State of Tennessee v. Savannah Jo Fritts

11/03/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON September 1, 2026 Session Heard at Memphis1 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SAVANNAH JO FRITTS Appeal from the Circuit Court for Benton County No. 23CR7 Bruce Irwin Griffey, Judge ___________________________________ No. W2025-00393-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The defendant, Savannah Jo Fritts, was found guilty by a Benton County jury of one count of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of aggravated child endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for aggravated child endangerment, the trial court infringed on her right to a fair trial by questioning witnesses, and the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive, forty-year sentence. Following our review, we affirm in part and vacate in part. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part, and Vacated in Part J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined. Jessica F. Butler, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Savannah Jo Fritts. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin L. Barker, Assistant Attorney General; Neil Thompson, District Attorney General; and Jennifer Hedge, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION Facts and Procedural History 1 Oral argument in this case was heard at the Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law at the University of Memphis. We express our gratitude to the University and our court staff for their efforts in bringing this project to fruition. We also appreciate the attorneys and students who attended and participated in the session.  The defendant’s convictions arise from the death of her son, T.F.,2 on June 27, 2022, in Benton County, Tennessee. Following her son’s death, the defendant was indicted for one count of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of aggravated child endangerment. Prior to the incident, the defendant, along with her three minor children, resided with her parents, Karen and Tim Odom. On November 22, 2021, a juvenile court issued an emergency order granting legal custody of T.F. to his father, Nick French. The defendant was allowed visitation with her son on alternating weeks to be supervised by the Odoms.3 During the weeks of supervised visitation, T.F. lived with the defendant and the Odoms in their residence. At trial, the following evidence was established: I. The Events of June 27, 2022 On June 27, 2022, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Ms.Odom arrived home from work. Entering through the side door of the residence, Ms. Odom observed the defendant exiting the house through a sliding door towards the back deck and swimming pool. Following her, Ms. Odom asked the defendant, “[w]here’s T.F.?” The defendant replied, “I thought he was in the house.” As Ms. Odom turned to re-enter the house, she glimpsed the victim in her peripheral vision. He was faced down, floating in the water under the edge of the pool. Immediately, Ms. Odom and the defendant grabbed the victim, placed him on the deck, and began CPR. Ms. Odom screamed for someone to call 9-1-1. Mr.Odom, who was asleep in the living room, awoke to the screams and called 9-1-1. Sergeant Ken Wright with the Benton County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) was the first officer to arrive on the scene. Next to arrive were the paramedics, Grant Crowell and Brad Dickson. 4 Sha Reynolds, the supervising paramedic, arrived in a second ambulance. Upon arriving, Mr. Crowell found the victim in the supine position with Ms. Odom and the defendant “doing CPR frantically.” Mr. Crowell testified that the victim had no pulse or respirations, and his pupils were fixed and dilated. The victim’s lips and fingernails were also blue, a sign of low oxygen. Most significantly, the victim’s heart rate was in asystole, or flatline, indicating there was no electrical rhythm. Mr. Crowell and Mr. Dickson 2 It is the policy of this court to identify minor victims by their initials only. 3 The facts established in the order of the juvenile court were presented during the pretrial hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3. After a hearing, the defendant’s motion was denied by the trial court and the facts contained within the order were not presented during trial. 4 Mr. Crowell and Mr. Dickson were employed by West Tennessee Healthcare Med Center EMS. -2- assumed medical care of the victim, taking over CPR compressions and preparing him for transport to Camden General Hospital. The victim was then intubated and administered adrenaline. Mr. Crowell testified that he was not made aware of how long the victim had been in the water prior to being discovered by Ms. Odom. In fact, he received conflicting accounts of the events that unfolded before the victim was discovered. Initially, the defendant told him that she had been watching the victim and “just looked away for a minute.” However, Ms. Odom told him that the defendant had “just went in to make some tea and answer a phone call.” Mr. Crowell testified that neither of the conflicting accounts of the defendant’s actions would have resulted in the victim’s condition when he arrived. Both versions of events, Mr. Crowell estimated, would have taken a minute or two. But the time necessary for the victim’s heart rate to slow down to asystole and for the pupils to become fixed would have been much longer. He estimated the victim would have to have been in the water for over “five or seven minutes.” While riding in the ambulance with the victim to the hospital, the defendant’s demeanor was described by Mr. Crowell and Ms. Reynolds as “distraught, crying, screaming.” Even though the defendant was “hysterical,” Mr. Crowell stated that the defendant was asking logical questions concerning the victim’s condition such as “[w]as he breathing? Does he have a pulse?” Ms. Reynolds testified that, while the defendant was emotional, she did not recall the defendant asking any questions concerning the victim’s status. Instead, Ms. Reynolds testified that the defendant “was talking mainly to the baby.” Both Mr. Crowell and Ms. Reynolds agreed that the defendant appeared oriented, was not lethargic, and was not slurring her words. Additionally, during the transport, the defendant disclosed that the victim had previously jumped into the swimming pool. The defendant described that on the prior occasion, the victim had coughed “a little bit,” they “shook him,” and he began breathing again. The defendant stated that she “didn’t think about him doing it again.” Mr. Crowell testified that he took note of this statement because as a parent, if his child had jumped in a pool, “it kind of makes you be a little scared of having them by the pool.” Ms. Reynolds recalled thinking, “[w]hy would you think [the victim would not jump again]? I mean, most children when they do something once, they’re going to do it again.” Mr. Crowell and Ms. Reynolds continued their care of the victim until they reached the hospital, and the victim was then transferred to the care of Dr. William Carney in the Camden General Hospital Emergency Room. Debbie Melton, the paternal grandmother of the victim, testified that she arrived at the hospital approximately forty minutes after the victim. When Ms. Melton arrived, she met Ms. Odom in the parking lot and asked, “[w]hat’s going on?” Ms. Melton testified -3- that Ms. Odom responded that when she arrived home from work, the defendant “was passed out” inside the house. To the contrary, Ms. Odom testified that when Ms. Melton confronted her in the parking lot, Ms. Melton began screaming that “if [T.F.] lived that [Ms. Odom] would never see him again. . . . He wouldn’t know his mother. He wouldn’t know his brothers and sisters.” Further, Ms. Odom denied finding the defendant “passed out” or making this statement to Ms. Melton. Ms. Melton testified that when she asked the defendant what had happened, the defendant responded, “I just turned my head for a second,” to which Ms. Melton replied, “[t]hat’s a d*mn lie. I know better.” Ms. Melton testified that she knew the defendant was lying because “I can tell – I know her.” Ms. Melton had previously worried about the victim’s safety while in the defendant’s care because the defendant “didn’t pay attention” and had a history of drug abuse. According to Ms. Melton, when she arrived at the hospital the defendant was slurring her words and was not crying. Ms. Melton stated that she could tell by the way the defendant was speaking that she was impaired and that it was “obvious.” When asked on cross-examination what led her to the opinion that the defendant was impaired, Ms. Melton replied, “I know [the defendant].” Ms. Melton conceded that while at the hospital she “went after [the defendant]” with the intent to strike her, acknowledging they had to be separated by law enforcement. Ms. Melton testified that she “knew [she] would hurt [the defendant].” At 6:30 p.m., the victim was pronounced dead. II. The Investigation At approximately 5:00 p.m., BCSO Sergeant Dan Clark received a dispatch call concerning an unresponsive child. When he arrived at the Odoms’ residence, the victim was in the ambulance and undergoing CPR. Sergeant Clark began an initial investigation of the home, taking photographs of the scene. He observed a green “floatie” in the pool and a blue rubber ball lodged in the pool’s filter system. Additionally, Sergeant Clark spoke with those present in the home: Mr. and Ms. Odom and Andreanna Crabtree, a friend of the defendant who had been inside the defendant’s bedroom at the time of the incident. Ms.Crabtree testified that on the morning of June 27, 2022, she messaged the defendant, asking to “hang out” because she believed the defendant might have access to a prescription for Xanax. Ms. Crabtree walked to the Odoms’ residence in the morning but could not recall the time she arrived. While she was there, the defendant gave Ms. Crabtree two Xanax pills from a plastic baggie. Although Ms. Crabtree initially testified that she -4- did not observe the defendant consume any controlled substance, she later equivocated, saying that she was not certain and could not remember. After taking the Xanax, Ms. Crabtree went outside to the pool deck with the defendant and the victim. At some point later, Ms. Crabtree went inside the house to use the bathroom and gather nail polish from the defendant’s bedroom. She testified that when she went inside the house, the defendant was sitting on the back deck, and the victim was in the pool. Ms. Crabtree stayed inside the defendant’s bedroom for approximately thirty minutes. However, during her initial interview with Sergeant Clark on the night of the incident, Ms. Crabtree claimed she was inside the house for only five to six minutes. While in the defendant’s bedroom, Ms. Crabtree heard a commotion at the back door and went to investigate. She overheard Ms. Odom ask the defendant, “[d]id you not see him laying out there?” Ms. Crabtree testified that she heard the defendant reply that the victim was playing in the pool and that he was ok. Continuing with his investigation, Sergeant Clark proceeded to the hospital to assist BCSO Lieutenant Bobby Ferguson and was tasked with remaining with the defendant while Lieutenant Ferguson sought a search warrant for a sample of the defendant’s blood. Both Sergeant Clark and Lieutenant Ferguson testified that the defendant did not appear impaired and that they did not detect any signs of intoxication from the defendant. Once Lieutenant Ferguson had obtained the warrant for a blood draw, he accompanied the defendant to the hospital lab for the procedure. Lieutenant Ferguson took possession of the defendant’s blood sample and transferred it to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s (TBI) evidence drop box. Lieutenant Ferguson testified that when the defendant’s blood was drawn, her demeanor changed: “She had stopped crying – by that point – just another day.” Collaborating in the investigation surrounding the victim’s death, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) assigned the on-call case worker, Kristy Kalinowski, to respond to the hospital on the evening of the incident. When she arrived, Ms. Kalinowski observed the defendant crying and “pretty hysterical.” She overheard the defendant apologizing to the victim, saying that “she would never do anything bad in her life again.” Throughout the evening, Ms. Kalinowski and the defendant engaged in several conversations during which the defendant relayed what had occurred prior to the victim’s drowning. However, over the course of their conversations that evening, the defendant’s account of the day’s events shifted. Ms. Kalinowski testified that originally the defendant stated that after going outside to the swimming pool, she went inside the house to retrieve the victim’s “bug juice” and left Ms. Crabtree outside with the victim. The defendant estimated she was inside for a minute and a half before Ms. Odom’s arrival. The defendant told Ms. Kalinowski that she believed the victim slipped through his “floatie.” Later in -5- their conversations that evening, however, the defendant told Ms. Kalinowski that she thought the victim may have been playing in the yard with the dog. While Ms. Kalinowski could not say if the defendant’s change in her account of the incident was due to deception or memory loss, she was concerned that the account was changing. Additionally, Ms. Kalinowski testified that during their conversations the defendant told her that she had taken Suboxone and a Xanax in the days prior to the victim’s drowning. As a result, Ms. Kalinowski asked the defendant to provide a urine sample, and the defendant consented. Ms. Kalinowski performed an on-site drug screen at the hospital in the defendant’s presence, using test strips. The urine drug test revealed the presence of Xanax, Suboxone, and methamphetamines in the defendant’s urine. When presented with the results, the defendant admitted and initialed next to Xanax, writing that “6/28 yesterday” was the date she last used the substance. She also admitted that she had used Suboxone on “Thurs 6/2-.” However, next to the positive result for methamphetamines, the defendant wrote. “I do not do meth.” Despite the positive drug screen, Ms. Kalinowski testified that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence at the time of their conversations. Once the victim’s body was transferred to the medical examiner for autopsy, Lieutenant Ferguson, Ms. Kalinowski, and other BCSO officers met the defendant and the Odoms back at their residence to conduct a search of the property. Lieutenant Ferguson requested the defendant give a statement. The defendant complied and gave a written statement, transcribed by Ms. Odom. The defendant’s statement claimed that she, Ms. Crabtree, and the victim were playing in the pool. She went into the house to get the victim’s “bug juice,” leaving him standing on the steps of the pool wearing his “floatie.” When the defendant turned around, she could not find him. After Ms. Odom arrived home from work and saw the victim in the pool, Ms. Odom and the defendant grabbed the victim and began CPR until the ambulance arrived. Lieutenant Ferguson’s search of the Odoms’ residence revealed that it was equipped with security cameras. When asked about the cameras, Mr. Odom told Lieutenant Ferguson that the camera surveillance system around the house was not operable. Ms. Odom testified that only the camera facing the swimming pool was not operable, because it had been turned off a few days prior to the incident. She stated it was turned off because it had been continually activated by “trees blowing” or “water splashing.” The Odoms’ sliding door leading to the back deck and swimming pool was also equipped with an alarm, a lock, and a piece of wood that could be wedged in place when the pool was not in use. In addition to testifying that the sliding door was open when she first arrived, Ms. Odom testified that later on the day of incident, when she opened the door, the alarm did not sound. She believed that the defendant and Ms. Crabtree had -6- disabled the alarm when they went outside earlier in the day. Mr. and Ms. Odom testified that if the sliding door was not completely closed, the victim was capable of opening the door with his fingers. On the night of the incident, Lieutenant Ferguson also collected the following statement from Ms. Crabtree: “Me and [the defendant] started out doing nails outside at the table! That’s when she let her boy get in the pool and then she walked off and left him in there for a good 30 minutes.” At trial, however, Ms. Crabtree did not recall giving this statement, testifying that it was “not true at all.” Ms. Crabtree conceded, however, that her memory of that day was foggy due to the Xanax in her system. She described herself as “heavily intoxicated.” On June 30, 2022, Kristen Ryion, an investigator with DCS, went to the Odoms’ residence to check on the defendant’s other minor children and to develop a safety plan for them. During her visit, Ms. Ryion also interviewed the defendant. In this interview, the defendant stated that the victim had jumped into the pool twice on the morning of the incident. On the first occasion, the defendant was able to catch him, and on the second occasion the defendant had to jump in the pool to grab him. The defendant told Ms. Ryion that she had explained to the victim that he could drown by doing that. When Ms. Ryion asked what had occurred before the victim drowned, the defendant said she went into the house to retrieve a drink of water, thinking that Ms. Crabtree was outside with the victim. But when the defendant turned around, she saw the victim in the pool. On July 15, 2022, Lieutenant Ferguson conducted a second interview with Ms. Crabtree. During this second interview, Ms. Crabtree gave a statement that the defendant had taken Xanax before going outside to the swimming pool with the victim. At trial, Ms. Crabtree attested to the truthfulness of her second statement to best of her recollection. However, she denied witnessing the defendant take any controlled substances. Ms. Crabtree stated that the defendant “appeared fine” to her. On August 18, 2022, Ms. Melton provided a written statement to the investigating officers. She stated that on the night of the incident, the defendant told her that she turned her head for a moment to retrieve the victim’s “bug juice.” Then, she saw the victim “flip backwards off the float.” According to Ms. Melton’s statement, the defendant claimed to have immediately jumped into the pool to reach the victim. By the time he had concluded his investigation, Lieutenant Ferguson had collected multiple, inconsistent accounts of what transpired on the day of the victim’s drowning. He testified that in his experience, those inconsistencies signified deception. -7-  On August 31, 2022, TBI issued its official toxicology report on the blood samples taken from the defendant. The samples were analyzed for drug toxicology by Dr. Tonya Horton, a forensic scientist with TBI’s Jackson Crime Laboratory. At trial, Dr. Horton was admitted as an expert in “fluids, analysis, controlled substance detection of blood or other liquids, par forensic science.”5 Dr. Horton testified that alcohol testing on the blood sample was negative, but the defendant’s blood did test positive for norbuprenorphine, the metabolite of Suboxone, at 1 nanogram per milliliter, alprazolam, more commonly known as Xanax, at less than 0.05 micrograms per milliliter, and methamphetamines at 0.11 micrograms per milliliter. Amphetamine, the metabolite of methamphetamine, and methadone, an analgesia for assisting with drug withdrawal, were also detected at less than 0.05 micrograms per milliliter, the lowest detectable measurement for those two substances. Dr. Emily Dennison, a forensic pathologist and medical examiner for the Nashville Medical Examiner’s Office, conducted the autopsy of the victim. The autopsy revealed that the victim suffered very little injury but had petechial hemorrhages on his face. The petechial hemorrhages were consistent with an asphyxial death, or “where the head or the body has a lack of oxygen to a certain area,” or if the victim is found in a suspended position, face-down. Additionally, the autopsy revealed the victim suffered cerebral and lung edema. Dr. Dennison concluded that the cause of death was drowning and listed the manner of death as an “accident.” III. The Defendant’s Testimony Testifying in her own defense, the defendant stated that prior to the victim’s death, she would accompany her mother, Ms. Odom, to exchange custody of T.F. with his father on Sunday nights. The defendant admitted that on the Saturday before she was to pick up the victim, she “ate some Xanax, Suboxone, and I think, an ecstasy pill.” She maintained that she had no recollection of taking methamphetamines. Despite her drug use on Saturday, the defendant claimed that she was not under the influence of any controlled substance when she took custody of the victim, claiming that she was not experiencing any residual effects. Nonetheless, she could not testify “a hundred percent” that she did not take a controlled substance on the day of the incident, but that on a typical day when she had custody of the victim, she did not use drugs. The defendant acknowledged having problems with alcohol and drug addiction, claiming to have begun using drugs at the age of 11. The defendant explained that two years prior to trial, she overdosed on drugs and suffered an anoxic brain injury. As a result, 5 Dr. Horton was tendered as an expert in pharmaceutical sciences. -8- she suffered from short-term memory loss. The defendant also admitted that she was on probation at the time of the incident. When questioned during cross-examination concerning her inconsistent versions of the events of June 27th, the defendant responded that she did not remember any facts of that day “a hundred percent,” except the victim’s death. She stated that she did not recall making statements to the paramedics or to DCS’ case workers. Despite her memory loss, the defendant testified that she felt comfortable being alone with the victim. However, she acknowledged that she was not supervising the victim the “way [she] should have been,” but stated “I think any parent who losses their child would say that they did something wrong, because they lost their child.” IV. The Trial Judge’s Questioning of the Witnesses During the course of the trial, the trial court independently asked questions of several witnesses, most notably, Mr.Crowell, Ms. Odom, and Mr. Odom. i. Grant Crowell Once the State and defense counsel had finished questioning Mr.Crowell, the trial court requested that the witness identify the defendant. TRIAL COURT: Let me ask you this, please: You indicated the mother, she rode with you in the ambulance and made statements. Is that person, the mother, in the courtroom today? MR. CROWELL: Yes. TRIAL COURT: Okay. Can you identify her? MR. CROWELL: Right there, the lady in the dress? TRIAL COURT: Sitting at defense table? MR. CROWELL: Yes. TRIAL COURT: Okay. Just for purposes of the record, he’s identified the defendant. -9-  Let me ask one other question: Do you recall what the situation was with the pool – was it an inground, a sunken pool, is it a stand-above pool? Do you remember? MR. CROWELL: From my memory, it’s a - -what do you call it – above the ground, but the deck hit where it matches. TRIAL COURT: Where the top of the pool – MR. CROWELL: Matches TRIAL COURT: --comes to it. MR. CROWELL: Yes. Yes, sir. TRIAL COURT: So, you could walk off the deck – MR. CROWELL: Yes. Yes, sir. TRIAL COURT: -- right into the pool? MR. CROWELL: That’s how I remember it. But I believe it was an above- the-ground with a large deck. TRIAL COURT: That’s what I was trying to determine. MR. CROWELL: Or, a high deck, or however you want to say it. ii. Karen Odom During Ms. Odom’s testimony, the State, using an aerial diagram of the Odoms’ residence, asked Ms. Odom to detail the layout and use of each of the rooms. Thereafter, the trial court interjected, “[s]o, if you were looking at it clockwise from the top and the pool is at twelve o’clock, noon, one bedroom is about two o’clock, there’s a bathroom at three o’clock, the next bedroom of that end of the house would be at, like, four o’clock, and then your bedroom, Ms. Odom, would be at like eight, going on nine o’clock.” Additionally, once defense counsel finished questioning Ms. Odom, the trial court gave the following instructions to the jury: - 10 - TRIAL COURT: All right. Let me ask a couple of questions for clarity and – Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if I ask a question, that doesn’t mean that I have an opinion about anything, the facts or credibility of any witness, I just – this might clarify things for the Court as well as you. TRIAL COURT: Ms. Odom, could T.F. open the sliding glass door by himself? MS. ODOM: If it didn’t get shut all the way, he could have got his little fingers in there and push it open, yes. TRIAL COURT: This was on – this took place on June 27, 2022, end of June. Was it hot outside? MS. ODOM: Yes. TRIAL COURT: You said it was hot. Did you have the AC on in the house typically at that time of the year? MS. ODOM: Yes. TRIAL COURT: Do you typically leave the doors open with the ACs on? MS. ODOM: I do. TRIAL COURT: You do. MS. ODOM: So that my dog can get in and out. TRIAL COURT: Was T.F. ever required to wear any kind of life vest – MS. ODOM: Yes. TRIAL COURT: -- flotation, that was attached to him? MS. ODOM: Yes. TRIAL COURT: You said you keep your Xanax locked up in a safe. Is that a combination safe? MS. ODOM: Yes. - 11 - TRIAL COURT: Does your daughter know the combination to – MS. ODOM: No. TRIAL COURT: – that safe? MS. ODOM: No. TRIAL COURT: Are you certain? MS. ODOM: I’m positive. My husband is the only one that knows the combination. TRIAL COURT: So, when he needs to get a prescription – or you need to get a prescription out of there, you’ve got to go through him? MS. ODOM: We fill our – We make our medicines up, except for our Xanax, so yes. We make it up once a week at the same time. TRIAL COURT: And – does that mean you keep your prescriptions with you on your person or in your purse, or – MS. ODOM: No. I leave them in the safe because I don’t – I don’t take Xanax very, very often, just periodically. I could use one today but refused to take it because I was going to be h ere. TRIAL COURT: Okay. When you saw T.F., was he floating on top of the water or at the bottom or the pool? MS. ODOM: He was floating. TRIAL COURT: When you came in and [the defendant] exited the living room area to go out to the pool, did she open the sliding glass door, or was it already open? MS. ODOM: She was going out the door. I don’t know, Your Honor, I was not there at that point. I come in the door, she was going out the door. TRIAL COURT: You didn’t see her open the door anyway, or take her hand – MS. ODOM: No, I just – I didn’t. - 12 -  TRIAL COURT: Okay. That’s all the questions I had. Redirect. And again, ladies and gentlemen, those questions are not – I don’t have any opinions about the case or the facts or anything. It’s just simply to try to clarify some things for me, maybe clarify some things for you. Thank you. iii. Tim Odom The defendant called Mr. Odom to testify. When defense counsel concluded his direct examination, the trial court engaged in the following exchange: TRIAL COURT: All right. I’ve got just a couple of questions. This was June 27, right middle of July [sic] in summer. Was it a hot day? I assume it probably was, I don’t recall. Do you remember whether it was hot that day? MR. ODOM: It probably was. TRIAL COURT: Do you keep your air conditioning going on summer months? MR. ODOM: Yeah. It’s on auto. TRIAL COURT: Okay. It would probably be hard to sleep at – take a nap, if it’s real hot in the house or something; the AC was probably going at that – do you remember or not? MR. ODOM: I don’t. TRIAL COURT: Did you keep your sliding door open – MR. ODOM: No. TRIAL COURT: -- or closed? MR. ODOM: It stays closed. TRIAL COURT: It stays closed. MR. ODOM: And another thing. Like, when I come in I take my shirt automatically off. I don’t know if it was hot or what. - 13 -  TRIAL COURT: Okay. Mr. Odom, let me ask you this: On that day that T.F. drowned, was T.F. capable of opening the sliding glass door on his own? MR. ODOM: On that one – if that door wasn’t shut all the way, it leaves a little gap there and he could get his little fingers in there. He could open it because my wife has caught him almost opening it. TRIAL COURT: Okay. And if the door is cracked, the alarm will go, or the chime will go, unless that door alarm is turned off? MR. ODOM: Yes. TRIAL COURT: And it was working that day? MR. ODOM: Yes. But like I’m saying on that, when that door was open, it wasn’t on alarm, it was on charm [sic]. TRIAL COURT: Okay. MR. ODOM: And if it opens, it charms one time. V. Verdict Based upon the evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of one count of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of aggravated child endangerment. VI. Sentencing Hearing The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on May 17, 2025. The defendant’s presentence report was admitted into evidence, containing the defendant’s criminal history, which consisted of four prior felonies and ten prior misdemeanors. The State submitted the defendant was a Range II offender based upon her criminal history, to which the defendant did not object. In determining if any enhancement or mitigating factors were applicable to the defendant’s sentence, the State argued the trial court should apply several enhancement factors to the defendant’s sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 114. The State referenced the defendant’s criminal history as evidence supporting the application of enhancement factor (1). Based upon the defendant’s numerous criminal convictions, including her July 14, 2022 conviction for possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, the trial court concluded that enhancement factor (1) was appropriate. - 14 -  The State also argued that enhancement factor (4), the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable because of age or physical or mental disability, should be applied as T.F. was two years old. The defendant argued that enhancement factor (4) could not apply, because the defendant’s age was integrated into the aggravated child endangerment Statute’s increase from a B felony to an A felony, if the victim was under the age of eight. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402(b). Because the offense of aggravated child endangerment incorporates the age of the victim as an element, the trial court concluded that enhancement factor (4) was inapplicable. The State asked for the trial court to apply enhancement factor (6), the personal injuries inflicted upon, or the amount of damage to property sustained by or taken from, the victim was particularly great. The State argued that the victim’s loss of life was the ultimate injury. The defendant argued that the victim’s death was encompassed in the homicide element of criminally negligent homicide and in the serious bodily injury element of aggravated child endangerment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212, 39-15-402. The trial court concluded that the death of the victim was incorporated in the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide, but the offense of aggravated child endangerment included the element of serious bodily injury, not death. Therefore, the trial court found enhancement factor (6) applicable to the defendant’s convictions for aggravated child endangerment. Lastly, the State asked the trial court to apply enhancement factor (8), the defendant, before trial or sentencing had failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, and enhancement factor (13), at the time the felony was committed, the defendant was on probation. The defendant did not contest these enhancement factors, and the trial court found them applicable to each of the defendant’s offenses. The defendant asked the trial court to apply mitigating factors (3), (8), and (13). Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113. The defendant argued that mitigating factor (3), substantial grounds exist tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense, should be applied due to the defendant’s anoxic brain injury that caused her to suffer from short-term memory loss. The defendant submitted that due to her short-term memory loss, there was no intentional criminal act. As evidence of her condition, the defendant submitted to the trial court a medical report dated June 15, 2022. The report, diagnosing the defendant with an anoxic brain injury, indicated that the defendant had difficulty remembering things and “had to write stuff down.” Similarly, the defendant also requested the trial court apply mitigating factor (8), the defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced the defendant’s - 15 - culpability for the offense, and mitigating factor (13), any other factor consistent with the purposes of this chapter. However, the trial court concluded that mitigating factor (3) was not substantiated because there was not enough evidence to indicate that the defendant’s short-term memory loss was a basis to excuse or justify her criminal conduct. As to requested mitigating factor (8), the trial court found that the medical records offered in support of the defendant’s request indicated that the defendant had been drug-free since July 2021, a statement the trial court found to be contradictory to the evidence presented at trial. Finally, as to enhancement factor (13), the trial court found that no evidence had been presented to substantiate the requested factor. To present the impact of the victim’s death on his family, the State presented the testimony of Debbie Melton and Nick French. Ms. Melton asked the trial court to impose the maximum “because we don’t have [T.F.] anymore.” She testified that her family “begged everybody” to keep the defendant from having custody of the victim, stating “[w]e knew something was going to happen.” Mr. French testified that he had nothing in life after the defendant took his son “due to negligence because she was high on drugs.” In making its sentencing determination, the trial court noted that it had considered the evidence presented at trial, the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the presentence report, the sentencing principles embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103, any arguments made as to alternative sentencing, the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, the evidence and information offered on enhancing and mitigation factors, the statistical information provided by the Administrative Offices of the Court, any statements made by the defendant, and the potential for the defendant’s rehabilitation. Ultimately, the trial court imposed the following sentence: In Count 1, criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender and imposed the maximum sentence, four years. In Counts 2 and 3, aggravated child endangerment, a Class A felony, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender and imposed the maximum sentence, forty years. The trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 and ran the sentences for Counts 1 and 2 concurrently for a total effective sentence of forty years. On July 16, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. This timely appeal followed. - 16 -  Analysis On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for aggravated child endangerment, (2) the trial court intruded upon her right to a fair trial when it independently questioned witnesses from the bench, and (3) her sentence was excessive. The State asserts that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated child endangerment. Additionally, the State responds that the defendant has waived any claim as to the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses by failing to contemporaneously object. Finally, the State argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum available sentence within range. After review, we agree with the State that (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated child endangerment on Count 2, (2) the defendant has waived the issue concerning the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses, and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to a maximum within-range sentence. However, as to Count 3, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, the judgment for aggravated child endangerment in Count 3 is reversed, and the defendant’s conviction is vacated. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt