State of Tennessee v. Demarco Antwan Locust
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketM2026-00180-CCA-R3-CD
JudgeJudge Timothy L. Easter
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/17/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs October 20, 2026
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEMARCO ANTWAN LOCUST
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
No. 2024-A-602 Cynthia Chappell, Judge
___________________________________
No. M2026-00180-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________
Demarco Antwan Locust, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder and possession
of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense for the death of Behrouz
Rezai Dashti, the victim, on Halloween in 2023. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted
as charged and sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant filed a
premature pro se notice of appeal while represented by counsel. The trial court denied the
motion for new trial. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and
the admission of a video of a shooting that took place on October 29. We determine that
we have jurisdiction over the appeal but decline to waive the timely filing of the notice of
appeal because the interest of justice does not require us to do so. Consequently, the appeal
is dismissed.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed
TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS
and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.
Brett J. Bukowski (at trial); Dustin Faeder (on appeal), Nashville, Tennessee, for the
appellant, Demarco Antwan Locust.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Julia A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney
General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Luis Casas and Amy Hunter,
Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
The victim was at a Mapco gas station on Harding Place (“Harding Mapco”) in
Nashville on October 31, 2023, when he was fatally shot multiple times from behind by a
masked gunman. The gunman fled the scene in a black Jeep Cherokee.
In March of 2024, a Davidson County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment
charging Defendant with one count of first degree murder and one count of possession of
a firearm by a convicted drug offender. Prior to trial, the State filed a written notice of its
intent to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 404(b) to demonstrate motive, intent, and identification.
Specifically, as pertinent to this appeal, the State sought to introduce surveillance
footage from October 29, 2023, that captured a blue Infiniti SUV matching the description
of Defendant’s vehicle at a Mapco gas station on Linbar (“Linbar Mapco”).1 In the video,
the male in the Infinity wore a white face mask and fired shots at the victim. Defendant
opposed the introduction of the evidence, arguing that the State failed to show proof he
was in the video. Further, Defendant argued the video should be excluded because the
unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value. The State argued that the victim’s
daughter identified Defendant as the driver of the blue Infiniti in a still photograph taken
from the video and that the evidence was offered to prove Defendant’s identity and motive.
The trial court overruled the objection, concluding that “although that is prejudicial, . . . it
is probative to not only identity, but also the relationship - - potential relationship between
[Defendant] and the victim.” Thus, the trial court determined that the probative value
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court noted that the State would still
have to “lay a foundation for the video to come in.”2
At trial, Defendant’s theory was that someone else committed the offense. The
proof established that the victim worked as a mechanic on Harding Place in Nashville near
the Harding Mapco where he was shot. The victim’s nineteen-year-old daughter, Elaheh
Rezai Dashti, explained that the victim raised her and her twin brother after their mother
1
The subject shooting took place at the Harding Mapco. The Linbar Mapco was “literally right
around the corner” from the Harding Mapco.
2
The State also sought to introduce evidence that the shell casings from the scene of the victim’s
death matched shell casings from a shooting in June of 2023 where a black male was driving a blue Infinity.
Defendant was known to drive a blue Infinity and the State argued that this evidence helped to establish
identity and placed Defendant at the scene of the victim’s death with a weapon in his hand. At the time the
motion was filed, the State was waiting on a report to link the shell casings from the June incident to the
shell casings from the day of the victim’s death. It does not appear that the State pursued admission of this
report at trial and it is not an issue on appeal.
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“left” when they were four years old. Ms. Dashti knew Defendant, known to her as “Jay.”
She saw him “three or four times before” her father’s death.
Ms. Dashti recalled Defendant “pointed a gun at [her] and threatened [her]” at the
Linbar Mapco a few weeks prior to the victim’s death. On that day, she left work at Burger
King, near the Linbar Mapco, walked to the Linbar Mapco, and Defendant pointed a gun
at her in the parking lot. Ms. Dashti did not call the police. She testified her father was
going to call the police but acknowledged that no police report was filed.
Ms. Dashti also recalled that Defendant “threatened” her entire family that “he was
going to have us six feet under” about “a week and a half before” the victim’s death. She
testified Defendant drove a “very dark, dark blue-ish Infinit[i]” SUV and “always” wore a
“face mask, a ski mask” that “only shows his eyes.”
She identified Defendant from a still photograph taken from surveillance video of a
person in a blue Infiniti vehicle at the Linbar Mapco on October 27. The person was not
wearing a mask in this photograph. Ms. Dashti described her confidence in the
identification as a “ten out of ten.” She identified Defendant in the courtroom. Ms. Dashti
also identified Defendant, Defendant’s vehicle, and the victim’s vehicle from a photograph
taken on October 29 at the Linbar Mapco. She recognized Defendant even though he was
wearing a mask because it was the “same car” he always drove.
The victim’s girlfriend, Keyarra Young, also known as “Kiki,” identified
Defendant’s blue vehicle from a photograph taken at the Linbar Mapco on October 29. She
could not identify Defendant from the photograph but knew it was Defendant because
“nobody else drove his vehicle.” She was not with the victim on the 29th but was waiting
for the victim “down the road.” Ms. Young explained that Defendant’s girlfriend worked
at the Linbar Mapco.
Ms. Young testified that on October 29, the victim “pulled up [to the Linbar Mapco]
trying to find [her], and Jay started shooting at him and they started shooting at each
other.”3 She said that three shots were fired. Ms. Young stated that the shooting occurred
after Defendant “tried to put [her] off the block.” She explained that this meant she could
not “be out there on the block anymore” or she would get killed.
Ms. Young was in the car with the victim on the day he was shot and killed.4 They
dated for “five and a half months” prior to the victim’s death and lived in the victim’s
3
Ms. Young initially told police that Defendant was the only person who fired shots on October
29. The officer who testified at trial stated it was “consistent with the trajectory” of the shots fired that
Defendant was the only shooter on October 29 but that it was “possible” the victim also fired.
4
Ms. Young appeared in court on a material witness warrant.
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“blue” SUV. On October 31, they went to the Harding Mapco “early in the morning” so
the victim could get gas and “get out of the area” because of threats from Defendant. The
area around the Harding Mapco was known to be Defendant’s “block.” Ms. Young
admitted she bought crack from Defendant “[l]ike three” times prior to the shooting. The
victim also sold crack. Ms. Young acknowledged that there were drugs and a gun in the
victim’s car on the day he was killed.
When they arrived at the Harding Mapco, the victim got out of the car and bent
“over [through the open car door] in the seat counting some money” for gas. Neither she
nor the victim used drugs that morning. Then, “Jay pulled up and just started shooting.”
Defendant was “masked up” in a black ski mask and was driving a “black Jeep.” She
acknowledged that after the incident she told police that Defendant was wearing a white
ski mask.
Ms. Young testified Defendant did not say anything prior to the shooting. She
acknowledged that in an interview after the shooting she stated Defendant said “yeah,
pu**y” before he fired shots but testified at trial that her memory was “better now than it
was then.” She did not know how many shots Defendant fired but felt like it was “more
than five.” She was in the passenger seat the entire time and did not get out of the car. The
victim “fought until the very end.” Ms. Young was crying so hard after the incident that
she could not talk. It took her a few weeks to calm down.
Ms. Young identified Defendant from a photograph after the incident and again at
trial. She testified Defendant normally drove a “blue” SUV. She did not know him to wear
a mask and had not seen him with a mask before.
Officer Jason Hees of the Metro Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) responded
to the “shots fired” call at the Harding Mapco. When he arrived, the victim was “rolling
around on the ground” with what he described as a “massive injury” to his face. The victim
was bleeding “profusely” and was unable to speak because of the amount of blood coming
from his mouth. Officer Hees tried to “find an airway” but was unable to do so because
the victim did not have “much of a jaw.” Officer Hees sat the victim upright and attempted
to insert a device into the victim’s nose to establish an airway as paramedics arrived on the
scene.
MNPD developed Defendant as a suspect based in part on Ms. Young’s statements
on the scene. MNPD Officer Thomas White interviewed witnesses on the scene, including
Ms. Young. Even though she was “hysterical,” she was “very” adamant in her
identification of Defendant. Officer White recognized the victim and his vehicle from prior
“drug related” dealings. He explained that the victim’s vehicle was at the Linbar Mapco
and Harding Mapco stations frequently.
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Officers located one deformed projectile near the passenger side of the victim’s car
and seven .40 caliber Smith & Wesson cartridge casings grouped together behind the
victim’s vehicle. Witnesses provided a photograph of the black Jeep. The tag number
from the Jeep returned as stolen three days before the shooting.
On November 1, MNPD was notified of a burned vehicle in Goodlettsville that was
suspected of being involved in a crime. The vehicle turned out to be the black Jeep that
was reported stolen on October 26 and matched the VIN number of the black Jeep from
the shooting. The suspect in the vehicle burglary, Charlena Gibson, admitted that she stole
the black Jeep and sold it to her friend “Heavy” around the first week of November of
2023. Ms. Gibson identified Defendant as “Heavy’s” cousin, “Stash.”
MNPD located Defendant on November 30, 2023, as he got into a blue Infiniti SUV
and drove away from Officer Tyler Edwards. Officer Edwards activated his emergency
lights and attempted to stop Defendant, but Defendant accelerated, ran some stop signs,
and drove into oncoming traffic to pass vehicles. Officer Edwards got ahead of Defendant
so that he could deploy spike strips if necessary. Officers pursued Defendant at speeds
more than eighty miles per hour on back roads. Defendant pulled over before the spike
strips were deployed. There was a backpack on the floorboard of Defendant’s car that
contained a digital scale with residue that field tested positive for cocaine, five M30 pills
believed to be Oxycodone, a magazine with .40 caliber ammunition, .40 caliber
ammunition in a clear bag, two boxes of .22 caliber ammunition, and an “AR style”
magazine containing twenty-two rounds. Defendant did not have a firearm.
Defendant made statements to another inmate, Dominic Bright, while in pretrial
custody. He told Mr. Bright that he was “just stressing about what’s going on.” Defendant
told Mr. Bright that the “only car he had any possession of from back then” was “set on
fire.”
During the testimony of Detective Christopher Cote, the State attempted to
introduce the video from the October 29th shooting. Defendant objected to the introduction
of the video. In a bench conference, Defendant argued that the video was not admissible
on the basis that the State did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Evidence
404(b). The State argued that the video was relevant to establish motive and identity.
Defendant noted that it was clearly prejudicial because it shows Defendant “being violent
a couple of days before this incident.” The trial court overruled the objection, finding the
video connected Defendant to the blue SUV and the Linbar Mapco. The trial court also
found the video prejudicial but found by “clear and convincing evidence that - that the
probative value outweigh[ed] the danger of unfair prejudice.” The trial court instructed the
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jury that it could only consider evidence of other crimes to determine the completeness of
the story or to establish Defendant’s identity, motive, and intent.
According to the medical examiner, the victim died from multiple gunshot wounds.
There were four wounds: one entered the right mandible, a second entered the right dorsal
upper arm and exited the right ventral medial upper arm, a third entered and exited the right
dorsal hand, and the fourth entered the left medial aspect of the proximal thigh and exited
the left lateral thigh. The shots were fired from several feet away. The shot to the mandible
injured the jugular but according to testimony from the medical examiner no one wound
definitively caused the victim’s death.
The victim had cocaine and fentanyl in his blood as well as metabolites indicating
“pretty recent use” of the drugs. However, the medical examiner testified that the drugs
did not contribute to the victim’s death. There were drugs (fentanyl) and a firearm in the
victim’s vehicle at the time of his death. Ms. Dashti had “never seen” her father sell drugs
and never saw him with a firearm but acknowledged that the victim used drugs.
At the conclusion of the State’s proof, Defendant stipulated that he was previously
convicted of possession with intent to sell a Schedule II controlled substance and that the
“prior felony conviction is relevant to the current charge of felon in possession of a
weapon.” Defendant did not testify or present any additional proof.
The jury found Defendant guilty of first degree murder and felon in possession of a
firearm. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder and later agreed to
a concurrent six-year sentence as a Range II offender for the possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon conviction.5
Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial and filed several amendments to the
motion for new trial, including a “Pro Se Supplemental Motion for New Trial” wherein he
asserted additional claims of error. As relevant to this appeal, Defendant claimed that the
trial court erred in admitting video evidence of him shooting at the victim on October 29,
because it “primarily served to demonstrate [his] propensity for violence” so its unfair
prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value it afforded in proving his identity,
motive, intent, knowledge, opportunity, and preparation. Defendant also challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 4, 2026,
while he was still represented by counsel and before the trial court ruled on the motion for
new trial. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on February 5, 2026.
5
That same day, Defendant also pled guilty to felony evading arrest, stemming from the October
29 incident.
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Analysis
Jurisdiction
The State argues that we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal because Defendant
filed a pro se notice of appeal while represented by counsel. Therefore, before we delve
into the issues presented on appeal, we must first address whether this Court has
jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal.
This Court is required to “consider whether the trial and appellate court have
jurisdiction over the subject matter” of every issue presented. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). A
notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days after entry of the judgment from which the
appeal is taken. Id. 4(a). In criminal cases, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is not
jurisdictional and may be waived in the interest of justice. Id. However, the filing of a
notice of appeal is required for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal.
Id. The failure to file a notice of appeal may result in the dismissal of the appeal. Id. 3(e)
(stating that an appellate court may dismiss an appeal where a timely filing of a notice of
appeal is absent). A criminal defendant in Tennessee is constitutionally guaranteed both
the right to be represented by counsel and the right to self-representation. State v. Hester,
324 S.W.3d 1, 30 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Tenn. Const. Art. 1, § 9). As a reminder, however,
these rights are mutually exclusive, meaning that a defendant may not be both represented
by counsel and represent himself at the same time. Id. Said differently, a defendant “does
not have a constitutional right under the State or Federal Constitution to participate in
propria persona in his own defense and simultaneously to be represented by participating
counsel.” State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976).
Here, Defendant filed a notice of appeal while still represented by counsel and prior
to or nearly simultaneously with the trial court’s order denying the motion for new trial.
This Court filed an order on February 11, 2026, noting the premature filing of the notice
of appeal, reminding Defendant that trial counsel’s representation continued through initial
appellate review, and ordering trial counsel to ensure preparation and transmission of an
adequate appellate record. Trial counsel moved to withdraw, and this Court issued an order
on March 3, 2026, remanding the matter to the trial court for consideration. In the order,
this Court noted that, “If new counsel is appointed, said counsel shall immediately file
notice of appearance with this Court and shall also ensure an adequate record is prepared
and timely transmitted on appeal.” On remand, the trial court permitted trial counsel to
withdraw and appointed appellate counsel to represent Defendant on appeal. As requested,
appellate counsel filed a notice of appearance on March 17, 2026, and filed a brief on April
25, 2026. Appellate counsel did not, however, file a notice of appeal. As noted above, in
the State’s brief, filed on July 15, 2026, the State argued that this Court should dismiss the
appeal because we lacked jurisdiction based on the lack of a timely filed notice of appeal.
-7-
The State also argued Defendant’s “inadequate” brief failed to sufficiently comply with the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and that all of the issues were waived. Appellate
counsel filed a notice of appeal and reply brief that same day, asking this Court to accept
the late-filed notice of appeal in the interest of justice, “even though it is being filed more
than 30 days after the judgment became final in the Trial Court, especially there having
been an intervening change in the law.”
Defendant cites Robinson v. State, No. W2024-01916-CCA-R3-PC, 2026 WL
1781863, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2026), perm. app. filed, as an “intervening
change in the law.” To the contrary, the decision in Robinson did not change the law, the
panel in Robinson dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on the fact that there
was not a properly filed notice of appeal. Robinson was a post-conviction case where the
petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal while represented by counsel. Id. After counsel
was permitted to withdraw and not one, but two substitute counsel were appointed, there
was never a proper notice of appeal filed. Id. The court in Robinson dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction recognizing that while this Court “may waive the time for filing a
notice of appeal, it lacks jurisdiction when the parties have not invoked it by filing a notice
of appeal.” Id. at *10.
Here, Defendant filed a premature pro se notice of appeal while represented by
counsel. This filing was a legal nullity and remained as such unless and until appellate
counsel filed a notice of appeal. See State v. Swann, No. E2025-00975-CCA-R3-CD, 2026
WL 973489, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2026) (“Generally, a defendant may not
proceed pro se while represented by counsel.”) (citing State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 242
(Tenn. 2016)), no perm. app. filed; see also Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 33-34 (holding that a
represented defendant cannot simultaneously exercise the right to self-representation).
Until that time, this Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Appellate counsel eventually
filed a notice of appeal and a reply brief in which he asked this Court to waive the timely
filing of the notice of appeal in the interest of justice. Because appellate counsel eventually
filed a notice of appeal with his reply brief, we awkwardly, yet properly, have jurisdiction
over the appeal.
Our inquiry does not end there. Next, we must determine whether we should waive
the timely filing of the notice of appeal. When deciding whether to waive an untimely
notice of appeal, this Court has considered “the nature of the issues presented for review,
the reasons for and the length of the delay in seeking relief, and any other relevant factors
presented in the particular case.” State v. Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2007). We will look first to the nature of the issues raised on appeal to determine
whether a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal is in the interest of justice.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) “[d]id the Trial Court err by permitting
introduction of prior bad act evidence that was prohibited by Tennessee Rule of Evidence
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404(b)?”; (2) “[w]as the evidence sufficient to convict Defendant of [first] Degree
Premeditated Murder?”; and (3) “[w]as the evidence sufficient to convict Defendant of
Felon in Possession of a Weapon?” While not required, panels of this Court have noted
that this factor sometimes considers a preliminary review of the merits of the issues raised.
See State v. Strowder, No. E2024-00537-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 659273, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2025) (citing State v. Murray, No. M2020-00168-CCA-R3-CD, 2021
WL 2156932, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2021), no perm. app. filed), perm. app.
denied (Tenn. June 20, 2025).
In this case, Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to admit the surveillance
footage from October 29 at the Linbar Mapco, arguing that it violates Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Because the trial court complied with the procedure detailed in Rule
404(b), we would review this evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Reynolds, 635 S.W.3d 893, 921 (Tenn. 2021).
The State argues that this Court should dismiss this claim, and all claims raised in
this appeal, due to “inadequate briefing.” Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)
provides that an appellate brief should contain, among other requirements, a statement of
facts with appropriate references to the record and argument supported by “citations to the
authorities and appropriate references to the record . . . relief on” with “a concise statement
of the applicable standard of review for each issue.” Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a). An appellate
brief which presents issues unsupported “by argument, citations to authorities, or
appropriate references to the record” is inadequate and waives appellate review of those
issues. Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b). Simply put, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial
or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and
where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely
constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility,
301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). The entirety of the “Statement of Applicable Law”
section of Defendant’s brief as to this issue is as follows:
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the introduction of prior bad
acts used to prove action in conformity with a person’s character trait. While
there are exceptions, T[ennessee ]R[ule of ]E[vidence] 404(b)(4) explicitly
states that the evidence must be excluded “if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
With regard to the first issue, the “Argument” section of Defendant’s brief does not
cite any case law to support his argument that the trial court “wrongfully admitted” the
video in violation of Rule 404(b) and mentions the standard of review, abuse of discretion,
only in passing without defining the standard of review or explaining how the trial court
erred other than blanketly stating that the trial court abused its discretion. This Court is not
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permitted to “second-guess a trial court’s exercise of its discretion simply because the trial
court chose an alternative that [others] would not have chosen.” State v. McCaleb, 582
S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tenn. 2019). We also may not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court simply because Defendant thinks exclusion of the evidence would have been a
better decision. Cf. State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 729 (Tenn. 2016).
In this case, the trial court identified the correct standard that applied to its decision
to admit or exclude the evidence. It considered and weighed the prejudicial nature of the
evidence with the probative value and determined the evidence was admissible to prove
the identity of Defendant and to show completeness of the story, specifically history of
issues between Defendant and the victim. See State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 271 n.6,
272 (Tenn. 2000) (recognizing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence to prove identity
and for contextual background). Moreover, this Court has affirmed a trial court’s
admission of prior bad acts in circumstances similar to those present here. See, e.g., State
v. Morse, No. E2022-00534-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1145231, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 17, 2025) (finding evidence that five days before the defendant shot him, the victim
arranged to meet the defendant under the false pretense of a drug sale in order to beat and
rob him, and the defendant then fired a gun at the victim, chased him down the road, and
tried to run him off the road was admissible to show motive and intent to commit first
degree murder), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2025).
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant’s entire argument is that if the trial
court had properly excluded the video, there would have been no evidence of Defendant’s
identity and therefore no evidence that Defendant committed the crime or possessed a
weapon. Defendant’s brief does not identify a single element of the crimes for which he
was convicted – first degree murder and possession of a weapon by a convicted drug
offender. Moreover, his entire argument relies on an incorrect statement of the law. This
Court considers all the evidence presented to the jury in a review of the sufficiency of the
evidence, whether the evidence was properly admitted or not. State v. Longstreet, 619
S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tenn. 1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d
948 (Tenn. 1990). On our preliminary review, the first Rockwell factor does not weigh in
favor of waiving the requirement of a timely filed notice of appeal.
The second Rockwell factor requires a consideration of the length of the delay in
filing the notice of appeal and the reasons for the delay. Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d at 214. Of
concern here is Defendant’s reply brief, in which he addresses the State’s contention that
the notice of appeal was untimely and the initial appellate brief was inadequate. While we
acknowledge that appellate counsel corrected the improperly filed pro se notice of appeal
by filing a notice of appeal, appellate counsel did not attempt to correct the alleged
deficiencies in the brief. Instead, filed some five months after the trial court’s denial of
Defendant’s motion for new trial, Defendant filed “alongside this Reply [Brief]” a notice
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of appeal. Defendant “disagrees” with the State’s characterization of his initial brief,
claiming his “core argument remains intelligible and justifiable by the plain text of the rule
– in order to be admissible, the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial.” As to
the sufficiency of the evidence, he acknowledges that the State has a stronger factual record
but asks this Court, without citing any authority, to “make its own determination, based on
the record” as to whether the video was more prejudicial than probative and whether
Defendant would have been convicted had it not been admitted.
We acknowledge that, on the one hand, there is precedent for waiver of late notices
of appeal. Notably, waiver has been approved in a case where there was a significant delay
in filing the notice of appeal, “particularly when the case had an excusable reason for the
delay, involved a true pro se litigant, or presented significant and substantial issues of law.”
Strowder, 2025 WL 659273, at *4 (citing State v. Williams, No. M2007-01385-CCA-R3-
CD, 2009 WL 564231, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2009) (waiving notice of appeal
filed 406 days late following a late-filed motion for a new trial due to “the gravity of the
crime” and “the magnitude of the punishment”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009)).
On the other hand, appeals have been dismissed with delays less than the delay in
this case, “particularly when the defendant offered no excusable reason for the delay, failed
to acknowledge the issue, or failed to respond to the State’s argument seeking dismissal.”
Strowder, 2025 WL 659273, at *4 (citing Sims v. State, No. W2022-01597-CCA-R3-PC,
2023 WL 5748764, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2023) (rejecting waiver for a three-
day delay when the appellant offered no reason for the late filing and did not respond to
the State’s waiver argument), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2024); State v. McNeal,
No. W2015-00316-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1223492, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29,
2016) (rejecting waiver for a three-day delay when the appellant offered no reason for the
late filing and did not respond to the State’s waiver argument), no perm. app. filed).
In this case, Defendant has offered no explanation for the late-filed notice of appeal.
He also has not asserted that circumstances beyond his control prevented the timely filing
of an appeal. Moreover, the reason for the delay is not obvious from the record. From our
review of the entire record, we see nothing that would have prevented Defendant from
filing, through counsel, a timely notice of appeal. Wade v. State, No. W2021-01419-CCA-
R3-PC, 2022 WL 4115374, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2022) (recognizing that
without a reason for the delay being offered, “there is simply no basis in the record which
this Court may find that the ‘interests of justice’ merit a waiver of the untimely filed notice
of appeal”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 12, 2023). Thus, the second Rockwell factor
weighs against waiving the requirement of a timely notice of appeal.
Rockwell also allows this Court to utilize “other relevant factors.” Rockwell, 280
S.W.3d at 214. Included in those are whether the defendant acknowledges the late filing,
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requests a waiver of the timely filing requirement, or responds to the State’s argument
seeking dismissal of the case. Id.; State v. Manning, No. E2022-01715-CCA-R3-CD, 2023
WL 7439203, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16,
2024). Appellant counsel “requests this Court consider [the notice of appeal] to be timely
in the interest of justice,” blaming the delay on the timing of his appointment, and the
“intervening change in law, which should create a new 30-day deadline.” We have already
noted that there was no intervening change in law.
Asking for waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal, without more, leads
us to conclude that the Rockwell factors weigh against the requirement of a timely filed
notice of appeal.
It is worth noting, and in the event of further review, simply viewing the three claims
framed by Defendant in this appeal through the lens of a Rockwell, convinces us
Defendant’s claims would also fail if considered in plenary review. Rockwell’s “interest
of justice” consideration, when weighed against this record, leads us to the conclusion that
even a properly preserved appeal on these claims would fail.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
S/Timothy L. Easter
TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE
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