Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0457n.06 Case No. 25-1975 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 16, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN RYAN ALEXANDER JONES, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and READLER, Circuit Judges. READLER, Circuit Judge. Ryan Alexander Jones was indicted for, pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to 51 months in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Along the way, he mounted unsuccessful facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). We now review those same arguments de novo. See United States v. Brown, 147 F.4th 687, 688 (6th Cir. 2025). Because Circuit precedent forecloses Jones’s position, we affirm. New York State Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a two-part test for examining whether a law infringes on the Second Amendment’s guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms. 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2129–30 (2022). A court first examines whether the Second Amendment’s “plain text covers” the conduct in question. Id. at 2129. If so, the government then bears the burden of showing the challenged law is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2130. Applying this framework in United States v. Williams, we concluded that No. 25-1975, United States v. Jones while the Second Amendment’s text covers what § 922(g)(1) regulates, the law accords with a historical tradition of barring “groups” deemed “dangerous” from possessing a firearm unless an individual within a prohibited class proved they “posed no danger to peace.” 113 F.4th 637, 648– 63 (6th Cir. 2024). As a result, Williams held that § 922(g)(1) was facially constitutional, but left open the possibility for as-applied challenges where a felon could show that he is not dangerous. Id. at 662–63; see also United States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2026). Williams resolves this appeal. Jones concedes as much with respect to the facial invalidity of § 922(g)(1). As to his as-applied challenge, Jones admits that his prior offenses, which include a robbery and assault conviction, fall within a category of crimes for which we should consider him dangerous. Jones instead criticizes Williams for placing the burden on him to prove his lack of dangerousness. He claims Williams’s holding on that front is inconsistent with Bruen and its progeny, which require the government to show that a law aligns with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. But as a follow-on panel, even if we thought Williams was wrong, we would be bound by its understanding of Bruen. See Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985). In any event, Jones is confusing different burdens: the burden of showing a historical tradition supporting a regulation versus the burden of proving an exception to a rule that the government has already justified as a historical matter. Williams held that the government satisfied the former burden as to § 922(g)(1), leaving a different burden for future defendants to shoulder in mounting as-applied challenges. 113 F.4th at 662–63. All to say, we see nothing inconsistent with Williams and the Supreme Court’s recent teachings on the Second Amendment. And given Jones’s concession that he cannot carry his burden as to proving his nondangerousness, his as-applied challenge necessarily fails. 2 No. 25-1975, United States v. Jones In his reply brief, Jones, for the first time, maintains that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. But his argument arrives too late for it to be considered on its merits. See United States v. Moore, 376 F.3d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). And even if timely, the Commerce Clause challenge, like his Second Amendment challenge, is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996). * * * * * We affirm the judgment of the district court. 3