Robert Vernon Gouge v. State of Tennessee

11/03/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 27, 2026 ROBERT VERNON GOUGE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 127656 Hector Sanchez, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01392-CCA-R3-PC ___________________________________ The Petitioner, Robert Vernon Gouge, appeals the denial of his petition for post- conviction relief from his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions for rape of a child, attempted rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the post- conviction court should have granted relief because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed STACY L. STREET, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined. Dillon E. Zinser, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Vernon Gouge. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Julia A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Rachel S. Hill, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION The convictions in this case arose from the Defendant’s abuse of his girlfriend’s daughter (the victim) between 2012 and 2016. 1 Factual and Procedural Background In 2019, the Knox County Grand Jury charged the Petitioner with five counts of rape of a child. See State v. Gouge, No. E2022-01001-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3454702, 1 In keeping with the policy of this court, we will not identify the victim, who was a minor at the time of the offenses, by name. at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 11, 2023). Following an April 2021 trial, a Knox County Criminal Court petit jury convicted the Petitioner of three counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. See id. at *4. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ninety-nine years’ incarceration. I. Trial and Direct Appeal The Petitioner appealed, challenging only the propriety of the sentence and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and one of his convictions of rape of a child on grounds that the State failed to establish that the victim was less than thirteen years old at the time of the offenses. See id. at *1. This court summarized the evidence adduced at the Petitioner’s trial in support of the challenged offenses. See id. at *1 n.1. That proof established that the Petitioner began dating the victim’s mother in 2003, that the two lived together with the victim until 2010 or 2011, and that the victim continued to visit with the Petitioner thereafter because she viewed him as her father. See id. at *1-2. The victim moved in with the Petitioner and his mother for several months when the victim’s mother went to jail. See id. at *2. In 2017, the victim told her mother that the Petitioner had sexually abused her, and the Petitioner initially denied the allegations. See id. The Petitioner later admitted to his cousin “that he had ‘touched’ and ‘messed with’ the victim.” Id. The Petitioner’s cousin testified that the Petitioner reported that after he and the victim “watched a movie with a sex scene,” the victim “kissed him,” that they “[were] French kissing,” and that “he touched the victim’s ‘breasts and private area.’” Id. at *1. The victim testified that on one occasion the Petitioner digitally penetrated her vagina when she was eleven years old and in the sixth grade. See id. at *2. On another occasion, the Petitioner forced the victim to touch his penis and then “tried to penetrate her vagina with his penis.” Id. at *3. This court affirmed the challenged convictions and the Petitioner’s sentence. See id. at *1, 10. II. Post-Conviction Proceedings After our supreme court denied his application for permission to appeal in September 2023, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged as grounds for relief the deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Following the appointment of counsel, the Petitioner filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, narrowing his grounds for relief to the deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he alleged that counsel performed deficiently by failing to (1) move the trial court to exclude prior bad act evidence, (2) review discovery materials or visit with the Petitioner a sufficient number of times prior to trial, (3) adequately investigate the case, (4) prepare -2- the Petitioner to testify at trial, (5) interview witnesses, (6) consult with or hire expert witnesses, (7) obtain and present evidence to show that the Petitioner was incapable of committing certain of the offenses due to a broken arm, (8) present the testimony of the victim’s mother’s ex-boyfriend, (9) provide him with sufficient information to make an informed decision regarding the State’s plea offer, (10) request the rule of sequestration at trial, (11) object to certain testimony, (12) adequately cross-examine the victim or the Petitioner’s cousin, (13) lay a proper foundation for proffered defense evidence, (14) present evidence that the Petitioner had sought an order of protection against the victim’s mother, (15) ask the Petitioner certain questions during direct examination, (16) and inform him of his right to allocute at sentencing. The Petitioner also claimed that trial counsel performed deficiently by eliciting testimony that was damaging to the defense. The Petitioner argued that but for the instances of deficient performance, considered individually and cumulatively, the result of the proceeding would have been different. At the June 27, 2025 evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that the petitioner retained his services after having initially been represented by appointed counsel. Although trial counsel could not recall how many times he met with the Petitioner, he said that they “met enough times that I felt like I was prepared to go forward.” He did not specifically recall reviewing discovery materials with the Petitioner but did recall “meeting with him in the attorney room” and said that he either reviewed the materials with the Petitioner or summarized their contents. Trial counsel testified that he filed a pretrial motion that required a hearing to which he had subpoenaed witnesses who did not appear despite the fact that he had been communicating with “[s]ome of them from the beginning” of his representing the Petitioner. He did not recall whether “it was a suppression motion or a motion in limine.” Trial counsel recalled that he interviewed the Petitioner’s cousin, whom the victim’s mother had accused of misconduct, and that “there was a problem getting him to testify.” He clarified, “If I could have used him and it would have been helpful, I would have done it.” Trial counsel agreed that the Petitioner told him that he had a broken arm for part of the timeframe covered by the indictment but said that the Petitioner’s having a broken arm “doesn’t mean it didn’t happen.” He could not recall whether the Petitioner asked him to obtain his medical records. Trial counsel could not recall eliciting testimony from the victim’s mother about her and the Petitioner using drugs together but said that he was “sure I had a reason in mind when I asked -- if I asked.” Similarly, he could not recall asking the Petitioner about his marijuana use. He said, however, that he did not “like to hide facts from the jury” and that it was his “trial strategy” to “bring the news to the jury myself.” He stated that if he asked the Petitioner about his drug use, he either “felt like it was going to come -3- out anyway” or “like we need to bring that to the jury’s attention because of other factors.” During cross-examination by the State, trial counsel agreed that he had filed several pretrial motions in the Petitioner’s case, including one for written disclosure of any prior bad act evidence and one for a bill of particulars. Trial counsel said that he told the Petitioner that the decision whether to testify was the Petitioner’s to make and that the two had discussed his testifying “at least three times.” He recalled that “during the State’s case-in-chief,” he “cautioned” the Petitioner that his testifying “was something that he might not want to do, because he opened himself up to cross-examination.” Trial counsel said that he interviewed many of the Petitioner’s family members in preparation for trial and that much of the information he gathered “wasn’t something I was going to be able to use.” In preparing to cross-examine the victim, trial counsel watched the video recording of her forensic interview, spoke with the Petitioner “about what she had said,” and “talked to family members about nuts and bolts things like did they sleep in this room off this hall, who slept in the room.” Trial counsel recalled that the victim “was a very good witness” and “was very believable.” He said that the effectiveness of the victim’s testimony “was a factor” in the Petitioner’s choosing to testify. Trial counsel testified he was aware that “there had been bad blood” between the Petitioner and his cousin who testified for the State at trial and opined that the cousin, who was incarcerated, “was trying to get brownie points by ratting out” the Petitioner. Trial counsel said that he questioned the victim’s mother about the appearance of the Petitioner’s penis because the Petitioner had told him that it bore distinctive markings or characteristics and “thought perhaps if [the victim] didn’t remember, that it would indicate that nothing ever happened.” Trial counsel said that he abandoned that part of the defense when it became apparent “that it would be more hurtful than helpful.” Trial counsel did not specifically recall telling the Petitioner that he had a right to make an allocution at sentencing but said that it was his general practice to do so. During redirect examination, trial counsel said that he did “go through rigorous practice with answers” when preparing witnesses, including the accused, to testify because it was his opinion that “rehearsed testimony falls flat more often than not.” To prepare the Petitioner, he “spent time with” him discussing the allegations, “getting to know him as a man, finding out how he expressed himself, [and] how he represented.” Trial counsel stated that, in hindsight, the Petitioner “didn’t make a very effective witness.” He recalled that some of the Petitioner’s answers made him think that he “could have prepared him a little more. But I typically don’t.” -4-  The Petitioner offered into evidence a flash drive containing the trial record in this case. The fifty-one-year-old Petitioner testified that he met with trial counsel “maybe three or four” times after retaining him. He did not recall trial counsel’s discussing pretrial motions, potential defenses, or the discovery materials with him. He acknowledged “just basically discuss[ing] the particulars of the case” with trial counsel. The Petitioner maintained that trial counsel did not discuss the possibility of his testifying until the second day of trial and said that counsel’s only advice was “that it couldn’t hurt if I testified.” The Petitioner could not recall whether trial counsel told him about interviewing any witnesses and did not think that trial counsel consulted with or retained any experts. The Petitioner testified that he told trial counsel that he had broken his arm in a motorcycle accident and that he “was kind of out of commission for about two years with it” due to complications. He said that he “couldn’t use it for anything” during the timeframe alleged in the indictment. He claimed that he asked trial counsel to obtain his medical records and that trial counsel did not do so. Similarly, he asked trial counsel to present evidence that he had sought an order of protection against the victim’s mother, but trial counsel did not do so. During cross-examination by the State, the Petitioner agreed that he had copies of “the paper portion” of the discovery materials that were provided to him by appointed counsel and that he discussed these materials with trial counsel. The Petitioner testified that he did not recall bringing up his arm injury during his testimony at trial. The Petitioner said that he could not recall discussing whether he should testify with the trial court during the trial. When asked if he would have made a different decision had he received more advice about whether to testify, the Petitioner said, “Maybe. I don’t know. I mean I wasn’t prepared at all to testify any at all. So I mean, I don’t know if it would have changed my mind or not.” He agreed, however, that it could have benefitted him to tell the jury that he did not commit the offenses. When asked what he would have said had he given an allocution at sentencing, the Petitioner said, “I don’t know right now.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court took the petition under advisement. The court denied relief via written order. Although the court addressed each of the claims raised in the petition, we recount here only the court’s findings as to those issues raised on appeal. The post-conviction court concluded that trial counsel’s decision to question certain witnesses about using drugs with the Petitioner was a “strategic and tactical” decision based on adequate trial preparation. Relatedly, the court found that trial counsel’s decision not to object to testimony regarding the Petitioner’s drug use was part -5- of trial counsel’s “strategy to discredit the witnesses against the Petitioner.” The post- conviction court concluded that the Petitioner suggested to trial counsel that he question the victim’s mother about the Petitioner’s penis as part of a strategy to discredit the victim’s testimony. The court accredited trial counsel’s testimony that he abandoned that strategy when he realized “this line of defense and attempting to show pictures of the Petitioner’s penis would actually harm the defense.” The court observed that the Petitioner did not testify about this issue at the hearing and concluded that trial counsel did not perform deficiently. The post-conviction court deemed the Petitioner’s allegation that trial counsel failed to investigate and prepare an adequate defense “baseless” given the proof at the evidentiary hearing that the Petitioner and trial counsel “discussed defense strategy and the facts of the case” and that trial counsel met with the Petitioner’s family and “interviewed multiple potential witnesses.” The post-conviction court accredited trial counsel’s testimony that it was not his practice to “rehearse testimony” and observed that the Petitioner elected to testify following a full Momon colloquy, undermining his claim. The court concluded that the Petitioner had failed to establish that trial counsel performed deficiently because the Petitioner elected to testify “after being properly advised.” Addressing the Petitioner’s claim that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies deprived him of a fair trial, the post-conviction court accredited trial counsel’s testimony that he “attempted to attack the credibility of the witnesses by showing that they participated in drug use, had pre-existing disagreements with the Petitioner, and held grudges toward the Petitioner.” The court observed that the victim “testified effectively and was credible.” The court stated that, under these circumstances, it could not “find that the cumulative error doctrine applies.” The post-conviction court concluded that trial counsel “was effective in his preparation of this case for trial and his representation during the pendency of the Petitioner’s case.” The Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief. Analysis On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief because the record establishes that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. He asserts that the post-conviction court should have granted relief based on trial counsel’s handling of evidence related to his drug use, his handling of the evidence regarding the appearance of the Petitioner’s penis, his failing to prepare the Petitioner to testify, and the cumulative prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s errors. The State asserts that the post-conviction court did not err. -6-  Post-conviction proceedings are not constitutionally required, see Dotson v. State, 673 S.W.3d 204, 216 (Tenn. 2023) (citing Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tenn. 1995)), but our legislature has provided a statutory framework for collateral attack “when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States,” T.C.A. § 40-30-103; see also T.C.A. §§ 40-30-101 to -123 (collectively the Post- Conviction Procedure Act). A petition for post-conviction relief must “include allegations of fact supporting each claim for relief” as well as “allegations of fact explaining why each ground for relief was not previously presented in any earlier proceeding.” T.C.A. § 40-30-104(e). To obtain relief, the Petitioner must prove “the allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence” at the hearing on his or her petition. Id. § 40-30-110(f). On appeal, our review is limited to those issues either “formally raised in the post- conviction petition or an amendment” or “argued at the evidentiary hearing and . . . decided by the post-conviction court without objection by the State.” Lowe v. State, 703 S.W.3d 319, 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024) (quoting Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2020) (stating that “issues that were not formally raised in the post-conviction petition” will be considered only when “argued at the post-conviction hearing and decided by the post-conviction court without objection”)). We review the “post- conviction court’s conclusions of law, decisions involving mixed questions of law and fact, and its application of law to its factual findings de novo without a presumption of correctness.” Holland, 610 S.W.3d at 455 (quoting Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2013)); see also Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2015). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact, however, are presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against them. See Lowe, 703 S.W.3d at 333 (citing Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)); see also Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578- 79 (Tenn. 1997); Bates v. State, 973 S.W.2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Under this standard, we will not reweigh the evidence, reconsider witness credibility, or reassess the factual issues resolved by the post-conviction court. Lowe, 703 S.W.3d at 333-34 (citing Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 456). Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee the right to counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.”); Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9 (“That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right to be heard by himself and his counsel[.]”). These provisions “envision[] counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results,” and, accordingly, “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)). To prevail on a claim that he or she has been denied the constitutional right to -7- the effective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must establish “both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457 (first citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; and then citing Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011)). Because the right to the effective assistance of counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the denial of the effective assistance of counsel may be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Phillips v. State, 647 S.W.3d 389, 401 (Tenn. 2022) (citing Mobley v. State, 397 S.W.3d 70, 79-80 (Tenn. 2013)). To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney,” fell outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This means that “the petitioner is required to prove the fact of counsel’s alleged error by clear and convincing evidence” and that the post-conviction court determines from the factual showing whether the alleged “error ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness[]’ and whether the error raised ‘a reasonable probability . . . that the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” Phillips, 647 S.W.3d at 401 (quoting Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 294 (Tenn. 2009)) (emphasis in Dellinger). “A court need not address both requirements if the [petitioner’s] proof fails to support either prong.” Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53, 57-58 (Tenn. 2020) (first citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; and then citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996)). Our analysis of counsel’s performance “begins with the strong presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance and used reasonable professional judgment to make all significant decisions.” Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 458 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “The petitioner bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370. This court will not second-guess a reasonable trial strategy and will not grant relief on the basis of a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision made after adequate preparation. See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (stating that “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment”). We do not view the petitioner’s claim through the lens of hindsight but, instead, “evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Phillips, 647 S.W.3d at 407 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). -8-  I. Petitioner’s Trial Testimony The Petitioner first asserts that trial counsel did not prepare him to testify at trial and that had trial counsel “adequately prepared him to testify, he would not have” offered testimony that “cast him in a negative light to the jury.” The State contends that the post- conviction court did not err by concluding that trial counsel met with the Petitioner multiple times and prepared the Petitioner to testify. The State also argues that even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient, the record does not support a finding of prejudice because the Petitioner did not explain how his testimony might have been different with more preparation. We agree with the State. The Petitioner testified that he and trial counsel did not discuss the possibility of his testifying at trial until the second day of trial. Trial counsel testified that it was not his practice to “rehearse” testimony with any witness. To prepare for the Petitioner’s testimony, trial counsel met with the Petitioner multiple times and discussed the allegations with him to determine how he might present to the jury. Although trial counsel acknowledged that he could have done more preparation, nothing suggests that further preparation would have resulted in the Petitioner’s offering materially different testimony at trial. Notably, the Petitioner does not claim that he would not have testified had trial counsel discussed the issue more thoroughly with him. Indeed, he acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that it was important for the jury to hear him deny the allegations. The Petitioner did not explain how his testimony might have been different with more or different preparation and did not offer any additional testimony that he might have offered at trial with more preparation. Further, as the post-conviction court observed, the Petitioner elected to testify after a full Momon colloquy at which he acknowledged having discussed the issue with trial counsel. II. The Petitioner’s Drug Use and Incarceration The Petitioner next asserts that trial counsel performed deficiently by eliciting testimony about the Petitioner’s drug use and failing to object to other testimony about his drug use. The State contends that the Petitioner waived claims related to trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony offered by the victim’s mother and the Petitioner’s cousin about the Petitioner’s drug use by changing theories on appeal. In the alternative, the State asserts that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Trial counsel’s accredited testimony established that it was part of his trial strategy to point out that the victim’s mother and the Petitioner’s cousin were using drugs at the time of the allegations as a means of discrediting their testimony. The record supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion that this was a reasonable strategy made after adequate preparation, and consequently, the Petitioner did not establish that trial counsel performed deficiently. Trial counsel was not asked about his failure to object to -9- testimony about the Petitioner’s drug use, and, in consequence, the Petitioner cannot show that the absence of an objection was not part of counsel’s trial strategy. The Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for asking him about his misdemeanor conviction for marijuana possession and asking how long he had been incarcerated at the time of the trial. Trial counsel testified that it was his practice to present bad facts, like the Petitioner’s misdemeanor conviction, to the jury in the first instance as a means of gaining credibility with the jury. This qualifies as a reasonable trial strategy. As to the question related to the Petitioner’s incarceration, the Petitioner did not present any evidence regarding this claim at the evidentiary hearing and, accordingly, the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings, and the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this claim. III. Evidence Related to Petitioner’s Penis The Petitioner next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for asking the victim’s mother questions about the appearance of the Petitioner’s penis and for attempting to introduce a photograph of the Petitioner’s penis into evidence at trial. The State asserts the post-conviction court did not err by denying relief on this basis because trial counsel’s questions and the proffered photograph were part of a trial strategy offered by the Petitioner that trial counsel ultimately abandoned. We agree with the State. Trial counsel’s accredited testimony established that the Petitioner alerted him to the fact that his penis bore unique markings and that the defense might be able to discredit the victim if she could not testify about the markings. Trial counsel said that he asked the victim’s mother, who was the Petitioner’s former romantic partner, about the Petitioner’s penis as part of this strategy. His accredited testimony further established that he abandoned this strategy when he realized that it was more harmful than helpful. The record supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion that this was a reasonable, if unsuccessful, trial strategy made after adequate preparation. As the State correctly observes, trial counsel did not proffer a photograph of the Petitioner’s penis in front of the jury, so the Petitioner cannot establish that the jury’s verdict would have been different had trial counsel not proffered the photograph. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings, and the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this claim. IV. Cumulative Error The Petitioner next argues that the post-conviction court erred by failing to grant relief because he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies. Multiple allegations of counsel’s deficient performance are treated as a single claim such that a petitioner may rely on multiple instances of deficient performance to satisfy the - 10 - prejudice requirement under Strickland. See Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is generally ‘a single ground for relief’ under the post-conviction statute.” (citing Cone v. State, 927 S.W.2d 579, 581- 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995))); Harris v. State, No. E2022-00446-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 17729352, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2022). Here, however, the Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any instance of deficient performance, and accordingly, he is not entitled to relief because he has failed to show that any errors existed to accumulate. See Martin v. State, No. E2022-00688-CCA-R3- PC, 2023 WL 3361543, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2023) (“[C]umulative error does not apply in post-conviction cases where the petitioner has failed to show any instance of deficient performance by counsel.”). Conclusion We conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings that the Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. ______s/ Stacy L. Street STACY L. STREET, JUDGE - 11 -