Jacques Cajuste v. People of the Virgin Islands

For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS JACQUES CAJUSTE ) §. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Appellant/Defendant ) Re Super. Ct. Crim. No. 216/2019 ) (STT) v ) PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ) Appellee/Plaintiff. 5 ) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas & St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Denise M. Francois Argued: November 14, 2023 Filed: September 17, 2026 Cite as: 2026 VI 19 BEFORE RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Adam G. Christian, Esq. (Argued) Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, LLC St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellant/Defendant Ian Clement, Esq. (Argued) Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice St. Thomas, U.S.V.1 Michael R. Francisco, Esq Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff. OPINION OF THE COURT CABRET, Associate Justice Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 2 of 58 q 1 Appellant Jacques Cajuste (“Cajuste”) appeals from the January 20, 2023 judgment and commitment of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands (“Superior Court”) memorializing a jury verdict finding him guilty of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Egbert “Manno” Stuart (“Manno”), in violation of title 14, sections 921, 922(a)(1), and 1t(a) of the Virgin Islands Code For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s June 30, 2022 order denying Cajuste’s motion to dismiss the murder charges, as well as several of the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings. Likewise, we affirm the Superior Court’s January 20, 2023 judgment and affirm Cajuste’s conviction of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Manno I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background €2 The evidence and testimony presented at trial established the following facts. On June 22, 2005, Manno’s body was discovered inside the residence he shared with his wife Vivian Stuart (“Stuart”), and their four-year-old autistic son at Heritage Hill Condominiums on St. Thomas, U.S Virgin Islands. Manno was found clad only in briefs, covered in blood from multiple stab wounds to his chest, back, and neck, with a kitchen-type knife approximately one foot in length (an eight inch blade with a four-inch handle) still lodged in his neck. Stuart, who had just returned home from her night shift at the Emerald Beach Resort, was the first to discover the body sometime after 7:15 a.m {3 Several officers from the Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”) responded to the scene. Upon inspecting the apartment, the officers found no signs of forced entry or burglary, and determined that the only point of entry was the front door. Stuart later confirmed that she had locked the door with her keys when she left for work the previous evening, and that only she and Cajuste v. People 2026 V119 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 3 of 58 Manno possessed keys to the home. Manno’s set of keys was found on the countertop when Stuart returned that morning 44 A walkthrough of the residence revealed that the eastern bedroom, where Manno’s body was found, showed signs of a violent struggle, with blood stains and droplets on the walls and floor. In contrast, the western bedroom, used by Stuart, appeared undisturbed q 5 The next day, June 23, 2005, Dr. Fransico Landron (“Dr. Landron”)! performed Manno’s autopsy, with VIPD officers Delbert Phipps (“Officer Phipps”)” and Daphne Rouse Carty (“Officer Carty”)? present. Dr. Landron observed multiple stab wounds, superficial cuts, and defensive wounds on Manno’s extremities. He noted that Manno sustained seven deep stab wounds, all consistent with the kitchen-type knife still embedded in his neck at the time of discovery, none of which exceeded the length of its blade. Dr. Landron concluded that the cause of death was multiple stab wounds inflicted by this kitchen-type knife 46 In the course of the investigation, VIPD officers collected evidence, photographed the crime scene and the morgue proceedings, conducted interviews, and coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) for further forensic testing of DNA evidence. Between 2007 and 2008, the case was transferred from the Major Crimes Team to the Cold Case Squad, where it remained dormant until 2016. In September 2016, following renewed investigation into Manno’s murder, the VIPD located Cajuste in Pennsylvania and brought him back to St. Thomas in connection with the case ' In June 2005, Dr. Landron was the medical examiner for St. Thomas ? In June 2005, Officer Phipps was a detective corporal in the Homicide Division of the Major Crimes Team * In June 2005, Officer Carty was an investigator in the Forensic Unit Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 4 of 58 B. Procedural Background q7 On October 5, 2016, the People of the Virgin Islands (“People”) filed a twelve-count information with the Superior Court against Cajuste (People v. Cajuste, criminal case no. ST-2016 CR-328) and Stuart (People v. Stuart, criminal case no. ST-2016-CR-296), charging them in connection with Manno’s murder.’ The trial court scheduled both matters to commence for joint jury selection and trial on September 16, 2019. However, on September 13, 2019, the People filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice after their motion to continue trial was denied. That same date, the court granted the People’s motion, and both matters were dismissed without prejudice 48 On September 25, 2019, less than two weeks after the dismissal of the 2016 matters, the People filed an eighteen-count information against Cajuste (People v. Cajuste, criminal case no ST-2019-CR-216) and Stuart (People v. Stuart, criminal case no. ST-2019-CR-217), again charging them in connection with Manno’s murder. Specifically, the charges against Cajuste included murder, assault, and related weapons offenses—all alleged under an aiding and abetting theory “9 On December 30, 2019, Cajuste filed a motion to dismiss Counts Two through Six, and Eight of the information—the non-murder charges—based on several grounds, including the expiration of the statute of limitations £10 On January 10, 2020, Cajuste filed a motion to dismiss Counts One and Seven of the information—the murder charges—based on “[t]he fourteen-year delay in bringing these charges “ While Cajuste and Stuart were jointly charged in the same information and subsequently jointly tried before a jury trial, a detailed rendition of the facts of Stuart’s case is unnecessary to our disposition of Cajuste’s appeal and accordingly not included herein. Stuart has also appealed her conviction of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Manno Cajuste v. People 2026 V1 19 S. Ct. Crim, No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 5 of 58 [in] violat[ion] [of his] due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands of 1954, as amended.” 411 On December 30, 2020, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting Cajuste’s December 30, 2019 motion and dismissed with prejudice Counts Two through Six, and Eight (the non-murder charges) of the information based on statute of limitations grounds 412 On June 17, 2021, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing on pending motions, including Cajuste’s January 10, 2020 motion to dismiss the murder charges £13 On June 30, 2022, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order denying Cajuste’s January 10, 2020 motion (“June 30, 2022 Order”). In the order, the Superior Court applied the test this Court established in Rivera v. People, 64 V.1. 540 (V.I. 2016), and reiterated in Ventura v. People, 64 V.1. 589 (V.I. 2016), to determine whether a precharge delay violated a defendant’s right to due process under the federal Constitution, and found that “Cajuste has not met his burden to establish that he has suffered substantial prejudice [caused by the delay] in violation of his due process rights and, thus, the Court need not examine why the government delayed in bringing charges to determine whether a violation of justice has occurred.” {14 On July 18, 2022, the People filed a four-count first amended information against Cajuste and Stuart: Count One (Cajuste)-“FIRST-DEGREE MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), and 11(a); Count Two (Cajuste)-“SECOND-DEGREE MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b), and 11(a) Count Three (Stuart)-“FIRST-DEGREE MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), and 11(a); and Count Four (Stuart)-“SECOND-DEGREE MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b), and 11(a) Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 6 of 58 415 On August 1, 2022, the Superior Court selected a jury and a jury trial took place from August 3 through 5, 2022 and August 8 through 11, 2022 where Cajuste and Stuart were jointly tried {16 At trial, the People presented testimony from the following VIPD officers: Gregory Coward, Delbert Phipps (retired), Daphne Rouse Carty (retired), Roselyn Bedminster (retired), Mario Stout, and Maha Hamdan. The People also presented the following witnesses: Kathryn Jensen-Delugo, Lemuel Houston, Jr., Lisa Toussaint, Leopold Rodriquez, Ishmael Rodriquez, Valerie Daley, Lyndane Jackson, Keisha Baynes, Jeremy Fletcher, and Dr. Landron {17 The Superior Court admitted the following evidence over Cajuste’s objections: (i) the knife used to kill Manno, marked as People’s Exhibit 18 (“Knife”), along with Ishmael Rodriquez’s testimony regarding it; (ii) the report prepared by FBI Agent Jeremy Fletcher (“Agent Fletcher”) containing his DNA testing and analysis of samples collected in connection with Manno’s murder, marked as People’s Exhibit 48 (‘DNA Report”), along with his testimony regarding the report; and (iii) a redacted printout of Roy Lester Schneider Hospital’s (“RLSH”) digital medical records concerning Cajuste’s June 23, 2005 emergency room visit, marked as People’s Exhibit 29 (“RLSH Digital Record”), along with testimony from RLSH record custodian Keisha Baynes (“Custodian Baynes”) regarding the redacted record. The Superior Court orally overruled Cajuste’s objections from the bench and subsequently memorialized in three separate orders entered on August 12, 2022, each of which included the court’s reasoning in greater detail 418 At the close of the People’s case, Cajuste made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 29”) which the court orally denied from the bench and subsequently memorialized in an order entered on August 15, 2022 (“Rule 29 Order”). Thereafter, Cajuste offered no evidence in his defense and rested. Stuart, Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 7 of 58 after she admitted Defendant Stuart’s Exhibit 8—the 911 call record for June 22, 2005—into evidence in her defense, also rested. At the close of all the evidence, Cajuste orally renewed his Rule 29 motion, which the court denied from the bench £19 The jury found Cajuste guilty of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Manno, as charged in Count One of the first amended information. On January 13, 2023, Cajuste appeared before the Superior Court for a sentencing hearing. On January 20, 2023, the Superior Court entered a judgment and commitment (“January 20, 2023 Judgment”) in which the court adjudged that Cajuste was “convicted of Count [One] of the First Amended Information to wit: First Degree Murder—Aiding and Abetting in violation of Title 14, § § 921 922(a)(1) and 11(a),” and ordered inter alia, “that for said conviction [Cajuste] is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections and imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life without parole” and “that Count 2 of the First Amended information...is dismissed.” (Emphasis omitted) €20 On February 13, 2023, Cajuste filed a timely notice of appeal Hf. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction 421 “The Supreme Court [has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law.” 4 V.I.C. § 32(a) Because the Superior Court's January 20, 2023 Judgment and Commitment was a final judgment, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Browne v. People, 56 V.1. 207, 216 (V.I. 2012); see also Gonsalves v. People, 2019 VI 4, { 34 (“In a criminal case, the written judgment embodying the adjudication of guilt and sentence imposed based on that adjudication constitutes a Final [Judgment] for purposes of 4 V.I.C. § 32(a).”) (citing Percival v. People, 62 V.1. 477, 483 (V.I 2015)) Cajustev. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 8 of 58 B. Overview of Issues 22 On appeal, Cajuste asserts the following assignments of error for our review: (i) the Superior Court erred when it denied his January 10, 2020 motion to dismiss Counts One and Seven of the information—the murder charges—in violation of his due process rights; (ii) the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal when there was insufficient evidence to sustain Cajuste’s conviction for first-degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory; and (iii) the Superior Court erred when it admitted the following evidence over his objections: the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) and Ishmael Rodriquez’s testimony concerning the same; Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and his testimony concerning the same; and the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) and Custodian Baynes’ testimony concerning the same C. Standard of Review 923 The standard of review for examining the Superior Court's application of law—including constitutional questions—is plenary, while factual findings are reviewed for clear error. St Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.1. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007); see also Allen v. HOVENSA, L.L.C., 59 V.1. 430, 436 (V.E. 2013) (citing Daniel, 49 V.I. at, 329) 424 “When [an] appellant[ ] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial ... all issues of credibility within the province of the jury must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government. The reviewing court must be particularly deferential when determining whether a jury verdict rests on insufficient evidence [and] may not usurp the role of the jury by re-weighing the evidence and re-assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Thomas v. Gov't of the V.I., 2022 VI 22, {| 9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Powell v. People, 2019 VI 2, 4 52 (Swan, J., concurring in judgment) (“Any concern with the credibility of witnesses and weighing Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 9 of 58 of evidence is not for this Court to second guess.”). “The trial court is required to ‘draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict.’” People v. Clarke, 55 V.1. 473, 477 (V.I. 2011) (quoting United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996)); see Ponce v. People, 2020 VI 2, 1 16 (observing that “this court...also grants the People the benefit of all reasonable inferences”) (citing Clarke, 55 V.I. at 477)) 425 “We must affirm a jury's verdict as long as substantial evidence was presented at trial to allow a rational trier of fact to convict when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the People. Therefore, a finding of insufficiency of the evidence should be confined to those cases in which the prosecution's failure to establish the elements of the crime is clear.” Canton v. People, 61 V.I. 511, 515-16 (V.I. 2014) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a]n appellant who seeks to overturn a conviction on insufficiency of the evidence grounds bears a very heavy burden.” Thomas v. People, 69 V.I. 913, 926 (V.I. 2018) (citations omitted); see Powell, 2019 VI 2, § 51 (Swan, J concurring in judgment) (noting that “when an appellant seeks to have his conviction overturned for lack of evidence, he bears a heavy burden” and emphasizing that “{t]his standard of review is highly deferential to the jury's verdict and [is] formidable,” insofar as “defendants challenging convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an uphill battle’) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) {26 Finally, we generally review trial court decisions concerning the admission and exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Castillo v. People, 59 V1. 240, 254 (V.I. 2013) (citing Billu v People, 57 V.1. 455, 461 (V.I. 2012); see also Davis v. People, 2022 VI 8, 4 31 (Swan, J concurring in judgment) (“Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for abuse of discretion.”) (citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion arises only when the decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 58 Streibich v. Underwood, 2021 V1 3, § 17. However, when a ruling on the admission of evidence implicates the interpretation of a legal standard, our review is plenary. /d.; see also Corriette v Morales, 50 V.I. 202, 205 (V.I. 2008) D. Whether the Superior Court Erred in Denying Cajuste’s Motion to Dismiss the Murder Charges 427 On appeal, Cajuste argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the murder charges in the following ways. First, the court committed error when it only addressed his due process argument in the context of the federal Constitution and not in the context of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 (“ROA”), the Virgin Islands’ de facto constitution. Specifically, citing to Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I, Inc., 2019 VI 17, for support, Cajuste argues that because the language in the beginning of clause 3 of ROA § 3—“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law’—‘“does not appear in either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, [it] must be given effect and indicates that ROA § 3 provides criminal defendants with greater due process protections than its federal counterparts.” Cajuste points out that “the trial court did not address this argument on the merits, but, rather, adopted federal cases addressing pre-charging delay solely under federal law and this Court’s holdings in Rivera [] and Ventura [}. . which both predate(d] Balboni [and] discussed pre-charging due process standards solely through the prism of federal law 428 Alternatively, Cajuste argues that even under the test we articulated in Rivera, the court still erred because “this record also establishes sufficient prejudice and unexplained delay under the federal due process clause.” Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 11 of 58 429 Cajuste also argues that his due process rights were violated because the Superior Court (1) took almost two years to rule on his fully briefed motion to dismiss° and (2) “failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion” despite his request 1. The People’s Precharge Delay Cajuste’s Due Process Argument Pursuant to Clause 3, Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 430 After reviewing the record, this Court cannot conclude that Cajuste adequately presented his argument that the precharge delay encountered in this proceeding violated his right to due process under clause 3 of ROA § 3, which “provides criminal defendants with greater due process protections than its federal counterparts.” 431 In his January 20, 2020 motion to dismiss, Cajuste failed to explicitly mention clause 3 of ROA § 3. Instead, he simply stated that “[pJursuant to Section 3 of the ROA and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Mr. Cajuste is entitled to due process of the law.” (J.A. 092). In fact, in his motion, Cajuste himself quoted to this Court’s test in Rivera for federal due process claims to argue that the precharge delay violated his right to due process (J.A. 093); Cajuste did not mention Balboni £32 Then, in his two-page reply to the People’s opposition, for the first time, Cajuste pointed out that ROA § 3 contains language not found in the United States Constitution and referenced specifically the following sentence in clause 3 of ROA § 3—“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.” He argued in his reply that “[t]his language is * In his brief, Cajuste points out that his motion was filed “on January 10, 2020, and it was fully ees by April 17, 2020,” and “[y]et, the trial court did not rule on this motion until June 30 Cajuste v. People 2026 V1 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 12 of 58 [sic] implicates a more stringent review than federal due process analysis” and the court “must give effect to this language in ROA.” However, without any explanation or further development of his argument, Cajuste simply cited Balboni® to support his contention that the due process guaranty under clause 3 of ROA § 3 provides greater protection than the federal due process guaranty. (J.A. 184-85) 433 Subsequently at the June 17, 2021 hearing, Cajuste reiterated the ROA argument he raised for the first time in his reply by, again, arguing it in a superficial manner. Cajuste stated that “...under Balboni, it is the precedent from our Supreme Court that it extends protection greater than those of the 5th and 14th Amendments” but he acknowledged that “[t]hat may not be across the board, but certainly that’s an issue to be noted.” Nevertheless, despite the fact that he correctly recognized that this Court’s holding in Balboni was limited, Cajuste concluded—without providing any explanation or further development of his argument—that “under Balboni, the Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act and the section [he] just quoted [No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law”], puts a higher burden on the People.”’ ® In Balboni, this Court concluded that our equal protection clause under clause 1 of ROA §3 “No law shall be enacted in the Virgin Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person therein equal protection of the laws” conferred greater rights than the federal equal protection clause, and thus this Court did not reach the issue of whether the ROA conferred greater rights than the federal due process clause. See 2019 VI 17, 4 60 n.55 (“Because we conclude that section 555 is invalid pursuant to the equal protection clause of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, we need not decide whether it also violates the due process clause of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, or if it is unconstitutional under the Fifth, Seventh, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”) 7 The relevant excerpt from the transcript reads as follows ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN Clearly, the pre-information delay has prejudiced Mr Cajuste, and in the absence of an explanation from the People as to what happened—and there’s none in the record—there’s a violation of section 3 of the Revised Organic Act which states, “no persons shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 13 of 58 434 Inthe June 30, 2022 Order, the court noted that Cajuste, “{rjelying upon Balboni, [] argues that the Revised Organic Act guarantee of due process that ‘[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process prior to being charged’ implicates a more stringent view than the federal due process analysis,” but pointed out that Cajuste did not “articulate what this stricter view should be” and concluded that “[s]uch an argument is an insufficient basis for this Court to depart from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands holding in Ventura....” Tellingly, the order contained no discussion of Cajuste’s analysis—-because Cajuste provided none—in support of his argument that ROA § 3 conferred upon criminal defendants greater due process protections than its federal counterparts based on the language in clause 3 of ROA § 3 935 Cajuste’s vague, perfunctory presentation of this argument deprived the Superior Court of the opportunity to consider and rule on this issue in any detail. “The rules that require a litigant to brief and support his arguments before the Superior Court, are not mere formalistic requirements. They exist to give the Superior Court the opportunity to consider, review, and address an argument[.}” Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272, 280 (V.I. 2012). That an issue adverted to in a cursory manner unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation does not And that’s a phrase not found in the Federal Constitution. My research indicates it’s been found in maybe three other states in that precise language, but under Balboni, that language must mean something. And we submit that under the circumstances of this case, absent an explanation in the record by the People for this extensive delay in bringing this matter or charging Mr. Cajuste, that his due process rights under the Revised Organic Act Section 3 have been violated, as well as under the 14th Amendment to the U.S Constitution, and that this matter should be dismissed THE COURT: Doesn’t People versus — Rivera versus People require a showing of substantial prejudice? ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN: Well, that is the standard that has been adopted using Sth Amendment standards. I believe under Balboni, the Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act and the section I just quoted, puts a higher burden on the People (J.A. 229-30) Cajuste v, People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 14 of 58 adequately preserve said issue on appeal is a well-established principle. See Richards v. Pub Emps. Relations Bd., 2024 VI 37, 4 46 n.31 (“It is not the Court's job to research and construct legal arguments open to parties ... In order to develop a legal argument effectively, the facts at issue must be bolstered by relevant legal authority; a perfunctory and undeveloped assertion is inadequate.”) (quoting V.[. Taxi Ass'n v. West Indian Co., Super. Ct. Civ. No. 551/2016, 2016 V.I LEXIS 170, at *4 (V.1. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2016) (unpublished; citation omitted)). Thus, Cajuste’s argument as to his due process rights under clause 3 of ROA § 3 is deemed waived.’ See V.I.R App. P. 4(h) (“Only issues and arguments fairly presented to the Superior Court may be presented for review on appeal.”); see also, V.I. R. App. P. 22(m) (“Issues that were (1) not raised or objected to before the Superior Court, (2) raised or objected to but not briefed, or (3) are only adverted to in a perfunctory manner or unsupported by argument and citation to legal authority, are deemed waived for purposes of appeal, except that the Supreme Court, at its option, may notice an error not presented that affects substantial rights.”’) 8 We note that the People did not raise the issue of Cajuste’s waiver on appeal. Cf Simpson v Golden, 56 V1. 272, 281 n.6 (V.I. 2012) (discussing “waiver of waiver” doctrine). But Rule 4(h) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure—which provides that an argument must have been “fairly presented” to the Superior Court in order to be raised on appeal—is among the small class of claims-processing rules that “implicate[] judicial interest beyond those of the parties” and that we may invoke sua sponte, Mustafa v. Camacho, 59 V.1. 566, 571 n.2 (V.I. 2013). As explained above, Cajuste did not present his ROA § 3 argument below Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 15 of 58 Cajuste’s Due Process Argument Pursuant to the Federal Constitution’ £36 This Court established the following test to evaluate whether a precharge delay violates a defendant’s right to due process under the federal Constitution: “once a defendant has proved substantial prejudice to his defense, the government must justify its delay, and this explanation will be balanced against the prejudice the defendant suffered due to the delay to determine whether a violation of justice has occurred.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 576; see Ventura, 64 VI. at 609 (“[W]e join the minority of jurisdictions and hold that once a defendant has proved substantial prejudice from the delay, the burden shifts to the People to explain the delay.”). In Rivera, we explained that “[i]n so doing, we recognize the Territory's right to investigate and prosecute cases according to its own agenda and ability, and that it has limited resources and must prioritize the cases it pursues” and that “[w]e only caution against misuse of its time and agenda to the extent that an unreasonable delay violates a criminal defendant's Constitutional right to due process.” 64 V.I. at 576 437 “This [burden of proving substantial prejudice] is a heavy burden because it requires not only that a defendant show actual prejudice, as opposed to mere speculative prejudice, but also that he show that any actual prejudice was substantial—that he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend against the state's charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal * Cajuste pursued his federal due process claim in the trial court. On appeal, however, he switched to due process under ROA § 3 and, in a single sentence, asserted that the record “also” establishes a due process violation “under the federal due process clause.” (Appellant’s Br. 17.) Because Cajuste’s treatment of the federal claim on appeal was “perfunctory,” we could deem the claim waived. See V.I.R. App. P. 22(m). And while Cajuste’s reply brief discusses the federal claim more thoroughly, “mak[ing] no arguments regarding [a claim] until [one’s] reply brief’ constitutes waiver. Webster v. People, 60 V.I. 666, 679 (V.I. 2014). (See Appellant’s Reply Br. 9-11.) Nevertheless, we will “exercise [our] discretion to address the merits” of Cajuste’s federal claim, especially since there is no doubt that he raised this claim below, unlike the ROA § 3 claim. Smith v. Henley, 67 V.1. 965, 976 n.9 (V.I. 2017); see Bryan v. V.I. WAPA, 2024 VI 30, 4 52 n.48 Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 16 of 58 proceeding was likely affected.” Ventura, 64 V.I. at 611 (quoting Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases)). “[A]ctual prejudice may be shown through loss—attributed to the delay—of specific witnesses or documents that would have provided information unavailable through other sources.”!° Jd., at 611-12 (citing Carty v. People, 56 V.I. 345, 367-68 (V.I. 2012) (finding no actual prejudice where defendant offered no evidence that a favorable witness actually existed); Francis v. People, 63 V.1. 724, 754 (V.I. 2015); United States v. Jackson, 446 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no actual prejudice where defendant's claim of deleted computer files did not specify with particularity the exculpatory nature of the files); Jones, 94 F.3d at 908). “Speculation about possible lost evidence is insufficient to support a Fifth Amendment due process violation.” See Ventura, 64 V.I. at 612 (collecting cases) 438 In his brief, Cajuste first points to the death of Iris Adina Brady (“Mrs. Brady”)—the mother of Leopold Rodriquez (“L. Rodriquez”) and Ishmael Rodriquez’s (“I. Rodriquez”)—and notes: (i) “[a]t trial, [the People] attempted to establish a butcher knife allegedly missing from Mrs Brady’s home, where [Cajuste] purportedly resided at the time of Manno’s murder, was the murder weapon”; (ii) “Ishmael Rodriquez testified at trial he only learned this information from his '© Cajuste—rather than citing cases from this Court—cites to State v. Zimbeck, 961 N.E.2d 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), an Ohio Court of Appeals case, to support his argument that he sustained actual prejudice because “key witnesses have died, memories have faded, and evidence has been lost.” 961 N.E.2d. at 1147. However, Cajuste’s reference to Zimbeck was incomplete. Cajuste fails to acknowledge that the Zimbeck court, like this Court, similarly requires more than speculative losses to show actual, substantial prejudice the defendant sustained as result of the delay To prove actual prejudice, a defendant must show, by concrete proof, the exculpatory value of any alleged missing evidence. In other words, a defendant must show how lost witnesses, memories and physical evidence would have proven the defendant's asserted defense. A showing based on mere speculation will not be found sufficient, and a court may not presume prejudice where a delay has been lengthy Id., 961 N.E.2d at 1147-48. As this Court explains below, Cajuste failed to meet his burden of showing actual prejudice Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 17 of 58 mother’; and (iii) he “did not have any opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Brady, the source of this information, at trial or even interview her prior to trial.” 439 Cajuste next points to the loss of the handwritten medical records of his June 23, 2005 RLSH emergency room visit (“Written Record”) and notes: (i) the People “attempted to argue [Cajuste] gave inconsistent accounts about the source of the laceration on his left arm”; and (ii) the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) introduced at trial “was not a copy of the actual emergency record, but only a reproduction of the same that was not a true and exact copy of the original [Written Record, which] was not available for trial because it was destroyed in the 2017 hurricanes.” 40 Here, Cajuste’s argument amounts to a claim that the evidence would have been different absent the delay, without identifying any specific prejudice he claims to have suffered as a result of the delay. In other words, Cajuste’s argument hinges on a speculative loss of evidence rather than demonstrating actual prejudice—let alone substantial prejudice—resulting from the absence of Mrs. Brady’s testimony and the RLSH Written Record. He fails to identify any concrete exculpatory information that Mrs. Brady’s testimony or the RLSH Written Record would have provided or to show that such information could not have been obtained from other sources. In fact, the information that would have been provided by Mrs. Brady was available through | Rodriquez, and the content of the RLSH Written Record was reflected in the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29). See Ventura, 64 V.I. at 611-12 941 According to his brief, Cajuste seems to argue that Mrs. Brady would have testified that a knife was missing from her kitchen in June 2005, but that her death rendered her unavailable for cross-examination, thereby prejudicing him. Although Cajuste claims that I. Rodriquez, who lived with his mother during the relevant period, learned of this information solely from her, I Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007 Opinion of the Court Page 18 of 58 Rodriquez’s testimony indicates that he had personal knowledge of a knife missing from her kitchen in June 2005. At trial, I. Rodriquez testified that he was aware that a homicide occurred at the end of June 2005. When presented with the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18), he recognized it as “one of [his] mother’s cutlery” because “[he] just know that it was one of hers among the many knives that she used to keep for cooking.” When asked whether he had “see[n] that [Knife (People’s Exhibit 18)] in [his] mother’s home after [he] learned of the homicide,” I. Rodriquez responded “no.” Cajuste had the opportunity to cross-examine I. Rodriquez and did so 442 On the other hand, Cajuste did not clearly identify what information the RLSH Written Record would have contained that became unavailable due to its destruction by the 2017 hurricanes. Nor did he explain how this loss pr