United States v. Kyle Wagner

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0227p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ > No. 26-1294 │ v. │ │ KYLE WAGNER, │ Defendant-Appellee. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 2:26-cr-20059-1—Denise Page Hood, District Judge. Decided and Filed: August 12, 2026 Before: NORRIS, BLOOMEKATZ, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Danielle Asher, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Jean Pierre Nogues, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNITY DEFENDER, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. HERMANDORFER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., concurred. BLOOMEKATZ, J. (pp. 18–42), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. _________________ OPINION _________________ HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Kyle Wagner for cyberstalking and transmitting interstate threats. The conduct giving rise to the indictment followed a series of escalating communications in which Wagner threatened federal law- enforcement officers and their supporters, solicited resources to evade detection by the  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 2 authorities, and entertained an inquiry about killing a former government official. A magistrate judge ordered Wagner detained pretrial. But the district court changed course and permitted Wagner’s release. Though acknowledging that the record exhibited some risk of Wagner’s danger, the district court reasoned that certain release conditions—like requiring Wagner’s assurances that he will limit his internet access and avoid making additional threats—would adequately ensure public safety. The Government appealed and sought an emergency stay of the release order, which we granted. We now reverse the district court’s decision. I A Kyle Wagner is a self-professed member of Antifa1—short for anti-fascist—based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Wagner has stated that he’s willing to die in what “he view[s] as” an “ideological battle” against “violent fascist government actions and its supporters.” Wagner Br. 3-4. Around January 2026, Wagner undertook a series of escalating steps to oppose Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s actions in Minneapolis and broadcast his efforts to a social-media following. As the month progressed, Wagner’s social-media posts transitioned into direct calls for violence against federal agents and their supporters. A few examples paint the picture. Wagner proclaimed that the situation in Minneapolis was “kill or be killed.” E.D. Mich., Complaint, R.1, PageID 9. In that same post, Wagner encouraged his online followers to “hunt” ICE by “sacrific[ing]” their “vehicles.” Id. at PageID 8. In other posts, Wagner declared that he and his followers were “f**king coming for” ICE and were “coming for [ICE’s supporters] too.” Id. at PageID 6, 13. Wagner urged his followers to “f**king fight” ICE and “put[] hands” on law-enforcement agents and “take their f**king guns.” 1Referencing a 2025 Executive Order, the Government identifies Antifa as “a designated domestic terrorist organization.” Gov’t Br. 24; see Designating Antifa as a Domestic Terrorist Organization, 90 Fed. Reg. 46,317 (2025) (describing Antifa as “a militarist, anarchist enterprise” that “uses illegal means to organize and execute a campaign of violence and terrorism”). Wagner disputes that characterization and claims that Antifa is instead “a broad, community-based movement composed of individuals organizing against racial and economic injustice.” Wagner Br. 19 n.9 (citation omitted). Because our decision turns only on evidence of Wagner’s specific conduct, we can leave the parties’ broader debate about the nature of Antifa to the side.  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 3 Id. at PageID 11, 23-24. He suggested that he and his followers should “have a little f**king fun” by “identify[ing] every single” ICE agent, “at the barrel of a gun” if necessary. Id. at PageID 17. Wagner also lamented that protestors had yet to “march on f**king Whipple”—the federal building in Minneapolis—“with guns.” Id. at PageID 26. He therefore directed his followers to “[g]et your f**king guns and stop these f**king people.” Id. Wagner prefaced that directive by exclaiming that he was “not talking about peaceful protests anymore.” Id. Other videos of Wagner’s stressed that Minneapolis was “where ICE has come to die.” Id. at PageID 16. At points, Wagner disavowed any intent to commit physical aggression. Still, Wagner’s followers—spanning Minnesota and beyond—understood him to be calling for violence. In response to one of Wagner’s posts, an Instagram user referenced firearms, commenting that it’s “[t]ime for [ICE agents] to meet your friends. Namely AR15 and 9MM.” Id. at PageID 17. Others expressed interest in joining Wagner’s “cause” from out of state. Id. Wagner also sought tangible resources from his followers to aid his efforts to “organize.” Id. at PageID 13. Wagner specifically requested funds to help him “evade” detection by law enforcement. Id. And he provided the name of several financial-payment accounts for use in transferring him money. Id. In all, Wagner’s followers sent him between $10,000 and $15,000. After Wagner posted calls for “[b]oots on the ground” to a local intersection near ICE agents and urged his followers to “[g]et your f**king guns and stop these f**king people,” Instagram deleted Wagner’s account. Id. Yet he quickly resurfaced with a different account— employing the username “@antifa.kaos”—and a new series of online postings. Id. at PageID 27. Among other things, Wagner used his updated account to publish a video of him distributing gas masks and riot shields at a protest. Wagner’s activities were not just public facing. In one private Signal chat, a user allegedly contacted Wagner with a request to help “kill” a man named J.P., a former high- ranking government official. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 131, 139. Wagner responded in the chat that “we do stuff, me and my family of friends” and “[w]e like to know about people who deserve consequences.” Id. at PageID 131. He then asked for “credible  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 4 verifiable information” that he could pass onto his “team” so it could “assess the situation.” Id. at PageID 131-32. In another chat, Wagner allegedly stated that he “may have found” the address and phone number of N.S., an individual “who did investigative work.” Id. at PageID 134-35. On January 29, 2026, Wagner allegedly “doxxed” J.S., “a pro-ICE individual,” by publishing what he claimed was J.S.’s name, phone number, birth month and year, and address. E.D. Mich., Complaint, R.1, PageID 5. Alongside that information, Wagner described J.S. as a “bb nazi boy” and said “we can all knock on strangers doors . . . See you soon kiddo – stay safe out here.” Id. at PageID 30. After the alleged doxxing, J.S. and Wagner apparently discussed fighting in a cage match. In a subsequent post, Wagner allegedly published what he thought was the address and phone number of J.S.’s parents. B Several days later, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging Wagner with one count of cyberstalking and one count of transmitting interstate threats for his alleged doxxing of J.S. Wagner was subsequently arrested in Minnesota. During his arrest, Wagner allegedly began “pushing” agents and “spitting on them” while stating that he would “beat” them. D. Minn., Detention Hearing Tr., R.13, Page 38. He also told the arresting agents “[d]on’t let me out.” Id. During his booking photo, Wagner flashed two middle fingers at the camera. His message: “This is for the judge.” Id. at Page 21. Following a detention hearing, a magistrate judge in Minnesota ordered Wagner detained pretrial under the Bail Reform Act. In the detention order, the magistrate judge stated that Wagner was “a danger to the community” given his “implied threat to injure, harass or intimidate J.S. and his parents” and his “voluminous” social-media posts “encourag[ing] his supporters to join him in obstructing, impeding, and assaulting officers.” D. Minn., Detention Order, R.11, Page 3. The magistrate judge further explained that Wagner’s “lack of job security,” “admitted lack of stable housing,” and expressed “desire to ‘evade’ law enforcement” rendered him a flight risk. Id.  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 5 Wagner’s criminal case was then transferred to the Eastern District of Michigan, where the Government had filed the criminal complaint. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Michigan later indicted Wagner for one count of cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), and one count of interstate communications involving threats, id. § 875(c). Meanwhile, Wagner appealed the magistrate judge’s detention order. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and argument on the pretrial-detention factors. See id. § 3142(g). At the hearing’s conclusion, the district court issued an oral ruling revoking the magistrate judge’s detention order and releasing Wagner. The district court’s subsequent written order memorialized Wagner’s release to his mother’s home in Minnesota subject to a series of conditions. Those conditions required, among other things, that Wagner submit to GPS monitoring, “refrain from posting on social media,” forgo accessing the internet with anything other than two approved devices (one phone and one computer), and that he “[n]ot engage in assaultive, threatening, or harassing behavior or statement[s].” E.D. Mich., Release Order, R.23, PageID 118. The Government appealed the district court’s order and sought a stay pending appeal. We granted the motion for a stay in a prior order. Since then, the Government has obtained a second grand jury indictment against Wagner in the District of Minnesota. That indictment charges Wagner and several others with conspiracy to impede or injure a federal officer, solicitation to commit a crime of violence, and transmitting interstate threats. Wagner has entered a plea of not guilty. II The Bail Reform Act sets out the factors courts must use in determining whether to detain or allow the release of a criminal defendant before trial. In the mine-run case, the Act’s policy favors release. United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010). But like any “default position,” that policy can be overcome. Id. Relevant here, the statute directs that courts “shall order the detention of” a defendant pretrial if “no condition or combination of conditions will  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 6 reasonably assure the appearance” of the defendant “as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). When assessing those risks, courts must consider (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,” (2) “the weight of the evidence against the” defendant, (3) the defendant’s “history and characteristics,” and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the [defendant’s] release.” Id. § 3142(g). The Government must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Stone, 608 F.3d at 945. For the reasons below, we hold that the Government has met its burden of proving Wagner’s dangerousness. And given the nature of Wagner’s prior conduct, we further conclude that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of J.S. and the community. The Bail Reform Act therefore mandates Wagner’s pretrial detention. A We begin with the standard of review. When assessing pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act, we have held that “mixed questions of law and fact” and “legal conclusions” are subject to “de novo consideration.” United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985). More recently, in Stone, we reiterated that the “ultimate question whether [pretrial] detention is warranted” is subject to “de novo” review. 608 F.3d at 945 (citing Hazime, 762 F.2d at 37). By contrast, “[w]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” Id. Our framework— de novo review for the ultimate application of the statutory factors to the detention determination, and clear-error review for findings of fact—tracks the circuits’ prevailing approach to reviewing detention decisions under the Bail Reform Act. See Jefri Wood, The Bail Reform Act of 1984 § VII, pp.57-58 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 4th ed. 2022) (collecting cases). The dissent favors a more deferential standard for reviewing the ultimate detention conclusion. And it reads our precedents to leave that option on the table. But Hazime directly addressed when and how deference factored into review of detention determinations. See 762 F.2d at 36-37. And it concluded that de novo review governed the ultimate issue of detention. Id. That Hazime then remanded for further consideration does not mean the standard “did not  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 7 contribute to the judgment,” Dissenting Op. 28 (citation omitted)—after all, had the dissent’s across-the-board deference rule prevailed, Hazime might have simply affirmed. So like other courts and commentators,2 we take Hazime and Stone to mean what they say: We review de novo “whether detention is warranted.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 945. Subsequent caselaw developments do not license a departure from that rule. No intervening Supreme Court decision contains “directly applicable analysis” that is “inconsistent” with what “we’ve said” about the standard of review for detention decisions. RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380, 390 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The dissent’s reliance on different standard-of-review analyses in other law-fact contexts does not reveal anything that “mandates modification” of our Bail Reform Act decisions. Id. (citation omitted). So whatever the first-instance case for applying deferential review, we lack power here to revisit our precedents. See Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 662 (6th Cir. 2015). We also disagree with Wagner’s argument that United States v. Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2002), supports abuse of discretion review. Chilingirian involved a convicted defendant’s request for release pending appeal—not release pretrial—and never cited Hazime. Id. Instead, Chilingirian’s abuse-of-discretion assertion rested exclusively on Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1993). Lee, though, dealt with a state prisoner’s challenge to the denial of bail pending adjudication of a federal habeas petition. Id. at 870. Lee is not a Bail Reform Act case, and so it does not implicate our Bail Reform Act rule. B We now turn to the merits. The Government argues that Wagner is a danger to both J.S. and the broader community. It also argues that Wagner is a flight risk. We agree with the Government that it carried its burden on dangerousness. Because that conclusion is sufficient to support Wagner’s detention, we need not address risk of flight. To establish a defendant’s dangerousness, the Government must “identify an articulable threat posed by the defendant to an individual or the community.” United States v. Munchel, 991 2See, e.g., Wood, Bail Reform Act § VII, p.58; United States v. Manafort, 897 F.3d 340, 346 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United States v. Westbrook, 780 F.2d 1185, 1189 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986).  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 8 F.3d 1273, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2021). That requirement does not limit detention to only those defendants who have “engaged in violence” personally. Stone, 608 F.3d at 947 n.6 (collecting cases). A “threat” sufficient to establish dangerousness “need not be of physical violence, and may extend to non-physical harms.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283 (citation omitted). And when determining whether the Government has met its burden of proving dangerousness, “we may consider as evidence” conduct that “does not relate to the offenses charged.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 953; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991). With those points in mind, we consider the four § 3142(g) factors in turn. 1. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense. Wagner’s conduct led a grand jury to indict him on two felonies involving threatened harm to others—cyberstalking and transmitting threats through interstate communication. The cyberstalking charge alleges that Wagner acted “with the intent to kill, injure, harass, and intimidate” J.S. by using “the internet and the social media application Instagram[] to engage in a course of conduct that caused, attempted to cause, and would reasonably be expected to cause substantial emotional distress to J.S.” E.D. Mich., Indictment, R.10, PageID 49-50 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)). The interstate-threats charge alleges that Wagner “knowingly transmitted in interstate commerce” a “communication containing a threat to injure” J.S. “with knowledge” and “reckless disregard that the communication[] would be viewed as a threat.” Id. at PageID 50 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). Both charges stem from Wagner’s attempt to “doxx[]” J.S. and his parents with a message that, in context, appears to threaten J.S. with harm. E.D. Mich., Complaint, R.1, PageID 29-30. Given those charges, the nature and circumstances of the offenses weigh in favor of Wagner’s detention on dangerousness grounds. See United States v. Hagar, 822 F. App’x 361, 369 (6th Cir. 2020) (deeming similar charges “extremely serious”). Neither Wagner nor the dissent disputes that the charged offenses are serious. And indeed, this Court has before characterized Wagner’s charged offenses—cyberstalking and transmitting interstate threats—as categorically “crimes of violence.” United States v. Lidderdale, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33235, at *9-10 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025) (collecting cases). Wagner’s interstate-threats charge requires a “threat to kidnap any person or [a] threat to injure the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Courts have likewise read the cyberstalking statute  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 9 to cover a more limited category of threatening speech. See, e.g., United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70, 80 (3d Cir. 2022). That forecloses the district court’s observation that the charged offenses could sweep in minor conduct like schoolyard “bullying.” E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 149-50. So discounting Wagner’s charges on that ground was legally unsound. That leaves Wagner to argue that the “alleged criminality in this case” lacks weight given the particulars of his conduct. Wagner Br. 15. Driving Wagner’s position is that the threats were “directed at a single individual, J.S.,” “who purposefully trolls his political opponents to generate responses and views by followers.” Id. But we are aware of no rule that permits cyberstalking or interstate threats so long as the victim has a controversial persona. Nor is now the time to litigate the Government’s ability to ultimately prove Wagner’s guilt at trial. Wagner posted J.S.’s information and address to his many followers, called J.S. “nazi boy,” and said “see you soon kiddo.” E.D. Mich., Indictment, R.10, PageID 50 (cleaned up). A grand jury concluded that such communications constituted evidence of “a threat to injure the person of another.” Id. The district court, too, indicated that the specific charges against Wagner were “very serious.” E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 149-50. All that weighs against attempts to mitigate the nature and circumstances of Wagner’s offenses by downplaying the risk of potential harm to J.S or others. Nor are we persuaded by the dissent’s comparative assessment of Wagner’s conduct. The fact that Wagner’s conduct could have been worse does not mean it weighs in favor of dangerousness only “slightly.” Dissenting Op. 30. To the contrary, the district court noted that “there are a lot of things” in the record “that point to at least some active . . . concerns relative to [the] danger posed by the defendant” to J.S. and others. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 146-47. We agree. 2. Weight of the Evidence. The “weight of the evidence” also points towards Wagner’s dangerousness. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). “This factor goes to the weight of the evidence of dangerousness, not the weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 948.  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 10 Wagner’s specific incident with J.S. followed weeks of posts that included communications the district court found could be interpreted as “actual threats” against federal law-enforcement authorities and their supporters. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 145. Those posts—appearing in the record verbatim—included calls for Wagner’s followers to “put[] hands on” ICE, “fight” ICE, and “[g]et your f**king guns and stop” ICE. E.D. Mich., Complaint, R.1, PageID 23-24, 26. In some of those posts, Wagner explained that he was “done with peaceful protests,” that he was “not talking about peaceful protests anymore,” and that it was “kill or be killed.” Id. at PageID 9, 24, 26. Such threatening statements “weigh[] strongly in favor of dangerousness.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 949. In addition to those posts, Wagner communicated with a Signal user about killing J.P., a former government official. In that conversation, which occurred two days before his arrest, Wagner said that if the user provided him with “credible verifiable information,” he would pass it along to “people who can” mete out “consequences” to J.P. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 131. The unknown Signal user responded “[h]ow can I trust you?” Id. at PageID 132. The record reflects that Wagner and the unknown user then connected via an incoming call. Id. Afterwards, the user sent additional information about J.P., including a “phone number, address, [and] E-mail.” Id. In response, Wagner stated, “[w]e have to walk through fire.” Id. That Wagner pitched himself as able to assist in soliciting a murder evidences his dangerousness. So does a separate January 2026 incident in which Wagner distributed a “current address” for an individual named N.S. with the message: “I may have found where he’s hiding.” Id. at PageID 135. Wagner’s counterarguments do not persuade. To start, Wagner contends that “[t]he government’s case on the charged offenses is weaker than its brief suggests.” Wagner Br. 16. And throughout these proceedings, Wagner has insisted that his prosecution boils down to a political vendetta. But those responses do not affect the detention calculus. As already explained, the “weight of the evidence” referenced in § 3142(g)(2) “goes to the weight of the evidence of dangerousness, not the weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt” on the indicted offenses. Stone, 608 F.3d at 948. Wagner’s characterization also does not account for  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 11 the grand jury’s indictment, which “by itself, establishes probable cause to believe that [Wagner] committed the crime[s] with which he is charged.” Id. Wagner next takes issue with the Government’s reliance on his social-media posts and chats to prove dangerousness. His argument is both legally and factually flawed. As a legal matter, “we may consider as evidence of dangerousness” a defendant’s “statements indicating a violent intent” even though those statements “do[] not relate to the offenses charged.” Id. at 953. Courts routinely consider a defendant’s threatening statements, among other speech, when determining whether the defendant poses a danger to the community.3 As for the facts, they do not support the characterization of Wagner’s posts as exclusively calls to “practice non-violent obstructive protest techniques.” Wagner Br. 19-20. The district court acknowledged the “very strong argument that there was some protection of the public involved” in detaining Wagner pretrial. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 147. And the record supports that finding. Wagner, among other things, called for his followers to “f**king fight” ICE, “put[] hands on” ICE, and “[g]et your f**king guns and stop these f**king people.” E.D. Mich., Complaint, R.1, PageID 23-24, 26. Wagner also called for his followers to “hunt ice” and expressed frustration that they had yet to “march on f**king Whipple with guns.” Id. at PageID 8, 26. Now that Wagner’s threats have come under legal scrutiny, he seeks to cast them as empty bravado. But given Wagner’s assertions that he was “done with peaceful protests now” and “not talking about peaceful protests anymore,” several of Wagner’s posts can only be understood as calls for violence. Id. at PageID 24, 26. Wagner’s followers understood them as such, with one responding that it was time for federal agents to meet an “AR15 and 9MM.” Id. at PageID 17. If messages calling to “march on” a federal building “with guns,” “put[] hands on” ICE, and “[g]et your f**king guns and stop these f**king people” don’t “promote[] physically assaulting and using weapons against federal agents,” Dissenting Op. 31 (citation 3See, e.g., id. at 953-54; United States v. Martinez-Torres, 181 F.3d 81, at *2 (1st Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Torres, 2023 WL 7391694, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023) (per curiam); see also United States v. Muhtorov, 702 F. App’x 694, 696, 702 (10th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); United States v. Lucero, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1662, at *2-3, 12 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2025).  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 12 omitted), it’s hard to imagine what words would. For good reason, then, the district court accepted that some of Wagner’s posts could be read as “actual threats.” E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 145. Wagner cannot avoid consequences for those threats by shifting the focus to times he chose more tempered words. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Torres, 181 F.3d 81, at *2 (1st Cir. 1998) (per curiam). That is especially so because Wagner’s threats had “escalated in volume and violence” around the time of his arrest. Lidderdale, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33235, at *12 (quoting United States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014)). Even accepting that Wagner himself did not present any “physically active” concerns of danger, E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 146-47, that does not disprove dangerousness. A defendant need not have “engaged in violence” to warrant detention. Stone, 608 F.3d at 947 n.6. Nor does the record support efforts to brush away Wagner’s private communications involving a request to “kill” J.P. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 131. Wagner claims that “an undercover federal agent” contacted Wagner about J.P. as part of an “attempt[] to trick Wagner” into incriminating himself. Wagner Br. 11. But Wagner provides no evidence to support that claim. And even if true, it does not help Wagner. Regardless of who contacted him, Wagner does not dispute the allegations that he agreed to pass along J.P.’s information to his “team” so they could “assess the situation” and potentially mete out “consequences.” E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 131-32. The dissent’s assertion that Wagner was intending to “‘forward’” J.P.’s “‘information’” to the “‘international criminal court’” fares no better. Dissenting Op. 33 (quoting E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 139). The proffered conversation shows that Wagner entertained a request to help “kill” J.P., not criminally refer him. E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 131. Wagner’s counter that he lacked sufficient notice that the Government intended to proffer the J.P. conversation does not alter the district court’s decision to admit that evidence into the record. “The government may proceed in a detention hearing by proffer.” United States v. Webb, 238 F.3d 426, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Stone, 608 F.3d at 948-49. And “[t]he rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 13 consideration of information at the [detention] hearing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); see also United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir. 1975). So the district court did not err by allowing the Government to introduce Wagner’s conversation about J.P., particularly since Wagner has not disputed the accuracy of that information. 3. Nature and Seriousness of the Danger. Next, “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by [Wagner’s] release” is significant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4). Internet-based threats like those Wagner is charged with making pose well-documented harms. See United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 745 n.4 (10th Cir. 2015); see also Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 747-48 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2024 Year End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6-7 (2024) (discussing dangers of “dox[x]ing”). Wagner’s “threatening statements regarding law enforcement officers” are also strong evidence that he “would pose a serious danger to the community if released” pending trial. Stone, 608 F.3d at 953; see also United States v. Davis, 2024 WL 3372682, at *2 (5th Cir. July 11, 2024) (per curiam). So are Wagner’s private communications about J.P., which further indicate a willingness to entertain targeted threats on specific individuals. Wagner disagrees. In doing so, he defends the district court’s apparent attempt to draw equivalency between Wagner’s threats and the actions of federal law enforcement. Specifically, the district court remarked during the detention hearing that “protection of the public” was “kind of like a two-way street” that “depends on what side of the street you’re on whether or not an individual might feel they are protected or in need of protection.” E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 147. Both Wagner and the Government interpret that remark as a “compar[ison]” between “Wagner’s actions in the community to those of ICE.” Wagner Br. 21. In context, it thus appears that the district court may have discounted the dangerousness of Wagner’s threats based on its view that ICE also threatened the public. Any reasoning along those lines was error. The Bail Reform Act focuses on the danger the defendant poses to “any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The district court’s views on the Executive Branch’s immigration policy have no bearing on that inquiry.  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 14 4. Defendant’s History and Characteristics. That leaves Wagner’s history and characteristics. Those “weigh[] slightly against dangerousness,” as Wagner has no violent criminal history. Stone, 608 F.3d at 951. But “a prior record of violence” is not “essential” to proving that a defendant is dangerous for detention purposes. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d at 89. So too, “a person could be deemed a danger to the community sufficient to justify detention even without posing a threat of committing violence in the future.” United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, 3 F.4th 449, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2021). And for the reasons already discussed, the Government “has met its burden” of “prov[ing] dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence” despite Wagner’s lack of a violent criminal history. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d at 89. C We also agree with the Government that no condition or combination of conditions will “reasonably assure” the safety of J.S. and the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). In ordering Wagner’s release, the district court concluded that the various conditions it imposed—including GPS monitoring, home detention, a third-party custodian (Wagner’s mother), device restrictions, and a prohibition on social-media posting—would mitigate Wagner’s dangerousness. We see two principal defects with that conclusion. First, the conditions of release mostly “hinge on” Wagner’s “good faith compliance.” United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 886 (1st Cir. 1990). That is “particularly” true here, as the “crimes with which [Wagner] is charged” are “not readily susceptible to effective monitoring” because they “involve communications” with others. United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008). Yet the record evidence leaves little confidence that Wagner will comply with the conditions of release. Wagner’s actions around the time of his arrest undercut his asserted promises to abide by the court-imposed conditions. Those actions include (1) flashing two middle fingers to the camera during his booking photo while stating “[t]his is for the judge,” (2) “spit[ting] in the face” of the arresting agents, (3) warning those agents not to “let [him] out” and that he would “beat” them, and (4) seeking—and obtaining—resources to “evade” federal law enforcement. D. Minn., Detention Hearing Tr., R.13, Page 21, 38; E.D. Mich., Complaint, R.1, PageID 13.  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 15 Moreover, Wagner has failed to appear for state criminal proceedings multiple times, was once “[l]isted as an absconder” by a state court, and had an active warrant for his arrest in Iowa at the time of his detention hearing. E.D. Mich., Pretrial Services Report, at 4-5. Wagner’s pattern of failing to appear for prior judicial proceedings further “demonstrate[s] a disregard for law enforcement and court-imposed restrictions.” United States v. Moore, 2024 WL 3294950, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2024). All told, the record evidence points toward “an unacceptably high risk that” Wagner will disregard the conditions that the district court found necessary to mitigate his dangerousness. Hir, 517 F.3d at 1093. Second, the online nature of Wagner’s conduct further diminishes the effectiveness of the district court’s conditions of release. Wagner could, for example, “easily evade[]” the device- monitoring requirement by accessing another device that is not equipped with the monitoring software. Tortora, 922 F.2d at 887. Indeed, Wagner has already allegedly evaded a social- media company’s limitations on posting once before by creating and posting from a new account. And the district court’s release order, which authorizes Wagner to leave home confinement for “employment,” “education,” and various other reasons, E.D. Mich., Release Order, R.23, PageID 116, would provide Wagner with ample opportunities to “access the internet” via unmonitored devices, United States v. Carpenter, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 2386, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2023). Yet the district court failed to address the Government’s argument that internet-monitoring conditions are easily circumvented or problematic given Wagner’s particular history of internet activity. Similarly, the GPS-monitoring and home-detention conditions “cannot be expected to prevent” Wagner “from committing crimes or deter him from participating in felonious activity within the monitoring radius.” Tortora, 922 F.2d at 887. Neither condition prevents Wagner from accessing the internet and “committing further criminal conduct” within the confines of his mother’s home “or inducing others to act in his stead.” United States v. Espino, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6755, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2021). Appointing Wagner’s mother as a third-party custodian is no silver bullet, either. As Wagner’s counsel stated, Wagner’s mother “doesn’t know everything that her son does.” E.D. Mich., Detention Hearing Day 2 Tr., R.24, PageID 141. And it’s unreasonable to expect her to “monitor[]” Wagner’s “compliance with conditions  No. 26-1294 United States v. Wagner Page 16 of bail twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.” United States v. Dono, 275 F. App’x 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2008). Wagner and the dissent maintain that the district court’s proposed conditions adequately address the danger he poses. Wagner emphasizes that most of his actions “were online,” which the district court addressed by “imposing strict device restrictions” and “social media restrictions.” Wagner Br. 21-22. And he says he can only “get around” those restrictions by “defeating Pretrial Services internet monitoring software or colluding with his third-party custodian.” Id. at 22. That position overstates the effectiveness of the district court’s proposed conditions and the difficulty of circumventing them. Examples highlighting the failings of internet-access limitations abound in our caselaw.4 And in the pretrial-release context, we have explained that “the myriad of Internet-capable devices, including those that work with data plans rather than wifi access, render policing a defendant’s Internet use almost impossible.” United States v. Watt, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 13950, at *5 (6th Cir. June 7, 2024) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[E]lectronic surveillance systems can be circumvented by the wonders of science and of sophisticated electronic technology,” and “monitoring equipment can be rendered inoperative.” (citation omitted)).