Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0465n.06 Case No. 25-3797 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED Nov 18, 2026 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO MICHAEL HOLLIS, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION _______________________________________ ) Before: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Michael Hollis pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After the district court sentenced him to 78 months, Hollis appealed. He argues that (1) the district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing, (2) the district court should not have concluded that he possessed the firearm “in connection with” another felony or applied the corresponding four-level sentence enhancement, and (3) the 78-month sentence is unreasonably long. We AFFIRM the district court in full. I. On December 3, 2024, police officers detained Michael Hollis, a convicted felon who had violated terms of his parole, and searched his vehicle and residence. On the floor of Hollis’s vehicle, officers found four blue pills containing 0.56 grams of xylazine and fentanyl. From a side table in the living room, officers found a Glock 9mm pistol, a holster, and a bag of a white powdery substance containing 1.17 grams of fentanyl and heroin. Inside a black pouch in Hollis’s basement, No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis officers found a Smith and Wesson .380 caliber handgun, ammunition, two digital scales, 16 quarter-inch paper squares containing 0.13 grams of LSD, 12 blue tablets containing xylazine and fentanyl, a smaller bag containing five tablets, one of which contained 0.16 grams of amphetamine, and a bag containing 1.18 grams of psilocin (mushrooms). Also in the basement, officers discovered a box of clear plastic bags and a digital scale. On January 23, 2025, a federal grand jury charged Hollis with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hollis initially pleaded not guilty but later entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Hollis pleaded guilty and Hollis and the government recommended a base offense level of 20, with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, corresponding to a sentence range of 30 to 37 months under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. But the agreement also acknowledged that the district court alone would decide Hollis’s sentence and that Hollis would not be able to withdraw his guilty plea even if he were dissatisfied with the court’s sentence. Hollis also waived the right to appeal his conviction or his sentence, except to the extent that the sentence exceeded the recommended range or statutory maximum or to the extent necessary to advance claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.1 Before accepting Hollis’s guilty plea, the district court questioned Hollis to ensure that Hollis understood each term of the plea agreement. Hollis affirmed that he had read and understood the terms of the plea agreement, and that he also understood that the district judge was not bound by the sentencing recommendations contained therein. In response to the district court’s questions, Hollis similarly affirmed that he 1 Hollis’s appeal of his sentence falls within an exception to the appeal waiver because the district court imposed a sentence that exceeded the range recommended in the plea agreement. Hollis’s appeal of his conviction does not fall within any obvious exception to the appeal waiver, but the government does not contest Hollis’s right to appeal his conviction on grounds of mental incompetency. 2 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis reviewed the indictment with his attorney, had discussed his case with his attorney more generally, and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Hollis acknowledged that he understood that by pleading guilty he would waive certain civil rights. And prior to finalizing Mr. Hollis’s plea, the district court asked both Hollis’s counsel and the government whether there was anything left to address. Both confirmed that nothing further needed to be addressed. Based on its observation of Hollis’s demeanor during the change-of-plea hearing and Hollis’s response to the district court’s questioning, the district court found Hollis competent and capable of pleading guilty. The Presentence Report disagreed with the parties’ recommended offense level. It recommended that a four-level enhancement should apply because Hollis possessed the firearms “in connection with” another felony offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B). Both Hollis and the government objected. In response, the presentence officer noted that felony-level quantities of drugs had been discovered in close proximity to Hollis’s firearms. At the sentencing hearing, the district court applied the four-level enhancement for possession “in connection with” another felony offense. Otherwise agreeing with the parties’ recommended base level of 20 and the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the district court concluded that an offense level of 21 applied, corresponding to an advisory guideline range of 46 to 57 months. From there, the district court imposed an additional three-level upward variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because of Hollis’s history of violent crime, corresponding to a range of 63 to 78 months. It imposed a 78-month sentence, explaining that Hollis’s lengthy criminal record demonstrated an “inability to try in any way, shape or form to follow the law.” Hollis filed a timely notice of appeal. 3 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis On appeal, Hollis requests that this court vacate his guilty plea and remand the case for an inquiry into Hollis’s competency. In the alternative, Hollis requests that this court vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing without the four-level enhancement for possession “in connection with” another felony or any other substantial upward variance. II. A. Neither Hollis nor his lawyer raised the issue of Hollis’s competency to the district court. Nevertheless, Hollis now argues that his guilty plea is invalid because the district court did not, of its own accord, order a hearing on his competency. Because Hollis did not raise the issue of his competency to the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. McBride, 39 F. App’x 139, 142 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir. 2001)).2 Plain error review requires Hollis to show error that “was obvious or clear,” that “affected his substantial rights,” and that “affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “The court . . . shall order such a hearing [to determine the mental competency of the defendant] on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241; see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). We recognize that the bare record before us is a poor substitute for the district court’s personal observation of the defendant. United States v. Stafford, 782 F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2015) 2 Even if we were to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard as Hollis demands, see United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 873, 879 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying an abuse-of discretion standard where defendant raised issue of competence to district court), his claim would still fail. 4 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008)). And there are “no fixed or immutable signs” which trigger the need for a competency hearing. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. But the relevant factors include “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, [the defendant’s] demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.”3 United States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180). Hollis does not allege that he engaged in irrational behavior or that his demeanor before the court indicated a lack of competency. Instead, he argues that his medical history, as documented in the presentence report, should have alerted the district court to the potential issue. In December 2023, Hollis sustained a gunshot wound to the head which required surgery and a 30-day hospital stay. The presentence report stated that, in the leadup to Hollis’s December 2024 arrest, Hollis had repeatedly failed to report to his parole officer and had “started to claim that he was forgetting to report because of his head injury.” The presentence report elsewhere stated that Hollis had reported “minor memory issues” related to the injury, with occasional headaches and dizziness.4 Hollis argues that his memory issues could have rendered him unable to remember the facts underlying his conviction or unable to remember whether he wanted to plead guilty. We have no reason to doubt the severity of Hollis’s injury. But “the bar for incompetency is high.” Miller, 531 F.3d at 350. The bar is particularly high where, as here, both a defendant and his counsel failed to raise the issue of competency to the district court and accordingly must show that the error was an obvious deprivation of substantial rights which calls into question the 3 Hollis challenges his competency to enter the plea agreement, not to stand trial, but there is no heightened standard of competence for pleading guilty. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 (1993). 4 Hollis also believes that he has become “overly protective” following his head injury and identifies with some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Reported feelings of overprotectiveness or paranoia do not trigger the need for a competency hearing. Miller, 531 F.3d at 349. 5 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. The kind of “minor memory issues” that allegedly made Hollis forget to report to his parole officer do not meet that high bar. The record does not give us any reason to question Hollis’s ability to “understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him” or to “assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241; see Drope, 420 U.S. at 172. At his change-of-plea hearing, Hollis fully satisfied the district court as to his competence. Hollis did not report any memory issues during the hearing but instead repeatedly affirmed to the court that he understood the nature and consequences of his plea agreement. At Hollis’s sentencing hearing, Hollis’s attorney—who had “gotten to know” Hollis— described Hollis as a “very articulate” young man with great potential to be “a positive force in his community.” Even the fact that Hollis disagreed with his attorney about the issues for appeal and requested a substitute demonstrates that Hollis “understood the case against him and was capable of consulting with counsel.” Miller, 531 F.3d at 349 (quoting United States v. Shan Wei Yu, 484 F.3d 979, 985 (8th Cir. 2007)). The district court committed no reversible error when, without conducting a separate competency hearing, it found Hollis mentally competent to enter his guilty plea.5 B. Having concluded that we will not vacate Hollis’s guilty plea, we turn to Hollis’s request that we vacate his sentence. Hollis argues that the district court erred when it imposed the four- 5 Hollis also argues the district court did not sufficiently ensure that Hollis’s guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently under Rule 11 because the court did not sufficiently inquire into Hollis’s mental health or cognitive history. Hollis similarly argues that the district court could have been alerted to a potential competency issue if it asked more than what he contends was only one question explicitly inquiring into competency during the change-of-plea hearing. But this is pure speculation. And to the contrary, the record demonstrates that the district court complied with the Rule 11 procedures and that Hollis “repeatedly affirmed under oath that he understood the district court’s advice about his guilty plea.” See United States v. Smith, No. 22-3198, 2025 LX 214630, at *12 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025) (citing Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 1999)) (holding that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the defendant was bound to his plea-colloquy answers despite allegedly suffering cognitive difficulties at the time from a gunshot wound to the head). 6 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis level enhancement for firearm possession “in connection with” another felony, and he argues that the final sentence of 78 months was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and accord “due deference” to the district court’s determination that the firearm was possessed “in connection with” another felony. United States v. Crump, 65 F.4th 287, 300 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Shanklin, 924 F.3d 905, 919 (6th Cir. 2019)). We recognize that the determination of whether there was a sufficient nexus between the firearm and the other felony is “necessarily ‘fact-specific’ and thus better examined by the district court.” Id. (quoting Shanklin, 924 F.3d at 919). The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide a four-level enhancement if the preponderance of the evidence shows that a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B); Crump, 65 F.4th at 299 n.8 (citations omitted). The commentary explains that this enhancement applies if the firearm “facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating,” the other felony. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(A). “The burden to show a nexus between the firearm and the other felony is not onerous.” United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 868 (6th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). The firearm must have “served some purpose” in relation to the other felony such that its presence was not “merely coincidental.” Id. (quotations omitted). For drug-trafficking offenses, a showing that the firearm was found “in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia” is sufficient. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(B). The question here is whether Hollis’s firearm possession “had the potential of facilitating” Hollis’s felony possession of fentanyl. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) cmt. n.13(A). Hollis does not contest that his possession of fentanyl constituted an Ohio felony. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(C)(11)(b). Instead, Hollis argues that his firearm possession did not have “the potential 7 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis of facilitating” his possession of a relatively small amount of fentanyl. We disagree. While we have reversed application of this enhancement in cases where the defendant possessed only a negligible amount of drugs, those holdings were expressly predicated on the lack of any further evidence of facilitation and a lack of any evidence of drug trafficking, or record evidence undermining facilitation coupled with the government’s admission that nothing in the record showed that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking. See United States v. Seymour, 739 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Shields, 664 F.3d 1040, 1046 (6th Cir. 2011). But here there was evidence of drug trafficking. Hollis’s basement handgun was stored in a pouch with drugs and digital scales—readily transportable for illicit transactions. We also note that Hollis’s other firearm was similarly positioned for facilitation of Hollis’s fentanyl possession: it was discovered on the same living-room side table that held a holster and Hollis’s bag of fentanyl and heroin. The district court identified Hollis’s multiple digital scales, plastic bags, and multiple guns as a drug trafficker’s “tools of the trade” and noted the wide variety of illicit drugs in Hollis’s vehicle, living room, and basement. Also considering Hollis’s lack of any legitimate source of income, the district court concluded that the evidence of trafficking was strong enough to consider drug trafficking an additional independent felony. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(B) (requiring only “close proximity” of firearm and drugs when independent felony is a drug-trafficking offense). The court’s conclusion that Hollis’s firearms were in “close proximity” to drugs being trafficked is certainly a permissible view of the evidence, to which we defer. See Crump, 65 F.4th at 301. And regardless of whether Hollis was trafficking in drugs, the strategic positioning of Hollis’s firearms with drugs and drug paraphernalia in a readily transportable container establishes that Hollis’s firearm possession “had the potential of facilitating” his felony possession of fentanyl. 8 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(A). We therefore affirm the district court’s application of the four- level enhancement. Even if the district court had erred in applying the enhancement, we would not vacate Hollis’s sentence because Hollis would have suffered no prejudice. The district court independently justified the 78-month sentence based on Hollis’s violent criminal history and repeated failure to comply with parole and probation—regardless of whether the four-level “in connection with” enhancement applied. See United States v. Tobias, 101 F.4th 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016)). C. Finally, Hollis asks us to vacate his sentence because it is otherwise procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). Procedural reasonableness is satisfied so long as the district court “properly calculates the guidelines range, treats that range as advisory, considers the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), refrains from considering impermissible factors, selects the sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explains why it chose the sentence.” Id. at 440 (citation modified) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Substantive reasonableness is satisfied so long as the district court does not abuse its “broad discretion to fashion individualized, fact-driven sentences without interference from appellate courts.” United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2019). We may not presume that an upward variance is reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. But a defendant “still must surmount a high bar to succeed on a substantive-reasonableness challenge even to an upward variance,” United 9 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2019), as we “give due deference to the district court’s decision,” id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Hollis argues that the upward variance is unreasonable because the district court failed to sufficiently distinguish his case from the “heartland” of felon-in-possession cases. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (“A district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission intends individual guidelines to apply.” (citation modified)). But the district court noted that Hollis was more than just a felon in possession of a firearm—he also possessed illicit drugs and had a long criminal history of violent behavior, including gun violence, with no indication of reform. Hollis responds that his past crimes are irrelevant to the upward variance because his criminal history was already accounted for in the initial guidelines calculation. In Hollis’s view, the district court unjustly double counted Hollis’s violent past against him. Prior to imposing a sentence, a sentencing court is required to consider, among other factors, “the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct [and] to protect the public from further crimes.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A defendant’s criminal history is undoubtedly relevant to the consideration of those factors. Hence, “[w]e have consistently rejected defendants’ arguments that a district court cannot impose upward variances based on criminal history, simply because the Guidelines calculation already accounts for criminal history as a factor.” United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020). 10 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis The district court concluded that an upward variance was necessary to achieve the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). First, the court found a pattern of violent behavior and drug abuse, which prior sentences had failed to deter. Hollis’s criminal record began with a department store robbery at age 12 and indicates steady participation in theft, burglary, and drug possession offenses since that time. In May 2010, Hollis was convicted of burglary and witness intimidation in connection with the theft of a television set. In November 2011, Hollis knocked down a pregnant woman and punched her repeatedly in the face, resulting in a domestic violence conviction. In July 2012, Hollis was sentenced to eight years in prison for aggravated burglary and felonious assault after he and two other men forcibly entered a woman’s home, demanded money from her, and shot her in the pelvis. After his release on parole in March 2020, Hollis did not comply with drug-screening, refused to engage in substance-abuse treatment, and failed to report to his parole officer. In June 2022, Hollis’s girlfriend tried to move out of his apartment. In response, Hollis threatened to shoot her, grabbed her hair, and again threatened to shoot her as officers transported her to the police station. He was convicted of felony domestic violence and sentenced to community control. In June 2023, Hollis was found in possession of methamphetamine, meth pipes, marijuana, digital scales, packaging equipment, and a money counter. He was convicted of felony aggravated possession of drugs and again sentenced to community control. Given Hollis’s history and characteristics, the district court committed no reversible error when it concluded that an upward variance was necessary to adequately deter Hollis from further criminal conduct and to protect the public. Also bolstering the upward variance is the district court’s conclusion that the guidelines calculation did not fully account for Hollis’s criminal history. Hollis has repeatedly committed crimes while on parole or probation for other offenses. No criminal history points were added to 11 No. 25-3797, United States v. Hollis reflect Hollis’s being on post-release control (for the 2010 burglary and intimidation conviction and the 2012 burglary and assault conviction) or probation (for the 2022 domestic-violence and 2023 drug-possession felonies) when he committed the instant offense. Further, because Hollis was sentenced to only probation for his 2022 domestic-violence and 2023 drug-possession felonies, each offense only earned one criminal history point. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c). And no criminal history points were added to reflect Hollis’s older convictions, including his 2012 domestic-violence conviction and his 2010 burglary and witness-intimidation conviction. See U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(e)(3). Finally, Hollis argues that the 78-month sentence was arbitrary because the district court stated that it would have imposed 78 months regardless of whether the four level “in connection with” enhancement applied. But a district court that provides an alternate and independent rationale for its sentence does not thereby abuse its discretion. See Tobias, 101 F.4th at 482 (quoting Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 200). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed an upward variance to reach a 78-month sentence. III. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 12