United States v. Avery Logan
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-1962
JudgeRichard Allen Griffin; John K. Bush; Whitney D. Hermandorfer
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0469n.06
No. 25-1962
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Nov 20, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
) MICHIGAN
AVERY LOGAN, )
Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
)
Before: GRIFFIN, BUSH, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. Avery Logan pleaded guilty to unlawful possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, Logan’s recommended
Guidelines range was 100-125 months’ imprisonment based upon application of an attempted
murder cross-reference. The district court applied that cross-reference. But, at Logan’s
suggestion, it then varied downward and imposed a prison sentence of 78 months. Still, Logan
contests application of the attempted murder cross-reference on appeal. And he challenges
§ 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession restriction as unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.
We reject his arguments and affirm.
I
In May 2024, Avery Logan walked into a liquor store in Detroit carrying a concealed,
loaded gun. This wasn’t Logan’s first time in the store. A few weeks earlier, Logan had allegedly
No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
passed a bad check. So when he showed up this time, the store’s owner came from behind the
counter to ask Logan about repayment.
The store’s surveillance footage shows what happened next. The owner told Logan that he
was going to report the bad check to the police. In response, Logan threatened to vandalize the
store: “Just because you said you are going to make a report, I’m about to have somebody tear
this b*tch up today and every time you clean it up, I’m going to have somebody come tear it up
again.” Camera 5 Footage, R.42-2, 05:22:29-05:22:37. A shouting match followed, and the owner
made a statement about making Logan “disappear in one second.” Id. at 05:22:47-05:22:51.
Logan responded, “[s]top talking crazy before your dumba** disappear right here.” Id. at
05:22:52-05:22:57. The owner returned to his place behind the counter, which was separated from
the rest of the store by a door and a see-through protective barrier.
Logan escalated. He toppled a shelf of snacks, then moved toward the exit. But instead of
leaving the store, he stood between the exit and the door enclosing the counter. He pulled his gun.
The store owner pulled his own gun too. One shot rang out, the store owner ducked, and then the
store owner fired at Logan. Logan fled the store by car.
Officers found Logan up the road around ten minutes later. He was fading in and out of
consciousness in the driver’s seat of a parked car that appeared to have crashed through a chain-
link fence. His leg was bleeding from a gunshot wound. While searching the car, the officers
found a black Taurus G2C 9mm pistol loaded with 11 rounds. As an ATF report later concluded,
that was the same type of firearm Logan brandished at the liquor store.
The Government obtained a grand jury indictment against Logan for possessing a firearm
after being convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Logan pleaded guilty
without a plea agreement and proceeded to sentencing. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines contain
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
instructions for calculating the Guidelines range for gun-possession convictions like Logan’s.
Applying those instructions, the probation office recommended cross-referencing the base offense
level for attempted murder. That move led to a base offense level of 27 and, ultimately, a total
offense level of 24. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2). Based on Logan’s criminal history category of
VI, the result was a recommended Guidelines range of 100-125 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5 pt. A.
At sentencing, the parties disputed the applicability of the attempted murder cross-
reference. That inquiry turned on whether Logan acted with a specific intent to kill the store owner.
As proceedings commenced, the district court noted its concern with “hav[ing] to sit as the trier of
fact” and decide whether Logan had the “intent” to “murder or kill someone.” Sent. Tr., R.50,
PageID 483. As part of that initial colloquy with Logan’s counsel, the district court stated: “As I
understand it . . . Mr. Logan allegedly discharged the firearm toward” the store owner, but “I don’t
know what his intent was.” Id. at PageID 485.
The Government then undertook to demonstrate Logan’s intent to the district court. The
Government began by citing this Circuit’s caselaw that aiming and firing at a person is sufficient
to show specific intent to kill. The Government then offered evidence to show that Logan not only
fired, but fired first. The Government started with surveillance footage, which in its view showed
Logan aiming his gun at the store owner and firing the first shot. The Government next introduced
a recording of the store owner’s 911 call where, it argued, the owner indicated to dispatch that
Logan fired at him and he returned fire. Last, the Government presented the ATF inspection of
Logan’s firearm. That report concluded that Logan’s pistol could carry 12 rounds in the magazine
and one in the chamber. But the Government noted that Logan’s pistol had only 11 rounds when
recovered by officers shortly after the shooting. Logan sought to dispute the Government’s
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
evidence and asserted that he lacked specific intent. The district court sided with the Government
and applied the attempted murder cross-reference.
The district court next addressed Logan’s motion for a downward departure. Although the
district court had rejected Logan’s argument on specific intent, it explained that it would consider
his argument in its “overall evaluation in terms of a variance and perhaps a downward departure.”
Id. at PageID 491. That was because the district court was “uncomfortable making a judicial
finding of intent” with “no evidence other than what” the Government presented “to support what
Mr. Logan was thinking” when “he fired the gun and what his intent was.” Id.
Logan suggested that the district court instead apply an enhancement for use of a firearm
in connection with another felony. With that enhancement, Logan’s Guidelines range would be
77-96 months. The district court declined to change the Guidelines range of 100-125 months, with
the attempted murder cross-reference applied, but noted Logan’s proposal would be “an important
factor” in ruling on a variance. Id. at PageID 494.
In deciding on Logan’s sentence, the district court reiterated its “distaste for having to make
intent findings in a case of this sort.” Id. at PageID 502-03. But the district court stressed the
“unbelievable” nature of Logan’s actions with his pistol as “the most extreme[,] serious conduct
that we see in federal court but for the actual loss of life.” Id. at PageID 503. The district court
then imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 78 months.
Logan timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
II
Logan first challenges the district court’s application of the attempted-murder enhancement
under § 2A2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
Logan doesn’t dispute the mechanics of the relevant cross-reference. That cross-reference
applies through a chain of Guidelines provisions connecting from Logan’s 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
guideline, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, to the guideline for attempt offenses, see id. § 2X1.1, and then to
the guideline for attempted murder, see id. § 2A2.1; see also United States v. Bradford, 822 F.
App’x 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2020). As a baseline rule, all agree that “[d]istrict courts may cross-
reference under § 2K2.1 only where a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that
the defendant committed or attempted to commit the offense that provides the cross-reference.”
United States v. Walker, 858 F. App’x 857, 860 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Logan thus does not contest that the cross-reference would apply if the Government proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the specific intent to kill the store owner. Instead,
he argues that the district court committed procedural error applying the enhancement without
making an express intent finding. He further contends that too little evidence supported the
attempted murder cross-reference. We disagree on both fronts.
A
We initially consider whether the district court procedurally erred by failing to make the
intent finding needed to support application of the attempted murder cross-reference.
Although a person can commit murder without an intent to kill, “an attempt to commit
murder requires a specific intent to kill.” United States v. Caston, 851 F. App’x 557, 564 (6th Cir.
2021) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). So to apply the cross-reference for attempted murder,
it is “essential” that the district court find that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill.
United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 696-97 (6th Cir. 2012). Any lesser mens rea, like
recklessness, does not suffice. See id.; see also Caston, 851 F. App’x at 564.
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
Our cases do not speak with one voice about how express an intent finding need be to
satisfy the district court’s procedural obligations. Some precedents reject that a district court need
employ any “magic words.” See United States v. Bates, 552 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2009). Those
cases, like those reviewing district court findings in other contexts, suggest that a factual “finding”
may be “implicit in what [the district court] did” and “sufficiently clear from the broader context
of the sentencing hearings,” id. at 478, as well as from “other factual findings set out in the case,”
United States v. Radney, 390 F. App’x 488, 490 (6th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). On that view,
even if “the district court may have failed to directly state its ultimate factual determination, its
holding” may still “clearly contain[] an implicit finding of fact.” Id.
From the other direction, certain cases—particularly those interpreting select fact-finding
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B)—note that “a district court
implicitly adopt[ing] the United States’ reasoning as part of its findings does not suffice” for
purposes of resolving disputes over facts presented in a defendant’s Presentence Report. United
States v. Roberts, 919 F.3d 980, 988 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see also United States v.
Karasarides, 159 F.4th 972, 995 n.3 (6th Cir. 2025). That requirement could have been read as
governing here, where factual issues embedded in the specific-intent dispute, like whether Logan
fired the gun, appeared in the Presentence Report and were contested by Logan.
But Logan failed to properly preserve any express-finding argument before the district
court, let alone cite any Rule 32 requirements, during or following the sentencing proceedings.
That was so even though the district court gave Logan an opportunity to air any new objections to
its sentencing explanation toward the conclusion of proceedings. Cf. United States v. Bostic, 371
F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004). Logan instead “maintain[ed]” his previous, bottom-line objection to the
enhancement’s applicability, Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 506; he did not offer any “new objections”
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
to the district court’s sentencing explanation, which could have arisen only during the sentencing
colloquy, Karasarides, 159 F.4th at 995; accord United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th
Cir. 2008) (en banc). Because Logan did not “object[] to the district court’s factual findings at
sentencing,” his express-finding argument is subject to only plain error review. Karasarides, 159
F.4th at 995.
To surmount the plain-error standard, Logan “must show (1) an error, (2) that was obvious
or clear, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of his judicial proceedings.” United States v. Jackson, 154 F.4th 422, 431 (6th Cir.
2025) (citation omitted). “That is a tall hill for” Logan “to climb.” Id. (citation omitted). To make
that showing, “the district court must have acted ‘clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal.’”
United States v. Baskerville, 164 F.4th 459, 484 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v. Tellez,
86 F.4th 1148, 1154 (6th Cir. 2023)). We conclude that Logan falls short of showing any plain
misstep in procedure requiring reversal.
We begin and end with the observation that no governing case makes “obvious” any
explanatory error by the district court. Tellez, 86 F.4th at 1154. The district court properly stated
what was required to impose the challenged cross-reference: It “ha[d] to sit as the trier of fact” as
to whether Logan “had the intent” to “murder or kill someone” in order to apply the cross-reference
for attempted murder. Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 483. Logan agreed that “the crux” of the issue was
“the government’s burden to prove by a preponderance” of the evidence that Logan had “specific
intent to kill.” Id. So there was no question that the district court understood its duty to assess
Logan’s specific intent before it could apply the cross-reference under § 2A2.1(a)(2).
The Government then sought to prove Logan’s specific intent by a preponderance of the
evidence. As presented at sentencing to the district court, the Government’s position had two
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
parts. First, on the law, it cited precedent for the proposition that aiming a gun in a person’s
direction and firing is alone sufficient to support a finding of specific intent to kill. See United
States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2021). That legal position tracked the Government’s
written response to Logan’s pre-sentencing objections, which the district court commended as
“very good.” Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 486. The district court’s acknowledgment of the
Government’s specific-intent precedent regarding § 2A2.1(a)(2), cited both in briefing and at
sentencing, confirms that it “had clearly been informed of the relevant law.” Bates, 552 F.3d at
477.
Second, on the facts, the Government contended that the preponderance of the evidence
showed that Logan had aimed a weapon at the store owner and fired. As part of that submission,
the Government presented surveillance footage of the shooting from two angles, the store owner’s
911 call, and the ATF examination of Logan’s firearm. Each piece of evidence, the Government
contended, supported that Logan “fired his gun at the store owner.” Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 488.
Logan’s firing of the weapon, on the Government’s view, legally sufficed to support “a reasonable
inference” that Logan “intended to kill the owner.” Id.
Logan then made his case against applying the cross-reference. He objected to what he
saw as the Government’s “two leaps: one, that Mr. [Logan] fired his gun, and two, that if his gun
was discharged,” it was with “an intent to specifically kill the store owner.” Id. at PageID 489.
Yet Logan did not specifically contest—either before the district court or on appeal—the validity
of the Government’s legal position that a person’s aiming and firing a weapon at another can
suffice to demonstrate specific intent to kill. Rather, Logan at sentencing disputed that any
“assumption” about intent should be made given “the evidence that’s been presented and the holes
in that evidence.” Id.
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
Even so, immediately following Logan’s objection, the district court stated that it was
“going to impose” the attempted murder cross-reference under § 2A2.1(a)(2) and its “higher
offense level.” Id. Later, the district court reiterated that it “didn’t accept” Logan’s “argument on
the attempted murder guideline.” Id. at PageID 491. It further described Logan as having “fired
the gun” and “shooting at people.” Id. at PageID 491, 506. And to close the hearing, the district
court “imposed” the sentence “over the objection of [Logan]” to the cross-reference. Id. at PageID
507.
On this record, Logan falls short of demonstrating that the district court’s explanation was
plainly erroneous. At the outset, Logan has not offered cases demonstrating that any Rule 32-
based obligation—which triggers when a defendant “actively raises a fact dispute”—applied to the
district court’s explanation of its legal conclusions about the meaning of the relevant specific-
intent caselaw. Karasarides, 159 F.4th at 995 (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see Roberts, 919
F.3d at 988 (describing Rule 32 obligation as applying when “a defendant actively disputes a
factual portion of the presentence report that might affect his sentence”) (emphasis added). So to
the extent Logan seeks to discredit the district court’s conclusion that Logan’s actions sufficed to
support an inference of specific intent as a matter of law, he fails to make the requisite plain-error
showing.
Nor does Logan’s challenge to the district court’s factual findings clear the plain-error
hurdle. Again, as presented to the district court, the key dispute over the facts in the Presentence
Report was Logan’s contention that he never fired the weapon. But as noted, the district court’s
statements indicate that it indeed independently resolved that disputed issue of fact. Among other
things, after having received the Government’s evidence, the district court stated that Logan “fired
the gun.” Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 491. It also rejected Logan’s two-leaps argument, which
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
contested whether Logan had “fired his gun.” Id. at PageID 489. And it later explained to Logan
that “when you’re shooting at people and people are shooting at you . . . there’s going to be death
and destruction.” See id. at PageID 506.
Logan’s cited cases do not establish that the district court committed “clear or obvious”
error in resolving the gun-use dispute against Logan for purposes of applying the cross-reference.
Tellez, 86 F.4th at 1154 (citation omitted). Consider first United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688
(6th Cir. 2012). That decision vacated application of the cross-reference because the district court
found only that the defendant was “able to form” an intent to kill, not that he “actually formed
such an intent.” Id. at 696-97. So the problem wasn’t the district court’s lack of an explicit finding;
it was that the district court made a finding of no consequence. Id. The same goes for United
States v. Brooks, 67 F.4th 1244 (10th Cir. 2023), which involved a district court improperly finding
a different mens rea, malice aforethought, rather than specific intent, see id. at 1250. Neither
address, nor set rules for assessing, how direct or express a district court’s specific-intent findings
need be to satisfy the applicable procedural obligations.
Our Rule 32 cases likewise fail to demonstrate plain error here. In Roberts, the
Government could not explain its proposed loss calculation. 919 F.3d at 988. Yet the district court
simply “accept[ed]” the Government’s “best guess,” meaning the sentencing record “did not reveal
how the district court determined the government accurately calculated the loss.” Id. Roberts
concluded that the district court’s bare “implicit[] adopt[ion]” of the Government’s unsupported
loss figure was plain error under Rule 32. Id. The same result obtained in Karasarides, where the
district court, without explanation, adopted the Presentence Report in its entirety at the outset of
sentencing proceedings and “never revisited [its] decision.” 159 F.4th at 995. On those facts,
Karasarides rejected the Government’s arguments that the district court had implicitly adopted its
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
evidence because the district court “fail[ed] to make independent findings” by “adopt[ing] without
elaboration the recommendation from the PSR.” Id. at 995 n.3 (citation omitted). Roberts and
Karasarides thus instruct that procedural error occurs when a district court’s sentencing
explanation leaves reviewing courts unable to “determin[e] what, if anything, the district court
relied upon in concluding that an enhancement was appropriate.” United States v. Middleton, 246
F.3d 825, 847 (6th Cir. 2001). That rule does not “obvious[ly]” govern here, Tellez, 86 F.4th at
1154, where the district court aired out the key factual dispute over Logan’s conduct—through
briefing, in-court testimony, surveillance and other evidence, and argument—and ultimately stated
that Logan “fired the gun,” Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 491.
Logan’s remaining counterarguments fail. Logan notes that the district court “repeatedly
stated that it could not make” the requisite intent “findings based on the evidence presented by the
government.” Reply Br. 11. But the district court made nearly all of those statements before the
Government presented its evidence. After that, the court imposed the enhancement and clarified
that it “didn’t accept” Logan’s argument on “the intent issue” for the “attempted murder
guideline.” Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 491. Logan cites no case establishing that a district court
locks in its factual findings whenever it expresses factual concerns prior to the submission of
evidence.
Along similar lines, Logan points out that the district court ultimately varied its sentence
downward based on concerns about its intent analysis. The district court stated, in particular, that
it was “uncomfortable making a judicial finding of intent” since “I can’t and have no evidence
other than what” the Government presented “to support what Mr. Logan was thinking” when “he
fired the gun and what his intent was.” Id. Yet a district court can be uncomfortable with applying
the Guidelines and still do so. Here, the district court understood that, in order to apply the cross-
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
reference, it was required to make a preponderance finding that Logan had a specific intent to kill
based on the Government’s showing. And the transcript shows that the district court then did so,
even if it had “distaste for having to make intent findings” like it did. Id. at PageID 503. That
“broader context” makes the district court’s required intent finding “sufficiently clear.” Bates, 552
F.3d at 478.
Last, Logan seeks to distinguish United States v. Bradford, 822 F. App’x 335 (6th Cir.
2020), which upheld the application of the attempted murder cross-reference. There, the district
court did not use the words “specific intent to kill.” That omission led Bradford to contest the
intent finding. Rejecting that argument, we held that the district court adequately found intent
from its conclusion that Bradford “fired multiple shots at a group of people” and “did so
deliberately, intentionally,” and “with premeditation.” Id. at 339. Suffice it to say, a case granting
sentencing courts flexibility to render adequate intent findings does not plainly show that the
district court’s explanation erred here.
We therefore conclude that Logan has failed to demonstrate any plain procedural error in
the district court’s explanation of its decision to apply the attempted murder cross-reference.
B
Logan next contends that the district court applied the cross-reference on insufficient
evidence. The Government counters that Logan failed to raise this argument in his opening brief
and so has forfeited the right to argue it now. See United States v. Taylor, 165 F.4th 1029, 1036
(6th Cir. 2026). We opt against resolving the forfeiture issue, which appears close, and instead
reject Logan’s evidence-based argument on the merits.
We review the substance of sentencing decisions “under the deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. Mills, 126 F.4th 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2025). Under that standard, we
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
review the district court’s factual findings only for clear error. United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th
824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022). Our review is highly deferential. We reject a challenge to a district
court’s factual finding “so long as the finding is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety.” Grant, 15 F.4th at 457 (citation modified). Even where “conflicting evidence” would
permit a district court to make two permissible findings, we “must respect” the district court’s
choice “of one finding over the other.” Caston, 851 F. App’x at 560.
The district court did not clearly err in applying the attempted murder cross-reference based
on the evidence presented. The Government provided surveillance footage from two angles, the
owner’s 911 call, and an ATF report all indicating that Logan fired. Supra pp. 3-4, 8. Presented
with all that, the district court concluded that Logan “fired the gun” “at people.” Sent. Tr., R.50,
PageID 491, 506. That conclusion reflected our caselaw, which permits a specific-intent finding
if a defendant “aimed the gun in” a person’s “direction and fired.” Grant, 15 F.4th at 458.
Logan contests the Government’s evidentiary showing. On his account, the Government’s
evidence suffers from several deficiencies: (1) the surveillance footage showed that the store owner
pulled his gun “at the same time or before” Logan; (2) the investigation did not “find any markings
showing a bullet struck the door or glass” in the direction Logan allegedly fired; and (3) the spent
casings recovered at the scene matched the store owner’s gun. Logan Br. 12-13. Logan’s read
offers “a competing view of the evidence.” Bradford, 822 F. App’x at 339. But to justify upsetting
the district court’s factual conclusions, Logan “must demonstrate that his view of the evidence is
the only view.” Mills, 126 F.4th at 475 (citation modified). Because he has not done so, Logan
“runs aground on the clear-error standard.” Jackson, 154 F.4th at 430.
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
III
Logan next argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), his statute of conviction, violates the Second
Amendment both on its face and as applied to him. We review Logan’s constitutional challenges
de novo. United States v. Taylor, 165 F.4th 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 2026).
Logan acknowledges that our precedent “foreclose[s]” his facial challenge. Reply Br. 15.
In particular, in United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), this Court applied New
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602
U.S. 680, 692 (2024), to hold that § 922(g)(1) “is not susceptible to a facial challenge.” United
States v. Feltus, No. 25-5296, 2025 WL 3111303, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) (citation omitted).
Though Logan seeks to preserve a future challenge to Williams, that decision continues to bind
this panel.
Williams, though, did leave a pathway for asserting as-applied Second Amendment
challenges to § 922(g) convictions. Under Williams, “legislatures may disarm groups of people,
like felons, whom the legislature believes to be dangerous—so long as each member of that
disarmed group has an opportunity to make an individualized showing that he himself is not
actually dangerous.” 113 F.4th at 663. Logan insists that he isn’t dangerous, and so says
§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Williams set forth a framework to guide the dangerousness inquiry. Id. at 657-58. Certain
categories of crimes, we explained, are “highly probative of dangerousness, while others are less
so.” Id. at 658. Category one includes crimes against the person, like “murder, rape, assault, and
robbery.” Id. These “dangerous and violent crimes” are all but dispositive on the dangerousness
question because they “speak directly to whether an individual is dangerous.” Id. Category two
includes crimes like drug trafficking and burglary that are “not strictly crimes against the person,”
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
but “may nonetheless pose a significant threat of danger.” Id. at 659. For example, “[c]ourts have
recognized that burglary is dangerous because it creates the possibility of a violent confrontation
between the offender and occupant.” Id. (citation modified). These crimes “put someone’s safety
at risk” and therefore “justify a finding of danger.” Id. Category three includes crimes that usually
“cause no physical harm to another person or the community,” like mail fraud or making false
statements. Id. “[M]any of these crimes don’t make a person dangerous” for purposes of a Second
Amendment challenge. Id.
Our dangerous assessment is not “categorical,” but instead “must focus on each
individual’s specific characteristics.” Id. at 657, 663. And that inquiry is “not confined to the fact
of conviction alone.” Taylor, 165 F.4th at 1034 (citation omitted). It also includes assessing the
“details of” a defendant’s “specific convictions” and his “entire criminal history, not just his felony
convictions.” United States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation
modified). We may also “‘consider how an offense was committed.’” Taylor, 165 F.4th at 1034
(quoting United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2024)). In so doing, we “can accept
prior convictions without an evidentiary hearing or jury fact finding” and “review the uncontested
contents of a presentence report.” Id. (citation omitted). As we review the record, we bear in mind
that the defendant carries the burden to show he isn’t dangerous. Hostettler, 170 F.4th at 542.
Logan does not carry that burden. We first consider Logan’s criminal offenses that are
typically classified as crimes against the person. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 658. Logan pled guilty
as an adult to two unarmed robberies. Robbery falls within the class of criminal offenses that
“speak directly to whether an individual is dangerous.” Id. Those convictions place an “extremely
heavy” burden on Logan to disprove dangerousness using the particular facts of his robbery cases.
Id. In the first robbery, Logan and an accomplice walked into a McDonald’s, swiped an iPhone
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
out of the hands of a McDonald’s employee, and fled. In the second, Logan and two others drove
up to two people on foot, assaulted one of them, then stole his iPhone from his pocket and his
watch off his wrist. Even if what we know about the first robbery presents a closer call, the second
robbery “speak[s] directly” to Logan’s dangerousness because it involved a physical assault. Id.
So Logan’s history of robbery provides “strong evidence” of dangerousness, “if not totally
dispositive on the question.” Id.
Second, we consider Logan’s history of crimes that are “not strictly crimes against the
person,” but may still “pose a significant threat of danger.” Id. at 659. Logan was adjudicated
guilty of second-degree home invasion as a juvenile. This Court has previously recognized that
“a conviction for second-degree home invasion under Michigan law is the equivalent” of “burglary
of a dwelling.” United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 2010). And under the Williams
framework, burglary is a crime that “pose[s] a significant threat of danger” and justifies a finding
of dangerousness. Williams, 113 F.4th at 659.
Finally, we consider the underlying facts of this case. Logan walked into a liquor store
carrying a loaded gun that he knew he was prohibited from possessing. After the store owner
confronted him about allegedly passing a bad check, Logan pointed the gun toward the store
owner. The district court called Logan’s conduct “unbelievable,” and “the most extreme[,] serious
conduct that we see in federal court but for the actual loss of life.” Sent. Tr., R.50, PageID 503.
Logan’s actions in this case, like his criminal history, demonstrate dangerousness under Williams
and require rejecting his as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).
Logan’s counterarguments are not convincing. He first seeks to narrow the frame of our
criminal-history review by urging that we omit his two unarmed robberies and home invasion. As
to the unarmed robberies, Logan says that because he received the benefit of Michigan’s Holmes
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.11, he did not receive “a conviction”
under state law for those crimes. Logan Br. 22. And as to his home invasion, he points out that
juvenile adjudications do not result in felony convictions. On that basis, Logan contends that
because those offenses “would not trigger the federal prohibition of Logan’s possession of
firearms” under § 922(g), we should ignore them. Id.
We reject that framing. Nowhere does Williams suggest that a court should limit its
consideration of a defendant’s criminal history to only those crimes that would constitute predicate
convictions for § 922(g)(1). Just the opposite. We “may evaluate a defendant’s entire criminal
record” in considering dangerousness. Williams, 113 F.4th at 663. That includes Logan’s crimes
of unarmed robbery and home invasion—however characterized under state law. Along the same
lines, to the extent Logan argues that his “juvenile offenses may be less indicative of lasting
dangerousness, controlling precedent from this court has never suggested—much less held—the
same.” United States v. Crawford, No. 23-5429, 2025 WL 3496999, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025)
(citations omitted). Indeed, this Court’s decisions understand the required review of “a defendant’s
entire criminal record,” Williams, 113 F.4th at 659-60, to include assessment of juvenile offenses,
see, e.g., United States v. Hunnicutt, Nos. 24-1831/1836, 2025 WL 3537329, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.
19, 2025) (order); United States v. Black, No. 23-1622, 2025 WL 1356614, at *2 (6th Cir. May 9,
2025) (per curiam); Feltus, 2025 WL 3111303, at *1.
Logan next argues that if we do consider his home-invasion adjudication, we should not
cast it as a “crime of violence.” Reply Br. 16-17. He makes three points in support: (1) the
Sentencing Guidelines removed burglary from the definition of “crime of violence,” (2) this Court
does not have access to the underlying facts, and (3) the home invasion was a juvenile adjudication,
not an adult conviction.
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
We need not decide whether burglary is a “crime of violence” for federal sentencing-
enhancement purposes. Our inquiry is different. We must decide whether Logan can carry his
burden to show he is not dangerous such that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Regardless of whether Logan’s home invasion involved violence, home invasion remains a
dangerous crime because it “creates the possibility of a violent confrontation.” Williams, 113 F.4th
at 659 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990)). So it’s the type of crime that
“put[s] someone’s safety at risk, and thus, justif[ies] a finding of danger.” Id.
Logan also argues that if we do consider his previous home invasion and unarmed robberies
in our assessment, we should also consider his age at the time in relation to those offenses. Even
spotting that age might mitigate the effect of prior crimes in certain cases, Logan’s is not one of
them. If anything, Logan’s violent conduct in this case provides confirmation that his
dangerousness persists into adulthood.
Logan’s remaining argument—that we should ignore his actions in this case when
assessing dangerousness—also misses the mark. Logan reads Williams to counsel against courts’
considering “unproven factual allegations in § 922(g)(1) proceedings.” Logan Br. 18. But in
Williams, this Court made clear that courts “may consider . . . the specific felony underlying his
§ 922(g)(1) conviction.” 113 F.4th at 659-60. That includes taking account of judicially
noticeable information like “the uncontested contents of a presentence report” to consider “how
an offense was committed.” See Taylor, 165 F.4th at 1034; see also Williams, 113 F.4th at 659-
60. Indeed, many post-Williams cases have considered such information. See, e.g., Morton, 123
F.4th at 499; see also United States v. Nailor, No. 24-1163, 2026 WL 768779, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.
18, 2026). Without it, courts may be unable in certain cases to make the “individualized
assessment of dangerousness that our precedent requires.” Hostettler, 170 F.4th at 544 (citation
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No. 25-1962, United States v. Logan
modified). So our assessment of Logan’s dangerousness properly considers his armed actions at
the liquor store.
In short, Logan cannot meet his burden under Williams to show that he is not dangerous.
Logan’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) therefore fails.
* * *
We affirm.
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