State of Tennessee v. Anthony E. Thomas II

11/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY E. THOMAS II Circuit Court for Lewis County No. 2022-CR-5 ___________________________________ No. M2026-01570-CCA-R8-CO ___________________________________ ORDER This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Anthony E. Thomas II, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce the amount of his pretrial bond. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes. Background The Defendant was charged in January 2022 with twenty-six counts of various sexual offense against his two minor stepdaughters. Following a multi-day jury trial in November 2024, the Defendant was convicted on all twenty-six counts in the superseding indictment. The offenses included continuous sexual abuse of a child, rape of a child, incest, aggravated sexual battery, rape and attempted rape. The Defendant received an effective one-hundred-three-year sentence. Judgements were filed on April 1, 2025. The Defendant, by and through new counsel, timely filed a motion for new trial on April 24, 2025, and amended it twice thereafter. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial on January 21, 2026. On February 9, 2026, the trial court filed a fifty-six-page written order granting the Defendant a new trial. The court found the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel which warranted a new trial. The Defendant was released on a $100,000 bond before and during trial. Upon the return of the jury’s verdict in November 2024, the Defendant’s bond was revoked and he was taken into custody. On February 23, 2026, he moved the trial court to reinstate his previous bond or release him on his own recognizance pending the new trial. He argued his model behavior while he was released on bond proved he would appear in court and would not pose a danger to the public. The trial court held a hearing on that motion on April 8, 2026. The Defendant called his great aunt and grandmother as character witnesses. On April 13, 2026, the trial court filed its written order setting the Defendant’s bond at $1,000,000, with conditions on release. On August 31, 2026, the Defendant filed a “Motion to Review Ruling on Bail Bond.” He requested the trial court to either revisit its prior decision or deny the motion for review so that he could seek appellate review. The Defendant reiterated his model behavior during his previous release warranted a lower bond. He also disputed some of the evidence the trial court relied upon during its earlier ruling. The Defendant suggested he was being punished for successfully moving for a new trial. The State filed a response in opposition. The trial court did not hold another hearing but issued its written order denying the Defendant’s motion for review on September 16, 2026. Although the Defendant did not seek appellate review of the April 13th order, he now moves this Court for review following the issuance of the trial court’s recent order. Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 Rule 8 provides the procedural framework for obtaining appellate review of a trial court’s actions regarding a defendant’s release. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144. In order for this Court to conduct its review, and because generally there is no record on appeal when a defendant seeks review of a trial court’s actions in this type of situation, it is a defendant’s responsibility to provide this Court with an ad hoc record of the proceeding below. In the matter at hand, the Defendant has provided this Court with copies of the relevant trial court filings; thus, the instant motion is adequate for this Court to conduct its review. Pretrial Release Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to bail in all except capital cases. See State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-102 (“Before trial, all defendants shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great.”). Similarly, excessive bail is expressly prohibited by Article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. See State ex rel. Hemby v. O’Steen, 559 S.W.2d 340, 341-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977). Initially, this Court observes that a trial court has the authority to release a defendant prior to trial on his or her own personal recognizance or upon an unsecured bond. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-115. If, however, the trial court determines a defendant does not qualify for release under the provisions of § 40-11-115, the court shall then “impose the least onerous conditions reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s appearance in court,” which may include the posting of a secured bond. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-116 and -117. 2  If a secured bond is ordered, and to assist the trial courts in determining an appropriate amount, our legislature has directed that bail “shall be set as low as the court determines is necessary to reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118(a). Furthermore, “in determining the amount of bond necessary to reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant while at the same time protecting the safety of the public,” the trial courts shall consider the following factors: (1) The defendant’s length of residence in the community; (2) The defendant’s employment status and history and the defendant’s financial condition; provided, that, the defendant’s ability to pay shall not be considered; (3) The defendant’s family ties and relationships; (4) The defendant’s reputation, character and mental condition; (5) The defendant’s prior criminal record and record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings; (6) The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence; (7) The defendant’s prior juvenile court record, as authorized by § 37-1- 133(b)(1), and prior criminal record and the likelihood that because of the records the defendant will pose a risk of danger to the community; (8) The identity of responsible members of the community who will vouch for the defendant’s reliability; . . .; and (9) Any other factors indicating the defendant’s ties to the community or bearing on the risk of the defendant’s willful failure to appear, including, but not limited to, whether the defendant is lawfully present in this state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118(b). These factors are similar to the ones the court must first consider when deciding whether to release a defendant on his or her own recognizance. See § 40-11-115(b). Any request for a change in bail or conditions of release must be made in a written motion, and the trial court shall state in writing the reasons for its actions on that motion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-143. “The trial court has very wide latitude in setting bail” and this Court should be “most reluctant to second-guess” the trial court’s decision. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 358 (Tenn. 1982). Indeed, this Court reviews the actions of a trial court regarding a defendant’s release under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-103. Our supreme court has stated that the abuse of discretion standard of review is a “less rigorous review” of a trial court’s decision and does not permit this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tenn. 2019) 3 (quoting Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). Trial Court’s Orders As noted above, the trial court issued two orders regarding the Defendant’s release pending the new trial. Because this Court reviews the decision of a trial court under an abuse of discretion standard, and because the trial court detailed in writing the reasons for its rulings, the Court hereinafter quotes the relevant portion of the trial court’s orders for reference. The following statements are found in the court’s April 13th order: As requested by the state, the court has considered statutory guidelines, reviewed the pretrial hearings, the forensic interview of the two minor victims, the proof brought out at the trial of the cause, the sworn testimony at the sentencing hearing, the evidence brought before the court at the motion for a new trial and the testimony before the court on the motion to set a bond, as well as arguments of counsel. While the defense counsel established that the defendant has relatives in and around the 32nd Judicial District, none live in this district. Pre-trial, the defendant has an extensive work record but there is no evidence before the court that, under the circumstances, he could obtain employment. When the court considered his family ties, the court notes a family with ten (10) siblings, a few of whom appear to be “close” to the defendant with the majority either ambivalent of disliking the defendant. Testimony at the sentencing hearing from one sibling indicated an angry, mean spirited, defendant who physically tortured his younger siblings prior to leaving home. There was testimony, not from a sibling, but from a grandparent who stated that these allegations were false. The court considered the sibling testimony at the sentencing phase and found it to be credible and finds no reason to discount it without countervailing sibling testimony at this point. The court does not find such stable family ties and relationships in this family to indicate abundant love, support and bonding. It further appears from the testimony at the bond hearing, that the nearest, in age, sibling to this defendant is serving a sentence in federal prison. Post trial, this court has received enough evidentiary material to place the defendant’s reputation, character and mental condition in question. The 4 testimony of the defendant, at trial, gave the court pause when considering his demeanor, ability to control his temper and requisite reasoning skills. It is apparent that the defendant’s testimony before the jury likely had a detrimental impact on his plea of innocence, which the jury could not accept. Yet, the defendant has no prior criminal record and during the pendency of this litigation, from indictment to trial, the defendant made each and every court appearance and was diligent in providing sufficient time to have his case presented to the jury. Further, the defendant has three young sons who appear, from the testimony, to be very dear to him and he is not likely to sever those ties and [lose] touch with them if at all possible. When considering the nature of the offense and apparent probability of conviction the court has the benefit of the entire proceeding. Without question, this court found that a new trial was necessary to protect the due process rights of the defendant and allow him to have a fair trial before a jury as constitutionally required. Original defense counsel fell short of providing an adequate defense for the defendant by failing to bring in witnesses to give weight to the theories of defense espoused by counsel. However, the testimony of the young stepdaughters in this case was compelling and the court noted the jury being very careful in weighing that testimony. The jury was commended, by the court, on their attention to detail and focus during the entire trial. Had the defense counsel brought in sufficient witnesses to support the defense theory of an “angry and vindictive spouse who sought a divorce and desired to win a custody battle” through this criminal proceeding, there would have been room for the jury to further weigh the credibility of the victims before them and there may have been a different outcome but this court believes, on the facts, that the probability of conviction has not been modified, for purposes of the motion presently before it. When considering the risk to the community, the court must be cautious recognizing that this case has played out adversely to the defendant. Defense counsel states that nothing has changed and since the defendant was on bond prior to the trial, he should be reinstated on that same bond or even without bond at this point. This court cannot agree. In fact, the circumstances have significantly changed. Once the arrow is released from the bow it cannot be withdrawn. This defendant has been convicted on the proof presented and he was sentenced to over one hundred (100) years, to serve. Prior to the trial it was evident to the court that the defendant believed he would be acquitted and it was further evident to the court that the defendant did not feel a lengthy 5  sentence would be administered. Now, however, the defendant lives under a different risk and a risk that rests on the testimony of two much older stepdaughters whose testimony can be presented with more clarity. One stepdaughter will be 20 years of age in August and the other 16 years of age in December. The risk of conviction must now loom before the defendant and his [two] accusers are not in hiding. In fact, if the defendant is released, it is apparent, from the testimony and arguments of counsel, he will seek a modification of the present parenting plan to allow him visitation with his sons and the whereabouts of the ex-wife and the stepdaughters will come to knowledge. The court views this as a substantial risk to the community. Further, this court is guided by the legislative concerns when rape of a child, as of July 1, 2024, became a capital offense where bail was no longer constitutionally required. ... THEREFORE, the court has considered the entire body of evidence, in this case, reviewed the forensic interviews, considered the testimony at trial, the sentencing hearing, the pre-trial report and assessment from the state, the evidence supplied at the motion for new trial, the testimony at this pending motion, arguments of counsel, and the entire record and upon those findings ORDERS: The defendant, Anthony Thomas, [is] incarcerated on the pending indictment and is entitled to a bond sufficient to insure his appearance but more importantly protect the public, considering the defendant’s knowledge of his risk and the court’s recognition of defendant’s demeanor at trial. For purposes of this order the Court witnessed the defendant, at the trial, considered his affect, tone, agitation and somewhat rebellious nature in giving his testimony and gives that recollection weight. The following statements are found in the court’s September 16th order: Where it necessary to review the prior order, what stands out for the Court when considering a bond, in this case, are those specific points set forth in that prior order as well as the following: 1. The defendant was, in the mind of the Court and, obviously the jury, totally lacking in credibility. He testified that he never touched the 6 girls, yet the jury refused to believe him. He testified that he was nervous but still calm and yet he became belligerent in the presence of the jury while being cross[-]examined. The volatile nature of the defendant as was seen in some testimony was certainly corroborated. 2. There was testimony, at sentencing, from Tiffany Adams Graham whose testimony the Court found to be both credible and compelling. She indicated that she was a prior fiancé of the defendant and described him as being manipulative and totally lacking in veracity. Her testimony revealed that : (1) [the defendant] was a different person than he portrayed to her initially; (2) [the defendant] changed from pleasant to a demanding individual; (3) [the defendant] forced sexual relations with her and, in fact, raped her on the campus on more than one occasion, at the college they attended together; (4) [the defendant] assaulted her and denigrated her openly by objecting to her weight and forced a limitation on her food consumption and finally (5) required that she shave her genital area so she would “look like a child.” This witness further testified that [the defendant] was a master at manipulating people and had turned her parents against her on issues so that she was forced to take [the defendant’s] side or be admonished by her parents. 3. Further, if reviewing the prior decision, the Court recalled the testimony of [the defendant’s] sister Mary Katherine “Elizabeth” who testified that [the defendant] was, even as an adult, mean to his younger siblings when he “hurt and bruised” them. In addition, she testified that he “tortured us” and she even witnessed [the defendant] being abusive to Danielle Thomas, his wife. Her testimony also included a statement that “[the defendant] is not what he wants people to think he is.[”] Defense counsel has tendered affidavits for appellate review, however, those affidavits do not pass the personal credibility review that has been available to this court concerning the above additional review. 4. Not needing further review, but as requested by the defendant in his motion, the court reflected on the oldest victim stating that [the defendant] would kiss her and touch her boobs and vagina, which went on for six (6) years. She noted that he put his penis between her legs but not inside of her. The youngest victim testified that [the defendant] licked her vagina and both girls were afraid to confide in their mother believing that she would credit [the defendant] over their cries for help. Apparently, they, too, understood the manipulative expertise of the 7  defendant. The Court in its prior order recognized that [the defendant] has no relatives living within the 32nd Judicial District and he has moved about frequently in the past. The testimony regarding rape, sexual abuse of at least one adult and the two children, in this case, all on very credible testimony cause this Court to fear for the safety of the public and even for the safety of the defendant, himself. In conclusion it bears noting that while this Court was compelled to grant a new trial, that grant rests with the inability of defense counsel to be effective as required by constitutional standards. Nowhere in that order was there the slightest intimation that it would be safe or appropriate for the defendant to be released on anything less than the bond that was set and then with conditions. This court has grave concerns, when having witnessed the testimony of those who came before the Court, that [the defendant] can safely and effectively integrate back into society and appear for a new trial, after he has seen that his position is not as tenable as he hoped. The risk of conviction, on these very serious charges, is great and it is evident that from past practice, [the defendant] is not in the business of taking risks and flight is a viable alternative. Discussion On appeal, the Defendant reiterates that his model behavior during his prior release favors a lower bond in this instance. He also contends the trial court mischaracterized some of the evidence it relied on from the sentencing hearing and that it referenced an inapplicable change in the law. The Defendant asserts the State and trial court “appeared to rely on a purely speculative argument” that he will retaliate against his ex-wife. However, he contends that he has not attempted to communicate with her or her daughters. The Defendant acknowledges the fact the trial court emphasized the likelihood of conviction in the new trial. However, he argues that factor alone cannot outweigh the other statutory factors the court was required to consider. To that end, the Defendant contends: Likelihood of conviction should also not be so heavily relied upon in circumstances such as this one where it has been demonstrated and confirmed that the trial was an unconstitutional one, lacking any real challenge to the credibility of the State’s case. The evidence at the Motion for New Trial hearing was rife with proof that the mother of the alleged victims coached the children, was physically abusive to the children, and provided the teenager with illegal drugs. 8 In summary, the Defendant argues that “if a major concern of the Trial Court is for public safety, the conditions on the defendant’s bond should be more important than the amount of money securing his release.” Accordingly, he asserts “[h]is success pretrial on a $100,000 bond is the strongest evidence of what was required to ensure his appearance in court and the safety of the community, and the Trial Court simply ignored this fact.” The Defendant asks this Court to reset his pretrial bond at $100,000. In response, the State contends that the Defendant has failed to demonstrate how the trial court abused its discretion in this instance. Although it does not dispute the Defendant’s compliance with the conditions of his prior release, it argues the trial court had the discretion to decide whether now the likelihood of conviction outweighs the other statutory factors it was required to consider. The State highlights the trial court’s concern that “[t]he risk of conviction must now loom before the defendant[,] and his accusers are no longer in hiding.” The State asserts the trial court considered all of the statutory factors on the record, made findings, and concluded bond in the amount of $1,000,000 is necessary to assure the Defendant’s presence and protect the safety of the community. Thus, as the State argues, the Defendant “is asking this Court to substitute its discretion for that of the trial court.” Initially, the Court agrees with the Defendant that the trial court’s comment about the recent change in the law regarding rape of a child is irrelevant to the case at hand. The Defendant asserts that he now stands in the same posture as he did before the first trial. The trial court’s decision on the instant bond matter is separate and distinct from its prior decision to grant a new trial on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however. Although it found “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different and therefore [found] that the failures [of trial counsel] undermine[d] [the] court[’]s confidence in the outcome” of the trial, the trial court nevertheless, when considering the relevant bond factors, found the testimony of the young stepdaughters in this case to be “compelling.” And despite concluding there would have been room for the jury to further weigh the credibility of the victims before them had trial counsel been effective in presenting impeachment evidence, the court believed, on the facts presented, that the probability of conviction has not been modified for purposes of the bond review. Indeed, the court held that the withheld evidence may have had an effect on the jury’s verdict if it had been introduced, but the court had the benefit of looking back on the first trial in making its assessment of the Defendant’s current flight risk and potential danger to the community. This Court has reviewed all of the material provided by the Defendant and has considered the arguments of the parties. As discussed above, the legislature has established a statutory procedure for the trial courts to follow in setting a secured bond as low as is 9 necessary to reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant while at the same time protecting the safety of the public. The transcript of the hearing on the first motion and both orders demonstrate the trial court followed that procedure before ruling on the Defendant’s motions. It is evident the trial court placed greater emphasis on the nature of the charges and the likelihood of conviction. Contrary to the Defendant’s assertion, that was within its sound discretion. The code requires an individualized inquiry into each defendant’s condition. The trial court did so here. Again, this Court reviews the decision of the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard. That standard does not permit this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Thus, even if this Court would have ruled differently, the information before this Court reveals the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard or reach a decision which is against logic or reasoning. And contrary to the Defendant’s argument, there is no indication the trial court punished the Defendant for succeeding on his motion for new trial. Nor is there anything before the Court to suggest the trial court intentionally set bond knowing the Defendant may not be able to afford it. See State v. Waldo Wiggins, Jr., No. W2000-02766-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1690193 at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 28, 2002). Again, the trial court emphasized the likelihood of conviction against the other factors, as permitted by statute, before issuing its ruling. Conclusion For these reasons, the motion filed by the Defendant before this Court is hereby denied. Because the Defendant is indigent, costs are taxed to the State. Easter, J., Wedemeyer, P.J., Ayers, J. 10