State v. Terron G. Dizzley
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2022-000671
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Terron G. Dizzley, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2022-000671
Appeal From Georgetown County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-493
Submitted October 2, 2026 β Filed November 18, 2026
AFFIRMED
William G. Yarborough, III, of WGY Law, of Greenville,
for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Attorney General
Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Melody J. Brown, and Assistant Attorney General
Julianna E. Battenfield, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Georgetown, all for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellant Terron G. Dizzley was convicted of murder following
a retrial after his first trial ended in a mistrial. Following his conviction, he filed
an "Emergency Petition for Ex Parte Motion of Terron Dizzley Pursuant to
Immediate Release, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Court's
Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence" (the October 2021 motion), claiming, among other
things, that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the mistrial was
declared without manifest necessity and that the first trial judge's remarks to the
deadlocked jury amounted to a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the
motion. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A grand jury indicted Appellant for murder. His first trial took place from
August 27 through August 28, 2012. After the jury at the first trial reported it was
deadlocked, the judge gave an Allen charge. 1 When the jury remained unable to
reach a verdict, the judge told the jurors that their inability to agree was not a failure
but "a strong message to the [State] that [it was] unable to meet [its] burden of proof."
He further explained that the court would declare a mistrial and that the State would
decide whether to ultimately dismiss the charge or retry Appellant. He then
discharged the jury and declared a mistrial.
Appellant was retried before a new judge from March 31 through April 3,
2014. The new jury found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to thirty-five
years' imprisonment. Appellant thereafter moved for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion.
On June 18, 2014, Appellant filed a direct appeal but later, through counsel,
voluntarily dismissed it with prejudice. His motion for voluntary dismissal
specifically stated that he sought dismissal in order to pursue an application for
post-conviction relief (PCR). This court granted the request and sent the remittitur
on August 4, 2015.
Appellant filed an application for PCR asserting numerous grounds for relief,
including ineffective assistance of counsel, after-discovered evidence, and
cumulative error. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied and
dismissed the PCR application with prejudice. Appellant filed a notice of appeal.
1
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
The supreme court ultimately dismissed the PCR appeal for failure to serve and file
a petition for a writ of certiorari.
On October 28, 2021, after the PCR appeal was dismissed by the supreme
court, Appellant, joined by his mother, Gwendolyn B. Frasier, and his wife,
LaQuesha Felder, as purported co-petitioners, filed the October 2021 motion with
the trial court. The motion sought Appellant's immediate release and asserted
several grounds on which Appellant claimed his conviction and continued
confinement were unlawful. Relevant to this appeal, Appellant raised double
jeopardy for the first time. First, Appellant contended that the trial judge's remark
that the hung jury sent the State a strong message that it had failed to meet its burden
of proof constituted a judgment of acquittal. Second, Appellant argued that the trial
judge improvidently declared a mistrial without adequately considering alternatives
or determining that manifest necessity required termination of the trial and thus,
jeopardy attached. On either theory, Appellant maintained that the circumstances
terminating his first trial barred the State from retrying him.
On April 12, 2022, the trial court denied the October 2021 motion. In its
order, the court concluded that because "a review of the motion and supporting
documents indicate that [Appellant's] first trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury
failed to reach a unanimous verdict," jeopardy did not attach and Appellant's right
against double jeopardy was not violated by the retrial.
On April 25, 2022, Appellant filed an "Emergency Motion to Alter or Amend"
asking the trial court to reconsider its April 12 order. Before the trial court ruled on
that motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the October 2021
motion with this court. This court initially dismissed the appeal as untimely but later
reinstated it and remanded the matter for the trial court to rule on the reconsideration
motion.
On November 17, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the reconsideration
motion and denied the motion. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We construe the October 2021 motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Brawley v. Richland County, 445 S.C. 80, 101, 911 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ct. App. 2025),
reh'g denied (Jan. 28, 2025), cert. denied (June 3, 2025) ("'The substance of the relief
sought,' not the form, is typically what matters." (citation modified)). We do so
because Appellant repeatedly sought immediate release from his confinement rather
than a new trial or other interim relief in his October 2021 motion. For example, the
motion stated, "A second trial judgment[] and sentence poses no authority for the
South Carolina Department of Corrections to hold [Appellant] in prison for the same
offense and [Appellant] 'must' be discharged." It further stated, "For the foregoing
reasons, [Appellant]'s second trial[] of 2014, was barred by the Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy Clause, therefore, [Appellant] must be immediately released from
false imprisonment for over eight years and counting." At the November 2022
hearing, Appellant's counsel likewise described the filing as "an emergency petition
to have [Appellant] released from prison because he's being held under a double
jeopardy standard." The motion to alter or amend reiterated that position, asserting
that Appellant "'must' be discharged" and "must be immediately released from
imprisonment." See Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 40, 495 S.E.2d 426, 427 (1998)
(noting habeas corpus is a petition that "test[s] the legality of the prisoner's present
detention").
A habeas corpus petition "present[s] a material issue of fact for determination
by the lower court." Ross v. State, 250 S.C. 442, 445, 158 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1967).
Appellate review is limited to determining "whether there was evidence to sustain
the findings made by the trial judge." Id. at 445β46, 158 S.E.2d at 648.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
"Habeas corpus is available only when other remedies . . . are inadequate or
unavailable." Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495 S.E.2d at 428. It therefore does not
ordinarily provide a means to circumvent an available avenue of direct or collateral
review. See id.
Here, both double jeopardy theories asserted in the October 2021 motion arose
entirely from events that occurred at the first trial and therefore were available for
appellate review following Appellant's second trial. Appellant filed a PCR petition
but did not raise the double jeopardy claims there. Because Appellant had an
available avenue for obtaining review of these claims and chose not to pursue it,
habeas corpus does not provide an alternative means to obtain the review he
relinquished. See Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 46, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1998)
(providing that habeas corpus may not be used "as a substitute for appeal or other
remedial procedure for the correction of errors for which a criminal defendant had
an opportunity to avail himself").
In light of our disposition that the October 2021 motion did not afford
Appellant a basis for obtaining the relief he sought, we decline to address Appellant's
remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing that "appellate court need not
address remaining issues when [resolution] of prior issue is dispositive").
AFFIRMED.2
GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.