United States v. William Boylston

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0246p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ │ │ v. > Nos. 24-5095/5104/5105/5106/5116/5125/ │ │ MICHAEL FORRESTER, JR. (24-5095); DEREK │ LEIGHTON STANLEY (24-5104); AELIX │ SANTIAGO (24-5105); JAMIE HERN (24-5106); │ WILLIAM BOYLSTON (24-5116); JAMES WESLEY │ FRAZIER (24-5125); JASON MEYERHOLZ (24- │ 5126), │ Defendants-Appellants. ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. No. 3:17-cr-00130—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge. Decided and Filed: August 27, 2026 Before: McKEAGUE, LARSEN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Paul J. Bruno, BARRETT, JOHNSTON, MARTIN & GARRISON, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, Thomas W. Kidd, Jr., KIDD & URLING LLC, Harveysburg, Ohio, for Appellant Michael Forrester, Jr. David L. Cooper, COOPER LAW FIRM, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Derek Stanley. Eileen M. Parrish, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Aelix Santiago. Charles D. Buckholts, BUCKHOLTS LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Jamie Hern. John Bailey, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellant William Boylston. Houston Goddard, GODDARD POPE PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant James Frazier. Juni S. Ganguli, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant Jason Mayerholz. Michael A. Rotker, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Kathryn Risinger Chris Suedekum, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 2 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 _________________ OPINION _________________ LARSEN, J. Defendants are members or associates of the Clarksville, Tennessee chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club. A federal grand jury indicted defendants and other Mongols in a 75-count indictment for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), with predicate acts of murder, kidnapping, robbery, and drug trafficking, to name a few. Some defendants pleaded guilty or died before conviction. The defendants involved in this appeal were tried jointly and convicted on numerous counts. Most received life or near-life sentences. Defendants now appeal their convictions and sentences. For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Mongols Motorcycle Club (or Mongol Nation) is a national motorcycle gang with chapters spread across the United States and a history of violent activity. See United States v. Mongol Nation, 56 F.4th 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 2023). It is “an all male, all white and Hispanic 1% motorcycle club,” and it is “among the small minority of motorcycle clubs that openly flout the law by engaging in criminal acts as a part of its business.” R. 2556, PageID 26105. Mongol members “are easily identified by the black leather vests (or ‘cuts’) they wear.” Id. at 26105–06. The vests contain patches that indicate national and chapter membership, any office the member holds, and special recognitions. The Mongols started in the Los Angeles, California area in 1969. The organization has a hierarchical leadership structure, with a national governing body, known as the “Mother Chapter,” exercising control over local individual chapters. Id. at 26106; R. 2410, PageID 18126. The Mother Chapter is located in Southern California, and it “has authority over all chapters and members,” including the power to resolve disputes. R. 2556, PageID 26106. Mongol Nation is governed by a written constitution, bylaws, and other rules, some written and some unwritten. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 3 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 Individual chapters report to regional representatives of Mongol Nation. The individual chapters are run by officers drawn from the local membership, including a President, Vice President, Secretary-Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms. Membership in a chapter requires paying dues, fees, and taxes, which in turn fund the organization, pay for national events, and cover legal expenses. Members must attend weekly chapter meetings. And they must own an operational motorcycle. Local officers oversee local club members. Full membership follows a two-stage initiation period. As described by the district court: Usually, one cannot become a full-fledged member of the Mongols until he has been a prospect for at least a year, during which time he wears a vest with a “P” on it. Underneath prospects are “hang-arounds,” meaning individuals who are getting a feel for what the organization is about and whether they want to be a part of it. The chapter members, too, get to size-up the prospects and hang-arounds. Prospects and hang-arounds are pretty much at the beck-and-call of fully patched members during this period. Id. at 26106–07. In 2015, Michael Forrester, James Frazier, Jamie Hern, Aelix Santiago, and Jacob Ort were either members or prospects of the Sin City Disciples, another motorcycle club. They decided to leave the Disciples and form the first Tennessee-based chapter of the Mongols in Clarksville, Tennessee. They began referring to themselves as “prospects” of Mongol Nation and actively recruited other members. “Though not yet officially recognized as [members] by the Mongols Nation, they took to wearing ‘soft colors,’ i.e., black and white items, which also happens to be the Mongols’ colors.” Id. at 26108. They also sold drugs, including methamphetamine. Around this time, Joel Aldridge, a local drug dealer, started to associate with the group. The fledgling group’s acts of violence began to increase. They showed support for Aldridge after he physically assaulted another drug dealer. They shot up the house of the president of another outlaw biker club. Santiago burned down Sin City’s clubhouse in Nashville; Frazier and Ort did the same two days later to Sin City’s clubhouse in Clarksville. Through these actions, the would-be Mongols distanced themselves from the Disciples and made themselves known around Clarksville.  Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 4 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 The violence intensified. In May 2015, Frazier, Ort, and Aldridge kidnapped two women, Stephanie Bradley and Brandi Cooper. Bradley and Cooper had previously purchased drugs from Aldridge. But Frazier and Ort had come to believe that Bradley had stolen drugs or money from them. After Frazier, Ort, and Aldridge questioned Bradley about the missing drugs, she made the mistake of posting negative comments about the Mongols on Facebook. After her Facebook post, Frazier, Ort, Aldridge, and Santiago subjected Bradley to “even more intense” questioning. Id. at 26109. Bradley then posted another comment on Facebook referencing being “harassed by some motorcycle guys.” R. 2413, PageID 18890. In response, Frazier, Ort, and Aldridge abducted Bradley and Cooper and drove them at gunpoint to a secluded area. “During the ride, Ort wiped the fingerprints off his bullets and placed them back into his gun. Aldridge put his gun in Bradley’s mouth. Bradley was so scared during the ordeal that at one point she begged not to be killed and told her captors she could be raped instead.” R. 2556, PageID 26109. Once out of the car, Ort shot Bradley approximately eight times. Frazier then ordered Aldridge to shoot Bradley as well, to ensure she was dead. So Aldridge shot her in the head. They left Bradley’s body in the woods, but spared Cooper’s life. Later, Cooper met with law enforcement about Bradley’s disappearance and stated that Aldridge had killed her. She later told federal law enforcement officers of Frazier and Ort’s involvement. By this time, defendants were almost fully joined with the Mongol Nation. They underwent Mongol Nation background checks, conducted weekly chapter meetings, and preliminarily elected members for positions. Their criminal activity continued, including multiple robberies or attempted robberies. During an attempted robbery gone wrong, Ort was killed in a car crash. In July 2015, Frazier, Santiago, Hern, and others went to California to join the Mongol Nation national run, essentially, the Mongols’ version of a national convention. They hoped the national organization would officially recognize them as full members of the Mongol Nation by awarding them “patches.” Although the national organization didn’t recognize the Clarksville Mongols as an official chapter at that time, they were encouraged to continue to act as one. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 5 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 Around this time, the fledgling Clarksville chapter became associated with the California Harbor Chapter, and its member Thomas Chavez, who would become the Clarksville chapter’s sponsor (or “patch daddy.”) Members of the Harbor Chapter had access to high-quality methamphetamine from a drug cartel and viewed Tennessee as a lucrative untapped market for distribution. The Clarksville Mongols were ready to help. Over roughly the next year and a half, Chavez and the Harbor Chapter would supply the Clarksville Mongols with large quantities of methamphetamine for distribution in Tennessee and Kentucky. Beginning in September 2015, the Clarksville Mongols began distributing large quantities of methamphetamine. Frazier made numerous trips to California to purchase meth from Chavez. Frazier, Hern, Cole, and others were involved in the local distribution. And so was Derek Stanley, a Kentucky drug dealer who was introduced to Frazier in the fall of 2015. Stanley began purchasing large amounts of methamphetamine from Frazier and distributed it throughout Kentucky. Methamphetamine wasn’t the only drug the Clarksville Mongols distributed. Frazier and Santiago also trafficked prescription pills. On one occasion in January 2016, Frazier arranged to send Theresa Cobb and Kyle Heade to a drug buy to restock his supply of illicit prescription pills. Santiago was also a part of this discussion, and he loaned the couple his gun and his car for the deal. But the deal went bad when the supplier tried to rob Cobb, and Heade shot the supplier in response. After this incident, Heade and Cobb returned home, where they reconnected with Santiago and Frazier. Santiago asked Heade if he had removed the spent shell casings from his car and Santiago then retrieved his gun from Heade to clean it. Frazier asked other Mongol members to search for the wounded pill supplier. Meanwhile, the injured supplier informed law enforcement of the shooting and Cobb’s address. Police subsequently searched the house and found the getaway car, firearms, ammunition, drugs, currency, and drug paraphernalia. Frazier and Santiago were arrested and charged with state-law offenses. The following July, during the 2016 national run, the Mother Chapter officially recognized the Clarksville Mongols as a probationary chapter. Around this time, William Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 6 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 Boylston and Robert Humiston became members of the Clarksville Mongols. Frazier, Santiago, Hern, Boylston, and Humiston, among others, became fully patched members. Emboldened by their national recognition, the Clarksville Mongols ratcheted up their violence. Humiston and Santiago, along with other members, fought with the Diablos Motorcycle Gang. “At one point the group managed to pull off the Diablos President’s vest, an incredible sign of disrespect.” Id. at 26118. The fight ended when police were summoned after a Diablo fired a gun. Humiston also engaged in a shootout with a member of the Iron Order Motorcycle Club. In October 2016, Chavez, the Clarksville Chapter’s sponsor, overdosed and died in a motel room he had rented with a woman named Sharon Priess. Chavez’s death held “monumental” significance for the Clarksville Mongols, who were “still on probationary status.” Id. at 26120. “His death in Clarksville reflected poorly on the Clarksville Chapter and raised the scorn of the Mother Chapter.” Id. Priess fled, worried about the Mongols’ response. When the Clarksville Mongols found Priess, they beat and strangled her until she agreed to give the California Mongols an account of Chavez’s death. Priess eventually was allowed to leave. In 2017, Jason Meyerholz, a member of a Colorado chapter of Mongol Nation, relocated to Tennessee and joined the Clarksville Mongols. Meyerholz quickly became involved in a dispute between Boylston and another Mongol, Stephen Cole, over missing motorcycles and an unpaid debt. In March of that year, Cole was evicted from a house where he had been storing Boylston’s motorcycles. The motorcycles disappeared during the eviction process. Boylston thought Cole had sold the motorcycles for drugs, and he made that accusation to Meyerholz and other Mongols. Although Cole disputed taking Boylston’s motorcycles, he eventually agreed to the Chapter leaders’ demands to pay Boylston for them. But Cole never paid Boylston. And “in the fall of 2017, Cole informed members that he was not going to pay the debt after all.” Id. at 26121–22. This led to his ouster from the club in November 2017. With Cole out of the club, he “no longer had the protection of being a brother Mongol[].” Id. at 26122. So it was “easier to justify retaliation” against him. Id. Boylston and Meyerholz abducted Cole. They took him to a member’s girlfriend’s house and locked him in a shed. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 7 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 “Inside the shed, Cole was zip-tied and mercilessly tortured for hours. He was beaten so badly that his skin was falling off his face and a tent spike was driven into his head.” Id. Christian Dykes, a hang-around who helped dispose of the body, testified to seeing Cole’s “mangled” face, with “[h]is jaw . . . hanging” and a nail “in the back of his head.” R. 2439, PageID 23953. Cole died, and Boylston, Meyerholz, and Dykes proceeded to clean up the mess and dispose of the body. In 2018, a federal grand jury returned a 75-count third superseding indictment against 21 defendants for crimes based on their membership in, or association with, the Clarksville Mongols. Twelve defendants pleaded guilty, two died, and the seven remaining defendants (appellants here) stood trial on numerous counts of racketeering conspiracies, murder, drug trafficking, kidnapping, assault, and illegal firearm possession. The relevant counts are as follows: ▪ Count 1 – conspiracy to participate in conducting the affairs of a racketeering enterprise ▪ Count 2 – conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 3 – conspiracy to commit money laundering ▪ Count 6 – kidnapping resulting in death ▪ Count 7 – kidnapping in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 8 – murder in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 9 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence ▪ Count 10 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting in death ▪ Count 11 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime resulting in death ▪ Count 12 – distribution and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine ▪ Count 13 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 8 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 ▪ Count 14 – assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 15 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence ▪ Count 16 – assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 17 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence ▪ Count 18 – conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce ▪ Count 19 – robbery affecting interstate commerce ▪ Count 20 – kidnapping ▪ Count 21 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence ▪ Count 22 – interstate travel in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 23 – distribution and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 24 – interstate travel in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 25 – distribution and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 26 – distribution and possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 27 – distribution and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 28 – conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute Oxymorphone ▪ Count 29 – distribution and possession with intent to distribute Oxymorphone ▪ Count 30 – attempted possession with intent to distribute Oxymorphone ▪ Count 31 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime ▪ Count 32 – possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 9 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 ▪ Count 33 – possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime ▪ Count 34 – possession with intent to distribute Alprazolam ▪ Count 35 – possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime ▪ Count 36 – assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 37 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence ▪ Count 38 – interstate travel in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 39 – interstate travel in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 40 – possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 41 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime ▪ Count 42 – interstate travel in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 43 – possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine ▪ Count 44 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime ▪ Count 48 – accessory after the fact to attempted murder and assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 49 – possession of a firearm by a convicted felon ▪ Count 50 – conspiracy to commit witness tampering ▪ Count 51 – witness tampering ▪ Count 52 – kidnapping ▪ Count 55 – assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 56 – kidnapping resulting in death Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 10 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 ▪ Count 57 – kidnapping in aid of racketeering ▪ Count 58 – use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence ▪ Count 59 – murder in aid of racketeering. Trial began on June 1, 2022, and the jury returned its verdicts on September 16, 2022. Defendants were all convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to various prison sentences, from life to near life sentences for most. The jury acquitted on some counts and the district court granted various motions to dismiss or motions for judgment of acquittal. In the end, defendants were convicted of the following counts and received the following sentences: ▪ Boylston – convicted on Counts 1, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59; sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive term of 84 months; ▪ Forrester – convicted on Counts 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 20; sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment; ▪ Frazier – convicted on Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 24–33, and 39–44; sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment, plus a 30-year consecutive term and various other concurrent terms ranging from 160 months to life imprisonment; ▪ Hern – convicted on Counts 1, 2, 3, 36, 37, 48, 49, and 52; sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment; ▪ Meyerholz – convicted on Counts 1, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59; sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive term of 84 months; ▪ Santiago – convicted on Counts 1, 2, 3, 28, 30, 31, and 52; sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment; ▪ Stanley – convicted on Counts 2, 3, 27, and 38; sentenced to 222 months’ imprisonment. Defendants now appeal. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 11 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE We begin with defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. We review de novo, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Woods, 14 F.4th 544, 551 (6th Cir. 2021). We affirm if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence alone can defeat a sufficiency challenge,” and “[w]e can neither independently weigh the evidence, nor make our own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial.” Id. (citation modified). A. Boylston, Frazier, Meyerholz, and Santiago challenge their convictions on Count 1 for RICO conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) prohibits conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity. “[T]o find a defendant guilty . . . the jury must find that two or more individuals agreed to participate in the conduct of an enterprise that would affect interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering; that the defendant knowingly joined that agreement; and the defendant, or another member of the conspiracy, agreed to commit at least two acts of racketeering activity.” United States v. Iossifov, 45 F.4th 899, 915 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Several of the defendants’ challenges go to whether there was sufficient evidence of a criminal enterprise. An “enterprise” is “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “[T]he very concept of an association in fact is expansive.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009). “[A]n association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” Id. at 948. Such an enterprise “must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. Here, the government offered two complementary “enterprise” theories—that “[t]he Clarksville Mongols existed or would exist as an enterprise during the relevant dates.” R. 2393,  Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 12 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 PageID 16647. That is, the defendants agreed to “found the previously-nonexistent Clarksville Mongols enterprise and to operate that enterprise after it came into existence.” Government Br. at 220 (emphasis omitted). There was sufficient evidence of both. First, the evidence supported the indictment’s charge that the Clarksville Mongols formed “[i]n or about March 2015” and existed as an entity. R. 485, PageID 1324. Santiago himself stated that the defendants were “put[ting] in work” in March and April 2015 to distance themselves from the Disciples and to form their own group. Government App’x at 41. By May 2015, the group was wearing soft colors to align themselves with the Mongols and committing acts of violence to bolster their reputations. In July 2015, Santiago said that he and others had been “prospect[s]” of the Mongols for “almost 5 months now.” Id. at 40. And it is irrelevant to the enterprise question that the Mother Chapter didn’t officially recognize the Clarksville Mongols as an official chapter until later. See Boyle, 556 U.S. at 945 (stating that an enterprise may be “formal or informal” (citation omitted)). We agree with the district court that defendants did “not come close to even raising a question about whether the Clarksville Mongols were functioning as an enterprise in the Spring of 2015.”1 R. 2556, PageID 26146. It also follows that the defendants agreed that they “would exist as an enterprise during the relevant dates.” R. 2393, PageID 16647. As we explained in United States v. Rich, 14 F.4th 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2021), “an agreement to associate with and participate in a yet-to-be-formed racketeering enterprise that would affect interstate commerce constitutes a completed” RICO conspiracy. 1Frazier makes a related sufficiency argument as to Counts 7 and 8, which charged kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering. He claims there was not enough evidence from which a jury could conclude an enterprise existed at the time the underlying offenses were committed in May 2015. Frazier has a point about the difference between the proof necessary to prove a conspiracy and a substantive offense. See United States v. Rich, 14 F.4th 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Section 1962(d) is a conspiracy offense” which “criminalizes an agreement rather than any substantive criminal offense” so “an agreement to associate with and participate in a yet-to-be-formed racketeering enterprise that would affect interstate commerce constitutes a completed offense under § 1962(d)”). But that makes no difference here. Like a RICO enterprise, there is no requirement that an enterprise under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute be formalized. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). With that in mind, as we’ve already described, the Clarksville Mongols existed as an enterprise (in or about March 2015) prior to the kidnappings and murder (in May 2015), so Frazier’s VICAR sufficiency challenge fails too. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 13 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 Finally, the group’s “purpose was to sell drugs in the Middle District of Tennessee, protect its territory through violence when necessary, and establish itself as the outlaw motorcycle club in Clarksville.” R. 2556, PageID 26141. Much of its criminal activity either affected interstate commerce or was conducted in interstate commerce. And “[t]he relationship amongst those associated with the group was readily apparent from a number of factors . . . including the shared belief of their brotherhood, the wearing of soft colors in anticipation of becoming part of the Mongols Nation, and the wearing of vests signifying their arrival as full patched members.” Id. And the “enterprise lasted for more than two years.” Id. The government easily established the existence of a criminal enterprise and that the defendants agreed that a criminal enterprise would exist during the relevant dates. Boylston argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he was part of the Clarksville Mongols enterprise. His own trial counsel disagreed. See R. 2430, PageID 21709 (“Boylston was a Mongol. He was a member of the Clarksville Mongols Motorcycle Club.”); R. 2425, PageID 21405 (“Boylston admits . . . [that he] was a member of the Clarksville Mongols.”). Boylston has waived any argument to the contrary. See Walker v. United States, 134 F.4th 437, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2025). Boylston also says that he didn’t sell drugs, meaning that he didn’t share in the “common purpose” of the Clarksville Mongols. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944. But even if Boylston did not sell drugs, “[e]ach coconspirator need not participate in every overt act of the conspiracy in order for the conspiracy convictions to be upheld.” United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1488 n.18 (6th Cir. 1986). In any event, selling drugs was only one part of the “common purpose.” Extreme violence with the goal of cementing the group’s position in Clarksville and with the national chapter was another, and Boylston was clearly involved in that aspect of the enterprise. Boylston then argues that because he didn’t join the Clarksville Mongols until late in the game, he shouldn’t be considered part of the ongoing enterprise. He is wrong. “[W]here a conspiracy is already in progress, a late comer who knowingly joins it takes it as he finds it and he may be held responsible for acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy before he joined Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 14 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 it.” United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1970)). There was sufficient evidence to support defendants’ convictions on Count 1. B. Meyerholz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions on Counts 55 through 59. These counts relate to the kidnapping and murder of Stephen Cole. Ample testimony placed Meyerholz at site of Cole’s abduction. Testimony also placed Meyerholz at the scene of the murder—a shed outside of a house owned by Jessie Decker, the girlfriend of Mongol member William Nelper. Decker testified that she saw Meyerholz go in and out of her house, and in and out of the shed, during the time of Cole’s murder. Humiston also testified that Meyerholz said he went in and out of the shed. Humiston further testified that Meyerholz admitted his involvement in Cole’s murder. For example, Meyerholz said that he was “going to have his brother’s back” so he helped Boylston “with what he did.” R. 2440, PageID 24328. Meyerholz told Humiston that he kept going in and out of the house that night because he was “getting sick to his stomach” from what was happening to Cole in the shed. Id. To dispose of the body, Boylston, Meyerholz, and Dykes placed Cole’s body in the bed of Meyerholz’s truck and covered it with a tarp; they left the body there overnight because they could not find a good spot to bury the body. And Humiston testified to seeing what looked like a body in the back of Meyerholz’s truck the day after the murder. There was more than sufficient evidence to convict Meyerholz for his involvement in the murder of Cole. Meyerholz contends, however, that the testimony was unbelievable, incredible, and made only by individuals who were motivated to protect their own interests. Meyerholz focuses on Humiston’s testimony that Dykes had admitted to murdering Cole alone and says that no rational juror could conclude to the contrary. It is true that the jury heard two competing theories regarding Cole’s death. And the parties’ closing arguments emphasized the competing theories, leaving it to the jury to decide whether to believe Meyerholz’s claim that Dykes had killed Cole alone or the government’s Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 15 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 claim that Meyerholz and Boylston killed Cole, and that Dykes was falsely taking the “credit” to enhance his chances of becoming a Mongol. The jury weighed the witnesses’ credibility and chose to believe that Meyerholz was involved with Cole’s abduction and murder. We may not displace the jury’s decision to believe one set of witnesses over the other. See United States v. Spears, 49 F.3d 1136, 1140 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses. The credibility of witnesses is exclusively the province of the jury.” (citations omitted)). There was sufficient evidence to support Meyerholz’s convictions. C. Hern and Stanley challenge their convictions on Count 2 (drug conspiracy) and Count 3 (money-laundering conspiracy). i. Count 2 alleges an ongoing drug conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846 spanning the duration of the RICO conspiracy charged in Count 1. “The elements of a drug conspiracy are (1) an agreement by two or more persons to violate the drug laws, (2) knowledge and intent to join in the conspiracy, and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 2006). There was sufficient evidence to support Hern’s and Stanley’s convictions on Count 2. As for Stanley’s argument, we, like the district court, have difficulty making sense of it. See R. 2556, PageID 26153 (“The Court is at a loss as to how best to address Stanley’s argument if for no other reason than it is not the Court’s duty to match-up the facts to the ‘applicable point of law’ and argue the interplay between the two.”). The district court did its best and discerned the issues as presented below. On appeal, Stanley does not contest the district court’s framing of the issues. And to the extent that Stanley’s appellate briefing presents new issues, not presented to the trial court, those issues are forfeited. Castellon-Vogel v. Int’l Paper Co., 829 F. App’x 100, 103 (6th Cir. 2020). Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 16 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 The district court gleaned from Stanley’s briefing that he might have been arguing that he was merely in a “buyer-seller” relationship with Frazier, or that he was merely someone who knew or associated with the conspirators; neither would have been sufficient to establish his role in the conspiracy. See United States v. Wheat, 988 F.3d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 2021). The district court concluded that the evidence was sufficient both to show Stanley’s knowledge of the conspiracy and to link Stanley to it. For example, Stanley’s “own cell phone records . . . show[ed] links to lower level Mongols[, and] the need to make payments [to the Mongols] after money was stolen.” R. 2556, PageID 26153. And other defendants’ cell phone records confirmed “Stanley’s knowledge and participation in the conspiracy with repeated texts” not only between Stanley and Frazier but also between Stanley and “lower-level dealers.” Id. at 26154. We agree. The evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Stanley joined the conspiracy. Stanley hasn’t shown that there was insufficient evidence for his conviction on Count 2. Neither has Hern. The district court did not address Hern’s sufficiency claim with respect to this count. That’s perhaps because Hern disregarded the district court’s rules forbidding counsel from incorporating legal or factual arguments by reference from another document. Whether or not this forfeited Hern’s challenge, there was enough evidence to establish a connection between Hern and the drug conspiracy. Janie Lee, a low-level dealer, testified that she purchased methamphetamine from Hern on at least two occasions. She also introduced her friends to Hern so they could purchase methamphetamine directly from Hern to sell. Michael West, another drug dealer and Mongol member, bought methamphetamine from Frazier and sold it to Hern. Hern told West that “he was going to sell it to somebody else.” R. 2433, PageID 22346. And when Frazier went to jail, Theresa Cobb contacted Hern to give him Frazier’s methamphetamine in a “quart-size bag” and money that Frazier had left behind. R. 2435, PageID 22967–70. For these reasons, there was sufficient evidence to convict Hern on Count 2. Nos. 24-5095 /5104 /5105/ United States v. Forrester et al. Page 17 5106 /5116 /5125 /5126 ii. Our conclusion with respect to Count 2 disposes of Hern and Stanley’s Count 3 argument as well. Count 3 alleges a promotional money laundering conspiracy. “To prove conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, the government had to show that [the defendant] knowingly and voluntarily joined an agreement between two or more people to (1) conduct a financial transaction from the proceeds of illegal activity, (2) knowing the money came from illegal activity, and (3) intending to promote that activity.” United States v. Tolliver, 949 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). The drug conspiracy in Count 2 formed the basis for the Count 3 convictions. Hern and Stanley argue that Count 3 must be overturned because insufficient evidence supported the underlying drug conspiracy in Count 2. Because there was sufficient evidence on Count 2, these arguments fail. The only remaining argument is Stanley’s bare assertion that there was “absolutely no evidence whatsoever” that he joined a money-laundering conspiracy. Stanley Br. at 26. But Stanley has forfeited this argument by failing to support it. See United States v. Bean, 214 F. App’x 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007). There was sufficient evidence to support Hern and Stanley’s convictions on Count 3. D. Santiago challe