State of Tennessee v. Thaddeus J. Johnson

10/30/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 27, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. THADDEUS J. JOHNSON Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hawkins County No. 22CR146 John F. Dugger, Jr., Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01054-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The Defendant, Thaddeus Johnson, appeals his Hawkins County Criminal Court guilty- pleaded convictions of aggravated assault and robbery, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing an effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. Although the trial court erred by failing to place on the record its findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences or the denial of alternative sentencing, our de novo review of the record supports the trial court’s imposition of a total effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. Accordingly, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed STACY L. STREET, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined. T. Hunter Shelton, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Thaddeus Jamalu Johnson. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin L. Barker, Assistant Attorney General; Dan E. Armstrong, District Attorney General; and Paul J. Hornick, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION The convictions in this case arose from the July 12, 2022, aggravated assault of Lowell Shaw (the victim) and the theft of $2,000 from his person. Factual and Procedural Background In October 2022, the Hawkins County Grand Jury charged the Defendant with one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; one count of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon (a motor vehicle), a Class C felony; and one count of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class D felony. In August 2024, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the Defendant with one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of aggravated assault by strangulation, a Class C felony. 1 On February 21, 2025, the Defendant entered an “open” plea of guilty to the charges in the superseding indictment.2 At the guilty plea submission hearing, the State indicated that it would rely on the transcript of the co-defendant’s3 trial as the factual basis for the pleas, but that transcript was not entered into evidence. The trial court, which presided over that trial, summarized its recollection of the salient facts: It’s alleged that there was a robbery and that you were a passenger, your [Mr. Green] was driving and the car stopped and you strangled this elderly man and money was taken and then he was taken back to his house unconscious and then he came -- he woke up and he was threatened by [Mr. Green] and then you all fled the scene and you all were arrested. The court added that “[t]here was an accident or something” and that the victim was “in his 80s.” The Defendant agreed that the court’s summary was “the 30,000 foot view of what happened” and pleaded guilty as charged. The trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing for June 18, 2025. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State filed a sentencing memorandum in which it asked the trial court to impose the maximum sentence within the range for both of the Defendant’s convictions and to align them consecutively. In support of its request, the State noted that the victim was eighty-two years old at the time of the offenses and that the Defendant and Chris Green took advantage of the victim by asking to test drive the car that the victim had listed for sale. During the test drive, the Defendant, who was seated behind the victim, strangled the victim with a strap until he lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, the victim was seated in the passenger’s seat of the vehicle, which was parked in the victim’s front yard. His wallet, cell phone, and some $1,800 were missing. Mr. Green, who was still seated in the driver’s seat, threatened the victim, saying, “If you try to leave or call the law, I’ll kill you.” The men then got into the Defendant’s BMW and fled toward Kingsport. The victim went to his son’s house and called 9-1-1. The Defendant led officers on a high-speed chase for ten miles before 1 The State entered a nolle prosequi on the charges of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery and felony evading arrest. 2 An “open” plea is entered without any agreement by the State to take any of the actions described in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). 3 The conspiracy count of the original indictment lists Chris Green as a co-conspirator. -2- crashing into a Hawkin’s County Sheriff’s Office patrol vehicle. A short foot pursuit followed. The Defendant was eventually caught and held by a truck driver. During an interview with the police, the Defendant acknowledged taking the victim’s money during the test drive. The State also noted that a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convicted Mr. Green of robbery and facilitation of aggravated assault. Based upon these facts and the Defendant’s considerable criminal history, the State asked the trial court to impose the maximum Range I sentence for both of the Defendant’s convictions because his previous history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior exceeded that needed to establish his sentencing range, he was a leader in the commission of the offenses, the victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, he allowed the victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty, he had no hesitation about committing a crime featuring a high risk to human life, he had previously been convicted of an offense involving serious bodily injury, and he was on probation at the time of the offenses. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (2), (4), (5), (10), (11), (13). The State asked the court to align the sentences consecutively based on the Defendant’s extensive record of criminal activity, his status as a dangerous offender, and the fact that he was on probation when he committed the offenses in this case. See id. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (4), (6). In his sentencing memorandum, the Defendant requested consecutive sentences of four years for his conviction of aggravated assault to be served at 100 percent and three years for his conviction of robbery to be served on “the strictest probation.” The Defendant recounted a troubled childhood and tumultuous adulthood that included stints of homelessness and the tragic death of his fiancée, with whom he shared two children, in 2019. The Defendant stated that he turned to marijuana and Roxicodone to cope with his troubles and that his drug addiction led to his many misdemeanor convictions. The Defendant met Mr. Green at the Defendant’s mother’s funeral in 2022. Despite that his mother died of a drug overdose in Mr. Green’s front yard, the Defendant began a friendship with Mr. Green, which relationship he claimed led to his convictions in this case. He stated that he had been a model inmate during his incarceration. The Defendant asked the trial court to find in mitigation that he lacked substantial judgment because of his youth, he acted under “duress or ‘the dominion of” Mr. Green, and his tumultuous life and upbringing contributed significantly to the offenses. I. Sentencing Hearing Proof Neither party presented live testimony at the June 18, 2025 sentencing hearing. The presentence report, which was exhibited to the sentencing hearing, includes the following statement of facts taken from the affidavit of complaint: On 07/12/2022 at 1:56 pm[,] I Deputy Ed Rodriguez received a BOLO of a Robbery that had occurred. The suspect vehicle was a blue -3-  BMW with temporary tags traveling east bound on Highway 11W. All available units responded to the last given location of the BMW[,] which was leaving Blevins Rd. and turned on 11W headed East toward Kingsport City. Church Hill City unit #802 Sgt Dustin Dean made contact with the suspect vehicle at Pal’s on 11W and gave chase into the Mount Carmel City limit where all available units gave chase to stop the vehicle. The suspect driving the vehicle intentionally rammed the Hawkins County Sheriff’s vehicle unit #373 Deputy Ernie Rodriguez where both suspect vehicle and sheriff vehicle came to a stop. The passenger later identified as Chris Green surrendered inside the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle later was identified as [the Defendant] who ran from the vehicle and was apprehended by responding officers. . . . I was then dispatched to take a report and statement from the victim who was robbed. On arrival[,] I spoke with [the victim] who stated that he was selling his car . . . and both suspects asked to road test the vehicle. All three went on a road test[,] and on the way back [the victim] was assaulted by both suspects and robbed of his wallet, $200 and $1800 dollars that was in his pocket. Suspects told [the victim] if he called the police they would kill him. [The victim] stated they had a gun and he was in fear for his life. The report also memorializes the Defendant’s written statement to the police following his arrest. In his statement, the Defendant admitted that he and Mr. Green took money from the victim while test driving a vehicle the victim had offered for sale. He denied having a weapon, made no mention of strangling the victim, and said they took the victim back to his house. The Defendant admitted running from the police and striking the patrol car with his vehicle. The presentence report reflects that Mr. Green was convicted of robbery and facilitation of aggravated assault and sentenced to consecutive terms of fifteen years and ten years, respectively. The report also reflects that the Defendant had several prior misdemeanor convictions dating back to 2012, including convictions for marijuana possession, assault, theft, driving on a suspended license, reckless driving, casual exchange, making a false report, domestic violence, and violating the vehicle registration law. The Defendant’s previous sentences of probation had been revoked on seven separate occasions. The Defendant reported previous addictions to alcohol, marijuana, Percocet, and Roxicodone. The State relied on its sentencing memorandum but added that the Defendant’s sentencing memorandum demonstrated that he had “learned nothing from his own experiences.” The State took issue with the Defendant’s attempt to blame his attacking -4- the elderly victim on poor upbringing and addiction. The State asked the trial court to impose a total effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. The Defendant also relied on his sentencing memorandum and asked the trial court to impose consecutive mid-range sentences to be served as four years’ incarceration followed by “the strictest form of probation.” The Defendant pointed to his youth, noting that he was “barely 31,” his tumultuous upbringing, his mother’s drug addiction, his experiences with homelessness, the death of his fiancée, and “his lack of emotional and intellectual maturity” as reasons “underscor[ing] his decision making process.” The Defendant also claimed that Mr. Green, “a career violent felon,” “exercised dominion and control over” him because of his “small stature” and desire for “a male role model.” The Defendant read a prepared statement into the record: Your Honor, my name is Thaddeus Johnson. I’m 31 years old. I live in Kingsport, Tennessee. I’m a single parent of three children, ages four, eight and eleven. Their mother -- the mother to the two oldest children was murdered in 2019. In the same month I lost my mother as well. My oldest two children, my aunt is currently taking care of them. After losing my children and my mother, it led me to using drugs trying to deal with the pain and loss I was feeling in my life. I know there is no excuse for the decisions I made on July the 12th, ‘22. I was not in the right state of mind. My judgment was wrong when I committed the crime that I’m incarcerated for now. I’m truly sorry for all I have done. I ask and I’m begging the court to show me mercy so I can return to my children and be a father to them that I never had in my life growing up. I understand I cannot change the past, all I can do is learn from it and try to show my children the right way to live. Please find it in your heart to give me the opportunity to show the court and my children that I’m a better person. The Defendant also read into the record a letter to the victim: I want to start with off [sic] an apology to Mr. Shaw for all the pain and hardship that I caused in his life for my actions on that awful day. I was under the influence of drugs and was not in my right state of mind when everything happened that day. I not only affected his family, it also affected my family and my life as well. I cannot turn back the times to fix the wrong that I have done that has been done to you. All I can do is take responsibilities for my actions on that day. I do understand there is nothing or anything I can say or do to take away the pain and hardship that I caused you on that day. I’m truly asking and begging you to find in your heart that -5-  one day you can forgive me for all that was done to you. I really hope and understand I’m truly sorry for everything that happened to you. Do not hold this against me any longer. Please find [it] in your heart to forgive me. In response to questioning by the trial court, the Defendant said that he did not know what Mr. Green had done with the money they took from the victim. The trial court did not impose any fines but ordered the Defendant to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $2,200.4 II. Trial Court Findings The trial court applied enhancement factors one, four, five, ten, twelve, and thirteen. See generally T.C.A. § 40-35-114. The trial court carefully recounted the Defendant’s criminal history, which included numerous convictions and probation violations, as well as the fact that the Defendant had pending Sullivan County charges of accessory after the fact, theft, failure to appear, and probation violation, and found that the Defendant had a history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior in addition to that necessary to establish the appropriate sentencing range. See id. § 40-35-114(1). The trial court found that the victim, who was “over 80 years of age at the time of this offense,” was particularly vulnerable because of his age. See id. § 40-35-114(4). The court also found that the Defendant allowed the victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty by strangling him into unconsciousness. See id. § 40-35-114(5). The court further found that the Defendant’s behavior demonstrated no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. See id. § 40-35-114(10). The court observed that the victim indicated in his impact statement that “he was still having trouble with his throat as a result of this strangling” and concluded that the Defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim. See id. § 40-35-114(12). Finally, the trial court found that the Defendant was on probation in Sullivan County when he committed the offenses in this case. See id. § 40-35-114(13). With regard to mitigation, the trial court found that none of the statutorily enumerated factors applied. See generally id. § 40-35-113. As for the “catch-all” factor, the court noted that the Defendant had “shown some remorse” and that the “preacher at the jail” said that the Defendant had “repented.” The trial court then weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors and imposed a sentence of six years for the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault to be served 4 The amount of loss is reported differently in different parts of the record. It is unclear from the record how the trial court arrived at this amount, but the Defendant does not challenge the amount on appeal. -6- at 100 percent by operation of law. See id. § 40-35-501(cc)(2)(B). The trial court imposed a sentence of four years for the Defendant’s conviction of robbery. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively and denied probation. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Analysis In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by “imposing a sentence of six years incarceration at 100% eligibility release followed by four years of 30% eligibility,” arguing that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing and erroneously weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors. The State contends that the trial court properly applied the enhancement and mitigating factors and did not abuse its discretion in the weighing of the factors. We review “sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act,” including “questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence” and to sentence alignment, under an abuse of discretion standard accompanied by “a presumption of reasonableness.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 864 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012); see also State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tenn. 2014). We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness when the trial court fails to consider and weigh the applicable factors and principles, “and the abuse of discretion standard, which merely looks for ‘any substantial evidence’ to support the trial court’s decision, is not appropriate.” See King, 432 S.W.3d at 327-28; Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). The record reflects that although the trial court carefully considered and weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors, it made no findings on the record with regard to sentence alignment or the denial of alternative sentencing. In the “Sentencing Findings of Fact” filed on the day of the sentencing hearing, the trial court checked boxes indicating that it had found that the Defendant had an extensive criminal history and that he was a dangerous offender. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (4). However, the court did not discuss either finding at the sentencing hearing. After pronouncing sentences of six years for aggravated assault and four years for robbery, the trial court stated, “I'm going to make it four consecutive to the six. It’s not going to be probation. You got six at a hundred and you got four at 30.” -7-  Because the record reflects that the trial court failed to consider and weigh the applicable factors, we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness and no longer review the sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. See King, 432 S.W.3d at 328. Having so concluded, we next consider whether to “conduct a de novo review or remand for reconsideration.” Id. Here, the parties briefed the sentencing issues extensively, and the record contains significant information about both the offenses and the Defendant. Thus, the record is more than adequate for a de novo review. I. Enhancement and Mitigating Factors The trial court thoroughly discussed the enhancement and mitigating factors and placed on the record its findings as to each of the factors. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the record supports the application of enhancement factors one, four, ten, and thirteen. The Defendant had an extensive history spanning ten years and dating back to his eighteenth birthday and admitted using illegal drugs, demonstrating that he had a history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior in addition to that necessary to establish his sentencing range. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1). The record also establishes that the victim was particularly vulnerable due to his advanced age. See id. § 40-35- 114(4). “Nothing” mandates that the State “prove that a defendant actually evaluated the vulnerabilities of his victims and then acted to capitalize on those perceived vulnerabilities,” but the record should show that any vulnerability occasioned by age “had some bearing on, or some logical connection to, ‘an inability to resist the crime, summon help, or testify at a later date.’” State v. Lewis, 44 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted). We believe that the proof of this factor, though slim, is sufficient to support an inference that the fact that the victim was more than fifty years older than the Defendant contributed to his being unable to resist the crime. See id. Further, the record is sufficient to support the finding that the Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime that involved a high risk to human life as demonstrated by his strangling the eighty-year-old victim long enough to render him unconscious, establishing that his conduct went beyond that was necessary to support his conviction. See id. § 40-35-114(10); see also id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv). The record also establishes that the Defendant was on probation in Sullivan County when he committed the offenses in this case. See id. § 40-35-114(13). In our view, the record does not support findings that the Defendant treated the victim with “exceptional cruelty” or that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. We also conclude that none of the statutorily enumerated mitigating factors argued by the Defendant apply. Given that he was twenty-nine years old at the time of the offense and thirty-one at the time of sentencing, the Defendant could no longer blame his lack of judgment on his youth. There was no proof that the Defendant “acted under duress or under the dominion” of Mr. Green. Finally, although we sympathize with the -8- Defendant’s difficult childhood, the death of his fiancée, and his struggles with substance abuse and addiction, we cannot conclude that those factors should operate to mitigate the sentence in this case. Accordingly, we find that the applicable factors are more than sufficient to support the sentences of six years for aggravated assault and four years for robbery. II. Consecutive Sentencing Although the Defendant states in his brief that “consecutive sentence is not at issue in this appeal,” he has asked us to review the sentence, and our review demonstrates that the trial court failed to place any findings in the record to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. See Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705 (stating that “if trial courts fail altogether to place on the record any reason for a particular sentence, the appellate courts would be forced to conduct a de novo review). The Sentencing Act mandates that the sentencing court make and place on the record the appropriate statutory findings before imposing consecutive sentences. See State v. Perry, 656 S.W.3d 116, 127-28 (Tenn. 2022) (stating that in addition to the factors enumerated in section 40-35-115(b), the sentencing court must consider the purposes and principles of sentencing described in sections 40-35-102 and -103); King, 432 S.W.3d at 322 (emphasizing “the need for trial courts to ‘place on the record, either orally or in writing, what enhancement or mitigating factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for the sentence, in order to ensure fair and consistent sentencing’”) (citation omitted); see also Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 861 (trial court imposing consecutive sentence pursuant to Code section 40-35-115(b) must “provide[] reasons on the record establishing as least one of the” grounds in the statute); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (trial court imposing consecutive sentencing “shall specify the reasons for this decision”). Because our review is de novo, we are similarly bound to consider these same factors, despite the Defendant’s apparent concession. Consecutive sentences may be imposed when the record establishes at least one of the grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b): (1) The defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted the defendant’s life to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood; (2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive; (3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so declared by a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant’s criminal conduct has been characterized -9-  by a pattern of repetitive or compulsive behavior with heedless indifference to consequences; (4) The defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high; (5) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor with consideration of the aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship between the defendant and victim or victims, the time span of defendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope of the sexual acts and the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to the victim or victims; (6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on probation; (7) The defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt; or (8) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more offenses involving sexual exploitation of an elderly or vulnerable adult with consideration of the aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship between the defendant and victim, the nature and scope of the sexual acts, and the extent of the physical and mental damage to the victim. T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b) (2021); see also Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 861. The State argued for consecutive sentencing based on the Defendant’s extensive criminal record, his status as a dangerous offender, and the fact that he was on probation when he committed the offenses in this case. The trial court made no findings at the sentencing hearing regarding the grounds supporting consecutive sentencing, but the written findings of fact document has check marks beside the factors for the defendant’s extensive criminal history and status as a dangerous offender.5 Our supreme court has consistently held that “before imposing consecutive sentences based upon the dangerous offender classification, trial courts must conclude that the evidence has established that the aggregate sentence is ‘reasonably rela ted to the severity of the offenses’ and ‘necessary in order to protect the public from further 5 Although we encourage trial courts to utilize such documents, we emphasize that they are no substitute for findings made on the record. If the trial court wishes to rely on written findings, more is required than is contained in the form document in the record. - 10 - criminal acts.’” Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995)). The court has also stated that when the trial court fails to make the required Wilkerson findings on the record, generally “the better course is to remand to the trial court for consideration of the Wilkerson requirements” because “the considerations required under Wilkerson involve a fact-intensive inquiry.” Id. at 864. In this case, however, we conclude that a remand is unnecessary because the record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon other grounds. First, the record establishes that the Defendant’s record of criminal activity is extensive. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2). The Defendant committed his first offense at eighteen years old and continued to commit misdemeanor offenses regularly until he committed the serious felony offenses in this case, evincing a criminal record that “is considerable or large in amount, time, space, [and] scope.” Perry, 656 S.W.3d at 128. During his ten years’ criminal activity, the Defendant committed offenses at a general rate of at least one per year, and the offenses included assaultive offenses, drug possession, and continuing to drive even though his driver’s license had been suspended. See id. at 129 (including in list of “non-exclusive considerations” to determine whether offender’s “record of criminal activity is extensive” for purposes of section 40-35- 115(b)(2)” the amount, frequency, and time span of the criminal activity”). In addition to his criminal convictions, the violated sentences of probation seven times. See id. (also permitting sentencing court to consider “[a]ny other fact about the defendant . . . present or prior, that informs the determination”). Second, the record establishes that the Defendant was on probation in Sullivan County when he committed the offenses in this case. See id. 40-35-115(b)(6). Furthermore, the record reflects that the total effective sentence was “justly deserved” in relation to the Defendant’s strangling the eighty-year-old victim until he was unconscious for the purpose of stealing the victim’s money and “no greater than that deserved” based upon the Defendant’s record and the circumstances of the offense. See id. § 40-35-102(1); -103(2); see also Perry, 656 S.W.3d at 128. Accordingly, we conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentences is warranted in this case, and that the aggregate term of ten years is justified. III. Alternative Sentencing The Defendant makes no serious challenge to the denial of alternative sentencing, but because we are conducting a de novo review of the sentence, we will consider the propriety of alternative sentencing. Before ordering a sentence of full confinement, the court must consider the factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1): - 11 -  Sentences involving confinement should be based on the following considerations: (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct; (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant . . . . T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1). Additionally, the court should consider the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation in determining whether to impose an alternative sentence. Id. § 40-35- 103(5). The Defendant asked that any sentence imposed be “suspended to time served and to be served on strictly supervised probation.” A sentence of split confinement is a probationary sentence. See State v. Robinson, 676 S.W.3d 580, 588-89 (Tenn. 2023) (stating that “the language of the split and periodic confinement statutes indicates that probation is a foundational requirement for these sentences” and concluding “that these alternative sentences are probationary sentences.” State v. Robinson, 676 S.W.3d 580, 588–89 (Tenn. 2023); see also Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 280 (Tenn. 2009) (“Split confinement sentences are, by definition, different from sentences of continuous confinement-technically, they are probated sentences.”) (citations omitted). Because the sentence “actually imposed upon the defendant is ten (10) years or less” and because the Defendant does not stand convicted of the offenses enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a)(1), the Defendant is eligible for probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a)(1). Eligibility does not equal entitlement, see id. § 40-35-303(b), and the Defendant bears the burden of establishing that he is suitable for probation, State v. Mounger, 7 S.W.3d 70, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), by demonstrating that probation would “subserve the ends of justice and the best interest[s] of both the public and the defendant,” State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). We also consider the circumstances of the offense; the need for special or general deterrence; and the Defendant’s amenability to correction, criminal and social history, and physical and mental health. See State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2017). Here, the Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing his suitability for probation. His record of criminal activity and failure to comply with sentences involving release in the community suggest that he is not amenable to correction. Similarly, the - 12 - record supports the denial of alternative sentencing based on the Defendant’s record of criminal activity and the recent and frequent unsuccessful application of measures less restrictive than confinement. See T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A), (C). Conclusion Although the trial court erred by failing to place on the record its findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences or the denial of alternative sentencing, our de novo review of the record supports the trial court’s imposition of a total effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. ______s/ Stacy L. Street STACY L. STREET, JUDGE - 13 -