United States v. Martin Murff

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0202p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ > Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 │ v. │ │ KEVIN FORDHAM (24-2033); MARTIN MURFF (24- │ 2041); EDDIE REID (24-2046), │ Defendants-Appellants. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 2:21-cr-20354—Jonathan J.C. Grey, District Judge. Argued: April 29, 2026 Decided and Filed: July 22, 2026 Before: STRANCH, BLOOMEKATZ, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Benjamin D. Allen, GESS, MATTINGLY & ATCHISON, PSC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Kevin Fordham. Meghan Sweeney Bean, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Benjamin D. Allen, GESS, MATTINGLY & ATCHISON, PSC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Kevin Fordham. Linda D. Ashford, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant Martin Murff. James C. Thomas, Sterling Heights, Michigan, for Appellant Eddie Reid. Meghan Sweeney Bean, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. Kevin Fordham, Martin Murff, and Eddie Reid held top posts within the Almighty Vice Lord Nation. Following a lengthy investigation into Vice  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 2 Lord operations in Michigan, law-enforcement officers arrested dozens of members in an effort to dismantle the organization’s leadership. Dozens of plea agreements resulted. But Fordham, Murff, and Reid opted for trial. After four weeks of proceedings, a jury convicted each of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and related crimes. All three defendants appealed. Their consolidated cases present four suppression issues, two Sixth Amendment claims, two sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, and a sentencing dispute. Of those, only Fordham’s procedural sentencing challenge has merit. We therefore vacate Fordham’s sentence, remand for Fordham’s resentencing, and otherwise affirm. I A Founded in Chicago in the late 1950s, the Almighty Vice Lord Nation (AVLN) is a gang that has grown into a nationwide enterprise with over 30,000 members. The organization operates under a written constitution and bylaws. Members must swear oaths of loyalty, abide by the organization’s strict code of silence, obey orders without question, and serve as soldiers for the AVLN to the point of death. They are required to attend weekly meetings and pay regular dues so that the organization can purchase guns, fund drug trafficking, and support incarcerated members. Those who violate the AVLN’s rules face disciplinary proceedings that often end in violent beatings. Those who cooperate with law enforcement face worse. The AVLN operates through a complex hierarchy comprising distinct groups and leaders. This case features two AVLN branches called the Insane Vice Lords and Mafia Insane Vice Lords. Every branch maintains its own internal leadership structure consisting of Princes and Kings. But members all ultimately answer to national- and state-level leadership. At the national level, the Vice Lord King of Kings governs the entire organization. Below him, national Princes exercise significant authority. Leaders of branches containing the word “Insane” sit on the El Shabazz Board in Chicago, the Vice Lord “holy land.” Trial Tr. Vol. 15, R.1345, PageID 11939-40; Trial Tr. Vol. 1, R.1310, PageID 9032. The El Shabazz Board directs and controls all Insane branches nationwide. Each state in which the AVLN operates in turn has its own Supreme Elite, the highest-ranking member in that jurisdiction. In Michigan, the Supreme Elite  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 3 chairs the Michigan Board, a governing body made up of the highest-ranking Vice Lords from each branch within the state. Despite the AVLN’s complex structure, Vice Lord allegiance transcends branch lines. When any Vice Lord puts out the call for an “aid and assist,” all others must respond without hesitation. Trial Tr. Vol. 5, R.1325, PageID 9802-03. Members owe the same obedience to any higher-ranked Vice Lord. B In 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives began an investigation with a single goal: dismantle the AVLN’s Michigan operations from the top down. For years, ATF agents worked to penetrate the organization. They cultivated confidential informants, monitored thousands of jail calls, conducted controlled purchases of narcotics and firearms, obtained court-ordered wiretaps on the cell phones of key members, and secured search warrants for social-media accounts, personal devices, and member homes. At the center of the investigation were Kevin Fordham, Martin Murff, and Eddie Reid. Fordham, an Insane Vice Lord, simultaneously held two of the AVLN’s most powerful positions. At the state level, he was the Supreme Elite of Michigan and served as chairman of the Michigan Board. In the national hierarchy, he held the rank of Prince and sat on the El Shabazz Board, where he wielded the self-proclaimed “deciding vote.” Ex. 3601, 1:42-45. These roles gave Fordham nationwide influence. As Fordham boasted, Vice Lords across the country knew his name and his “status [would] stick anywhere.” Ex. 3611B, 0:10-17. Martin Murff was a Chicago-based national Prince of the Mafia Insane Vice Lords. At the time of the investigation, he was the highest-ranking active member of the branch. In that role, he sat with Fordham on the El Shabazz Board. Operating below Fordham and Murff was Eddie Reid, the highest-ranking Mafia Insane Vice Lord in Michigan. He represented his branch on the Michigan Board alongside Fordham. As the law-enforcement investigation progressed, agents uncovered the AVLN’s extensive criminal operations in Michigan. Among other things, agents became aware of  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 4 narcotics distribution, firearms trafficking, and numerous violent acts committed under the Vice Lord banner. The discussion below addresses only the activities most relevant to this appeal. Drug trafficking. Federal agents discovered a drug-distribution network that ran through the organization’s hierarchy and extended from Chicago to Michigan and beyond. From Chicago, Murff orchestrated the supply chain and coordinated distribution to other Vice Lords. At his direction, members transported substantial quantities of controlled substances across state lines. Vice Lords looking for illegal narcotics often reached out to Murff. Reid worked closely with Murff—his branch’s Prince—in coordinating sales and supply runs. On one occasion, when a courier transporting two kilograms of fentanyl from Atlanta was intercepted, Reid led efforts to secure replacement shipments. Reid also regularly corresponded with other Vice Lords about drugs and personally participated in multiple controlled purchases. Fordham’s involvement in the drug-distribution network also came to light during the investigation. As Supreme Elite of Michigan, Fordham kept close tabs on the AVLN’s drug operations in the state. Agents testified that Fordham discussed drug trafficking daily during the 90-day period his phone was wiretapped. In one recorded call, Reid reported sourcing cocaine from Vice Lords in Chicago and noted that the favorable price he received was likely because the sellers knew Fordham. Fordham agreed and discussed with Reid the importance of securing a consistent supply for trafficking purposes. Other members also updated Fordham of their sale activity by text. And when the AVLN’s drug operations came under law-enforcement scrutiny, members informed Fordham. Investigators also conducted dozens of controlled purchases from Vice Lords using confidential informants and undercover officers. One of the investigation’s key players— Confidential Informant 27016—completed four purchases of crack cocaine, cocaine, and marijuana directly from Fordham, each for resale quantities. CI-27016 later provided details about the AVLN’s drug activities. He confirmed that the general ethos of the operation was “we all eat”—meaning, “collectively we gonna get money together.” Trial Tr. Vol. 5, R.1325, PageID 9869. To accomplish that goal, members purchased their supply from within the AVLN distribution chain, gave each other “family discount[s],” and paid dues that helped fund additional drug purchases. Id. at PageID 9800.  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 5 Code of silence. Beyond drug distribution, the investigation revealed numerous acts of violence committed to protect and promote the AVLN. Many of these acts stemmed from violations of the organization’s strictly enforced code of silence. Vice Lords actively monitored court filings for potential cooperators, including by circulating documents and witness lists among themselves via text and social media. Anyone suspected of assisting law enforcement was promptly reported to leadership. The consequences for perceived cooperation could be lethal. During the investigation, agents learned of a kill order issued against an AVLN member suspected of cooperation and intervened to warn him of the threat. While leadership agreed to postpone his sentence until law- enforcement scrutiny subsided, others were less fortunate. The Michigan Board once ordered the death of an inmate suspected of cooperating, leading to a prison stabbing that left him in critical condition. Subsequent testimony established that such violent retaliation was a standard part of Vice Lord procedure. Members learned how to fashion weapons, identify blind spots in prison security systems, and efficiently kill fellow inmates. Fordham’s own communications reflected the same preoccupation with exposing cooperators and preserving AVLN integrity. He possessed lists of potential cooperators and coordinated retaliatory efforts. In one recorded call, Fordham suggested having an individual “watch the sunset”—common code for a targeted killing. Trial Tr. Vol. 14, R.1344, PageID 11715. And when another Vice Lord broke the code, it was Fordham who approved the “charges” against her. Id. at PageID 11658. C After three years of investigation, the Government obtained a grand-jury indictment charging 40 AVLN members and their associates with racketeering conspiracy, multiple drug conspiracies, and other related offenses. In the early hours of June 3, 2021, law-enforcement officers arrested dozens of these individuals in one fell swoop. Fordham, Murff, and Reid were among those apprehended. While many of their associates entered plea agreements, Fordham, Murff, and Reid proceeded to trial. Fordham was charged with five counts: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 6 Organizations conspiracy (Count 1), two counts of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (Counts 4 and 5), possession with intent to distribute marijuana (Count 40), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the marijuana offense (Count 41). Counts 40 and 41 arose from the events of June 3, when arresting agents discovered large quantities of marijuana and other drug paraphernalia in Fordham’s home, along with three firearms stored nearby. Murff and Reid were also charged in the RICO conspiracy (Count 1) and with one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (Count 5). Reid faced two additional counts of distribution of controlled substances (Counts 25 and 26), and one count of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances (Count 27). After a month-long trial, the jury convicted Murff and Reid on all counts. It convicted Fordham on Counts 1, 5, and 40—covering RICO conspiracy, national drug-trafficking activities, and possession with intent to distribute. But it acquitted him of Counts 4 and 41— covering drug trafficking that allegedly occurred in Detroit as well as firearm possession. At sentencing, Fordham received 200 months’ imprisonment, Murff received 235 months, and Reid received 240 months. Each timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The defendants raise a panoply of issues. First, all three press a range of suppression arguments. All defendants challenge the admission of evidence obtained through a Title III wiretap of cell-phone communications. Fordham and Reid also object to the scope of search warrants for information contained within their Facebook accounts. Next, Reid challenges the warrant that authorized the seizure and search of his cell phone. Finally, Reid contends that the district court should have suppressed statements made by Vice Lords in a police van after the June 2021 arrests. Second, Murff argues that certain prison-correspondence policies abridged his constitutional right to counsel. Third, Fordham urges that limitations on his cross-examination of a trial witness violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Fourth, Fordham contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting two of his convictions. Fifth, Fordham argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We address each issue in turn.  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 7 II We begin with the defendants’ suppression challenges. When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we examine factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 536 (6th Cir. 2011). We view all evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id. The movant bears the burden of establishing a constitutional or statutory violation requiring suppression. United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2003). Motions to suppress must be filed before trial and argued “with specificity.” United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1995); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). Defendants who fail to file a pretrial motion to suppress forfeit their suppression arguments on appeal. United States v. Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d 955, 962 (6th Cir. 2020). Our review of such forfeited arguments “is permissive, not mandatory.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). And we routinely decline to reach forfeited, fact-intensive suppression issues implicating an underdeveloped record. See Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d at 962 (collecting cases). A The defendants’ first suppression challenge concerns certain evidence obtained through wiretaps under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Defendants argue that the wiretap applications violated Title III’s necessity requirement, which they say required exclusion of the resulting wiretap evidence. 1 Title III provides that a wiretap application must include “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). That language, we have noted, imposes a “necessity requirement” for wiretap applications. United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2022). That requirement in  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 8 turn helps ensure that wiretaps are not “used thoughtlessly or in a dragnet fashion.” United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1988). To make the requisite Title III showing, however, law enforcement need not “prove that every other conceivable method has been tried and failed or that all avenues of investigation have been exhausted.” Id. Instead, we evaluate whether applications satisfy three criteria: (1) the wiretap cannot be “the initial step” in an investigation, (2) “traditional investigative techniques” must be inadequate under the circumstances, and (3) investigators’ reliance on past experience in addressing the necessity of a wiretap must be tied to the “particular facts of the case.” Gardner, 32 F.4th at 515 (citations omitted). In short, investigators must “give serious consideration to the non-wiretap techniques” before seeking a wiretap and inform the issuing court why “such non-wiretap techniques have been or will likely be inadequate.” Alfano, 838 F.2d at 163-64 (citation omitted). Courts analyze wiretap evidence differently than traditional suppression motions. That is because Title III wiretaps involve two layers of decisionmakers: the district court that originally authorized the wiretap and the district court that later denied the motion to suppress wiretap evidence. Gardner, 32 F.4th at 514. An assertion that a wiretap application fails Title III’s necessity requirement “attacks the issuing district court’s determination.” Id. We accord that determination “great deference” and reverse only if the issuing court abused its discretion by authorizing the wiretaps. Alfano, 838 F.2d at 162 (quotation marks omitted); see Gardner, 32 F.4th at 514. 2 Before applying those standards, we address the scope of the wiretap evidence that is properly under review. Throughout the investigation, law-enforcement agents obtained several wiretaps on the phones of key AVLN members. In the district court suppression proceedings, however, the defendants challenged only a January 15, 2021, order authorizing a wiretap on Murff’s phone. Murff’s suppression motion argued that the wiretap application flunked the statutory necessity requirement. Though Fordham and Reid later joined the Murff wiretap motion, neither joinder filing mentioned any other wiretap.  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 9 On appeal, Fordham and Reid seek to expand their challenge by contesting multiple wiretaps—beyond that on Murff’s phone—obtained during the investigation. Fordham, the only defendant to file a reply,1 offers two reasons why the broader challenge was preserved. To start, Fordham claims that his joinder expressed intent to “argue in conjunction with” Murff’s motion. Reply Br. 7. In addition, Fordham notes that his counsel prefaced his remarks at the suppression hearing by claiming that all the wiretaps were “clones” of one another. Id. In his telling, both statements indicate an intent to go beyond the four corners of Murff’s suppression motion and challenge every wiretap that captured Fordham’s calls. Neither statement supports Fordham’s broader suppression arguments. Murff’s written motion expressly limited the suppression challenge to the Murff wiretap alone. Fordham’s request to join and argue in conjunction with that motion—through a filing that never mentioned another wiretap—lacks the requisite “specificity” to expand the suppression motion’s scope. See Buchanon, 72 F.3d at 1226-27. The same goes for the ambiguous remarks by Fordham’s counsel at the hearing, which did not present or otherwise expand on challenges to other wiretap evidence. Accordingly, Fordham and Reid have forfeited any challenge to Title III wiretaps other than the wiretap on Murff’s phone. In this suppression context, defendants’ forfeiture leaves us with two options: review for plain error or not at all. Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d at 962. “[I]n the ordinary case, where the defendant’s suppression claim hinges on unresolved issues of fact, the more prudent course is to decline to exercise plain-error review.” Id. at 964. We heed that path here. Wiretap suppression claims are fact-intensive, detail-oriented inquiries that depend on the exact content of the challenged application. E.g., Gardner, 32 F.4th at 515-18. Yet here, the other wiretap applications Fordham and Reid purport to challenge were never introduced into the record. While Fordham claims that review is still possible because these other applications were “clones” of the Murff application, he has offered no support for that assertion. Reply Br. 7. Nor does that argument solve the lack of record fact-findings about the state of the investigation and 1We reiterate that reply briefs, though not required, “are critical to inform the court if a defendant disagrees with the government’s argument.” United States v. House, No. 25-5505, 2026 WL 1168127, at *2 n.1 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026).  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 10 sufficiency of traditional techniques at the time agents obtained these other wiretaps. We therefore limit our review to the Murff wiretap application. 3 The Murff wiretap application satisfies each of the three necessity criteria we have applied to Title III. Initial step. First, the wiretap was not an initial step in the investigation. See Gardner, 32 F.4th at 515. Law-enforcement officers had actively pursued the AVLN network for three years before applying for the wiretap. This Court has held that just one year of traditional investigation was “an appropriate time” to wait in comparable cases. Id.; see also United States v. Turner, Nos. 22-5046/5107/5131/5681/6056, 2024 WL 3634454, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (about a year in another AVLN investigation). During those three years, moreover, investigators employed an array of traditional techniques, including: cultivating two confidential informants embedded in the AVLN enterprise; reviewing hundreds of phone calls to those informants and thousands of prison calls by AVLN members; conducting multiple controlled purchases of narcotics through confidential informants and undercover officers; surveilling various AVLN members; installing multiple pole cameras; obtaining around 200 federal grand jury subpoenas regarding internet transactions, money transfers, and prison calls; executing multiple search warrants on the homes and social-media accounts of AVLN members; using pen registers on the phones of AVLN leadership; and reviewing public records and police reports. These efforts confirm that law enforcement did not seek to shortcut their investigation by obtaining the wiretap as an initial step. See Gardner, 32 F.4th at 515; United States v. Gonzalez, 849 F. App’x 557, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Patel, 579 F. App’x 449, 454 (6th Cir. 2014). Use of traditional techniques. Second, the application explained why each of the above traditional methods of investigation had failed, run its course, would be “too dangerous” to pursue, or appeared “unlikely to succeed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c); see Gardner, 32 F.4th at 515. Some techniques—like visual surveillance, pole cameras, and pen registers—could provide information on Vice Lords’ general patterns of movement and communication but failed to shed light on the innerworkings of AVLN leadership. Techniques that involved soliciting information  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 11 from members were frustrated by the AVLN’s code of silence and policy of violent retaliation, both of which were documented in the application. The group’s compartmentalization and hierarchical structure further frustrated investigative efforts; for instance, information on the Michigan and El Shabazz Boards was shielded from most rank-and-file members. For that reason, undercover officers and current confidential informants lacked insight into either Board. The defendants insist that investigators should have conducted more surveillance, cultivated additional confidential sources, or attempted trash pulls and GPS tracking. But Title III is not an exhaustion requirement that forces investigators to attempt the “full panoply of surveillance techniques.” United States v. Wright, 635 F. App’x 162, 167 (6th Cir. 2015). It is enough that investigators considered alternative methods and explained why they would be inadequate to accomplish the goals of the investigation. See Alfano, 838 F.2d at 163-64. Here, the application detailed how earlier surveillance efforts were unsuccessful and at times thwarted by AVLN countersurveillance techniques. It further explained that cultivating additional sources may be ineffective or dangerous. New sources would require significant time to rise through the ranks and reach a position where they were privy to Board matters. Meanwhile, recruiting existing AVLN members risked unearthing the entire investigation with one ill-chosen target. Finally, the application noted that trash pulls and GPS tracking were both unlikely to yield information on internal Board affairs. That explanation sufficed under Title III to show the shortcomings of traditional investigatory methods. Case-specific support. Third, as the above details confirm, investigators keyed their alternative-methods assessment to the “particular facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1977). Defendants’ chief counter—that the application impermissibly relies on generic or “boilerplate” assertions—does not hold up. Reid Br. 21; Murff Br. 45; see also Fordham Br. 18-19. To be sure, the application at time drifts into the generic. But caselaw recognizes that certain patterns hold constant across criminal organizations. See Gardner, 32 F.4th at 517. So wiretap applications can rely on generalizations so long as “specific examples provide support along the way.” Id. Investigators cleared that bar by pairing general statements about the nature of gangs or the futility of certain techniques with AVLN literature and specific incidents throughout the investigation. The defendants’  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 12 mere-“boilerplate” objection “fail[s] to contend with” the presence of “case-specific examples.” Id. To sum up, the Murff wiretap application established that officers gave “serious consideration” to traditional techniques before reasonably concluding that those methods could not bring down the Michigan and El Shabazz Boards. Alfano, 838 F.2d at 163 (citation omitted). The challenged wiretap approval was lawful, as was the admission of the resulting evidence. B Next, Fordham and Reid argue that evidence recovered from their Facebook accounts should have been suppressed because the search warrants were unconstitutionally overbroad. The warrants. As the investigation unfolded, it became clear that Vice Lords routinely used Facebook for a wide range of activities including coordinating meetings, discussing internal governance, and selling drugs and firearms. Fordham and Reid were no exception. The publicly available portions of their accounts showed both men self-identifying as Vice Lords and discussing AVLN business. So, in December 2019, investigators sought a warrant for information related to three Facebook accounts, including Fordham’s. About two months later, they sought a warrant for six other accounts, including Reid’s. Both warrants followed a two-step structure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). At step one, Facebook was ordered to disclose broad categories of account data. Many categories lacked any time limits on the data requested. But, as relevant here, the warrants limited the production of photos and messages to January 2014 onward for Fordham and January 2015 onward for Reid. At step two, the warrant authorized officers to seize only that information constituting fruits, evidence, or instrumentalities of the crimes under investigation. In addition, that step-two authorization was likewise time-bound to January 2014 onward for Fordham and January 2015 onward for Reid. Before trial, Fordham and Reid moved to suppress all evidence obtained under the two- step Facebook warrants. As their sole basis for suppression, Fordham and Reid argued that the  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 13 breadth of step one’s disclosures rendered the warrants unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court denied the motion. Overbreadth. The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Particularity challenges come in two varieties: clarity and overbreadth. See Richards, 659 F.3d at 537. Fordham and Reid raise the latter, arguing that each warrant’s scope “is too broad in the sense that it includes items that should not be seized.” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, they argue that particular portions of the warrant permitted seizures that were not supported by probable cause. See id. We review such claims de novo. Id. at 536. Seizing items beyond the proper scope of a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment and “generally requires that either an officer request a new warrant to seize items not in the warrant’s scope or that an exception to the warrant requirement must apply.” United States v. Whiteside, 141 F.4th 734, 747 (6th Cir. 2025). Overbreadth, however, does not “doom the entire warrant.” United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2001). Instead, courts isolate the overbroad portions and suppress only the “evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant.” Id. (citation omitted). That principle applies on appeal, too. Where the evidence “seized pursuant to the overbroad portion of the search warrant was not introduced into evidence . . . [the defendant] was not prejudiced by the defect in the warrant.” United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir. 1991). Sometimes, as here, defendants pressing overbreadth challenges assert that a warrant provision should have been narrowed with additional constraints. In such cases, courts decline suppression if the challenged evidence would have been seized even under the narrower warrant. See United States v. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 287 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Honeysucker, No. 21-2614, 2023 WL 142265, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2023). For instance, even when this Court has agreed that warrants should have covered only a particular time period, we’ve explained that suppression follows only for evidence that falls outside that time window. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 576 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Neuhard, 770 F. App’x 251, 254 (6th Cir. 2019). We’ve indicated the same for subject-matter limitations. See Hanna, 661 F.3d at 287.  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 14 Both lines of cases illustrate the same basic point. A defendant cannot seek suppression on the ground that a warrant lacks safeguards if the challenged evidence still would have been seized with the safeguards in place. In such cases, the defendant has suffered no prejudice from the warrant’s alleged overbreadth. See id.; Abboud, 438 F.3d at 576. And no prejudice as to the trial evidence means no suppression. Our most recent encounter with a two-step warrant in United States v. Honeysucker confirms this rule. See 2023 WL 142265, at *5. At step one, the Honeysucker warrant sought broad cell-phone-record disclosures from T-Mobile—many without time limits. Id. at *4. Yet step two then limited the items subject to seizure to the fruits of the suspected crimes and imposed a particular date range. Id. In seeking suppression, Honeysucker asserted that the Fourth Amendment required temporal restrictions at step one. Id. We noted that even if Honeysucker were correct, he offered “no argument that any trial evidence or evidence that contributed to his conviction” came from beyond the time period he requested. Id. at *5. That meant the evidence Honeysucker sought “to suppress would have been recovered even if the warrant had imposed that limitation.” Id. at *10 (Moore, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). So there was simply “no evidence to be severed for overbreadth.” Id. at *5. Fordham and Reid’s overbreadth challenge encounters the same problem. Both generally allege three deficiencies with the warrants. They claim that step one of the warrant (1) was not tailored to the crimes alleged, (2) exceeded the time period covered by the indictment, and (3) extended beyond AVLN-related matters. But all three proposed restrictions—as to crimes, the time period, and non-AVLN matters—were in place at step two. Perhaps for that reason, Fordham and Reid have not cited any evidence introduced at trial that falls outside the temporal and subject-matter guardrails they now seek.2 Nor do they argue that the allegedly improper 2During oral argument, Fordham’s counsel newly asserted that the four-year period governing seizure of the Facebook photographs and messages was too lengthy. Counsel pressed that contention even while acknowledging that the charged conspiracy spanned longer than four years. But see United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 338 (4th Cir. 2024) (explaining that the conspiracy’s “wide-ranging nature” and breadth helped “mitigate[] any concern that the scope of the warrant was impermissibly broad”). In any event, because the four- year challenge made its first appearance at oral argument, it is forfeited. Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 35 F.4th 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc).  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 15 scope at step one yielded any evidence or investigatory leads distinct from the evidence seized at step two. Thus, even had Fordham and Reid’s preferred limitations been present at step one, the record indicates that the challenged trial evidence “would have been lawfully acquired.” Hanna, 661 F.3d at 287. We therefore need not address whether the Facebook warrants’ two-step structure violated the Fourth Amendment. Fordham and Reid’s failure to link their overbreadth claim with the exclusion of any evidence independently forecloses their challenge. Id.; Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. C Reid next challenges the admission of evidence seized from his cell phone. When officers arrested Reid, they executed a search warrant at his residence that authorized the seizure of various items, including his cell phone. The warrant also permitted officers to search electronic-storage media seized for evidence of the crimes charged in the indictment. Reid contends the warrant was overbroad because it lacked temporal limits, though he does not dispute that the core of the warrant was supported by probable cause. The warrant passes muster under our Court’s caselaw. We have repeatedly upheld warrants authorizing the seizure of computers for subsequent off-site forensic search when “the warrant application and affidavit demonstrate a sufficient chance of finding some needles in the computer haystack.” United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (collecting cases). That’s because the unique nature of electronic-storage mediums makes it difficult to know ex ante where or in what format relevant evidence may be stored. Id. at 653. We apply the same principles to cell phones, which “may contain a litany of information” functionally “equivalent to a personal computer.” United States v. Bass, 785 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2015). Thus, we’ve upheld cell phone search warrants without temporal limits against overbreadth challenges when the warrant is limited to evidence of the crimes under investigation. See id. at 1049-50. Because the warrant for Reid’s phone was so limited, it was not overbroad.  Nos. 24-2033/2041/2046 United States v. Fordham, et al. Page 16 Reid’s counterarguments do not change that conclusion. He suggests that officers needed a second warrant before conducting a forensic extraction from the phone. But a second warrant to search properly seized electronic devices is unnecessary if “the evidence obtained in the search did not exceed the probable cause articulated in the original warrant.” Evers, 669 F.3d at 652 (quoting Richards, 659 F.3d at 539 n.10). He also briefly faults the affidavit for not limiting itself to specific crimes, but in so doing ignores that such a limit was contained in the warrant. For those reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence seized from Reid’s phone. D Reid’s final suppression challenge addresses statements that he and other Vice Lords made while detained in law-enforcement vehicles following their arrests. After the coordinated arrests on June 3, 2021, many arrestees were held in two vans while awaiting interviews at an ATF field office. Both vans were equipped with recording devices, and some of the conversations captured on recordings were introduced at trial. No defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress these statements. Reid now argues that the surreptitious recording violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Because he failed to file a motion to suppress, he forfeited that claim. See Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d at 962; Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). Moreover, whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy is “necessarily a fact-dependent inquiry” that must be undertaken “on a case-by-case basis.” Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Reid did not develop a record that might aid us in conducting that inquiry. So, as with the forfeited Title III-wiretap challenges, we decline to review this fact-intensive suppression claim. See Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d at 962. Reid also briefly asserts that the recording violated the Wiretap