Full Opinion

11/17/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE September 15, 2026 Session KENNETH DEANGELO THOMAS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 2002-A-446 Khadija Lanice Babb, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-01102-CCA-R3-PC ___________________________________ Petitioner, Kenneth DeAngelo Thomas, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis as time-barred. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, and STACY L. STREET, JJ., joined. Drew Justice, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kenneth DeAngelo Thomas. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Christopher Buford, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION Factual and Procedural Background Petitioner, also referred to as “Delo,” and his co-defendants Paul Talley, 1 Torrey Leevale Glenn, and Arqui Bryant 2 were charged with the murder of Andrew Titus. Paul and Mr. Glenn both testified against Petitioner at trial. Petitioner was found guilty of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. This court affirmed the conviction on 1 Because Paul Talley and his brother Frederick both share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names. We intend no disrespect. 2 Mr. Bryant was deceased at the time of trial and is also referred to as Arkie Bryant. direct appeal. State v. Thomas, No. M2004-03069-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 521426, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2006). Petitioner and Paul, along with Travita Dumas, had also been charged with the murder of James Ransom which occurred around the same time as Mr. Titus’s murder in January 1999. While initially being interviewed for Mr. Ransom’s murder on April 14, 1999, Paul told Detectives Tim Mason and Kent McAlister that he had information about the murder of Mr. Titus. 3 He then told them: [Paul]: I know who did it. But I just don’t know his name. He stay, he stay out south in the projects. [Detective] McAlister: Why did he do it? [Paul]: Well, what I was told and what they told me he, hangs with Delo too. He, man I’m going to tell you who all hang with Delo. It’s a light-skinned dude, he wears glasses. His name is Leevale. It’s Delo, and and the dude that killed the little 18 year old is Leevale’s brother. They’d be out South. I guess he told me . . .” [Detective] McAlister: Why would he kill his brother? [Paul]: Nah, he didn’t kill his brother. The two that I’m telling you that hang with Delo are brothers. Leevale, and I don’t know the other dude. . . . The above portion of Paul’s interview, 4 a letter the State sent to the parole board on Paul’s behalf, and testimony from Frederick Talley at the tolling hearing recanting his trial testimony are the subjects of this appeal. Trial Paul and Mr. Glenn both testified that at the time of the Super Bowl in January 1999, Petitioner drove them and Mr. Glenn’s brother, Mr. Bryant, around in Ms. Dumas’s car looking for someone to rob. According to Paul, Petitioner took a shotgun and accompanied Mr. Glenn and Mr. Bryant to rob the victim, Andrew Titus. Paul heard several gunshots and said that Mr. Bryant and Petitioner shot Mr. Titus multiple times. He said Petitioner admitted to shooting Mr. Titus with the shotgun and that Mr. Bryant shot the victim with a 3 Petitioner later, spoke with Detective Bill Pridemore on April 14, 1999, and implicated Petitioner in the murder and robbery of Mr. Titus. 4 The record contains both an audio file and a transcript of the interview. For accuracy, the above quoted portion of the interview was taken from the audio file because the transcript noted inaudible portions. -2- different gun. Mr. Glenn also testified that Petitioner used a shotgun. Mr. Glenn said Petitioner later instructed him to “off” Paul because Petitioner believed Paul would tell the police what happened. Frederick, Paul’s brother, confirmed that Petitioner picked up Paul that night at their home in Ms. Dumas’s car. The autopsy revealed that Mr. Titus’s body contained both buckshot and .38 caliber projectiles. Those projectiles matched a pistol that had been discarded and found near the victim’s body. A spent shotgun shell was also discovered near the murder scene. Petitioner denied shooting Mr. Titus and said he was at a hotel with his ex-girlfriend, Ms. Dumas, at the time of the murder; Ms. Dumas corroborated his statement. Prior to their testimony both Paul and Mr. Glenn were asked about their own legal proceedings. The following exchange took place between Paul and the prosecutor: [Prosecutor]: Ha[ve] any promises been made to you regarding possible outcome of your charge with respect to this case? [Paul]: No, it ain’t. I hope to get something out of it, but no promise guaranteed [sic] have been told to me. [Prosecutor]: And has anyone, either myself, General Hamm, or anybody from the district attorney’s office suggested to you that you’re going to get a sweetheart deal? [Paul]: No, ma’am. Mr. Glenn also testified that he had not been promised any leniency for his testimony. Both Paul and Mr. Glenn described themselves as minor participants in the murder. First Error Coram Nobis Petition In 2013, Petitioner filed his first petition for error coram nobis, alleging that Paul lied at trial about Petitioner’s presence at the murder scene and that the State had offered Paul a plea deal in exchange for his testimony. Paul had recanted his trial testimony in a sworn notarized statement. Thomas v. State, No. M2014-00884-CCA-R3-ECN, 2015 WL 1568235, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2015). Petitioner presented Paul’s testimony at the coram nobis hearing, and the court concluded that Paul was not a credible witness and denied the coram nobis petition. Id. at *2. This court affirmed the denial on appeal. Id. -3- Post-Conviction Petition and Second Error Coram Nobis Petition On April 19, 2024, Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the State suppressed the above portion of the police interview on April 14, 1999, in violation of Brady v. Maryland 5 and that Paul had received a plea offer in exchange for his testimony as evidenced by a letter the prosecutor sent to the parole board on Paul’s behalf. On April 20, 2024, Petitioner filed a second error coram nobis petition asserting that Paul’s interview and the prosecutor’s letter were newly discovered evidence and that Frederick had recanted his trial testimony. The State argued that both petitions were time-barred and that the Petitioner offered no justification for tolling the statute of limitations. The court conducted a hearing on both petitions to determine the issue of tolling. At the hearing, Paul testified that during the interview, he initially discussed the murder of Mr. Ransom, for which Petitioner had been charged and acquitted. Regarding the murder of Mr. Titus, Paul agreed that he told police that “someone who hangs with Delo and who was Leevale’s brother was the person who killed Andrew Titus.” He identified the person as Arqui Bryant and said that Mr. Bryant, not Petitioner, killed Mr. Titus. Paul said that police were focused on Mr. Ransom’s murder and wanted him to implicate Petitioner in Mr. Titus’s murder. He said he implicated Petitioner in Mr. Titus’s murder a few years after the interview. Paul said that at some point while he was incarcerated, and after Petitioner was acquitted of Mr. Ransom’s murder, the prosecutor and Detective Mason offered him a four- year sentence for attempted robbery in connection with Mr. Titus’s murder “to run concurrent with what I was already serving, [and the prosecutor] wrote letters to the parole board to help me get released because, a couple months after that, I was released.” He said that “a lot worked in [his] favor just to point [Petitioner] out on that case.” He clarified that he was released on parole in 2003 after the prosecutor wrote a letter on his behalf to the parole board. When asked why he testified at trial that the prosecutor had not offered any leniency, Paul testified: Well, behind closed doors, it was a lot that I was forced and threatened with with words. If I didn’t do it, I wouldn’t get this. If I didn’t do it, I wouldn’t make parole or they will recharge me. So it was so much that was said behind closed doors that wasn’t recorded that was brought to me. So I was threatened, and I was - - so I was like okay, let me just go ahead and go for it. 5 373 U.S. 83 (1963). -4- On cross-examination, Paul agreed that he was charged, along with Petitioner, in the murder of Mr. Ransom. Mr. Ransom’s murder and the murder of Mr. Titus both occurred in January 1999. Paul agreed he spoke with detectives about both murders in the same interview on April 14, 1999, and he eventually implicated Petitioner in the robbery and murder of Mr. Titus when he was talking to Detective Bill Pridemore. He did not recall stating that Petitioner possessed a “TEC automatic” weapon and that Petitioner, Mr. Bryant, and Mr. Glenn confronted the victim during the robbery. He also testified at Petitioner’s trial for the murder of Mr. Titus, with his attorney present, that Petitioner had a shotgun at the time of the robbery and shot Mr. Titus. Paul said the State began talking to him more after Petitioner was acquitted of Mr. Ransom’s murder. He said, “That’s when everything really came to light. The investigation started more as far as me, Torrey Glenn and everything else.” He pled guilty to the attempted robbery of Mr. Titus. Paul claimed that he lied under oath at Petitioner’s trial and lied multiple times to police when he said that Petitioner shot Mr. Titus. Paul claimed that Petitioner was unarmed and was “never nowhere near Mr. Titus” at the time of the robbery and that Paul and Petitioner were standing at the “store” at the time. He said Mr. Bryant and Mr. Glenn, who were both armed, approached Mr. Titus. Paul agreed that he did not recant his trial testimony until after he was released from serving his attempted robbery sentence. Paul testified that his attorney was not present when the State made an offer of leniency at the jail after he was incarcerated. He did not recall when he met with the State but said two prosecutors were present. Paul said he told his attorney about the offer, but he could not recall his attorney’s name. He did not recall testifying at Petitioner’s trial that the State did not promise him leniency in exchange for his testimony. Paul agreed that the prosecutor wrote a letter to the parole board stating that “there was no previous deals and that . . . she did not promise [him] any leniency. She only promised [him] consideration for [his] truthful testimony.” Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that she had been licensed to practice law since 1997 and had handled several trials by the time of Petitioner’s trial in 2003. She said that if she had received discovery indicating that an accuser had made a prior statement that her client was innocent, her standard practice was to bring that statement out during cross- examination. Trial counsel did not specifically recall receiving the portion of Paul’s recorded interview wherein he said someone who “hangs” with Petitioner killed Mr. Titus. She had not read the trial transcript prior to her testimony but said if she had the statement and used it for cross-examination at trial, “it would have been in the trial transcript.” Trial counsel did not recall if the prosecutor told her about any offers of leniency made to Paul before Petitioner’s trial but said “that was thoroughly explored in trial prep and at trial.” -5- Trial counsel agreed she was aware that Petitioner had been charged with the murder of Mr. Ransom “fairly close” in time to the murder of Mr. Titus and that there were some of the same co-defendants in both cases. She was aware that Paul had pled guilty to facilitating the murder of Mr. Ransom. She was also aware that Paul had made a statement to police on April 14, 1999, discussing his and the other co-defendant’s involvement in both murders. Trial counsel testified that Petitioner was “very active in his defense” and he discussed his trial for the murder of Mr. Ransom with her. She also had numerous discussions with the prosecutor about the previous trial. Trial counsel no longer had the files from Petitioner’s case because they were destroyed in a warehouse fire fifteen to eighteen years prior to the hearing. Trial counsel recalled that Mr. Bryant had been involved in the case and said it was always the State’s position that Petitioner was part of the group that approached Mr. Titus when he was shot and killed. Counsel for Petitioner’s first petition for error coram nobis (“coram nobis counsel”) testified that he filed the first petition based on Paul’s recantation and that the petition was denied because the error coram nobis court found Paul’s recantation not to be credible. Coram nobis counsel said he never had any written or audio documentation of an interview where Paul said that Petitioner was innocent; he would have used that information for the petition had it been available. Coram nobis counsel agreed that Paul’s recantation contradicted all of his prior statements and that the only difference in the two statements Paul gave to police was “which weapons were used by which co-defendants in the murder, a mistake he had made based on who actually owned the weapons.” Coram nobis counsel agreed that he did not have any previous information that the prosecutor had promised Paul leniency in exchange for testifying against Petitioner and that such information would also have been beneficial to the error coram nobis petition because it “added some credence to [Paul’s] affidavit or his recantation that there was a promise of leniency for his testimony.” The prosecutor who litigated the case against Petitioner for the murder of Mr. Titus testified that she sent a letter to the parole board on October 31, 2003, on Paul’s behalf and “indicated in the letter what I would have routinely done with anyone that I was flipping on a co-defendant that I would consider - - take into consideration their truthful testimony at trial.” She denied making Paul a four-year offer: I would not have made that offer. That would not be my manner of habit. I had handled a lot of trials by this point in time. And I would always meet with the co-defendant in the presence of his counsel or her counsel, but it would not be my habit to make a set offer. For example, the claim here is that I made an offer of four years if he testified at trial. And that’s simply not true. I would not have done that. -6- The letter sent to the parole board, which was exhibited to the prosecutor’s testimony, stated: “Without any promises or guarantees from the State concerning his possible plea offer, [Paul] testified against [Petitioner] at that trial despite the danger that [Petitioner] posed to him.” The letter further said: I want to impress upon the Board that Paul Talley was a follower in these crimes. At all times he has been cooperative with me and admitted his involvement in these crimes immediately upon his arrest in 1999. He voluntarily testified despite the possible risk of “snitching” against [Petitioner] and without any assurances from me that it would help him in his charges. Mr. Titus’[s] family attended the trial of Andrew Titus. The young man’s father, Andrew Allen, was very appreciative of his cooperation and testimony. I anticipate that we will resolve the pending charge against him in the Titus murder. I wanted you to know that Paul Talley has repeatedly provided help to the State in prosecuting a dangerous offender in determining whether he should be placed on parole at this time. The prosecutor did not recall whether Petitioner was charged with the murder of Mr. Titus after he was acquitted of Mr. Ransom’s murder. As for any recorded interview provided during discovery, the prosecutor said that it would have been her “habit” to listen to any recordings before turning them over in discovery. She disputed that Paul said Petitioner did not kill Mr. Titus. The prosecutor noted that there were multiple shooters involved in the murder. She had reviewed the portion of the interview transcript post- conviction counsel claimed implicated Mr. Bryant, and she did not believe it was exculpatory. She pointed out that Paul consistently implicated Petitioner from the beginning through the trial. The prosecutor said, “The impression that [Paul] gave the detectives and in reviewing their investigation was that [Petitioner] was effectively the leader in those robberies and they were - - they tended to be younger, his co-defendants, and they went along with him.” She agreed that she would not have provided the discovery from Petitioner’s trial for the murder of Mr. Ransom to trial counsel who represented Petitioner for the murder of Mr. Titus. The prosecutor could not recall whether she had been contacted by Carlos Parks, who claimed to be making a documentary about Petitioner or whether he read a statement to her from Paul. When asked “did you then say that, if you had known that [Paul] had made these statements, you never would have indicted [Petitioner],” the prosecutor replied, “I definitely did not say that.” On cross-examination, the prosecutor testified that she had tried “[m]any, many murder cases.” She said that she was trained that “every bit of evidence is made available to the defense [ ] including a hard copy of written material as well as any recordings.” She -7- identified the initial portion of the State’s response to discovery in Petitioner’s case for Mr. Ransom’s murder, which included notice that she had statements from Paul and Ms. Dumas that would be provided to counsel “upon receipt of three blank audio/video tapes.” Copies of Paul’s signed waiver of rights would also have been provided to counsel. A supplemental report listed Petitioner, Paul, and Ms. Dumas as suspects in Mr. Ransom’s murder. Regarding Mr. Titus’s murder, the State’s discovery response contained the following: Paul Talley, [Petitioner], and Torrey Glenn made statements to the police. A copy of those statements will be provided to counsel upon receipt of one blank audio and one blank video tape. Paul Talley signed a waiver of rights form each time. Torrey Glenn signed a use immunity agreement. See attached summaries. Also attached are various reports concerning the crime scene. A supplemental report prepared by Detective Pridemore listed Petitioner, “Leevale,” and “Leevale’s brother” as suspects in Mr. Titus’s murder. Paul provided the names. The prosecutor then read the following from Paul’s trial testimony from Petitioner’s trial for the murder of Mr. Titus: [Prosecutor]: And do you remember calling or speaking with Detective Bill Pridemore about your participation in this crime? [Paul]: Yes, I did. [Prosecutor]: And at that interview you had indicated to him that you had believed [Petitioner] had the shotgun? [Paul]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Excuse me, I misspoke. That you had believed that [Petitioner] had had the T[EC] 9? [Paul]: I had based that on who owned the weapons. [Prosecutor]: That’s what I wanted to ask you. Do you know who owned each of the guns. You testified that Torrey Glenn owned the .32 and that’s the gun you returned to him? -8- [Paul]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Who owned the T[EC] 9? [Paul]: [Petitioner] owned the T[EC] 9 and Arqui owned the shotgun. But at the time of the shooting [Petitioner] had the shotgun and Arqui had the T[EC] 9. [Prosecutor]: How do you know they were the owners of those guns? [Paul]: I had kept the T[EC] 9 for [Petitioner] before at my mother’s house. The prosecutor said that Paul’s trial counsel was present when he testified against Petitioner. The prosecutor testified that Paul never informed her that his trial testimony was inaccurate, and to her knowledge, he had not approached law enforcement to inform them that his statements or testimony were inaccurate. Instead, Paul sent a letter directly to Petitioner. She noted that in Petitioner’s previous error coram nobis proceedings, the court found Paul’s recantation not credible. It was always the prosecutor’s belief that multiple people approached Mr. Titus at the time of the murder, including Petitioner. Carlos Parks testified that he is a licensed real estate agent in North Carolina, a director of communications for Fifth Sun TV, and “an entrepreneur, business owner, an adjunct professor at Durham Tech.” He had learned of Petitioner’s case and began investigating the case for a documentary. Mr. Parks testified that he spoke with the prosecutor by phone for approximately twenty minutes. During their conversation, the prosecutor said she was not aware of the “newly discovered evidence” in the form of an exculpatory statement by Paul during his first interview with police. Mr. Parks claimed that the prosecutor was “shocked.” He said that the prosecutor “said, if she would have known about it, she would have never indicted him.” On cross-examination, Mr. Parks agreed that he had never met the prosecutor and did not know her voice. Although he said he recorded his conversations with the prosecutor, no recordings were introduced at the hearing. Frederick Talley testified that he did not remember anything about his testimony from Petitioner’s trial. He did not recall saying that Petitioner came over with Paul on the night of the Super Bowl. Frederick said that Petitioner did not visit Paul’s house that night and that it was too long ago to remember what happened. He also said that he was “a child almost” and naïve at the time. Frederick denied that he hoped to get leniency for a loved -9- one from his testimony. He agreed that he sent Petitioner a letter and an affidavit indicating that Petitioner was innocent, but he denied that anyone asked him to send the letter. He agreed that post-conviction counsel typed the letter, read it to him, and supplied a notary for the affidavit. Frederick agreed that he was currently serving a ten-year sentence for attempted rape. He said he lied at Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner testified that he first learned of Paul’s exculpatory interview when post- conviction counsel notified him in August of 2023. He learned of the letter sent to the parole board on Paul’s behalf at the same time. Petitioner did not know if his previous counsel received the interview in discovery during his trial for the murder of Mr. Ransom. At that time, he had not been charged with Mr. Titus’s murder. Petitioner testified that he first learned of Frederick’s letter and affidavit after post-conviction counsel gave it to him. The post-conviction court made detailed findings and concluded that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was time-barred and that there was no statutory or due process justification to toll the one-year statute of limitations period. In particular, the court found: After a thorough examination of the case files and all the evidence presented at the tolling hearing, the Court is of the opinion that Paul Talley’s April 14, 1999, interview was known to Petitioner at the time of his jury trial and hence, the interview cannot be classified as “newly discovered.” More importantly, based on the State’s discovery responses and the testimony of [trial counsel] and [the prosecutor], the Court does not find that the State suppressed and withheld Paul Talley’s interview. The Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that a Brady violation occurred as it relates to the disclosure of the Paul Talley interview. As for the Prosecutor’s letter to the Parole Board, there is nothing in the letter that indicates or proves, either directly or indirectly, that the State promised Paul Talley any specific outcome in exchange for his testimony against the Petitioner. There is nothing about this letter that can remotely be classified as “exculpatory.” The post-conviction court likewise made detailed findings that Petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis was also time-barred. The court again noted that Paul’s interview was known to Petitioner at the time of trial and was not “newly discovered.” The court further concluded: However, even if Paul Talley’s interview was “newly discovered,” the pertinent question is whether his interview clearly and convincingly shows that the Petitioner is actually innocent of acting in concert with Torrey Glenn - 10 - and Paul Talley by attempting to rob Andrew Titus and killing Andrew Titus during the attempt. Essentially, Paul Talley’s interview would have to leave the Court with no serious or substantial doubt that the Petitioner is actually innocent of felony murder. The jury verdict established that the Petitioner, along with Torrey Glenn and Paul Talley, attempted to rob Andrew Titus and killed him during that attempt. Under the law of Felony Murder, if all three (3) shared the intent to commit the robbery, then it would not matter who was the actual gunman because all three (3) could be found guilty of Felony Murder. As such, assuming arguendo that Paul Talley’s statement was true, on its face, it does not show that the Petitioner is actually innocent of the Felony Murder of Andrew Titus. Consequently, Paul Talley’s interview does not meet the legal standard for tolling the statute of limitations. As to the State’s letter to the parole board on Paul’s behalf, the post-conviction court found that the letter did not show that Petitioner was actually innocent of felony murder and thus, “does not meet the legal standard for tolling the statute of limitations.” Finally, as to Frederick Talley’s recantation, the post-conviction court concluded: The pertinent question here is whether his recantation clearly and convincingly shows that the Petitioner is actually innocent of acting in concert with Torrey Glenn and Paul Talley in the attempted robbery of Andrew Titus that resulted in Andrew Titus’s death. Even if Fred[erick] Talley’s tolling hearing testimony was accurate, it does not show that Petitioner was not at the scene of the robbery, or that he was not involved in any way. It does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent of Felony Murder. Consequently, Fred[erick] Talley’s recantation does not meet the legal standard for tolling the statute of limitations. It is from these two orders that Petitioner now appeals. Analysis I. Post-Conviction Petition On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed his petition as untimely. He maintains that due process tolling is warranted because the State allegedly suppressed two categories of evidence he claims is favorable: (1) a portion of Paul Talley’s April 14, 1999 interview that Petitioner characterizes as exculpatory, and (2) a letter the prosecutor sent to the parole board, which he contends demonstrates that Paul - 11 - Talley received an undisclosed inducement to testify against him. The State contends that the post-conviction court properly denied the petition because Petitioner failed to prove that the interview was suppressed and because the prosecutor’s letter was consistent with Paul’s trial testimony that while he hoped to receive favorable treatment for his testimony, he was not promised such. A person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition for post- conviction relief “within one year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one year of the date on which the judgment becomes final.” T.C.A § 40-30-102(a). “The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity.” Id. Moreover, “[t]ime is of the essence of the right to file a petition for post-conviction relief . . . and the one-year limitations period is an element of the right to file the action and is a condition upon its exercise.” Id. “An untimely post- conviction petition divests the post-conviction court of subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to summary dismissal.” Lowe v. State, 703 S.W.3d 319, 330 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024) (citing T.C.A. §§ 40-30-102(b); -106(b)). In this case, Petitioner was convicted on October 16, 2003; this court denied relief on direct appeal on March 3, 2006; and the supreme court denied his application for permission to appeal on October 30, 2006. Thus, Petitioner had until October 30, 2007, to file his post-conviction petition. Petitioner did not file his post-conviction petition until April 19, 2024, well past the expiration of the statute of limitations. Petitioner does not assert that his petition was timely. “The question of whether the post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled is a mixed question of law and fact that is . . . subject to de novo review.” Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 355 (Tenn. 2011)). In addition to the statutory exceptions to the statute of limitations for post- conviction relief as set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b), our supreme court “has identified three circumstances in which due process requires tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations”: (1) when the claim for relief arises after the statute of limitations has expired; (2) when the petitioner’s mental incompetence prevents him from complying with the statute of limitations; and (3) when the petitioner’s attorney has committed misconduct. Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 623-24 (Tenn. 2013). Petitioner does not contend that his claim falls within one of the statutory exceptions. Rather, he asserts that due process requires tolling of the limitations period because the State allegedly suppressed an exculpatory statement - a portion of Paul’s April 14, 1999 interview relating to the murder of Mr. Titus – and that he did not discover the factual basis for his claim until after the limitations period had expired. A petitioner seeking due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations based upon an - 12 - alleged Brady violation must establish that the claim is a later-arising claim, and that strict application of the limitations period would deny a reasonable opportunity to present the claim. See Wright v. State, 987 S.W.2d 26, 28-30 (Tenn. 1999). Under the framework articulated in Sands, a court must determine: (1) when the limitations period normally commenced; (2) whether the grounds for relief arose after that date; and (3) if so, whether application of the statute of limitations would effectively deny the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present the claim. Id. at 29 (citing Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Nunley v. State, 552 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2018)). In conducting the third inquiry, the court balances the petitioner's interest in litigating the alleged constitutional violation against the State's interest in preserving final judgments and preventing the litigation of stale claims. Id. at 29-30. Applying this framework to the facts of this case, Petitioner failed to establish that his Brady claim was a later-arising claim warranting due process tolling. The proof presented at the tolling hearing supports the post-conviction court’s determination that Paul Talley’s April 14, 1999 interview was disclosed before trial and was not withheld by the State. The State’s discovery response specifically referenced Paul Talley’s statement and advised that a copy would be provided to defense counsel. The prosecutor testified that it was her practice to provide all recorded statements to the defense, and trial counsel was unable to testify that the interview had not been disclosed. Consequently, the record does not demonstrate that an extraordinary circumstance prevented Petitioner from discovering or pursuing the claim within the limitations period. Nor does it establish that the factual basis for the claim first arose after the statute of limitations expired. Even if Petitioner had established that the portion of Paul’s interview in question was only recently discovered by his current post-conviction counsel, he has not shown that the statements were exculpatory and would have changed the outcome of the trial. Although Paul identified Mr. Bryant as the shooter, he never affirmatively stated that Petitioner was not present, was not involved, or was otherwise innocent. Throughout the April 14 interview with Detective Pridemore, Paul indicated that Petitioner was involved in the murder of Mr. Titus. The proof showed that Mr. Titus was shot by two different people with two different weapons. Co-defendant Glenn also testified at trial that Petitioner was one of the shooters. Even if Petitioner was not the shooter, the proof shows that he was present and participated in the robbery that resulted in Mr. Titus’s death - sufficient evidence to support a conviction for felony murder during the commission of attempted robbery. Balancing Petitioner’s interest in obtaining collateral review against the State’s substantial interest in the finality of convictions, we conclude that due process would not require tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. Burford v State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Tenn. 1992); Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tenn. 2002) (requires weighing analysis i.e. petitioner’s liberty interest in raising such an issue was outweighed by the State’s interest in finality). - 13 - As to Petitioner’s claim that he was unaware of the prosecutor’s letter to the parole board, which he claims evidenced leniency for Paul’s trial testimony, we agree with the post-conviction court that the letter neither “indicates or proves, either directly or indirectly, that the State promised Paul any specific outcome in exchange for his testimony against the Petitioner.” Nor is the letter in any way exculpatory. The prosecutor testified that the letter she sent to the parole board after Petitioner’s trial on Paul’s behalf was routine and consistent with her agreement to “take into consideration their truthful testimony at trial.” The letter was also consistent with Paul’s trial testimony that he was not promised leniency by the prosecutor, only that he hoped for leniency, which Petitioner already knew. Based on these facts, even if Petitioner was unaware of the letter to the parole board until after the post-conviction limitations period expired, balancing the liberty interest in a collateral attack against the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims, we conclude that due process does not require tolling of the statute of limitations. See Wright, 987 S.W.2d at 28; Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207; Sample, 82 S.W.3d at 268. The post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petition as time-barred. Petitioner is not entitled to relief. II. Error Coram Nobis Petition Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis as time-barred for the same reasons as those advanced in his petition for post-conviction relief: that the State suppressed a portion of Paul’s interview with police in violation of Brady and that he was unaware of the prosecutor’s letter to the parole board which he claimed evidenced leniency in exchange for Paul’s trial testimony. Additionally, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to due process tolling because Frederick Talley recanted his trial testimony at the tolling hearing. The State argues that this evidence was not newly discovered and it did not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Error coram nobis relief is: confined to errors dehors the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial. - 14 - T.C.A. § 40-26-105(b). The relief sought in an error coram nobis proceeding “is the setting aside of the conviction and the granting of a new trial.” Clardy v. State, 691 S.W.3d 390, 400 (Tenn. 2024) (citing Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478, 485 (Tenn. 2016)). The writ of error coram nobis is “an extraordinary procedural remedy,” and is subject to a one-year statute of limitations which is measured from the date the judgment becomes final, thirty days after either entry of the judgment of conviction or disposition of a timely, post-trial motion. Nunley v. State, 552 S.W.3d 800, 816 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999)); T.C.A. § 27-7-103. Compliance with the one-year statute of limitations is an “essential element of a coram nobis claim.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828. Whether a petit