Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0446n.06 No. 26-1195 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 05, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) MARCELL ANTONIO TILLMAN, DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges. LARSEN, Circuit Judge. The district court sentenced Marcell Tillman to 24 months’ imprisonment after revoking his supervised release for a second time. Tillman challenges the term of imprisonment as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We AFFIRM. I. In 2022, Marcell Tillman pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 15 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years’ supervised release. Tillman was released from custody and began his term of supervised release in August 2023. Tillman didn’t stay out of trouble for long. Just over a month later, the probation department filed a petition for revocation of supervised release. The petition alleged four violations of Tillman’s release terms stemming from his stay at a re-entry center, a requirement for the first three months after his release from prison. The petition alleged three violations for failure to follow re-entry center rules, and one for threatening staff by yelling, swearing and acting aggressively. Tillman admitted to all four violations. The district court, frustrated by Tillman’s No. 26-1195, United States v. Tillman quick return to trouble, revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 10 months’ imprisonment followed by 2 years of supervised release. Tillman was released from prison in July 2024 and began his second term of supervised release. In November 2025, the probation department filed a second petition to revoke supervised release, alleging that Tillman had violated state law by committing assault and battery on a victim named T.G. The assault occurred during an incident that ended in the shooting death of another individual (J.R.) outside an apartment complex. Witnesses to the shooting reported that Tillman had been “in a physical altercation” with J.R.’s friend, T.G., “immediately before” the shooting. R. 54, Probation Petition & Order, PageID 166. T.G. confirmed that account, telling officers that he and Tillman had argued and then Tillman struck him in the head, knocking him to the ground. While on the ground, T.G. heard Tillman say “get the gun” and then heard a gunshot. Id. T.G. then saw Tillman flee in his vehicle. Tillman was initially arrested for the homicide, but investigators later determined that another person in Tillman’s car had shot J.R. The probation department later added charges to the petition related to Tillman’s possession and use of marijuana. The probation office calculated Tillman’s Guidelines range as 4 to 10 months but recommended a 12-month term of imprisonment given Tillman’s violent criminal history and his repeated inability to abide by his supervision terms. Tillman admitted to the assault and battery violation in return for dismissal of the marijuana violations. The district court revoked Tillman’s supervision and imposed an above-Guidelines term of imprisonment of 24 months. Given Tillman’s repeated run-ins with the law and quick return to criminal conduct, the court imposed the maximum statutory sentence. Tillman now appeals. -2- No. 26-1195, United States v. Tillman II. Procedural Reasonableness. Tillman first challenges the procedural reasonableness of his term of imprisonment. Generally, we review procedural challenges for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018). But where, as here, the defendant has failed to preserve the procedural challenge, we review for plain error. See United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2019). To satisfy plain error, Tillman must “show (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights[,] and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Procedural reasonableness requires the court to, among other things, “select the sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous[] and adequately explain why it chose the sentence.” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 440. Tillman first argues that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for his 24-month term of imprisonment. We disagree. The district court began by considering the nature and circumstances of his violation of the conditions of supervised release. It recognized that Tillman was young (29 years old at the time of the hearing) but stated, “I don’t believe, based on everything that I’ve seen, from the first time that I sentenced you to the second time that I saw you on a supervised release, to now, that there’s any sentence that I can give you that will deter you from the conduct that you’ve been engaged in for many years now.” R. 83, Supervised Release Violation Tr., PageID 247. The court noted that the “conduct [was] assaultive,” “dangerous,” and “involve[d] weapons possessions.” Id. And Tilman had “started this whole situation with this fight that then escalated into someone getting murdered.” Id. at 248. The court explained that it wasn’t sentencing Tillman for the murder, but for his actions, which were “quite serious given [his] history.” Id. at 248–49. -3- No. 26-1195, United States v. Tillman The court then turned to Tillman’s criminal history. Tillman had been in the criminal system since he was fourteen and, although still young, had “a total of maybe 20 plus convictions.” Id. at 249. While “a lot of those were traffic-related,” including driving on a suspended license, some were firearm offenses. Id. Tillman had also been charged “with threatening someone” and had “admitted to shooting a man inside a hallway of an apartment building.” Id. And when the court last saw Tillman it was because he had failed out of a re-entry center after “threaten[ing] the staff, yelling, swearing, [and] beating on doors.” Id. In sum, the court told Tillman, “You have a history that involves assaultive behavior, you have a history that involves weapons related behavior, you have convictions for assault with the intent to murder and firearms violations, convictions for aggravated assault, assault and battery and now another assault and battery in a situation that was highly volatile.” Id. at 249–50. Returning to its initial consideration, the court stated its concern that no term of imprisonment it could impose would deter Tillman, given that “no sentence that has been given since [he was] age 14” had deterred him yet. Id. at 250. The court told Tillman, “[Y]ou haven’t shown that you can be deterred. You certainly haven’t shown me that any sentence has also deterred you to the extent that it’s protected the public from further crimes that you commit—that you will commit because you continue to commit.” Id. The court continued, “As I look at everything in totality, Mr. Tillman, I fear that there will come a day when you will either be killed or you will kill someone if you continue the conduct that you have exhibited.” Id. Based on all of this, the court revoked Tillman’s supervised release and imposed an upward variance of 24 months’ imprisonment. The court more than adequately explained its chosen rationale. Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 440. -4- No. 26-1195, United States v. Tillman Despite this thorough explanation, Tillman maintains that the district court didn’t do enough to explain its decision to vary upward to the statutory maximum. Again we disagree. After imposing the 24-month term, the court stated, “I’ll make a record of the fact that I have not done this very often where I [vary] and [vary] upward in the manner that I have.” R. 83, Supervised Release Violation Tr., PageID 251. But it was necessary here “for all the reasons stated and the nature and circumstances of the offense, [the criminal] history, the need to protect the public, [and] the need to afford adequate deterrence.” Id. Even 24 months likely wasn’t enough in the court’s view. Id. at 251–52. The court elaborated, “When I sentenced you the first time, on the original count, I gave you the middle of the guidelines despite this huge history. When I sentenced you the second time I gave you the top end of the guidelines, which was ten months.” Id. at 252. But, the court noted, “[n]one of that has deterred you.” Id. We fail to see how the district court could have done more to explain why it landed on an above-Guidelines term of imprisonment. In any event, the court’s duty was not to “exhaustively explain” why it chose one sentence over another but instead to sufficiently articulate its reasoning so that we can know why it chose the term it did. United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 2006). The court’s lengthy explanation satisfied that duty. Tillman also briefly asserts that the district court erred by relying on “disputed allegations” regarding the “alleged shooting incident.” Appellant Br. at 10. He asserts that “the court never expressly found that the disputed allegations were true or never explained why the underlying hearsay was sufficiently reliable.” Id. The district court didn’t err, however. The court focused on Tillman’s undisputed involvement in the incident that ultimately led to the murder of an individual. To the extent there was some dispute regarding whether Tillman said “get the gun,” the court didn’t focus on that fact, instead focusing on the uncontested fact that the gun used in the -5- No. 26-1195, United States v. Tillman murder was taken from Tillman’s car. And the court clearly explained that it was not sentencing Tillman for the murder itself. Tillman therefore hasn’t shown that the district court relied on disputed allegations or clearly erroneous facts. The district court didn’t procedurally err when imposing Tillman’s 24-month term of imprisonment. Substantive Reasonableness. Tillman next challenges the substantive reasonableness of his term of imprisonment. Substantive reasonableness focuses on whether “a sentence is too long (if a defendant appeals) or too short (if the government appeals).” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. “It is a complaint that the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing the individual.” Id. We review for an abuse of discretion. Id. Confounded by Tillman’s repeated and quick return to criminal conduct, the court concluded that even the statutory maximum might not deter Tillman from future crime. The court’s prior attempts to deter Tillman had failed. The court understood the severity of its decision to impose a 24-month term but undertook considerable effort to explain why such a term of imprisonment was necessary. See id. In so doing, “[t]he district court properly considered all of the factors, balanced them, and imposed a reasonable sentence.” Id. at 443. Tillman has provided no basis for us to “second guess[] that judgment,” id., especially given his repeated violations of supervised release, see United States v. Glass, 794 F. App’x 434, 441–42 (6th Cir. 2018). Tillman’s sentence was substantively reasonable. *** We AFFIRM. -6-