State of Tennessee v. Rodriquez D. Jones

11/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 27, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RODRIQUEZ D. JONES Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County No. 319807 Boyd M. Patterson, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01562-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The Defendant, Rodriquez D. Jones, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court guilty- pleaded conviction of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and, therefore, affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed STACY L. STREET, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined. Kendall Stivers Jones, Assistant Public Defender - Appellate Division (on appeal), and Chad D. Wilson, Assistant District Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Rodriquez D. Jones. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney General; Coty Wamp, District Attorney General; and Charles Minor, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION The conviction in this case arose from a June 21, 2024 road rage incident that ended in a violent altercation during which the Defendant physically assaulted Julius Summerrow (the victim) with his fists and a machete. Factual and Procedural Background The Defendant waived his right to a grand jury determination of probable cause and agreed to proceed by information. The Hamilton County Grand Jury charged the Defendant by information with one count of aggravated assault by the use or display of a deadly weapon. The Defendant entered an “open” plea of guilty to the single charge in the information.1 I. Guilty Plea Submission Hearing The summary of facts presented by the State at the May 27, 2025 guilty plea submission hearing established that officers responded to a call “related to an individual bleeding from his head.” When they arrived, officers found the victim, who was in his 70s, seated in his car. The victim reported that the Defendant had been traveling behind the victim, who was apparently “driving too slow for” the Defendant’s “liking.” The Defendant “honked at [the victim] trying to get him to move out of the way and was yelling at him.” When the victim pulled into a gas station, the Defendant pulled in behind him, got out of his vehicle, approached the victim’s vehicle on the driver’s side, and began to yell at the victim through the open window. The victim said something the Defendant “did not like,” and the Defendant punched the victim through the window several times before walking back toward his car. The victim got out of his car with a sheathed machete, approached the Defendant, and “tried to swing” the machete at the Defendant. The Defendant grabbed the machete, unsheathing it in the process, and then struck the victim in the head just above his ear, resulting in a significant cut. The Defendant got into his vehicle and fled. Police officers tracked the vehicle “using RTIC cameras” and eventually located and arrested the Defendant. The trial court accepted the Defendant’s plea of guilty to the single count of aggravated assault and set the case for a sentencing hearing. Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted sentencing memoranda outlining their respective positions on sentencing. II. Sentencing Memoranda In his sentencing memorandum, the Defendant argued in favor of alternative sentencing despite that the Strong-R assessment indicated he was a “high violent overall risk.” The Defendant stated that the circumstances of the offense did not warrant full confinement because the victim exited his vehicle with the machete after the Defendant beat him about the face through his car window for driving too slowly, arguing that the Defendant’s taking the machete and attacking the elderly victim with it was “an act taken in response to a threat from another.” The Defendant similarly asserted that the need for general deterrence did not warrant full confinement because others were unlikely to find themselves having to “fend of[f]” an elderly and injured man approaching them with a 1 An “open” plea is entered without any agreement by the State to take any of the actions described in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). -2- sheathed machete. Finally, he contended that full confinement was necessary because he had been in continuous custody for 451 days, which was sufficient to accomplish the goal of specific deterrence. Regarding the potentially applicable enhancement factors, the Defendant argued that the injuries that resulted in a lengthy, expensive ICU stay could not be used to support application of enhancement factor 6, that the victim’s injuries were particularly great, because the offense of aggravated assault had as an element that the victim suffered serious bodily injury.2 See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(6). He also argued that the use of a deadly weapon and a high risk to human life were elements of the charged offense and could not be used to enhance the sentence. See id. § 40-35-114(9), (10). The Defendant acknowledged that the victim was elderly and physically disabled but asserted that neither his age nor his disability made the victim particularly vulnerable as evidenced by his “wield[ing] the machete against” the Defendant. See id. § 40-35-114(4). In mitigation, the Defendant argued that he acted under strong provocation because he had begun to withdraw after beating the victim through the open car window when the victim got out of his car with the machete. See id. § 40-35-113(2). He also asserted that the victim’s approaching him with the sheathed machete provided “substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify” his taking the machete from the victim and attacking him with it; he claimed that the offense “involve[d] a complicated pattern akin to self-defense.” See id. § 40-35-113(3). For these same reasons, the Defendant contended that the unusual circumstances evinced that the Defendant lacked a sustained intent to violate the law. See id. § 40-35-113(11). Finally, regarding the “catchall” mitigating factor, the Defendant stated that he had completed several classes at the Hamilton County Jail and attached certificates of completion to his memorandum. See id. § 40-35-113(13). The Defendant argued that a sentence of three years, the minimum within the range, to be served on probation was an appropriate sentence. In its sentencing memorandum, the State noted that the Defendant created the circumstances that led to his conviction when he began driving aggressively behind and honking at the victim as both drove in congested traffic. The Defendant continued those circumstances when, instead of driving around after the victim pulled out of the way, the Defendant followed the victim, stopped behind him, and struck him several times through the open car window with an open fist, before starting to walk back to his car. The victim got out of his vehicle with a sheathed machete and walked toward the Defendant, who took the weapon from the victim and struck the victim several times, leaving severe lacerations on the victim’s arm and head and fracturing his skull. As the Defendant fled 2 The Defendant was not charged with aggravated assault by serious bodily injury. -3- in his car, the victim managed to mark the car with his own bloody palm print and to memorize a partial license plate number. After the attack, the victim was transported to Erlanger Hospital, where he was treated for potentially life-threatening injuries. The State argued the trial court should apply enhancement factor one because the Defendant had a history of criminal behavior and convictions that dated back to age twelve and demonstrated a pattern of violence. See id. § 40-35-114(1). The State argued the trial court should apply enhancement factor six based on the fact that the victim suffered severe, life-threatening injuries, including a skull fracture and numerous lacerations on his head and arm. See id. § 40-35-114(6). The State also observed that the Defendant had repeatedly failed to comply with sentences involving release into the community. See id. § 40-35-114(8). In addition to his past failure to comply with community-based sentences, the State noted that the Defendant was on probation for a conviction for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed when he committed the offense in this case. See id. § 40-35-114(13). The State asserted that the court should apply enhancement factor sixteen based on the Defendant’s juvenile adjudications of arson, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery, each of which would be classified as a felony if committed by an adult. See id. § 40-35-114(16). The State argued that the conviction offense, the Defendant’s lengthy criminal history, and his repeated failures to successfully complete sentences involving less than confinement supported the imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence. Regarding the Defendant’s criminal history, the State argued that the Defendant had garnered twenty- one convictions as an adult in addition to four juvenile adjudications for offenses that would have otherwise been classified as felonies and argued that full confinement was necessary to protect society from the Defendant. See id. § 40-35-103(1)(A). The State also asserted that the trial court should impose a sentence of full confinement to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense—a road rage incident that led to a brazen public attack—and to provide an effective deterrent to others who might take their road rage too far. See id. § 40-35-103(1)(B). Finally, the State asserted that the “most persuasive factor” in favor of a sentence of full confinement was the Defendant’s “pattern of offending while under court supervision,” demonstrating that measures less restrictive than confinement had been frequently and recently applied unsuccessfully. See id. § 40- 35-103(1)(C). The State observed that the Defendant accumulated “the majority of” his convictions while either on bond or on probation; the Defendant was on probation when he committed the offense in this case. The State asked the trial court to impose a sentence of six years’ confinement. III. Sentencing Hearing -4-  At the September 15, 2025 sentencing hearing, the victim testified that he was driving home at approximately 7:00 p.m. on June 21, 2024 and that the traffic “was quite busy.” He recalled hearing someone honk at him and then seeing a black car “following me real close.” At that point, he pulled over, “hoping that he would go by, and when he wouldn’t even go by, I pulled on up on the parking lot of the convenience store.” The Defendant followed him into the parking lot and got out of the car. The Defendant came to the open window of the victim’s car, called him an “[o]ld, motherf***er,” and asked why he “wasn’t driving fast enough.” The victim responded, “I’m not going to do over 35 no way, unless I’m on the expressway.” The Defendant then “started reaching in the car, hitting me.” The victim recalled thinking, “I’m not going just sit here and let this man beat the hell out of me.” He said the Defendant “seem[ed] like he want[ed] to walk away” but “put his hand beside him” in a way that made the victim believe he had a gun. At that point, the victim reached into his floorboard and grabbed a machete that he used in his work as a gardener. He got out of the car and tried to hit the Defendant, but the Defendant “grabbed it from me and hit me in the head with it and then he hit me on this arm here,” causing the victim to suffer “two concussions.” After the attack, the victim went into the convenience store and had some patrons call 9-1-1. Emergency responders arrived and took the victim to the hospital via ambulance. He recalled that he was admitted to the ICU “under alias because they said somebody could come to the hospital and do more harm to me.” He said that he suffered two lacerations to his skull and three to his arm that required stitches and a fracture to his skull. He spent two nights in the hospital and required a series of follow-up visits to monitor the skull injury. The victim said that at the time of the sentencing hearing, he still experienced occasional swelling of the right side of his head. He stated that he became less social after the offense. During cross-examination, the victim testified that he did not recall saying anything to the Defendant during the interaction. He acknowledged that he grabbed the machete and got out of his car as the Defendant walked away. He said that he thought the Defendant might have a gun based on how he was holding his hand, adding, “I don’t put nothing past these kids out there.” Travilicia Martin testified that the Defendant was the father of three of her six children and that she was pregnant with their youngest child at the time of the offense. Ms. Martin recalled that she was a passenger in the car being driven by the Defendant when the offense occurred. She said that the victim was “driving pretty slow” and that “he waved his hands out of the car, saying stuff.” She said that when the victim pulled over, the Defendant also pulled over, got out, and walked to the victim’s vehicle. Without exchanging any words, the Defendant “punched him probably three or four times.” She said that the Defendant then walked back towards their car, and the victim -5- got out with a machete in a black sheath and began to walk towards them. The victim swung the sheathed machete toward the Defendant, who grabbed it and hit the victim with it. She said that she did not think the Defendant intended to hurt the victim. She claimed that the injured and bloody victim “chased” them and “hit my vehicle with some kind of tool” before they drove off. In response to the court’s questions, Ms. Martin said that the Defendant could live with her and their children should he be released on probation. She said that she would return to work to allow the Defendant to “get as much time as he could with the children.” She added that she would help the Defendant to obtain his general education diploma. During cross-examination, Ms. Martin acknowledged that the Defendant did not have to get out of the vehicle. She agreed that the entire encounter “seems rather stupid” and that both men could have acted differently. She said that they went straight home and that she knew the police would be coming to the residence. Ms. Martin admitted that she cleaned the victim’s blood from the back of her car but insisted that she did not do so to hide anything. She said that the Defendant “took off from” her after the incident. The Defendant was arrested at her house nearly three months later. She claimed that they were “planning on” the Defendant turning himself in to the police when the police found him at her house while looking for someone else. The Defendant’s great aunt, Ella Mapp, testified that she raised the Defendant after his mother became addicted to drugs when he was four years old. She said that the Defendant completed high school while living with her and that during that time, he did not struggle with mental health or substance abuse issues. She said that she and other family members would be available to help the Defendant should he be released on probation. In an unsworn allocution, the Defendant said he was “very sorry for what happened that day to” the victim and “how it has affected my loved ones, and I’m sure his, too.” The Defendant said that he believed that he was protecting Ms. Martin and their unborn child when he attacked the victim but that he had come to realize that he was not being protective. He apologized to the victim and to his own family. The Defendant said that he could not justify his behavior and expressed a desire to accept responsibility for his actions. He asked the court to place him on probation for the remainder of any sentence imposed so that he could implement the skills he had learned while in jail to “succeed on probation, at living a better life and furthering my education.” The presentence investigation report, which was entered into evidence at the sentencing hearing, showed that the Defendant had the following prior convictions: -6- Conviction Offense Disposition Date Disposition Possession with the intent to February 22, 2024 11 months and 29 days, go armed suspended to probation Violating the sex offender April 5, 2022 11 months and 29 days, registry suspended to probation Possession with the intent to April 5, 2022 11 months and 29 days, go armed suspended to probation Assault July 28, 2021 11 months and 29 days, suspended to probation Vandalism, less than $500 March 1, 2021 11 months and 29 days, suspended to probation Vandalism, $500-$1,000 August 14, 2019 11 months and 29 days, suspended to probation Domestic Violence April 26, 2018 11 months and 29 days, suspended to probation Statutory Rape (Count 1) April 26, 2018 Two years’ probation Statutory Rape (Count 2) April 26, 2018 Two years’ probation Statutory Rape (Count 3) April 26, 2018 Two years’ probation Assault March 7, 2016 11 months and 29 days, suspended to probation Simple Possession October 9, 2015 $250 fine Criminal Trespass February 20, 2015 Thirty days’ probation Simple Possession February 20, 2015 11 months and 29 days, suspended to probation Domestic Violence May 22, 2014 Conviction but no sentence noted -7- Criminal Trespass May 22, 2014 Conviction but no sentence noted Casual Exchange May 22, 2014 Fine Domestic Violence August 30, 2013 Conviction but no sentence noted Vandalism, less than $500 August 30, 2013 Conviction but no sentence noted Casual Exchange May 30, 2012 Fine The report also listed juvenile adjudications for, among other things, rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and arson. The Defendant was sanctioned by a forensic social worker while on probation four times between August 8, 2018, and October 10, 2019 after testing positive for the use of marijuana and benzodiazepines. His probation was revoked on November 20, 2018, after he attempted to cut off his GPS monitor and garnered new charges for aggravated domestic assault and child endangerment. He was sanctioned for failing a polygraph on July 1, 2019. His probation was revoked on October 10, 2019, for garnering new charges of assault and vandalism. The thirty-two- year-old Defendant had no significant employment history. In the victim impact statement, the victim reported that he suffered a fractured skull during the Defendant’s attack and had amassed medical bills totaling $329,607.91. IV. Trial Court’s Findings At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of four years’ incarceration. The trial court found that, in addition to four juvenile adjudications that would have been felonies had they been committed by an adult, the Defendant had fifteen significant prior convictions, including three assault convictions, three domestic violence convictions, and three statutory rape convictions as well as convictions for vandalism, drug possession, and firearms possession. The court found that the Defendant’s violent criminal history suggested that the offense in this case was not the result of “a mistake” but was instead “just the 16th time someone’s broken the law intentionally.” The trial court acknowledged that the Defendant had “had a significantly difficult life” but said -8- that “society doesn’t allow folks who have had tough lives to consistently and extensively break the law in the way that” the Defendant had done. The trial court applied enhancement factors one, eight, thirteen, and sixteen based on the Defendant’s extensive criminal history, including his juvenile adjudications, as well as his repeated failures to comply with sentences of probation, including the term of probation he was serving when he committed the offense in this case. See T.C.A. § 40- 35-114(1), (8), (13), (16). The court did not apply enhancement factor six, concluding that although the victim suffered “substantial bodily injury,” the injury “probably is covered regardless how the indictment came out, as to whether it’s a deadly weapon or not” and that the victim “participated in the second part of the interaction.” See id. § 40- 35-114(6). The trial court did not apply mitigating factor three, finding that substantial grounds did not exist to justify or excuse the Defendant’s conduct because the Defendant “started the whole thing by stopping his car, by getting out, by engaging, and by all accounts, hitting [the victim] in his car.” See id. § 40-35-113(3). The court did not apply mitigating factor eleven, that the Defendant’s behavior did not indicate a sustained intent to violate the law, finding that even though the Defendant acted out of impulse, his assault of the victim was “a continuation of his impulsive behavior and of other people physically hurt.” See id. § 40-35-113(11). The court also found that the “catchall” factor did not apply, observing that the Defendant’s claim that he acted out of a desire to protect Ms. Martin and his unborn child was not borne out by the proof. See id. § 40-35-113(13). Instead, the court found that the Defendant “wasn’t feeling protective of her when he got out and started who knows what with a stranger.” The trial court stated that the Defendant “seemed sincere . . . for 15 minutes, but then 15 minutes later, someone could cut him off . . . and then suddenly he’s back to doing what we know, by looking at his past behavior, what he is likely to do.” The court did “not give much weight to the statement.” The court did give some weight to the Defendant’s scoring as a “high violent” offender on the validated risk and needs assessment. The trial court found that the victim “might have contributed to continuing the interaction” and that that contribution warranted a sentence less than the maximum for the Defendant. The court imposed a sentence of four years, one more than the minimum for his class C felony offense. Regarding the Defendant’s request for probation, the trial court concluded that the Defendant’s lack of potential for rehabilitation “cut against” the request. The court found that the Defendant had not “shown any capability or interest” in completing a sentence of probation. The court found that the Defendant’s behavior in endangering the lives of Ms. Martin and their unborn child “shows an abysmal lack of potential for rehabilitation.” The court acknowledged the Defendant’s work at improving himself while in jail but -9- found that “his past actions speak volumes louder” than his performance in those classes. The court observed that the Defendant did not dispute that he had a long history of criminal conduct and found that “society apparently does need protection from his actions.” The court also found that measures less restrictive than confinement had been recently applied unsuccessfully, noting that the Defendant was on probation when the offense occurred. Ultimately, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing “based on the great weight that the [c]ourt places on his long history of criminal conduct.” The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Analysis On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying all forms of alternative sentencing, arguing that a sentence of full confinement was not the least severe measure necessary. The State contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We review “sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act,” including “questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence” and to sentence alignment, under an abuse of discretion standard accompanied by “a presumption of reasonableness.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 864 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012); see also State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tenn. 2014). We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness when the trial court fails to consider and weigh the applicable factors and principles, “and the abuse of discretion standard, which merely looks for ‘any substantial evidence’ to support the trial court’s decision, is not appropriate.” See King, 432 S.W.3d at 327-28; Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). “Convicted felons committing the most severe offenses, possessing criminal histories evincing a clear disregard for the laws and morals of society and evincing failure of past efforts at rehabilitation” are generally not considered favorable candidates for alternative sentencing. T.C.A. § 40-35-102(5)-(6)(A). Before ordering a sentence of full confinement, however, the trial court must consider the factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1): Sentences involving confinement should be based on the following considerations: - 10 -  (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct; (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant . . . . T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1). Additionally, the trial court should consider the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation in determining whether to impose an alternative sentence. Id. § 40-35-103(5). A defendant is statutorily eligible for probation when the total effective sentence “actually imposed upon the defendant is ten (10) years or less” and when the defendant does not stand convicted of the offenses enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a)(1). T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a)(1). Eligibility does not equal entitlement, see id. § 40-35-303(b), and the defendant bears the burden of establishing his “suitability for full probation,” State v. Mounger, 7 S.W.3d 70, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), by demonstrating that full probation would “subserve the ends of justice and the best interest[s] of both the public and the defendant,” State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). A trial court considering whether to place a defendant on probation should consider the circumstances of the offense; the need for special or general deterrence; and the defendant’s amenability to correction, criminal and social history; and physical and mental health. See State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2017). Our supreme court has concluded that to support the denial of alternative sentencing based on the circumstances of the offense alone, the offense “as committed, must be ‘especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.” State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981); see also Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 292 (stating that “[a]lthough Travis predates the Sentencing Act by several years,” the Tennessee Supreme Court “has continued to recognize its vitality”). Our legislature codified this principle in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 103(1)(B). See State v. Housewright, 982 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (first citing State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); and then citing State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). Because the record reflects that the trial court carefully considered the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the enhancement and mitigating factors, and the purposes and - 11 - principles of sentencing, we apply a presumption of reasonableness to the trial court’s sentencing decision. See King, 432 S.W.3d at 327. The Defendant’s argument turns on his assertion that the trial court erroneously concluded that he lacked the potential for rehabilitation when the record did not show that the Defendant had participated in “rehabilitative treatment.” But participation in some sort of particular “rehabilitative treatment” is not a prerequisite for determining whether the Defendant has the potential for rehabilitation. As the State correctly observes, “The primary goal of probation, under the Act and the decisions of the appellate courts of this state, is rehabilitation of the defendant.” State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 86-87 (Tenn. 1996) (first citing State v. Thomas, 776 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); and then citing State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn. 1983); and then citing State v. Bunch, 656 S.W.2d 404, 405-06 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); and then citing State v. Barber, 595 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tenn. 1980); and then citing Moten v. State, 559 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tenn. 1977); and then citing Mattino v. State, 539 S.W.2d 824, 829-30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); and then citing Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tenn. 1974); State v. Silva, 477 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tenn. 1972); and then citing People v. McClendon, 265 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. 1970)). Indeed, “[t]he entire theory of probation is that it is in the public interest that those who violate society’s rules of conduct should, in proper cases, be given an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves and to be restored to useful and productive citizenship.” Id. (quoting Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tenn. 1974)) (emphasis added). The courts of this state have identified many factors that suggest a lack of potential for rehabilitation. For example, “[c]andor is a relevant factor in assessing a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, and the lack of candor militates against the grant of probation.” State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (citations omitted). Similarly, a defendant’s failure to complete previous sentences of probation reflects poor potential for rehabilitation. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 919 S.W.2d 362, 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (finding that record supported trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s “potential for rehabilitation is virtually nil” when “[i]n every instance over the past fourteen years in which the defendant has been released into the community after committing a crime, he has resorted to additional criminal activity”). The Defendant’s assertion simply finds no support in our law. Here, the trial court acknowledged the Defendant’s efforts at self-improvement but concluded that those efforts were outweighed by his extensive history of convictions for violent crimes and the many instances of his failure to abide by previous sentences of probation. The record demonstrates that the Defendant was given many opportunities to rehabilitate himself and that he simply did not do so. The record supports the trial court’s findings that the Defendant’s extensive criminal history and previous unsuccessful attempts to complete sentences less restrictive than confinement warranted a sentence of full confinement. - 12 -  Conclusion Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a sentence of full confinement and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. ______s/ Stacy L. Street STACY L. STREET, JUDGE - 13 -