State of Tennessee v. Billy Chase Rogers

11/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs September 29, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BILLY CHASE ROGERS Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County Nos. 319519, 319520 Amanda B. Dunn, Judge No. E2025-01942-CCA-R3-CD The Defendant, Billy Chase Rogers, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s probation revocation he received for his guilty-pleaded convictions for possession with the intent to sell or to deliver methamphetamine and possession with the intent to sell or to deliver fentanyl. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four- year sentence for the methamphetamine-related conviction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the Defendant’s probation. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed; Case Remanded ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., and MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., joined. Steve Smith, District Public Defender; and Jay A. Perry, Assistant District Public Defender, for the appellant, Billy Chase Rogers. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Joshua R. Gilbert, Pro Hac Vice Legal Assistant; Coty Wamp, District Attorney General; and Aaron J. Chaplin, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION On March 19, 2025, the Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell or to deliver methamphetamine in docket number 319519 and possession with the intent to sell or to deliver fentanyl in docket number 319520. He received consecutive sentences of four years for each conviction, to be served on supervised probation. As a special condition of his probation, the Defendant was required to complete the drug recovery court program. The Defendant’s signature appears on the probation order, which reflects the special condition and the rules of probation, and on the Hamilton County Drug Recovery Court Contract. On July 24, 2025, a capias was issued after drug recovery court program staff advised the trial court that the Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of the program by appearing for treatment while under the influence of a prohibited substance. The Defendant was, likewise, alleged to have sold illegal substances and to have assisted or aided in falsifying a urine analysis. On July 28, 2025, the State filed a request for the Defendant’s removal from the program. The request was based upon allegations from program staff that the Defendant and two program participants came to a group therapy meeting under the influence of a prohibited substance and that a search of the Defendant’s and the two program participants’ cell phones showed that they had been using prohibited substances and that they had been “selling, distributing, or trading substances with each other” and program participants. Further, a search of the Defendant’s car showed “suspected K2, and a CO2 pistol that appears to be a firearm,” which was alleged to have supported program staff’s determination that the Defendant had “been selling or sharing prohibited substances” within the drug recovery court program. On August 5, 2025, a probation violation report was filed with the trial court. The report alleged that the Defendant had committed a “first technical violation.” The report alleged that the Defendant was being terminated from the drug recovery court program, which was a special condition of his probation and which violated Rule 10 that he observe the special conditions of probation imposed by the court. On August 6, 2025, the trial court held a hearing regarding the State’s request that the Defendant be removed from the drug recovery court program. The court minute entry reflects that the Defendant voluntarily removed himself from the program, at which time the court issued a capias relative to the probation violation allegation that the Defendant failed to complete the drug recovery court program. On August 14, 2025, an addendum to the probation violation report was filed with the trial court. The addendum alleged that the Defendant had violated Rule 3 of the conditions of probation that he would not receive, own, possess, ship, or transport any firearms, ammunition, or illegal weapons. The addendum alleged that during a search of the Defendant’s cell phone, the probation officer found text messages, in which the Defendant asked a person if the person knew anyone who wanted to purchase a rifle and confirmed for the person that the gun was in the Defendant’s name and “clean.” Photographs of the text messages were attached to the addendum, which are consistent with the probation officer’s account. The messages also included a photograph of a rifle and the Defendant’s request for $360 to $400. One of the Defendant’s messages stated that he had found another buyer. -2-  On October 28, 2025, an amended probation violation report was filed with the trial court. The report incorporated the allegations contained in the addendum related to the rifle, which was the alleged violation of Rule 3, and the Defendant’s termination from the drug recovery court program, which was the alleged violation of Rule 10. These were the sole allegations contained in the probation violation report and the grounds for which revocation was sought. At the November 4, 2025 probation revocation hearing, Tennessee Department of Correction Probation and Parole officer Teanna Chastain testified that she began supervising the Defendant on March 19, 2025. She said that she worked alongside and communicated with drug recovery court program staff regarding the Defendant’s compliance and non-compliance with the program. She said that the Defendant “self- terminated” from the drug recovery court program on August 6, 2025, which violated Rule 10 and the special condition of the Defendant’s probation. She said that she later learned of text messages the Defendant exchanged, in which he discussed the potential sale of a firearm. She explained that according to the “sanction matrix,” a violation regarding “possession, sale, or shipment of a firearm would be a zero tolerance” violation. She stated that the text messages regarding the firearm violated Rule 3, which prohibited the Defendant from receiving, owning, possessing, shipping, or transporting any firearms. She stated that the Defendant’s failure to complete the drug recovery court program violated Rule 10, which required the Defendant to observe the special probation condition imposed by the trial court. She said that the Defendant’s failure in this regard was a technical violation. When asked on cross-examination if Rule 3 prohibited the sale of a firearm, Ms. Chastain stated, “It does not say.” Hamilton County Drug Recovery Court Program coordinator Brittany Baldwin testified that the Defendant joined the program on March 19, 2025. She acknowledged that the Defendant agreed to be terminated from the program. She said that on July 24, 2025, several program participants came to the treatment center under the influence of a prohibited substance and that program staff searched several participants’ cell phones and cars. She said that she searched the Defendant’s phone, which she said showed the text messages related to the rifle, and the Defendant car. She said that the search of the Defendant’s car resulted in the discovery of a substance, which she described as “K2, Spice, synthetic.” She said she confirmed the identity of the substance with the participants who used the substance found inside the Defendant’s car. Ms. Baldwin testified that a search of the Defendant’s cell phone showed that he exchanged text messages with “other people” who bought “K2 or Spice.” Referring to the text messages, she said that the Defendant bought the drugs and sold them to other drug recovery program participants. She said that text messages also showed that the Defendant sold his Suboxone MAT prescription and that the Defendant admitted to “that in his cell phone.” -3-  Ms. Baldwin testified that the Defendant’s text messages also referred to the sale of a firearm. She stated that she took photographs of the messages related to the firearm. She said that the Defendant referred to a rifle and that the photograph of the gun reflected that it was “Blue Line Solution Mowser 15.” Referring to the messages, she stated that the Defendant asked the person to whom he sent a text message if the person knew anyone who wanted to purchase a gun. She stated the person asked about the type of gun, and the Defendant stated that it was a rifle and sent a photograph of the gun. She said that the person asked for a price and that the Defendant provided an amount. She said the Defendant confirmed that he owned the gun and that it was “clean” and had never been fired. She said that the Defendant stated that he needed to “get rid of this gun” and asked if anyone was interested in purchasing it. She said the person confirmed that an unidentified man wanted to buy it. She said that, however, the Defendant told the person that he “just found someone to buy it.” Photographs of the text messages were received as an exhibit. Ms. Baldwin testified that additional text messages on the Defendant’s cell phone showed communications about “selling and distributing and using” Suboxone and K2. When asked if she saw any evidence on the phone that someone had paid the Defendant for K2, Ms. Baldwin stated that she saw in a payment application on the Defendant’s phone and that the Defendant had received payments from other drug recovery court program participants between June 11 and July 13 for K2 in the amounts of $20, $10, $20, $20, $25, and $20. On cross-examination, Ms. Baldwin testified that the photograph of the gun in the text messages was a screenshot from the internet. She agreed that the person with whom the Defendant communicated about the gun was not a drug recovery court program participant. Hamilton County Community Corrections probation officer Miracle McCallie testified for the defense that she supervised felony probationers who suffered from substance use disorder. She said that the community corrections program had resources to provide or to connect a probationer with drug treatment, including inpatient treatment, and housing. She said that at the beginning of the program, a defendant would be placed on house arrest for four months but was permitted to go to work or to look for work. She said that a defendant wore a monitor and was required to obtain an officer’s permission to attend church or to go to the grocery store. She said defendants were routinely drug tested. She stated that the community corrections program had assessed the Defendant and determined that he was an appropriate candidate for the program. On cross-examination, Ms. McCallie testified that the community corrections program was an “intense” program. She disagreed that a probationer who sold drugs and firearms would be a poor candidate for the program. -4-  The twenty-seven-year-old Defendant testified that he graduated from college and worked in the engineering field for approximately five years but that, in 2023, he lost his job because he fell “into addiction.” He said that he and his fiancée ended their long-term relationship, that his mental health declined as a result, and that he began to self-medicate. He said that he lost his job because he began using drugs. He said that the present case was his first criminal matter, that he posted bond after his arrest, and that he was confused about and missed a general sessions court date, which resulted in the revocation of his bond. He said that he pleaded guilty by information and agreed to participate in the drug recovery court program. He said that he pleaded guilty to the two drug charges, in part, because he needed to care for his godfather and for his animals. He said that he agreed to participate in the drug recovery court program because he thought it would provide “stability, some help with [his] addiction.” He admitted that he “couldn’t do it on [his] own.” The Defendant testified that he was not successful in the drug recovery court program and that he continued to use K2 and “nitrous” with other program participants. He understood that using drugs with the other program participants could have significant consequences because a person could die by “relapsing on fentanyl or other substances.” He said that, during treatment, he learned how he “handled” his addiction and gained perspective. He said that he had never received inpatient treatment but that he would complete an inpatient treatment program if the trial court ordered it. He thought he could successfully complete the community corrections treatment program. The Defendant testified that he did not possess the rifle. He said that after he pleaded guilty, his guns were stored at his godfather’s home. The Defendant said that he posted a photograph of the rifle online and that he needed the money for living expenses. He understood that he was not permitted to possess firearms. On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he never sold the rifle. He identified a photograph of a text message he sent to a drug recovery court program participant. Referring to the photograph, he said that the gun he held in the photograph was a “BB gun.” He agreed, though, that the gun looked like a revolver and appeared to contain ammunition. The Defendant testified that the original plea offer included the drug recovery court program and that he accepted the offer. He agreed that his convictions stemmed from his possession of loaded firearms, scales, plastic bags, 7.2 grams of fentanyl, 28 grams of amphetamine, and 4.6 grams of methamphetamine. He admitted that he used drugs with program participants but denied that he sold drugs to participants. He said that he bought the drugs, that he and the participants “got together,” and that they used the drugs. He said, though, he was not certain if he sold prohibited drugs. Referring to a text message exchange with a program participant, the Defendant agreed that the participant asked for -5- one dose of Suboxone because her pharmacy could not fill her prescription until the next day due to the drug being out of stock and that he agreed to provide it to her. He stated, though, that he did not give her the medication. He acknowledged that he asked the program participant the name of her pharmacy but denied that he picked up her prescription. He admitted that he provided K2 to program participants. On redirect examination, the Defendant testified that the two guns found inside his car during Ms. Baldwin’s search were BB guns, rather than firearms. He acknowledged that the BB guns looked “very realistic” but said that they were not firearms. He said that the police officer who assisted Ms. Baldwin with the search examined them and determined they were BB guns. Referring to the money application transactions for K2, the Defendant said that he and the program participants “were going in on [the K2] together” and that the participants provided a portion of the money to purchase the drugs. At the conclusion of the proof, the State argued that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation by possessing a firearm and by failing to complete the drug recovery court program. The Defendant admitted that he violated the special condition of probation that he complete the drug recovery court program. The Defendant, however, disputed that any of the evidence showed that he possessed a firearm at any time. He conceded that he attempted to sell a gun, but he argued that the photograph of the gun in the text message was a photograph from an internet website and did not show that he possessed the gun. Counsel noted that the Defendant was not charged with unlawful possession of a firearm after the search of the Defendant’s car because the officer determined that two guns were BB guns and that the Defendant’s guns were stored at his godfather’s home after the Defendant pleaded guilty. The trial court determined that the Defendant violated the special condition of his probation by his failure to complete the drug recovery court program. The court determined, however, that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant possessed a firearm. The court found that the evidence did not establish that the Defendant physically possessed the firearm at the time he attempted to sell the gun or that a sale was completed. The court found, as well, that the proof failed to show that the Defendant possessed a firearm at any time after entering his guilty pleas. However, the trial court stated that Rule 1 of the Defendant’s conditions of probation required him to obey federal and state laws and that Rule 8 prohibited him from using any intoxicants of any kind to excess or have in his possession illegal drugs. The court found, based upon the Defendant’s testimony, that he violated both conditions of his probation by using intoxicants and by possessing “illegal drugs.” The court noted that violations of both conditions “could be considered a technical violation” and that the court could not “execute a sentence upon a technical violation in the first instance.” The court found, though, that a preponderance of the evidence established that the Defendant -6- possessed K2, a synthetic cannabinoid, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-438. The court found, based upon Ms. Baldwin’s testimony and the text messages on the Defendant’s cell phone, that he had distributed drugs to drug recovery court participants. The court acknowledged that the Defendant had not been charged with or indicted for those offenses but found that the conduct violated state laws. The court found that possession of K2, an unlawful substance, was a zero tolerance violation. In considering the appropriate consequence for the probation violations, the trial court acknowledged that the Defendant needed further substance use treatment but found that the Defendant had been provided with the “very best opportunity” to obtain all of the support, resources, and treatment he required. The court found that the Defendant “abused that situation” by engaging in unlawful conduct with drug recovery court program participants that “jeopardized the health and safety of other participants.” The court stated that it was difficult to consider a new alternative sentence because, in the court’s opinion, although the community corrections program had “significant restrictions,” the level of supervision was less than the supervision of the drug recovery court program. The court ordered, based upon the zero tolerance violation, that the Defendant serve the remainder of the four-year sentence in docket number 319519 in confinement. The court reinstated the Defendant’s probation in docket number 319520, which was a consecutive four-year sentence. This appeal followed. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence in confinement. He argues that he violated his probation by “voluntarily withdrawing” from the drug recovery court program. He argues, as well, that he violated his probation by “essentially to committing new crimes in Tennessee, which was a non-technical violation.” He asserts, though, that the court should have ordered him to serve the sentence on community corrections. The State responds that the court did not abuse its discretion. “On appeal from a trial court’s decision revoking a defendant’s probation, the standard of review is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness so long as the trial court places sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the consequence on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). An abuse of discretion has been established when the “record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the conditions of probation has occurred.” State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); see State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 554 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978). A finding of abuse of discretion “‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in light of the factual circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’” Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 1999)). -7-  If the trial court failed to memorialize its reasons for the revocation decision on the record, the appellate court may either conduct a de novo review, provided the record is developed sufficiently for such review, or it may remand the case to the trial court with instructions to make appropriate findings. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759. When a trial court determines that a defendant’s probation must be revoked, the court must then decide upon an appropriate consequence. Id. at 757. A separate hearing is not required, but the court must address the issue on the record in order for its decision to be afforded the abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness standard on appeal. Id. at 757-58. In determining a consequence for a violation, factors among which a trial court may consider include “the number of revocations, the seriousness of the violation, the defendant's criminal history, and the defendant’s character.” Id. at 759 n.5. “‘[T]he consequence determination essentially examines whether the beneficial aspects of probation are being served and whether the defendant is amenable to continued probation.’” State v. Rand, 696 S.W.3d 98, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024) (quoting State v. Gregory Sean Robinson, No. M2022-00248-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 17335656, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2023)). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311 classifies violations into “technical” and “non-technical” violations. A technical violation “means an act that violates the terms or conditions of probation but does not constitute a new felony, new Class A misdemeanor, zero tolerance violation as defined by the department of correction community supervision sanction matrix, absconding, or contacting the defendant’s victim in violation of a condition of probation.” Id. § 40-35-311(g) (2025). “[T]he trial judge shall not revoke a defendant’s probation and suspension of sentence for a felony offense . . . based upon one (1) instance of technical violation or violations.” Id. § 40-35-311(d)(2). Thus, “when a defendant is on probation for a felony offense and commits a technical violation of probation, the trial court’s authority to order an incarcerative sanction is restricted based on the number of previous ‘revocations.’” Rand, 696 S.W.3d at 103. For non-technical probation violations, a trial court has other options. After revoking a defendant’s probation on a non-technical violation, the court may return a defendant to probation with modified conditions as necessary, extend the period of probation by no more than one year upon making additional findings, order a period of confinement, or order the defendant’s sentence into execution. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-308(a), (c) (2025), -310 (2025), -311(e)(2). The record reflects that the initial probation violation report alleged that the Defendant committed the first instance of a technical violation by failing to complete the drug recovery court program, which violated probation Rule 10 and the special condition imposed by the trial court. The addendum to the original probation violation report alleged that the Defendant had violated probation Rule 3 by possessing and attempting to sell a rifle based upon evidence found on the Defendant’s cell phone. The subsequent amended -8- probation violation report incorporated into one report the allegations that the Defendant violated probation Rules 3 and 10, along with the special condition imposed by the trial court. No other rule violations were alleged in the amended probation violation report. At the revocation hearing, the State sought revocation on grounds consistent with the amended probation violation report: (1) that the Defendant failed to complete the drug recovery court program, a technical violation of Rule 10 the special probation condition, and (2) that he possessed a firearm, a non-technical violation of Rule 3. The Defendant conceded that he failed to complete the drug recovery court program but testified that he never possessed a firearm, which the trial court credited based upon the court’s determining that the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant had possessed a firearm since he pleaded guilty. The Defendant’s failure to complete the treatment program constituted a single instance of a technical violation or violations. See T.C.A. § 40-35-311(g); see also State v. Noel, 729 S.W.3d 315, 325 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025) (A defendant’s failure to complete an inpatient treatment program is a technical probation violation, and the first instance of a technical violation is not subject to revocation.); State v. Richard Wayne Norrod, No. M2025-01873-CCA-R3-CD, 2026 WL 2364616, at *4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2026). The Defendant violated Rule 10 and special condition of his probation, but his conduct “does not constitute a new felony, new Class A misdemeanor, zero tolerance violation as defined by the department of correction community supervision sanction matrix, absconding, or contacting the defendant’s victim in violation of a condition of probation.” T.C.A. § 40-35-311(g). As a result, revocation was not permitted on this basis. The probation violation report did not allege, based upon the Defendant’s conduct resulting in his voluntary withdrawal from the drug recovery court program, that the Defendant had failed to obey the laws or had used or possessed illegal drugs. The State could have sought revocation on these grounds but declined to include them in the amended probation violation report. We remind the trial court, and counsel, that principles of due process require proper written notice of the allegations that are a basis to revoke probation. See State v. Wade, 863 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tenn. 1993); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (stating that minimum due process requirements provide that a defendant must receive written notice of the claimed probation violation). The State was not permitted to seek revocation of the Defendant’s probation at the hearing on grounds not alleged in the probation violation report, and the trial court was, likewise, not permitted to revoke the Defendant’s probation on unalleged conduct. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence in confinement for a first instance of a technical violation or violations. See T.C.A. § 40-35-311(d)(2). The Defendant’s probation is reinstated immediately upon the filing of this opinion. -9-  We take this opportunity to note that in the future, the trial court, “on its own motion, or on application of a probation and parole officer, district attorney general or the defendant,” may seek to “[m]odify any [probation] condition” during the Defendant’s probationary term. Id. § 40-35-308(a)(1) (2025). In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the Defendant’s probation is reinstated. s/ Robert H. Montgomery, Jr. ____ ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE -10-