State of Tennessee v. Regis Miguel Green
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
DocketE2025-01883-CCA-R3-CD
JudgeJudge J. Ross Dyer
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/12/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs October 27, 2026
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. REGIS MIGUEL GREEN
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
No. 129360 Emily F. Abbott, Judge
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No. E2025-01883-CCA-R3-CD
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The defendant, Regis Miguel Green, pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with
intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved the right to
appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of
Criminal Procedure, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based on lack of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop of his vehicle. Upon review, we
conclude that the record is insufficient to address the merits of the defendant’s certified
question, and therefore, we presume the trial court’s ruling was correct and affirm the
judgment below.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREENHOLTZ and
STACY L. STREET, JJ., joined.
Russell T. Greene, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Regis Miguel Green.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrew R. Runions, Assistant
Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Gregory C. Eshbaugh,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
Facts and Procedural History
In December 2024, the defendant was indicted for possession of methamphetamine
with intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, arising out of the stop and search of his vehicle on
February 29, 2024. The underlying facts of the case giving rise to the charges were as
follows:1
[O]n February 29, 2024 at approximately 22:48 hours Officer Stainback
observed a black 2014 Nissan Pathfinder that failed to come to a complete
stop before entering the roadway of Walker Springs Road when it was
leaving 206 Walker Springs Road, the GoodStop. Officer Stainback initiated
a stop on that vehicle on the [I]40 West and [I]40 East exit ramp. Upon
approach Deputy Stainback found [the defendant] to be the driver of the
vehicle. He was unable to provide a valid driver’s license or registration or
proof of insurance. [Deputy Stainback] was able to smell the odor of
marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. He . . . the [d]efendant was able
to provide a Bill of Sale stating he just purchased the vehicle. A record’s
check conducted on the vehicle came back with . . . the temporary tag on the
vehicle came back not on file. A check[] found that the [d]efendant was on
active Tennessee State probation. Deputy Stainback asked if there was
anything illegal in the vehicle, to which [the defendant] said “no”. Later
Deputy Stainback was able to obtain consent to search the vehicle. Search
was conducted which did find approximately twenty-one grams (21g) of a
green-leafy substance that was consistent with marijuana, twenty-two (22)
portion baggies, two (2) digital scales, clear plastic cup with marijuana
residue. At that time, . . . the [d]efendant was placed into restraints. The
search conducted on [the defendant] found an additional fifty-nine (59) pills,
which the [d]efendant stated was MDMA, also known as Ecstasy located in
his front-left pocket. He was taken into custody. Subsequent TBI testing of
that material, . . . found that rather than being MDMA it was in fact
methamphetamine. These events did all occur in Knox County. The State
submits that based on the amount of methamphetamine that was possessed,
by the [d]efendant along with the paraphernalia, including the scales, that
that was possessed with the intent to sell or deliver.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop of his
vehicle based on his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
defendant argued that Deputy Stainback did not have reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to conduct a traffic stop of his vehicle. The defendant claimed that his not stopping
before driving over the sidewalk in front of the Good Stop did not constitute a violation of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-150 because there was no pedestrian or vehicular
traffic in the area at the time. The defendant also insinuated that there were pretextual
1
As recited by the State at the guilty plea hearing on November 12, 2025.
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reasons for the traffic stop, asserting, “If Deputy Stainback had reasonable suspicion, aka
violation of TCA 55-8-150, he could have easily pulled him over well before” he did.
Although neither a transcript from a hearing on the motion to suppress nor a ruling on the
motion is in the record before us, the trial court apparently denied the motion.
On November 12, 2025, the defendant entered a plea agreement under which he
pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in exchange for
a sentence of ten years, dismissal of the other charges, and reservation of a certified
question. The trial court accepted the plea and entered a judgment form for the possession
of methamphetamine conviction (Count 1) reflecting the terms of the plea agreement.2 In
detailing the certified question, the judgment form provided:
The defendant pleads guilty but explicitly reserves the following certified
question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
37(b)(2)(A):
Whether the court erred in ruling that Deputy Stainback had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to stop the defendant after the defendant exited
the parking lot and crossed the sidewalk at the Good Stop Convenience Store
without stopping in violation of T.C.A. 55-8-150, when there were no
pedestrians or other vehicles present requiring the defendant to yield the right
of way and Deputy Stainback did not observe any other violations supporting
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the defendant. The defendant,
the State, and the Honorable Judge Emily Abbott consent to this reservation
and agree that it is dispositive of the case.
The defendant timely appealed.
Analysis
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the traffic stop of his vehicle was initiated without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. The State responds, first, that the appeal should be dismissed because the
statement of the certified question fails “to provide the reasons relied upon by [the
defendant] in the trial court to advance his motion to suppress the evidence recovered
during his traffic stop and the reasons passed upon by the trial court in denying the motion.”
Alternatively, the State responds that the trial court properly determined Deputy
Stainback’s stop of the defendant’s vehicle was reasonable. As we will address, we
conclude the record is insufficient to address the merits of the defendant’s certified
2
Judgment forms for Counts 2 and 3 are not in the record.
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question, and therefore, we presume the trial court’s ruling was correct and affirm the
judgment below.
A guilty plea “constitutes an admission of all facts necessary to convict and waives
all non-jurisdictional defects and constitutional irregularities which may have existed prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.” State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999).
However, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b)(2) specifies the limited scenarios
when a defendant in a criminal case has a right of appeal following a guilty plea:
[I]f the defendant entered into a plea agreement but explicitly reserved the
right to appeal a certified question of law dispositive of the case pursuant to
and in compliance with the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or (D) of the
Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, or if the defendant seeks review of
the sentence and there was no plea agreement concerning the sentence, or if
the issues presented for review were not waived as a matter of law by the
plea of guilty or nolo contendere and if such issues are apparent from the
record of the proceedings already had. . . .
Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b)(2).
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) provides that a defendant can appeal
a certified question following a guilty plea when:
(A) the defendant entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(c) but
explicitly reserved – with the consent of the [S]tate and of the court – the
right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case, and
the following requirements are met:
(i) the judgment of conviction or order reserving the certified
question that is filed before the notice of appeal is filed
contains a statement of the certified question of law that the
defendant reserved for appellate review;
(ii) the question of law as stated in the judgment or order
reserving the certified question identified clearly the scope and
limits of the legal issue reserved;
(iii) the judgment or order reserving the certified question
reflects that the certified question was expressly reserved with
the consent of the [S]tate and the trial court; and
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(iv) the judgment or order reserving the certified question
reflects that the defendant, the [S]tate, and the trial court are of
the opinion that the certified question is dispositive of the
case[.]
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). The defendant bears the burden of satisfying the
requirements of Rule 37(b)(2). State v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tenn. 2013); State
v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996).
In State v. Preston, our supreme court instructed:
[T]he question of law must be stated so as to clearly identify the scope and
the limits of the legal issue reserved. For example, where questions of law
involve the validity of searches and the admissibility of statements and
confessions, etc., the reasons relied upon by defendant in the trial court at the
suppression hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified
question of law and review by the appellate courts will be limited to those
passed upon by the trial judge and stated in the certified question, absent a
constitutional requirement otherwise.
759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988). However, our supreme court recently addressed how
some of the language in Preston has led to the dismissal of numerous appeals by this Court
declining to look beyond the “four-corners . . . [of] the certified-question statement” when
evaluating “the scope and limits of a certified-question appeal.” State v. Burrell, --- S.W.3d
---, 2026 WL 2329459, at *5-*6 (Tenn. 2026). Taking the opportunity to clarify and revise
Tennessee’s certified-question procedure, our supreme court held that
when determining the scope and limits of appellate review, a reviewing court
must consider the certified-question statement in conjunction with the
record. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) is satisfied when the certified-question
statement, read together with the record, contains enough detail to allow the
appellate court to identify the scope and limits of the issue.
Id. at *6 (emphasis added). The court explicitly overruled Preston “to the extent it
require[d] that the reasons ‘relied upon by defendant in the trial court’ and ‘passed upon
by the trial judge’ be included in the certified-question statement.” Id.
In light of our supreme court’s holding in Burrell, the State’s argument for
dismissal—that the certified question fails “to provide the reasons relied upon by [the
defendant] in the trial court to advance his motion to suppress the evidence recovered
during his traffic stop and the reasons passed upon by the trial court in denying the
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motion”—is to no avail. As instructed in Burrell, this Court is to consider the certified-
question statement in conjunction with the record to determine the scope and limits of
appellate review. However, the defendant failed to include the transcript of the hearing on
the motion to suppress or the trial court’s ruling on his motion. Thus, unlike the situation
in Burrell, where our supreme court noted that “[a]ny details omitted from the question –
including the reasons underlying the [d]efendant’s suppression motion and the trial court’s
denial of that motion – are readily discernable from the record,” id. at *7, we do not have
that information at our disposal. Without the transcript from the suppression hearing or
especially the trial court’s ruling on the motion, we do not have the information before us
to address the merits of the defendant’s certified question even if we presume the certified
question “identified clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved[.]”
The question becomes what this Court’s next step is, given recent Tennessee
Supreme Court precedent. In State v. Bishop, another certified question case issued the
same day as Burrell, our supreme court addressed the requirement that a certified question
be “dispositive of the case.” --- S.W.3d ----, 2026 WL 2329478, at *1 (Tenn. 2026). The
court determined that the appropriate action for a reviewing court in the event it determines
the certified question is not dispositive is to vacate the judgment of the trial court and give
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his or her guilty plea. Id. at *9. In State v.
Holley, the court indicated displeasure with this Court’s dismissal of an appeal due to the
defendant’s failure to include a transcript of the guilty plea hearing in the record on appeal.
--- S.W.3d ---, 2026 WL 2149085, at *7-*10 (Tenn. 2026). However, the issue in Holley
involved the denial of probation, and much of the discussion is not clearly applicable
outside the sentencing context.
This case presents a situation where the defendant failed to provide a sufficient
record to address the merits of the issue, which is distinguishable from a situation where
the defendant pled guilty and reserved a certified question later determined not to be
dispositive or where the defendant’s issues could be addressed under an abuse of discretion
standard with a presumption of reasonableness without a missing transcript. With Burrell,
Bishop, Holley, and prior precedent in mind, we determine that our supreme court’s
instruction in Preston remains—that the defendant bears the burden of ensuring the record
on appeal “contains all of the proceedings below that bear upon . . . the merits of the
question certified.” Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650. An appellant has “a duty to prepare a
record that conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired with respect
to the issues forming the basis of the appeal.” State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn.
1993) (citation omitted); see Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b) (“[T]he appellant shall have prepared
a transcript of such part of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair,
accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the
bases of appeal”). “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this [C]ourt must
presume that the trial court’s rulings were supported by sufficient evidence.” State v.
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Brown, 373 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d
554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)); see also Holley, 2026 WL 2149085, at *9 (listing the
reviewing court’s options aside from dismissal when a missing transcript was necessary
for review and stating “[p]erhaps the simplest is . . . presuming that the missing . . .
transcript supports the trial court’s ruling”).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
S/ J. ROSS DYER __
J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE
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