State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Andrew Berretta

06/30/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE February 10, 2026 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JONATHAN ANDREW BERRETTA Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County No. 2022-CR-48,197 William A. Lockhart, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2024-01538-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Andrew Berretta, of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication and one count of vehicular homicide per se. The trial court merged those convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises thirteen issues in three broad categories: challenges to the denial of his motion to suppress the seizure of his blood, trial issues, and a sentencing issue. Challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that (1) the affidavit supporting the Vanderbilt University Medical Center (“VUMC”) search warrant for his blood contained no false or reckless statements; (2) probable cause supported the search warrant and judicial subpoena; (3) the search warrant was not overbroad; (4) the search warrant and judicial subpoena established a sufficient nexus between VUMC and the evidence sought; (5) the VUMC blood draws were not the result of state action; and (6) an earlier warrantless EMS blood draw was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Regarding his trial, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (7) admitting a life-in-being photograph of the victim; (8) finding that the VUMC specimen release form satisfied the business records exception to the rule against hearsay; (9) finding that chain of custody was established for the VUMC blood samples; (10) admitting the VUMC blood draw evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (11) instructing the jury on vehicular homicide per se in a manner that created an unconstitutional presumption of guilt; and (12) allowing the cumulative effect of those errors to deprive him of a fair trial. Finally, the Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in (13) ordering his sentence to run consecutively to a sentence he had pending in Davidson County at the time of these offenses. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined. Paul Andrew Justice, III, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jonathan Andrew Berretta. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney General; Craig Northcott, District Attorney General; and Johnathan C. Hershman, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. T HE C RASH AND I NVESTIGATION At approximately 2 a.m. on August 7, 2021, the Defendant drove in the oncoming lane of travel on Highway 55 outside of Tullahoma. In doing so, he struck Katie Leigh Bauer in a head-on collision, and she died as a result of her injuries. The first officer on scene was Sergeant Cody Brandon with the Tullahoma Police Department (“TPD”). Based on the vehicles’ positions and the layout of the divided highway, Sergeant Brandon determined that the Defendant had been traveling in the wrong lane before the collision. Sergeant Brandon further observed that Ms. Bauer’s injuries were severe. He did not see the Defendant and had no direct contact with him at any point during the investigation. Other emergency personnel arrived shortly after Sergeant Brandon, including EMS personnel and members of the Tennessee Highway Patrol (“THP”). A THP trooper notified Sergeant Brandon that he smelled alcohol on the Defendant. An emergency medical technician (“EMT”) also reported that he smelled “something” on the Defendant, though Sergeant Brandon could not remember if the EMT used the word “alcohol” or other terminology. -2-  Based on this information, Sergeant Brandon determined that probable cause existed to draw the Defendant’s blood for testing. He did not believe he had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant before the Defendant was transported by helicopter to VUMC. Consequently, Sergeant Brandon directed EMS personnel to conduct a warrantless blood draw before the Defendant’s transport, citing exigent circumstances. Two days later, Sergeant Brandon applied for a search warrant to obtain samples of the Defendant’s blood drawn at VUMC. Three samples—drawn at approximately 3:00, 4:28, and 7:18 a.m.—were sent to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) for forensic analysis. Those samples had blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) levels of 0.283, 0.296, and 0.214, respectively. Sergeant Brandon also obtained a search warrant for the Defendant’s vehicle, including the vehicle’s airbag control module. Analysis of the module revealed that the Defendant did not apply his brakes before the collision. A search of the vehicle yielded two broken liquor bottles, a broken wine bottle, and three empty beer cans. An investigator with the district attorney’s office later interviewed the Defendant. The Defendant admitted to drinking between nine and ten beers between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. while at an IndyCar race in Nashville, followed by approximately two to four more beers after returning home. He left for Tullahoma around 7 p.m. and admitted to drinking another one to two beers during the drive. The Defendant acknowledged having a wine bottle and two liquor bottles in the car but denied drinking from them after 8:15 p.m. Despite drinking between twelve and sixteen beers throughout the day, the Defendant did not believe he was intoxicated when he began driving. He estimated that he had fallen asleep in a parking lot on his way to Tullahoma and woke just before 2 a.m., having driven for less than a minute before the collision. In June 2022, a Coffee County grand jury charged the Defendant with vehicular homicide by intoxication and vehicular homicide per se, among other charges.1 1 The indictment also charged the Defendant with vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, DUI second offense, DUI second offense per se, violation of the open container law, and driving on the wrong side of the roadway. The State dismissed these charges by nolle prosequi at the start of the trial after the jury was sworn. Those charges are not part of this appeal. -3-  B. T HE D EFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO S UPPRESS Before trial, the Defendant moved to suppress the TBI’s testing of his blood samples and his VUMC medical records. He argued that: (1) no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw; (2) the VUMC blood draws constituted state action requiring a warrant; (3) the search warrant and judicial subpoena lacked probable cause; (4) the judicial subpoena lacked a sufficient nexus between evidence of intoxication and his medical records; and (5) the search warrant was overbroad. After holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied relief on all grounds. The case then proceeded to trial in May 2024. C. T RIAL , S ENTENCING , AND A PPEAL The State’s proof at trial largely reflected the facts described above. The jury also heard testimony from other motorists who stopped to render aid, first responders, the TBI forensic toxicologist, and the medical examiner who performed Ms. Bauer’s autopsy. The trial court also admitted a life-in-being photograph of Ms. Bauer over the Defendant’s objection. The Defendant testified and admitted to the alcohol consumption described above. In rebuttal, the State’s TBI forensic toxicologist testified that the Defendant’s account of his drinking—stopping at 8:15 p.m.—did not “make sense” given his BAC of 0.283 at 3:00 a.m. The jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to an existing Davidson County sentence. The Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied by written order filed on September 11, 2024. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal twenty-six days later. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). ANALYSIS In this appeal, the Defendant raises thirteen issues for our consideration. Challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, he raises six grounds: four contesting the VUMC warrant and judicial subpoena, one contesting the VUMC blood draws as state action, and one challenging an earlier warrantless EMS blood draw. -4-  Regarding his trial, the Defendant raises six additional issues: a challenge to a life- in-being photograph of Ms. Bauer; three evidentiary challenges to the admission of the VUMC blood samples; and a challenge to the jury instruction on vehicular homicide per se. He also contends that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. Finally, the Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence to run consecutively to a sentence he had pending in Davidson County at the time of these offenses. We address each of these issues in turn. A. I SSUES R ELATED TO THE D EFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO S UPPRESS The Defendant raises six challenges to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the seizure of his blood. With respect to the blood seized from VUMC pursuant to a warrant, he argues that the trial court erred by finding that: (1) the affidavit supporting the VUMC search warrant contained no false or reckless statements; (2) probable cause supported the search warrant and judicial subpoena executed at VUMC; (3) the search warrant was not overbroad; (4) the search warrant and judicial subpoena established a sufficient nexus between VUMC and the evidence sought; and (5) the VUMC blood draws were not the result of state action. With respect to the earlier warrantless EMS blood draw, he argues that the trial court erred by (6) finding that the blood draw was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied each ground of the motion. We agree with the State on the first five issues. On the sixth, we conclude that any alleged error in admitting evidence of the warrantless EMS blood draw was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1. Background The trial court held a hearing on the Defendant’s motion to suppress about two weeks before trial. The motion sought to exclude several pieces of evidence on multiple grounds. The trial court decided to hear proof on the exigent circumstances question first and rule on it before moving to the other suppression issues. -5-  The State called Sergeant Brandon to testify about exigent circumstances. He testified that he did not believe he had enough time to get a warrant before the Defendant was transported to VUMC. He described the steps the process would have required: traveling to the TPD to draft the warrant; drafting, reviewing, and proofreading the warrant; driving to the Coffee County Jail to obtain a judicial commissioner’s signature; waiting for review and copying; and then returning to the hospital where the Defendant awaited the life-flight helicopter. By Sergeant Brandon’s own estimates, the entire process would have taken at least an hour and fifteen minutes. On cross-examination, Sergeant Brandon made several key admissions. He admitted that judicial commissioners were available around the clock and could have met at the Coffee County Jail. He conceded that other officers would likely have been at the jail and that nothing stopped him from asking one of them to convey probable cause to a commissioner. The sergeant acknowledged that, despite more than twelve years of service in Coffee County, he had never sought contact information for any local judge, including on the night of the crash. He also confirmed that he never considered asking Davidson County law enforcement for help once the Defendant arrived at VUMC. Separately, Trooper Boles told Sergeant Brandon that the Defendant said he was returning from an IndyCar race in Nashville. The trial court ruled on the exigent circumstances issue first. It began by crediting Sergeant Brandon’s testimony about the warrant acquisition timeline, finding that the process would have taken at least an hour, more time than was available before the Defendant’s departure. The court found that Sergeant Brandon arrived on scene at 2:08 a.m. and directed medical and emergency personnel to respond. After speaking with Trooper Boles and an EMT, Sergeant Brandon determined at approximately 2:38 a.m. that he had probable cause to draw the Defendant’s blood. The court found that obtaining and executing a warrant before the Defendant’s scheduled departure was not feasible and ruled that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. The court also made a separate probable cause finding for the warrantless draw. It identified three supporting factors: the Defendant’s driving in the wrong lane of travel in the middle of the night, the odor of alcohol, and the Defendant’s statement to Trooper Boles about returning from an IndyCar race in Nashville, which the court found inconsistent with his direction of travel. The court then turned to the remaining grounds of the Defendant’s motion. Sergeant Brandon had also applied for and executed the search warrant for the Defendant’s blood -6- samples at VUMC. His affidavit identified his law enforcement training and experience, including specialized DUI training. It described the time and place of the crash, the people involved, and the Defendant’s driving in the wrong lane that caused Ms. Bauer’s death. It also stated that Paramedic Jimmy Adams and Advanced EMT Shelby Stewart told law enforcement that a strong odor of alcohol came from the Defendant’s person and filled the rear of the ambulance. At the hearing on the remaining issues, the Defendant called Sergeant Brandon to testify about the affidavit and the investigation underlying it. Sergeant Brandon remembered calling both Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart the day after the crash. They told him the smell of alcohol had filled the rear of the ambulance. He could not recall their exact words but said his affidavit accurately reflected what they communicated. When asked how he knew VUMC would draw the Defendant’s blood, Sergeant Brandon said he considered it standard hospital practice. He also confirmed that he did not contact anyone at VUMC between the crash and when he applied for the warrant. Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart also testified. Paramedic Adams did not recall telling Sergeant Brandon about the case. He confirmed, however, that the whole rear of the ambulance smelled of alcohol. He rated the smell a ten out of ten and described it as being “very strong” and “very noticeable.” EMT Stewart testified that the Defendant told them he had taken some pills and had been drinking. EMT Stewart could not describe the smell in the rest of the ambulance because he was positioned directly in front of the Defendant. He described the odor as “very intense” and “just like hot alcohol.” After hearing all the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied each remaining ground of the Defendant’s motion from the bench. 2. Standard of Appellate Review For every issue raised on appeal, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review. State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tenn. 2022). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “we will uphold the trial court’s findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates against those findings.” State v. Stanfield, 554 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2018). The party prevailing in the trial court “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing[,] as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress, we -7- may consider the evidence introduced at both the suppression hearing and trial. State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Henry, 539 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). 3. Hospital Search Warrant and Judicial Subpoena The Defendant argues that the affidavit’s allegation—that Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart reported a strong smell of alcohol that filled the rear of the ambulance—must be removed from the probable cause analysis. He contends that Sergeant Brandon’s bodycam footage and testimony show the statement was either a reckless or intentional falsehood. He further argues that, once the allegation is removed, the affidavit’s remaining facts fail to establish probable cause for the VUMC blood draw. The State responds that the statement accurately reflected what Sergeant Brandon was told and that there is no basis to impeach it. We agree with the State. a. The Warrant Requirement The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution both protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. In the context of a search warrant, that protection requires a neutral and detached magistrate to issue the warrant “upon probable cause.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 182 (Tenn. 2016). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-103 requires the supporting affidavit to name or describe the person and particularly describe the property and place to be searched. Searches conducted pursuant to valid warrants are presumptively reasonable. State v. Hamm, 589 S.W.3d 765, 771 (Tenn. 2019) (citing State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 678-79 (Tenn. 2016)). Probable cause exists when the facts set out in the affidavit are sufficient “to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing” that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched—a standard requiring more than mere suspicion but considerably less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 534 (Tenn. 2014). That determination is practical rather than technical, turning on “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 306-07 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). A court examining probable cause must consider the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at -8- 307-08. The affidavit must establish “a nexus between the criminal activity, the place to be searched, and the items to be seized” and must contain more than conclusory allegations. Id. at 300; Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 294. Affidavit language is to be read in a “commonsense, nonhypertechnical fashion.” State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Our supreme court has confirmed that the probable cause determination must reflect “the nontechnical, commonsense approach” applied to “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 306-07 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175). The reliability of hearsay information in an affidavit depends on its source. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 302 (citing State v. Williams, 193 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tenn. 2006)). Where the source is a law enforcement officer, no special showing of reliability is required. Id. A presumption of reliability also applies to citizen informants, as long as the affidavit identifies them by name. Id. Where the source is an unknown informant or one from the criminal milieu, the affidavit must establish both the informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity. Id. at 302-03. When the question is whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause, a separate and more deferential standard governs our review of the magistrate’s findings. Our review is limited to “whether, in light of all the evidence available, the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause.” State v. Meeks, 876 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); see also State v. McLawhorn, 636 S.W.3d 210, 239 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020). Stated differently, the question is whether the affidavit gave the magistrate “a substantial basis for concluding that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 299 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, our review is limited to the four corners of the affidavit. Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 295. We will not consider additional evidence known by the magistrate or possessed by the affiant but omitted from the affidavit. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 299. b. Alleged False Statement and Omission in the Affidavit The Defendant argues that the affidavit’s allegation—that Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart reported a strong smell of alcohol that filled the rear of the ambulance—must be removed from the probable cause analysis. He contends that Sergeant Brandon’s bodycam footage and testimony show the statement was either a reckless or intentional -9- falsehood, and that the allegation should therefore not be considered. The State responds that the statement accurately reflected what Sergeant Brandon was told and that there is no basis to impeach it. We agree with the State. Because a magistrate must rely on accurate information when making a probable cause determination, false or misleading statements in an affidavit may invalidate a search warrant. State v. Norris, 47 S.W.3d 457, 469 n.4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Little, 560 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tenn. 1978). As our supreme court has explained, [T]here are two circumstances that authorize the impeachment of an affidavit sufficient on its face, (1) a false statement made with intent to deceive the Court, whether material or immaterial to the issue of probable cause, and (2) a false statement, essential to the establishment of probable cause, recklessly made. Recklessness may be established by showing that a statement was false when made and that [the] affiant did not have reasonable grounds for believing it, at that time. Little, 560 S.W.2d at 407; see also State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 721 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 470 (Tenn. 2002) (same). The two circumstances differ in a critical respect. Where an officer intended to deceive the magistrate, any false statement—whether material to probable cause or not— will impeach the affidavit. Little, 560 S.W.2d at 407. Where an officer did not intend to deceive, a false statement impeaches the affidavit only if it was both recklessly made and essential to the establishment of probable cause. Id.; Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d at 470; Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 721. Allegations of mere negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). The “essential to probable cause” requirement imposes an additional limit even where recklessness is found. “In order to be ‘essential to the establishment of probable cause,’ the false or reckless statement must be the only basis for probable cause or if not, the other bases, standing alone, must not be sufficient to establish probable cause.” Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Norris, 47 S.W.3d at 469 n.4). The Little framework also extends to omissions. But “an affidavit omitting potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information.” Willis, 496 - 10 - S.W.3d at 721 (quoting State v. Yeomans, 10 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)); see also State v. Hardison, 680 S.W.3d 282, 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023). The defendant bears the burden of proving any allegation of falsity or reckless omission by a preponderance of the evidence. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 308. i. Was the Statement False? As to the first Little category, we must ask whether the statement was false and, if so, whether it was intentionally so. The Defendant points to three items in support of his argument that the statement was false: Sergeant Brandon’s bodycam statement that he smelled nothing; the inability of Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart to recall a phone conversation three years after the crash; and testimony from other officers at the scene who detected only a faint odor or none at all. None of these items, individually or together, establishes that the affidavit’s allegation was false. The record refutes the Defendant’s reading of both the affidavit and the suppression hearing proof. The relevant portion of the affidavit states: Upon response and on scene treatment by Coffee County EMS Paramedic Jimmy Adams and Advanced EMT Shelby [Stewart], information was shared with law enforcement officers that a strong odor generally associated with alcoholic beverages was emanating from Jonathan Andrew Berretta’s person. The odor was described as having permeated the rear of the ambulance. The Defendant reads this language as having only one possible meaning: that Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart communicated the smell to Sergeant Brandon at the crash scene on the night of the crash. That reading is inconsistent with the commonsense, nonhypertechnical approach our supreme court has directed courts to apply. See Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 306-07; State v. Whaley, No. E2024-00387-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 3541414, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2025) (rejecting hypertechnical parsing of affidavit language and applying a commonsense reading), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 21, 2026). The record shows that Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart responded and treated the Defendant on scene. Sergeant Brandon testified that he spoke to both of them by phone the day after the crash. Paramedic Adams confirmed that the whole rear of the ambulance smelled of alcohol, rating the smell a ten out of ten. EMT Stewart could not speak to the - 11 - smell in the rear of the ambulance because he was working directly in the Defendant’s face, and he described that odor as very intense, “just like hot alcohol.” The fact that Sergeant Brandon smelled nothing does not contradict the affidavit— he had no personal contact with the Defendant. The same is true of the other EMT and the THP trooper, neither of whom was in the rear of the ambulance with Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart. The inability of Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart to recall a phone conversation from three years earlier does not undermine Sergeant Brandon’s unimpeached testimony that he contacted them the day after the crash. Read in a commonsense manner, the affidavit’s allegation is consistent with the proof at the suppression hearing and at trial and does not amount to a false statement, whether reckless or intentional. ii. Even If the Statement Were False, Was It Intentionally False? Next, in determining the first Little category, we must then ask if the statement was intentionally false. Assuming that the statement was in fact false—and we do not so conclude—nothing in the record supports a finding that Sergeant Brandon intended to deceive the magistrate. He testified without contradiction that he called Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart the day after the crash and that his affidavit accurately reflected what they communicated to him. The Defendant offered no evidence of deliberate falsity—no contrary testimony, no objective evidence, no offer of proof—and Franks requires more than conclusory allegations to mandate even an evidentiary hearing on this question. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; see also Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 721. The first Little category, therefore, does not apply. iii. Even If Recklessly Made, Was the Statement Essential to Probable Cause? In applying the second Little category, the Defendant’s challenge also fails at this step. Even if the odor allegation were set aside entirely, the affidavit independently establishes probable cause through two other categories of facts: the Defendant’s fatal head-on collision caused by driving eastbound in the westbound lane of travel, and Sergeant Brandon’s explicit opinion—formed without any reliance on the odor—that “in all probability the motor vehicle accident involving a fatality was a result of [the Defendant’s] intoxication,” grounded in fifteen years of law enforcement experience and specialized DUI training. - 12 -  As we explain in our discussion of probable cause in the next section below, those other facts alone gave the magistrate a substantial basis for finding probable cause. See State v. Kroese, No. M2022-01180-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 2034366, at *13-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2024), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2025); State v. Ryder, No. M2024-01717-CCA-R9-CO, 2025 WL 2536352, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2026). Because probable cause exists independent of the odor allegation, that allegation cannot be “essential to the establishment of probable cause.” Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 721. As such, the Defendant’s challenge on this ground lacks merit as well. iv. The Defendant’s Omissions Argument The Defendant also argues that Sergeant Brandon recklessly omitted material information from the affidavit—specifically, that Sergeant Brandon himself detected no odor of alcohol and that other officers at the scene similarly detected no strong odor. He contends that had these omissions been included, the affidavit would not have established probable cause. The State responds that the information in the affidavit was true regardless of who relayed it to Sergeant Brandon or when. We agree with the State. An omission-based challenge faces a higher threshold than an affirmative-false- statement challenge, because “an affidavit omitting potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information.” Yeomans, 10 S.W.3d at 297; Hardison, 680 S.W.3d at 310. Nothing in the record suggests that Sergeant Brandon intentionally withheld what he considered material information. His failure to note that he personally detected no odor was, at most, a drafting omission—not a deliberate or reckless withholding of material facts. See Ryder, 2025 WL 2536352, at *8-9 (holding that an officer’s failure to identify the precise source of a statement in the affidavit was “at most negligent drafting and not a false and reckless statement”). Moreover, even if Sergeant Brandon had included his personal observation, it would not have negated probable cause, as we discuss in the next section. Because he had no personal contact with the Defendant, his inability to detect an odor was entirely consistent with the affidavit’s allegation that the emergency personnel working directly on the Defendant inside the ambulance reported a strong smell. That disclosure would not have eliminated the showing of probable cause. See Yeomans, 10 S.W.3d at 297. - 13 -  There is an additional and independent reason to reject both the false-statement and omissions arguments. The affidavit identifies Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart by name and professional role. A presumption of reliability attaches to named citizen informants. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 302. That presumption applies here. The Defendant bears the general burden of proving falsity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 308. He must also overcome the presumption of reliability that the law extends to named citizen informants. Nothing in the record carries either burden. We conclude that the Defendant has not carried his burden under Little. As such, he is not entitled to relief on this ground. c. Probable Cause Supporting the VUMC Warrant The Defendant next argues that even with Sergeant Brandon’s allegations left intact, the affidavit does not establish probable cause. He contends that the only relevant facts— a crash and an odor of alcohol—fall short of the standard, particularly because no field sobriety tests were given, no physical signs of impairment were observed, and the Defendant made no admission to drinking. The State responds that the combination of the crash, the odor, and Sergeant Brandon’s training-based opinion satisfies the standard. We agree with the State. i. Probable Cause in Impaired Driving Cases As we noted above, probable cause to support a warrant exists when the facts set out in the affidavit are sufficient “to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing” that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 534. In impaired driving cases, probable cause is assessed on the totality of the circumstances. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 307-08. No single factor is required, and a defendant need not exhibit every known sign of intoxication. Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 535. The absence of field sobriety tests, physical signs of impairment, or an admission to drinking does not defeat probable cause where other indicators are present. Whaley, 2025 WL 3541414, at *20 (holding that the omission of field sobriety test results, the defendant’s demeanor, and other typical DUI indicators from the affidavit “was not necessary to establish probable cause”). Our courts have identified three categories of facts that are particularly relevant to assessing probable cause in impaired driving cases: - 14 - x Driving behavior and crash characteristics. The nature of a driver’s conduct and the character of a resulting crash are among the most probative indicators available to an investigating officer. See Kroese, 2024 WL 2034366, at *14 (“We can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indicia of drunk driving.” (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014))). Indeed, driving in the opposing lane of traffic on a divided highway is conduct inconsistent with unimpaired driving, particularly when it results in a fatal head-on collision. See Whaley, 2025 WL 3541414, at *20 (concluding that driving in the wrong lane on a highway resulting in a fatal head-on collision, combined with an odor of an intoxicant, established probable cause for a blood draw warrant); Kroese, 2024 WL 2034366, at *13-15 (holding that “elements of the fatal crash were inconsistent with unimpaired driving and therefore supported probable cause for a search warrant for a blood draw”); Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 535 (concluding that driving on the wrong side of a divided highway, combined with an odor of alcohol, “clearly support[ed] a finding of probable cause for DUI”); see also State v. Crisp, No. M2013-01339-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3540646, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2014) (finding probable cause where the totality of the circumstances included a head-on collision in the opposing lane, an odor of alcohol, and an admission to drinking), no perm. app. filed. x Evidence of Alcohol Use. Evidence of alcohol use, including a driver’s admission of use or an odor of alcohol detected on or near a suspect, is a recognized factor in the probable cause analysis. See State v. Evetts, 670 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that odor of alcohol at a crash scene, combined with the crash itself, supported probable cause even without visible signs of intoxication). The strength and source of the odor are also relevant. Thus, a report of a strong odor from a named, identified person in close physical contact with the suspect carries more weight than a fleeting or uncertain observation from a distance. See Evetts, 670 S.W.2d at 642; Roscoe, 2014 WL 3511041, at *4. Of course, an odor of alcohol alone is not sufficient for probable cause. State v. Sides, No. E2000-01422-CCA- R3-CD, 2001 WL 523375, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2001) (holding insufficient an officer’s statement that he “thought” he detected “not a strong odor, but an odor of alcohol”), no perm. app. filed. x The Officer’s training and experience. An officer’s specialized training in DUI detection and accident investigation is a recognized factor when the - 15 -  officer applies that training to the facts and forms an explicit opinion. See Ryder, 2025 WL 2536352, at *9 (holding that an affidavit’s recitation of the officer’s specialized DUI training and his training-based opinion of intoxication was a relevant factor in the totality analysis). All information in the officer’s possession, including inferences drawn from past experience, is relevant to the probable cause determination. An officer’s opinion alone will not establish probable cause, but it gives weight to the other facts in the affidavit. Evetts, 670 S.W.2d at 642. ii. Application Measured against these standards, Sergeant Brandon’s affidavit gave the magistrate a substantial basis for finding probable cause. On driving behavior and crash characteristics, the affidavit stated that the Defendant caused a fatal head-on collision by driving eastbound in the westbound lane of travel on New Manchester Highway in the early morning hours of August 7, 2021. Driving in the opposing lane of a divided highway and striking an oncoming vehicle head-on in the predawn hours is conduct that a person of reasonable caution would recognize as inconsistent with unimpaired driving. See Kroese, 2024 WL 2034366, at *13-15; Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 535; Whaley, 2025 WL 3541414, at *20. On the odor of alcohol, the affidavit stated that Paramedic Adams and EMT Stewart—each identified by name and their professional role—reported a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the Defendant’s person that filled the rear of the ambulance. This is not the tentative, uncertain observation that has fallen short