State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Spencer
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketW2025-01844-CCA-R3-CD
JudgeJudge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/19/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs October 6, 2026
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JONATHAN SPENCER
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Weakley County
No. 2025-CR-63 Jeff Parham, Judge
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No. W2025-01844-CCA-R3-CD
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Defendant, Jonathan Spencer, appeals his Weakley County Circuit Court conviction for a
violation of the seat belt law, for which he received a fifty-dollar fine. On appeal,
Defendant asserts that the circuit court: (1) erred by denying his right to a jury trial; (2)
abused its discretion by arbitrarily rejecting Defendant’s statutory medical exemption
defense; (3) committed structural error by “forcing” Defendant to testify to authenticate a
document, in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and that (4) the
circuit court’s proceedings were “arbitrary, including an improper exchange, and left the
record incomplete,” thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial. Following our review, we
reverse Defendant’s conviction and remand to the circuit court for a new trial.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed;
Case Remanded
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MATTHEW J.
WILSON and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined.
Jonathan Spencer, Dresden, Tennessee, pro se.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth Evan, Assistant Attorney
General; Colin Johnson, District Attorney General; and James R. Washburn, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On June 1, 2025, Defendant received a citation for a violation of the seat belt law, a
Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603. On August 22, 2025, Defendant
appeared on the citation in the Weakley County General Sessions Court. Following a
bench trial, the general sessions court found Defendant guilty of the offense and imposed
a thirty-dollar fine.
On September 2, 2025, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Weakley
County Circuit Court for a trial de novo. In the notice of appeal, Defendant included a
demand for a jury trial. At a status hearing held on September 22, 2025, Defendant
requested a jury trial; the circuit court denied the request, stating that Defendant was not
entitled to a jury trial on a Class C misdemeanor.
On November 10, 2025, the circuit court held a bench trial, at which Defendant
represented himself. Tennessee Highway Patrol Trooper Christopher Crocker testified that
on June 1, 2025, he stopped Defendant’s vehicle in Dresden for a seat belt violation. While
positioned in an elevated location on Highland Street, he observed Defendant driving on
State Route 54 without a seat belt fastened across his body. Trooper Crocker stated that
his vantage point allowed him to see inside the vehicle and that he could clearly determine
that no seat belt was being worn. Based on his observation, he initiated a traffic stop.
Trooper Crocker testified that, after stopping Defendant, he identified himself,
explained the reason for the stop, and requested Defendant’s driver’s license and vehicle
information. He stated that Defendant was still not wearing a seat belt during their
interaction. After checking Defendant’s information, Trooper Crocker issued a citation for
a seat belt law violation, returned to the vehicle, explained the citation, and requested
Defendant’s signature. According to Trooper Crocker, Defendant did not speak during the
stop and offered no explanation for failing to wear a seat belt.
During continued cross-examination, Trooper Crocker acknowledged that a
subsection of the seat belt law provides a waiver for individuals with medical conditions.
Trooper Crocker did not recall that Defendant had a handicap license plate.
Defendant testified that he had medical conditions and submitted a letter dated May
1, 2023, from Dr. Thomas P. Evans written after Defendant had “a prior issue with having
the seat belt on and having an anaphylactic reaction.” The letter from Dr. Evans stated:
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To Whom It May Concern:
This is in regards to an established patient of this clinic, [Defendant].
[Defendant] reports having an allergic reaction while driving recently which
caused him to remove his seatbelt. He was subsequently pulled over and
issued a citation for a seat belt violation.
Defendant presented two additional notes from Dr. Evans. The first note, dated
November 5, 2019, stated that Defendant saw Dr. Evans for “multiple chronic illnesses”
and that Defendant was considered one hundred percent disabled. The second note, dated
April 12, 2021, asserted that Defendant was to use a walking stick “to assist with
ambulation due to service-related and non-service related injuries.”
Defendant also submitted a letter from a legal assistant with the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs Office of General Counsel dated August 14, 2025. The letter explained
to Defendant that, if he wished to file a tort claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, he
needed to complete an attached form and return it “along with all supporting
documentation.”
Defendant testified that the documents showed he had an ongoing medical
condition. Defendant then stated:
If you want to we can call my daughter from downstairs at the
property assessor’s office. She came over about two or three weeks ago
where I had an anaphylactic reaction. I had a big knot on the side of my neck
just pop up. She’s got a video. However, I didn’t know the rules of the court
on how to get that video, and I didn’t want to taint the evidence, so right now
it’s sitting on her phone downstairs. We can call her up and she can give her
testimony and it can be presented also.
When the circuit court indicated that it would allow Defendant to call his daughter as a
witness, Defendant replied, “I would rather not, Your Honor, because I’m afraid the
political backlash will be against her.”
On cross-examination, Defendant admitted that he did not have his seat belt on after
Trooper Crocker stopped him. He said that he could not recall whether he was wearing the
seat belt when he was driving. He testified that he sometimes pulled the shoulder portion
of his seat belt off his shoulder, which he believed was not prohibited by Tennessee law.
According to Defendant’s testimony, he may have been wearing his seat belt with the
shoulder portion positioned away from his shoulder, such that an observer could have
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concluded he was not wearing it. Defendant said that he usually wore his seat belt unless
he had “some type of medical issue going on . . . at the time.”
Defendant agreed that the letter from Dr. Evans related to a prior seat belt violation
in Gleason. Defendant further agreed that he did not provide Trooper Crocker a copy of
the letter at the time of the traffic stop.
The circuit court then instructed Defendant to call his next witness, and the
following colloquy occurred:
[Defendant]: Your Honor, I’m going to not call my daughter up at this
time. She’s got the medical evidence. If I need to bring that forward into the
appeal if I’m found guilty, I will take care of it at that time, Your Honor.
[Circuit Court]: You need to understand this, [Defendant]. An appeal
from here goes to the Court of Criminal Appeals. They only go on the record.
You won’t introduce more testimony there. This is your day in court. You
can call her or not call her; I don’t care.
[Defendant]: I won’t call her at this time, Your Honor, sir.
The circuit court noted that it had reviewed the testimony and the statute, including
subsection (h)(1) which provides an exception for a passenger or operator with a physical
disability that prevents appropriate restraint in a safety belt. The court stated that the letter
“from Dr. Evans dated May 1[,] 2023, just says you reported to him you had an allergic
reaction while driving which caused you to remove the seat belt. It doesn’t state what your
disability is or why the seat belt would be inappropriate.” The court explained:
But the doctor’s got to certify it in writing what your condition is and why a
restraint is inappropriate. He’s got to certify that. He could do it with an
affidavit. He could do it with any number of things that you could keep on
you. But this isn’t appropriate. This is not sufficient.
The court found Defendant guilty of violating the seat belt law and imposed a fifty-
dollar fine. This timely appeal follows.
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II. Analysis
A. Denial of the right to jury trial
In his first issue on appeal, Defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional
right to a trial by jury. The State concedes that Defendant was entitled to a jury trial and
that his conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
“[W]here a fine of more than $50.00 or any confinement of the accused may be
imposed, the right to jury trial under the Tennessee constitution is well-established.” State
v. Dusina, 764 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1989) (emphasis added). In Dusina, the court
recognized the state constitutional right to trial by jury is more expansive than the federal
constitutional right, the latter of which guarantees the right to a jury trial only where the
fine exceeds fifty dollars or confinement of more than six months may be imposed. Id.
(citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
When a defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor in general sessions court, the
defendant has a right to appeal to the circuit or criminal court with a trial de novo. Tenn.
R. Crim. P. 5(c)(2). Such an appeal includes the right to trial by jury, provided a demand
is made at the time of the filing of the appeal. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3-131. However,
there is no right to trial by jury for “small offenses.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(b). Small offenses
are those which carry a maximum fine of fifty dollars and for which no imprisonment may
be imposed. Dusina, 764 S.W.2d at 768; see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5, Advisory Comm’n
Cmt.
Whether a defendant has been denied the right to a jury trial is a mixed question of
law and fact that this court reviews de novo. State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 656 (Tenn.
2013), overruled on other grounds by Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Roussis, --- S.W.3d ---,
2026 WL 2207688 (Tenn. July 31, 2026).
In this case, Defendant requested a jury trial upon appealing his conviction from
general sessions court to circuit court. A seat belt violation is a Class C misdemeanor
punishable by up to thirty days’ incarceration. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-9-603(d)(1), 40-
35-111(e)(3). Although the seat belt statute permits a violator to resolve the citation by
paying a fine without appearing in court, that provision applies only when the violator does
not contest the charge. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603(d)(2). Because Defendant chose
to appear in court and contest the citation, that provision was inapplicable. Defendant was
entitled to a jury trial. See id.; State v. Powell, No. M2001-02955-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL
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708047, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2002), no perm. app. filed. Accordingly, we
must reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for a trial by jury.1
B. Rejection of statutory medical exemption defense
Defendant asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion by arbitrarily rejecting
his statutory medical exemption defense. Although we are reversing Defendant’s
conviction and remanding for a new trial, to the extent that Defendant challenges the circuit
court’s rejection of his defense under a sufficiency of the evidence framework, we will
briefly address this issue. Should we find the evidence insufficient, double jeopardy would
bar a retrial.
Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R.
App. P. 13(e). We afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn from it. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).
Questions concerning witness credibility, the weight of the evidence, and factual disputes
are resolved by the jury, and this court does not reweigh the evidence. State v. Bland, 958
S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). The same standard applies to convictions based on direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn.
2011).
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-603(a)(1) states that “[n]o person shall
operate a passenger motor vehicle on any highway . . . in this state unless the person and
all passengers four (4) years of age or older are restrained by a safety belt at all times the
vehicle is in forward motion.” As relevant here, section 55-9-603(a)(1) does not apply to
an “operator with a physical disability which prevents appropriate restraint in a safety seat
or safety belt; provided, that the condition is duly certified in writing by a physician who
shall state the nature of the disability, as well as the reason a restraint is inappropriate[.]”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603(h)(1).
In this case, Trooper Crocker testified that on June 1, 2025, he initiated a traffic stop
of Defendant in Dresden after observing Defendant operate a vehicle on State Route 54
without a seat belt. Trooper Crocker stated that, from his elevated position on Highland
Street, he had a clear view into the vehicle and could determine that Defendant was not
1
In his brief, Defendant insists, without support, that the charge against him should be dismissed
with prejudice. Even though he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on the violation of his right
to a jury trial, Defendant is not entitled to have the charge dismissed with prejudice and must face a new
trial.
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wearing a seat belt. He further testified that Defendant made no statements during the
traffic stop and offered no explanation for the violation.
Defendant asserted that medical conditions exempted him from wearing a seat belt
and submitted several documents that purportedly substantiated his claim. Upon review,
however, the circuit court found that Defendant failed to establish the statutory seat belt
exemption for a physical disability. In considering Dr. Evans’s May 1, 2023 letter, the
court determined that it merely reflected Defendant’s report of an allergic reaction and did
not identify a qualifying disability or explain why a seat belt was inappropriate. The court
concluded that Defendant’s documentation was insufficient because it did not include a
physician’s written certification of Defendant’s condition and the basis for the exemption
as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-603(h)(1).
Defendant insists that the court should have given him an opportunity to supplement
his medical documentation to “address[ ] any perceived deficiency.” However, Defendant
provides no authority, and we can find none, that the circuit court was required to provide
such an opportunity. In any event, the record reflects that the circuit court allowed
Defendant the opportunity to put on additional proof. Defendant initially indicated that he
would call his daughter to present supplementary medical evidence, but he ultimately
declined to do so. This issue is without merit.
III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand
for a new trial. Because we are reversing Defendant’s conviction due to the denial of his
constitutional right to a jury trial, we choose not to address Defendant’s two remaining
issues.
s/Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE
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