Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Terron G. Dizzley, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2022-000671 Appeal From Georgetown County Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-493 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 18, 2026 AFFIRMED William G. Yarborough, III, of WGY Law, of Greenville, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody J. Brown, and Assistant Attorney General Julianna E. Battenfield, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Georgetown, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Appellant Terron G. Dizzley was convicted of murder following a retrial after his first trial ended in a mistrial. Following his conviction, he filed an "Emergency Petition for Ex Parte Motion of Terron Dizzley Pursuant to Immediate Release, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Court's Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence" (the October 2021 motion), claiming, among other things, that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the mistrial was declared without manifest necessity and that the first trial judge's remarks to the deadlocked jury amounted to a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A grand jury indicted Appellant for murder. His first trial took place from August 27 through August 28, 2012. After the jury at the first trial reported it was deadlocked, the judge gave an Allen charge. 1 When the jury remained unable to reach a verdict, the judge told the jurors that their inability to agree was not a failure but "a strong message to the [State] that [it was] unable to meet [its] burden of proof." He further explained that the court would declare a mistrial and that the State would decide whether to ultimately dismiss the charge or retry Appellant. He then discharged the jury and declared a mistrial. Appellant was retried before a new judge from March 31 through April 3, 2014. The new jury found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant thereafter moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. On June 18, 2014, Appellant filed a direct appeal but later, through counsel, voluntarily dismissed it with prejudice. His motion for voluntary dismissal specifically stated that he sought dismissal in order to pursue an application for post-conviction relief (PCR). This court granted the request and sent the remittitur on August 4, 2015. Appellant filed an application for PCR asserting numerous grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel, after-discovered evidence, and cumulative error. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied and dismissed the PCR application with prejudice. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. 1 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). The supreme court ultimately dismissed the PCR appeal for failure to serve and file a petition for a writ of certiorari. On October 28, 2021, after the PCR appeal was dismissed by the supreme court, Appellant, joined by his mother, Gwendolyn B. Frasier, and his wife, LaQuesha Felder, as purported co-petitioners, filed the October 2021 motion with the trial court. The motion sought Appellant's immediate release and asserted several grounds on which Appellant claimed his conviction and continued confinement were unlawful. Relevant to this appeal, Appellant raised double jeopardy for the first time. First, Appellant contended that the trial judge's remark that the hung jury sent the State a strong message that it had failed to meet its burden of proof constituted a judgment of acquittal. Second, Appellant argued that the trial judge improvidently declared a mistrial without adequately considering alternatives or determining that manifest necessity required termination of the trial and thus, jeopardy attached. On either theory, Appellant maintained that the circumstances terminating his first trial barred the State from retrying him. On April 12, 2022, the trial court denied the October 2021 motion. In its order, the court concluded that because "a review of the motion and supporting documents indicate that [Appellant's] first trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict," jeopardy did not attach and Appellant's right against double jeopardy was not violated by the retrial. On April 25, 2022, Appellant filed an "Emergency Motion to Alter or Amend" asking the trial court to reconsider its April 12 order. Before the trial court ruled on that motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the October 2021 motion with this court. This court initially dismissed the appeal as untimely but later reinstated it and remanded the matter for the trial court to rule on the reconsideration motion. On November 17, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the reconsideration motion and denied the motion. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW We construe the October 2021 motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Brawley v. Richland County, 445 S.C. 80, 101, 911 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ct. App. 2025), reh'g denied (Jan. 28, 2025), cert. denied (June 3, 2025) ("'The substance of the relief sought,' not the form, is typically what matters." (citation modified)). We do so because Appellant repeatedly sought immediate release from his confinement rather than a new trial or other interim relief in his October 2021 motion. For example, the motion stated, "A second trial judgment[] and sentence poses no authority for the South Carolina Department of Corrections to hold [Appellant] in prison for the same offense and [Appellant] 'must' be discharged." It further stated, "For the foregoing reasons, [Appellant]'s second trial[] of 2014, was barred by the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, therefore, [Appellant] must be immediately released from false imprisonment for over eight years and counting." At the November 2022 hearing, Appellant's counsel likewise described the filing as "an emergency petition to have [Appellant] released from prison because he's being held under a double jeopardy standard." The motion to alter or amend reiterated that position, asserting that Appellant "'must' be discharged" and "must be immediately released from imprisonment." See Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 40, 495 S.E.2d 426, 427 (1998) (noting habeas corpus is a petition that "test[s] the legality of the prisoner's present detention"). A habeas corpus petition "present[s] a material issue of fact for determination by the lower court." Ross v. State, 250 S.C. 442, 445, 158 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1967). Appellate review is limited to determining "whether there was evidence to sustain the findings made by the trial judge." Id. at 445–46, 158 S.E.2d at 648. LAW AND ANALYSIS "Habeas corpus is available only when other remedies . . . are inadequate or unavailable." Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495 S.E.2d at 428. It therefore does not ordinarily provide a means to circumvent an available avenue of direct or collateral review. See id. Here, both double jeopardy theories asserted in the October 2021 motion arose entirely from events that occurred at the first trial and therefore were available for appellate review following Appellant's second trial. Appellant filed a PCR petition but did not raise the double jeopardy claims there. Because Appellant had an available avenue for obtaining review of these claims and chose not to pursue it, habeas corpus does not provide an alternative means to obtain the review he relinquished. See Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 46, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1998) (providing that habeas corpus may not be used "as a substitute for appeal or other remedial procedure for the correction of errors for which a criminal defendant had an opportunity to avail himself"). In light of our disposition that the October 2021 motion did not afford Appellant a basis for obtaining the relief he sought, we decline to address Appellant's remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing that "appellate court need not address remaining issues when [resolution] of prior issue is dispositive"). AFFIRMED.2 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.