. And it was – the petition was amended by counsel extensively, January 4th of 2025. The government filed a response March the 26th of 2025. Are the parties ready? The post-conviction court then heard testimony from the Petitioner’s trial counsel and the Petitioner. At no point during the hearing did the State object to the timeliness of the petition or the fact that neither the original nor the amended petition was verified under oath. On August 8, 2025, the post-conviction court denied relief by written order. It is from this order that the Petitioner now appeals. ANALYSIS 1 The amended petition also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to prepare a defense and to put the State’s case to the meaningful adversarial test; trial counsel’s failure to use and maintain the file concerning threatening text messages sent to the Petitioner by the victim’s father to impeach his credibility; trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for a bill of particulars rendering counsel unsure of the dates of commission of the offense; and trial counsel’s failure to object to the State’s failure to make an election of offenses, to ask for a unanimous jury instruction, and to include this issue in the motion for a new trial. -3-  I. Statute of Limitations. For the first time on appeal, the State contends this appeal should be dismissed as untimely because the post-conviction petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. While the Petitioner included a certificate of service in which he asserted that he placed the petition in the prison’s mailing system on October 4, 2023, he included no documentation of the correctional facility acknowledging the date the petition was submitted, and his certificate of service, while signed, was not notarized. The State asserts that when the timeliness of the filing is an issue, the burden is on the pro se litigant to prove compliance by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(d)(3). The State argues that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that application of the prison mailbox rule was appropriate and that it is not enough for a prisoner to simply declare that he has complied with the prison mailbox rule; there must be documentation from the correctional facility acknowledging the date the prisoner delivered the document to the appropriate person at the correctional facility. State v. Kroese, No. M2024-01166- CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1091841, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2025) (addressing the prison mailbox rule as reflected in Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g)), no perm. app. filed. Thus, regardless of the parties below treating the petition as if it were timely, it was not. See Greene v. State, No. E2005-02769-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 1215022, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2007) (“[E]ven if the statute of limitations was not raised at the trial court level and the trial court treated the petition as timely, [this court] must still dismiss the appeal if we conclude that the trial court never had jurisdiction to consider the petition because the petition was untimely and that due process does not require tolling the statute of limitations.”), no perm. app. filed. Finally, the State asserts that no due process considerations require tolling of the statute of limitations. In his reply, the Petitioner emphasizes that the record contains the Petitioner’s signed pro se certificate of service showing delivery to prison authorities on October 4, 2023. The State did not object and did not present contrary evidence. The post-conviction court found the petition timely. The State offers nothing that contradicts that finding, and the absence of further documentation does not preponderate against the determination of the post-conviction court. The Petitioner contends that the prison mailbox rule applies, and that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 2(G) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 49(d) require delivery within the filing period, but neither rule requires notarization of the certificate of service. The Petitioner distinguishes Kroese by arguing that it is an unpublished decision involving a different procedural posture, which does not follow the plain text of Rule 28, § 2(G), which the Petitioner asserts only requires timely filing, not verification. Kroese, 2025 WL 1091841, at *2. Furthermore, the Petitioner asserts that due process tolling applies even if the prison mailbox rule does not. An appellate court must consider subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether that issue was presented by the parties or addressed below. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d at 926 -4- (citing Recipient of Final Expunction Ord. in McNairy Cnty. Cir. Ct. Case No. 3279 v. Rausch, 645 S.W.3d 160, 167 (Tenn. 2022); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b) (“The appellate court shall also consider whether the trial and appellate court have jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether or not presented for review . . . .”); Tenn. R. App. P. 13, Adv. Comm’n Cmt., subdiv. (b) (“Only the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, whether at the trial or appellate level, must be considered by the appellate court regardless of whether it is presented for review.”)). This court has recognized that, “[g]iven the post-conviction statute’s language conferring jurisdictional import to the timely filing of a petition, it is essential that the question of timeliness be resolved before any adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims may properly occur.” Saulsberry v. State, No. W2002-02538- CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 239767, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2004), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2004) (citations omitted); see Thomas v. State, No. W2022-00887-CCA- R3-PC, 2023 WL 4397037, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 7, 2023) (recognizing that “[t]he timely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the post-conviction court’s initial consideration of the claims, as well as a jurisdictional prerequisite to this court’s consideration of the Petitioner’s claims on appeal”), no perm. app. filed. Given the jurisdictional import of this issue, we do not consider it waived by the State’s failure to raise it below. See Anderson v. State, 692 S.W.3d 94, 104 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023) (holding that, because complying with the statute of limitations in post- conviction proceedings is a jurisdictional prerequisite, the State did not waive the post- conviction statute of limitations defense on appeal in spite of the State’s concession at the trial level), no perm. app. filed. Moreover, because this issue is one of subject-matter jurisdiction, we review it de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 103. “A post-conviction proceeding is commenced by filing, with the clerk of the court in which [a] conviction occurred, a written petition naming the state as the respondent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a) (2025). Under Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on which the judgment became final, or consideration of the petition shall be barred.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). “No court shall have jurisdiction” to consider an untimely petition unless it falls within one of the enumerated statutory exceptions under section 40-30-102(b) or is mandated by due process. Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tenn. 2001). The General Assembly has intended for the one-year bar to be strictly construed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a); Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 632 (Tenn. 2013). The “prison mailbox rule” permits documents filed by an incarcerated pro se litigant to be deemed timely if the papers were delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time fixed for filing. The codified rule provides, in pertinent part, -5-  If papers required or permitted to be filed by these rules are prepared by or on behalf of a pro se petitioner incarcerated in a correctional facility and are not received by the clerk of the court until after the time fixed for filing, filing shall be timely if the papers were delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time fixed for filing. “Correctional facility” shall include a prison, jail, county workhouse or similar institution in which the pro se petitioner is incarcerated. This provision shall also apply to service of papers by pro se petitioners pursuant to these rules. Should timeliness of filing or service become an issue, the burden is on the pro se petitioner to establish compliance with this provision. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 2(G); see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(d)(1) (“If a paper required or permitted to be filed pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure is prepared by or on behalf of a pro se litigant incarcerated in a correctional facility and is not received by the court clerk until after the deadline for filing, the filing is timely if the paper was delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time set for filing.”). As the rule clarifies, the burden of establishing compliance with the prison mailbox rule rests on the petitioner. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(d)(3). In Butler v. State, 92 S.W.3d 387, 390-91 (Tenn. 2002), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that when an incarcerated pro se litigant alleges sufficient facts to make a threshold showing that a post-conviction petition was timely delivered to the appropriate correctional officer for mailing within the one‑year statutory limitations period, the post- conviction court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the litigant can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he timely delivered the petition to a particular correctional officer for mailing, and (2) this correctional officer was the “appropriate individual” for post-conviction petition filing purposes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, § 2(G). Butler emphasizes that timely filing of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional, and thus factual resolution of mailbox‑rule compliance is mandatory before a petition may be dismissed as untimely. Id. A petitioner must, at minimum, allege sufficient facts to make a threshold showing that he complied with the rule. In other words, although a petitioner ultimately bears the burden of proving compliance with the prison mailbox rule, an allegation supported by some evidence of timely delivery to the appropriate correctional officer may be sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing at which the petitioner is given an opportunity to carry that burden. Examples of sufficient proof to trigger such a hearing include affidavits supporting the petitioner’s allegations of timely delivery from a prison official, a notarized certification on the petition itself indicating the date and to whom it was delivered for mailing at the correctional facility, reference within the petition to correspondence from the prison mailroom staff or records kept by the prison substantiating timely filing; and any other -6- evidence of delivery to the correct prison official within the filing period of his claim that he filed his petition in a timely manner. See, e.g., Price v. State, No. W2006-02233-CCA- R3-PC, 2008 WL 2065054, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2008), no perm. app. filed; Riggs v. State, No. E2004-02233-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 1919844, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2005), no perm. app. filed; Adkins v. State, No. E2020-01213-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 122673, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2022), no perm. app. filed. The “final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal [was] taken” occurred on October 7, 2022, when the Tennessee Supreme Court filed its opinion disposing of the direct appeal arising from the Petitioner’s convictions. Because October 7, 2023, was a Saturday, and the following Monday, October 9, 2023, was Columbus Day, a state and federal holiday, the Petitioner had until October 10, 2023, to file his petition for post-conviction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-102 (“The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, and then it shall also be excluded.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 15-1-101 (defining Columbus Day as legal holiday); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(4) & Adv. Comm’n. Cmt. (noting that a “legal holiday,” as defined by Code section 15-1-101, does not depend on whether the clerk’s office is open for business and asserting that although state offices might be open, “Columbus Day is still a ‘legal holiday’ for purposes of computing time periods under the rule”). The initial pro se petition contained a certificate of service which stated, “I further certify that I have placed this legal document in this prison’s mailing system this the 4 day of October, 2023[;]” however, the pro se petition was not filed with the court clerk until October 11, 2023, one day after the one-year deadline. Thus, the petition was untimely, and the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to consider it, unless, pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the Petitioner established that he delivered it to the appropriate persons at his correctional facility for mailing by October 10, 2023. The Petitioner contends that his certificate of service—averring that he placed his pro se petition in his prison’s mailing system on October 4, 2023—is adequate proof that his pro se petition was timely filed. He asserts compliance with the prison mailbox rule and that neither rule requires notarization of the certificate of service. Although the post- conviction court did not explain the basis underlying its determination that the pro se petition was timely filed, it is reasonable to conclude that the post-conviction court relied on the Petitioner’s certificate of service, particularly in light of the State’s trial-level concession that the petition was timely. Respectfully, we disagree that the Petitioner’s unsworn certificate of service, unsupported by any other proof, was sufficient, in and of itself, to satisfy the prison mailbox rule. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 sets forth rules that “supplement the remedies and procedures set forth in the Post-Conviction Procedure Act[.]” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § -7- 1(A). Rule 28 includes an Appendix A which sets forth a Form Petition to be made “available without cost to a prisoner in the prisons.” This Form Petition is designed to be used by prisoners filing pro se their petitions for post-conviction relief. The Form Petition includes a lengthy list of instructions, including the directive that the petition “must be signed by petitioner under penalty of perjury.” The Form Petition also includes numerous specific numbered prompts to aid the petitioner in completing his petition in such a manner as to meet the statutory requirements for full consideration on the merits by the post- conviction court. Prompt number 22 asks, “What date is this petition being given to prison authorities for mailing?” Immediately following the line for providing the answer to this prompt is the sentence, “Wherefore, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner relief to which petitioner may be entitled in this proceeding,” which sentence is followed immediately by “PETITIONER’S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH SUBJECT TO PENALTY FOR PERJURY” and the appropriate form for the petitioner to submit his sworn and notarized signature. Thus, Appendix A makes clear that a pro se post-conviction petitioner’s allegations of fact regarding his claim, including his claim of the date on which he delivered his petition to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility for mailing, are to be made under penalty of perjury and notarized. As will be discussed more fully below, the Petitioner’s certificate of service in this case is unsworn and unsupported by any additional proof. It does not satisfy the requirements of the Form Petition. Because the timeliness of the petition was not at issue at the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel had no reason to question the Petitioner under oath about the information contained in the certificate of service. Thus, other than the unsworn and unsupported certificate of service, the record contains no proof that the Petitioner did, in fact, deliver his pro se petition to the appropriate individual in his prison for mailing on October 4, 2023. Under these circumstances, the State argues dismissal is appropriate. The State relies on Kroese, 2025 WL 1091841, at *2, for the proposition that a prisoner may not simply declare that he has complied with the rule and that documentation from the correctional facility acknowledging the date the prisoner delivered the document to the appropriate person at the correctional facility is required. However, this proposition completely ignores Butler’s requirement for the post-conviction court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual questions surrounding (1) the date of delivery and (2) whether the official to whom the petition was delivered was an “appropriate individual” under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 § 2(G). 92 S.W.3d at 391. Kroese is also distinguishable. Kroese did not involve a post-conviction petition nor any jurisdictional statute‑of‑limitations bar. Instead, the defendant sought appellate review of the denial of a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion and filed a notice of appeal while incarcerated. The question was whether the notice was timely under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(g). Unlike Rule 28 section 2(G), Rule 20(g)’s timeliness -8- requirement for notices of appeal is not jurisdictional and may be waived “in the interest of justice.” After examining the limited record—which contained only the defendant’s uncorroborated declaration—the Kroese court concluded that the defendant had not met her burden of proving timely delivery under Rule 20(g). 2025 WL 1091841, at *2. Nevertheless, exercising its discretion, the court waived the timely filing requirement and proceeded to adjudicate the appeal. Id. at *3. Because the mailbox-rule determination under Rule 20(g) was not dispositive of the court’s ability to hear the case, no evidentiary hearing was required. Id. The remand requirement in Butler arises only where mailbox‑rule compliance is necessary to determine the timeliness—and thus the very viability—of a post-conviction petition. 92 S.W.3d at 391. Accordingly, the question here is whether the Petitioner has met the threshold showing to trigger the remand requirement in Butler, 92 S.W.3d at 391. We conclude that the Petitioner’s certificate of service constitutes at least some evidence that he satisfied the prison mailbox rule. Because the post-conviction court ruled that the petition had been timely filed without objection by the State, the Petitioner was not provided with the opportunity to present proof on that issue. We therefore remand this matter to the post- conviction court to hold an evidentiary hearing in which the Petitioner will be given an opportunity to carry his burden of demonstrating, by sufficient proof, that he satisfied the prison mailbox rule and that his petition for post-conviction was timely filed. II. Verification. To further complicate the issues presented in this appeal, upon review of the record, and during oral argument, this court observed that neither the original pro se petition for post-conviction relief, nor the amended petition for post-conviction relief filed later with the assistance of counsel, was verified under oath. For the first time at oral argument, the parties requested, and this court granted, supplemental briefing on the question of whether the absence of a verified petition for post-conviction relief requires dismissal of the petition. The parties have briefed these issues, and the issue is now ripe for review. See Bristol, 654 S.W.3d at 927 (“The requirement that an appellate court give parties notice and an opportunity to be heard is especially important when, as here, an appellate court undertakes to review an issue that was neither preserved below nor presented on appeal.”). In his supplemental brief, the Petitioner does not dispute that his original pro se petition and the amended petition lack the sworn under oath verification required by section 40-30-104(d) and (e). The Petitioner argues that although Tennessee Code Annotated section 40‑30‑104 requires verification under oath, dismissal is not warranted on the present record because the State never objected to the lack of verification and the post‑conviction court proceeded to a full evidentiary hearing at which the Petitioner testified under oath. -9-  Relying on Sexton, Lee, Cole, Hinton, and Watt, the Petitioner contends that Tennessee courts consistently reach the merits when: (1) the State fails to timely raise the verification defect before the evidentiary hearing, and (2) the petitioner’s sworn testimony at the hearing effectively adopts and attests to the petition’s factual assertions. See Sexton v. State, 151 S.W.3d 525, 530 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Lee v. State, No. W2025-00455- CCA-R3-PC, 2026 WL 517955, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2026), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 25, 2026); Cole v. State, No. W2025-01491-CCA-R3-PC, 2026 WL 411271, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2026), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 24, 2026); Hinton v. State, No. W2022-01135-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 8525148, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16, 2024); Watt v. State, No. M2015-02411- CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 6638856, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2017). The Petitioner distinguishes Maxwell, Schklar, and Paschel because in those cases the State raised the verification defect in a timely fashion before any merits hearing, and dismissal occurred only in a different procedural posture. See Maxwell v. State, 647 S.W.3d 593 (Tenn. 2019); Schklar v. State, --- S.W.3d --------, No. M2025-00907-CCA- R3-PC, 2026 WL 473332 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2026), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 21, 2026); Paschel v. State, No. E2025-00491-CCA-R3-PC, 2026 WL 1256189, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2026), perm. app. filed (Tenn. June 26, 2026). The Petitioner further asserts that although verification is “mandatory,” it is not jurisdictional. The Petitioner states that, unlike the statute of limitations provision under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40‑30‑102, section 40‑30‑104 contains no jurisdiction‑stripping language. The Petitioner argues that, based on Maxwell, Code section 40‑30‑104 is a “reasonable procedural rule,” which does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 647 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn. 2000)). The Petitioner asserts that the State’s non‑objection is material under Bristol, Holland, and Lowe, which limit sua sponte consideration of unpreserved issues in post‑conviction proceedings. See Bristol, 654 S.W.3d at 917; Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 459-60 (Tenn. 2020); Lowe v. State, 703 S.W.3d 319, 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024). In the alternative, the Petitioner contends that if this court determines that an explicit verification remains necessary, a limited remand—rather than dismissal—would permit the Petitioner to cure the defect, consistent with Timberlake, Sexton, Hinton, and Hutcherson. See Timberlake v. State, No. W2008-00037-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 302294, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), no perm. app. filed; Sexton, 151 S.W.3d at 530; Hinton, 2023 WL 8525148, at *4; Hutcherson v. State, 75 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). - 10 -  In response, the State argues that the Petitioner’s failure to verify his petition is fatal to his post‑conviction action, regardless of whether the State raised the issue in the post- conviction court. The State contends that the verification requirement in section 40‑30‑104(d) and (e) is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, akin to the statute of limitations requirement in section 40‑30‑102(b). Citing Maxwell, the State maintains that a represented petitioner has no statutory opportunity to amend or cure an unverified petition once filed, and panels applying Sexton‑type reasoning—such as Lee, Cole, and Hinton— did so in conflict with Maxwell’s jurisdictional characterization. According to the State, more recent cases such as Schklar, Fitts, and Vaughn, properly treat an unverified petition filed by counsel as a legal nullity that cannot confer jurisdiction on the post‑conviction court. See Schklar, 2026 WL 473332, at *4; Fitts v. State, No. M2024-00565-CCA-R3- PC, 2025 WL 3124142, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2026); Vaughn v. State, No. W2021-00354-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 1618435, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2022). The State emphasizes that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and a court must dismiss whenever the absence of jurisdiction is shown, even if raised for the first time on appeal. It relies on Johnson, Dishmon, and related authority, which underscore that any judgment entered without jurisdiction is void. See Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 843-44 (Tenn. 2013); Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). The State further asserts that even if oral testimony at the hearing could cure verification in some circumstances, that doctrine is unavailable here because the original petition was filed outside the statute of limitations and without verification. Thus, the Petitioner’s later sworn testimony cannot revive a petition already barred by the jurisdictional limitations period. We begin by addressing whether the statutory requirement that a post‑conviction petition “shall be verified under oath,” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40‑30‑104(d) and (e), operates as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the post-conviction court’s exercise of authority or as a mandatory procedural requirement that must be enforced when properly invoked. After reviewing the statutory text, structure, and Tennessee precedent, we conclude that the verification requirement is mandatory, but nonjurisdictional, and therefore may be forfeited if not timely raised.2 2 Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-104 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (d) The petitioner shall include all claims known to the petitioner for granting post- conviction relief and shall verify under oath that all the claims are included. (e) The petitioner shall include allegations of fact supporting each claim for relief set forth in the petition and allegations of fact explaining why each ground for relief was not previously presented in any earlier proceeding. The petition and any - 11 -  The Tennessee Constitution grants the Legislature the power to define the limits of a trial court’s jurisdiction. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 8 (“The jurisdiction of the Circuit, Chancery and other Inferior Courts, shall be as now established by law, until changed by the Legislature.”). “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.” Houghton v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 737 S.W.3d 334, 345 n.12 (Tenn. 2025) (citations omitted). A court derives its subject matter jurisdiction, either explicitly or by necessary implication, from the Tennessee Constitution or from legislative acts. In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tenn. 2012); In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). “Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot enter a valid, enforceable order.” In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). Subject matter jurisdiction “carries with it certain attributes, among them that defects cannot be waived, forfeited, or excused for equitable reasons, and they may be raised at any time before final judgment.” Houghton, 737 S.W.3d at 345 n.12 (citations omitted). “Because a court may not adjudicate a matter over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that may be raised at any time and is not subject to waiver.” Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials, LLC, 740 S.W.3d 877, 881 (Tenn. 2026) (citing Houghton, 737 S.W.3d at 345 n.12). In order to determine whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, this court must “examine (1) the nature or gravamen of the cause of action, (2) the nature of the relief being sought, and (3) the constitutional or statutory provisions relied upon by the plaintiff.” In re Est. of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d at 489 (citing Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000); Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994)). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo and with no presumption of correctness. Houghton, 737 S.W.3d at 346. The issue of whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case appears to be dependent on the interpretation of a statute, which is also a question of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Richards v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., 706 S.W.3d 319, 323 (Tenn. 2025); State v. Hollon, 671 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023). In determining whether a statutory requirement is jurisdictional under Tennessee law, we must first examine the statute’s text and structure and then consider whether the legislature made compliance a condition of the court’s adjudicatory authority, either explicitly or by necessary implication. See In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d at 489. If a requirement in a statute is interpreted as jurisdictional, then a defect in that requirement cannot be waived, forfeited, or excused for equitable reasons. See Houghton, 737 S.W.3d amended petition shall be verified under oath. Affidavits, records or other evidence available to the petitioner supporting the allegations of the petition may be attached to it. Id. (emphasis added). - 12 - at 345 n.12 (citations omitted). Conversely, if a requirement in a statute is determined to be procedural, rather than jurisdictional, then a defect in the requirement is subject to waiver or forfeiture if it is not timely invoked. We emphasize that merely labeling a statutory requirement “jurisdictional” does not make it so. The requirement at issue must clearly operate as a condition on the court’s power to hear the case. As an initial matter, nothing in section 40-30-104(d) or (e) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act conditions the compliance of the verification requirement on the court’s authority to adjudicate a petition. The Post‑Conviction Procedure Act contains only one provision that expressly limits the jurisdiction of the courts to hear post‑conviction claims: Tennessee Code Annotated section 40‑30‑102 (“Limitations of actions”), which provides that untimely petitions “shall be barred” and that “no court shall have jurisdiction” to consider them. No similar jurisdiction‑stripping language appears in section 40‑30‑104(d) and (e). Instead, Code section 40-30-104(d) and (e) impose form and content obligations on petitioners. They require the petitioner to include all known claims, to allege supporting facts, and to verify those allegations under oath. They do not state that compliance is a prerequisite to the court’s authority to adjudicate a petition. Nothing in section 40‑30‑104(d) or (e) indicates that the General Assembly conditioned the court’s subject matter jurisdiction on compliance with these provisions. “Legislative intent is derived from construing the statute in its entirety, and it should be assumed the legislature used each word purposefully and that those words convey some intent and have a meaning and a purpose.” Federal Exp. Corp. v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, 717 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tenn. 1986). The General Assembly’s decision not to include any jurisdiction‑stripping language in section 40‑30‑104(d) and (e) is itself a compelling basis to conclude that the verification obligation is a procedural requirement, not a condition of the court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, as previously noted, a jurisdictional defect cannot be waived, forfeited, or remedied by amendment or testimony. It follows that if a statutory requirement has been historically treated as curable, waivable, or subject to forfeiture, it cannot be jurisdictional. This court has repeatedly treated verification defects as procedural in nature, permitting waiver of the defect, curing of the defect, or consideration of the merits of the petition where the State fails to timely challenge the defect. These cases have long recogni