Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Dean Troy Stevens, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-000648 Appeal From Bamberg County Courtney Clyburn Pope, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-475 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Senior Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor John William Weeks, of Aiken, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Dean Troy Stevens appeals his convictions for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime and concurrent sentences of forty years' imprisonment for murder and five years' imprisonment for the weapon charge. On appeal, Stevens argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement made to law enforcement. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold the trial court did not err by denying Stevens's motion to suppress his police statements because they were voluntarily made and were not induced by promises of leniency. See State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 510-11, 702 S.E.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 2010) ("On appeal, the trial [court]'s ruling as to the voluntariness of the confession will not be disturbed unless so erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v. Myers, 359 S.C. 40, 47, 596 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004))); State v. Parker, 381 S.C. 68, 74, 671 S.E.2d 619, 622 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning voluntariness, [an appellate court] does not reevaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence." (quoting State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001))); State v. Miller, 441 S.C. 106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023) ("[T]he question of voluntariness presents a mixed question of law and fact."); id. ("[An appellate court] will review the trial court's findings regarding voluntariness for any evidentiary support. However, the ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on those facts, a statement was voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo review."); State v. Peake, 291 S.C. 138, 139, 352 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1987) ("The test for determining the admissibility of a statement is whether it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 565, 647 S.E.2d 144, 164 (2007) ("A criminal defendant is deprived of due process if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession."). We hold the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) agent's statements did not constitute coercive police activity. See State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 386, 652 S.E.2d 444, 452 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a statement is not voluntary."); id. ("Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect."); State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (stating a "confession may not be 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] obtained by the exertion of improper influence'" (alterations in original) (quoting Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976))); State v. Von Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 244, 471 S.E.2d 689, 695 (1996) ("It is generally recognized that the police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting a statement from a suspect. . . . These ploys may play a part in the suspect's decision to confess, but so long as that decision is a product of the suspect's own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is voluntary." (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir. 1986)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 832 S.E.2d 575 (2019). Viewing the SLED agent's statements from Stevens's perspective, the statements were a psychological tactic rather than a promise of leniency. See State v. Arrowood, 375 S.C. 359, 369, 652 S.E.2d 438, 443 (Ct. App. 2007) (concluding the defendant's statements were made "in the mere 'hope' of leniency based on his cooperation, rather than as the consequence of promises"); State v. Hillary, 441 S.C. 239, 252, 892 S.E.2d 541, 548 (Ct. App. 2023) (concluding officers did not appear to promise leniency but, at most, assured the defendant "they would put in the proverbial good word for him— that they would not 'hang [the defendant] out to f***** dry' when they talked to prosecutors"); cf. Peake, 291 S.C. at 138-39, 352 S.E.2d at 488 (holding an officer stating the death penalty would not be sought was a promise of leniency that induced the defendant to give a statement). Further, we hold that under the totality of the circumstances, Stevens's statements were made voluntarily. See State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession."); State v. Collins, 435 S.C. 31, 45, 864 S.E.2d 914, 921 (Ct. App. 2021) (stating factors to consider in the totality-of-circumstances analysis include "the youth of the accused, his lack of education or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep" (quoting Pittman, 373 S.C. at 566, 647 S.E.2d at 164)), aff'd as modified, 442 S.C. 444, 900 S.E.2d 426 (2024); id. at 46, 864 S.E.2d at 921 (stating other factors to consider are "background, experience, and conduct of the accused; age; length of custody; police misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; threats of violence; and promises of leniency" (quoting Miller, 375 S.C. at 386, 652 S.E.2d at 452)); id. at 43, 864 S.E.2d at 920 ("If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but chose to make a statement anyway, the 'burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.'" (quoting State v. Childs, 299 S.C. 471, 475, 385 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1989))). AFFIRMED.1 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.