United States v. Ryan Alexander Jones
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-1975
JudgeAlice M. Batchelder; Karen Nelson Moore; Chad A. Readler
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0457n.06
Case No. 25-1975
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Nov 16, 2026
) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
) MICHIGAN
RYAN ALEXANDER JONES, )
Defendant-Appellant.
) OPINION
)
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
READLER, Circuit Judge. Ryan Alexander Jones was indicted for, pleaded guilty to, and
was sentenced to 51 months in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Along the way, he mounted unsuccessful facial and as-applied Second Amendment
challenges to § 922(g)(1). We now review those same arguments de novo. See United States v.
Brown, 147 F.4th 687, 688 (6th Cir. 2025). Because Circuit precedent forecloses Jones’s position,
we affirm.
New York State Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a two-part test for examining
whether a law infringes on the Second Amendment’s guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms.
142 S. Ct. 2111, 2129–30 (2022). A court first examines whether the Second Amendment’s “plain
text covers” the conduct in question. Id. at 2129. If so, the government then bears the burden of
showing the challenged law is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” Id. at 2130. Applying this framework in United States v. Williams, we concluded that
No. 25-1975, United States v. Jones
while the Second Amendment’s text covers what § 922(g)(1) regulates, the law accords with a
historical tradition of barring “groups” deemed “dangerous” from possessing a firearm unless an
individual within a prohibited class proved they “posed no danger to peace.” 113 F.4th 637, 648–
63 (6th Cir. 2024). As a result, Williams held that § 922(g)(1) was facially constitutional, but left
open the possibility for as-applied challenges where a felon could show that he is not dangerous.
Id. at 662–63; see also United States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2026).
Williams resolves this appeal. Jones concedes as much with respect to the facial invalidity
of § 922(g)(1). As to his as-applied challenge, Jones admits that his prior offenses, which include
a robbery and assault conviction, fall within a category of crimes for which we should consider
him dangerous. Jones instead criticizes Williams for placing the burden on him to prove his lack
of dangerousness. He claims Williams’s holding on that front is inconsistent with Bruen and its
progeny, which require the government to show that a law aligns with our nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation. But as a follow-on panel, even if we thought Williams was wrong,
we would be bound by its understanding of Bruen. See Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985). In any event, Jones is confusing different burdens: the burden
of showing a historical tradition supporting a regulation versus the burden of proving an exception
to a rule that the government has already justified as a historical matter. Williams held that the
government satisfied the former burden as to § 922(g)(1), leaving a different burden for future
defendants to shoulder in mounting as-applied challenges. 113 F.4th at 662–63. All to say, we
see nothing inconsistent with Williams and the Supreme Court’s recent teachings on the Second
Amendment. And given Jones’s concession that he cannot carry his burden as to proving his
nondangerousness, his as-applied challenge necessarily fails.
2
No. 25-1975, United States v. Jones
In his reply brief, Jones, for the first time, maintains that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause. But his argument arrives too late for it to be considered on
its merits. See United States v. Moore, 376 F.3d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). And even if timely, the
Commerce Clause challenge, like his Second Amendment challenge, is foreclosed by our
precedent. See United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996).
* * * * *
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
3