Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0422n.06 Case No. 25-1693 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 20, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN ANTONIO DARNEL REED, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) Before: CLAY, NALBANDIAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. In March 2025, Defendant Antonio Reed pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. As part of his plea agreement, he reserved the right to appeal several motions that he had filed pro se before his plea that the district court had denied. Now, represented by counsel, Reed appeals. On appeal, Reed largely reiterates the arguments he made below. But his arguments fare no better the second time around. We affirm. In fall 2023, law enforcement made several controlled purchases of fentanyl from Reed. Purchases were made at two addresses. The first, 102 Euclid Street, was a stash house. The second, 160 North Avenue, was Reed’s residence that he shared with Darqualla Montgomery, a female associate. On October 18, 2023, police executed search warrants for both addresses. At the North Avenue address, police discovered cocaine, fentanyl, other drug paraphernalia, and a firearm, all on the second floor. And they found more weapons and drugs at the Euclid Street address. No. 25-1693, United States v. Reed During the search at North Avenue, Reed at first declined to talk to the police but later changed his mind, told officers he wanted to talk, and signed a waiver of his Miranda rights. In that interview officers also suggested to Reed that it might be in his best interest to cooperate. But officers were clear that they could not “guarantee any promises that [he] would not be prosecuted.” R.99, PageID 495–96. Reed ultimately claimed ownership of all the drugs and guns at both places. The interview was recorded by law enforcement body camera. A federal grand jury indicted Reed on four counts. Before eventually reaching a plea agreement with the government, Reed made several motions pro se. He challenged the scope of the warrant for the North Avenue address. He argued that the police searched 158 and 160 North Avenue, purportedly two separate residences in the same building, even though the warrant only authorized a search of 160 North Avenue. Reed also argued that his incriminating statements were coerced by law enforcement’s promise of favorable treatment. Finally, Reed brought two challenges to the bodycam footage. First, he argued that the prosecution had withheld the footage in violation of Brady. Second, he argued that the videos had been edited. Reed also asked for an expert witness to be appointed to prove the footage was doctored. On March 17, 2025, the district court held a hearing on these motions. There, the court rejected his arguments. The court found that the 160 North Address was a “unified location” and that the search of the whole building was covered by the warrant. Alternatively, the court also found that the good-faith exception would apply. As for the statements, the court found that Reed voluntarily reinitiated contact with law enforcement and voluntarily signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights before making inculpatory statements. And on the Brady allegations, the court concluded that Reed provided no evidence or explanation as to how any withheld or belatedly produced evidence was exculpatory. As for the appointment of an expert witness and allegations 2 No. 25-1693, United States v. Reed the tape was edited, the court noted that there was no indication that the footage was altered but told the defendant that he could finish reviewing the footage and request a hearing on that issue if he wanted. Reed never requested a hearing. Instead, two days after the motion hearing, Reed pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute the controlled substances that police found at the Euclid Street address. His plea agreement was conditional on the right to appeal his prior motions. For the reasons explained below, none of his arguments on appeal have merit. First, Reed alleges a couple of problems with the search at the North Avenue address. When reviewing a defendant’s claim that a search violated the Fourth Amendment and the lower court wrongly denied a motion to suppress, “this Court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Adams, 583 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2009). And “[w]hen a district court has denied a motion to suppress, this Court reviews the evidence ‘in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1999)). Here, although Reed contends that the warrant was defective with respect to North Avenue and that the officers’ search exceeded its scope, we don’t need to reach those issues. That’s because the district court denied Reed’s motion on two independent grounds: the propriety of the warrant and search, and the good-faith exception. But Reed did not appeal the good-faith ruling in his opening brief. And we have held that “[w]hen a district court provides two alternative grounds for its decision, the losing party must challenge each ground on appeal to change the outcome.” Stewart v. IHT Ins. Agency Grp., LLC, 990 F.3d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 2021). So Reed can’t dispute the district court’s application of the good-faith exception for the first time here. 3 No. 25-1693, United States v. Reed Reed asserts in his reply brief that he has challenged the district court’s good-faith determination. But putting aside that “even well-developed arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief come too late,” what Reed contends in his reply brief is hardly well-developed. Id. at 457. Reed’s good-faith argument is essentially to reiterate that the warrant was not supported by probable cause—but that’s taken as a given when we apply good faith. So we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. And while Reed’s concessions on the good faith issue close the door on his Fourth Amendment claim, his probable-cause argument lacks merit anyway. Reed argues that the warrant only authorized the search of 160 North Avenue, not 158 North Avenue, which he says is his residence and is a separate unit in the building.1 In his view, the search of the main floor of 158 North Avenue violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by probable cause and because it exceeded the scope of the warrant. It’s true that if a single building is composed of multiple residences, probable cause is needed for each residence. United States v. Olt, 492 F.2d 910, 911 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Crumpton, 824 F.3d 593, 614 (6th Cir. 2016). If a building is being used as a single unit, 1 The space Reed claims to be 158 North Avenue is the main floor of the building, while he claims the upstairs floor of the house is 160. He also claims to live only in 158. But he points to no evidence in the record that sufficiently rebuts the district court’s finding that the building was used as one residence. And even if there were two residences, Reed offered no evidence to rebut officer testimony that he lived upstairs and Montgomery lived downstairs. Reed’s possessions, including a credit card with Reed’s name on it, were in a second-floor bedroom, and Mongomery’s were in the first-floor bedroom. He also told officers he lived upstairs, not downstairs. And finally, even if Reed is right that the main floor is a separate residence with the address 158 North Avenue, that he did in fact live there, and that it would’ve been outside the scope of the warrant to search that space, he would lack standing to challenge the search of the upstairs floor he calls 160 North Avenue because he asserts no Fourth Amendment right to that space. And “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978). So even if he was right on the facts, he wouldn’t be able to suppress the cocaine, fentanyl, and pistol found upstairs regardless. 4 No. 25-1693, United States v. Reed however, probable cause to search the building suffices. Olt, 492 F.2d at 911. Furthermore, even if the building has two separate residences, for the warrant to be unlawful, officers must’ve known or should’ve known that when the warrant was issued. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987); United States v. Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir. 1996). The district court did not clearly err in concluding that the 160 North Avenue address was being used as a single unit, so Reed has not shown that either the warrant or its execution violated the Fourth Amendment. With respect to the warrant, when officers had investigated the building, they had noted 160 on the front. And only the 160 address was in their report system. That’s because Reed had previously provided 160 North Avenue as his address to police. Moreover, the building only had one door. While it had two numbers flanking that door, as well as two mailboxes and two doorbells, Reed presented no evidence tending to show that the police should have noticed any of this during their pre-warrant investigation. It’s therefore not clear that, when they obtained a warrant, the police should’ve known that the building potentially contained two residences. So we reject Reed’s argument that the warrant was defective. Nor did the district court err in holding that the search didn’t exceed the scope of the warrant. The building only had one kitchen. Internal doors were unlocked. There were no markings on the interior of the building that would indicate there were two separate residential units. That means that even if the building could be construed as two residences, law enforcement could have reasonably concluded it was functionally a single unit and did not need to limit their search. See Crumpton, 824 F.3d at 615. So given the uncontested evidence that the building was one unit, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and Reed’s challenges to the warrant and search fail. 5 No. 25-1693, United States v. Reed Reed next argues that officers coerced his incriminating statements by promising him that he would not go to jail or be arrested if he talked. We disagree. For police conduct to be coercive, three requirements must be met: “(i) the police activity was objectively coercive; (ii) the coercion in question was sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will; and (iii) the alleged police misconduct was the crucial motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to offer the statement.” Michael v. Butts, 59 F.4th 219, 227 (6th Cir. 2023). We evaluate these requirements given the totality of the circumstances. Id; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973). And “although we rely on the district court’s factual findings . . . unless they are clearly erroneous, we independently examine how those events affect the voluntariness analysis.” United States v. Jacobs, 63 F.4th 1055, 1058 (6th Cir. 2023). Reed’s challenge fails because the police activity wasn’t objectively coercive. As Reed admits, “[m]ere promises to recommend leniency and speculation that cooperation will have a positive effect do not constitute coercion.” D.27 at 16 (citing United States v. Delaney, 443 F. App’x. 122, 129 (6th Cir. 2011)). Reed asserts that law enforcement made “illusory promises” that he wouldn’t go to jail if he talked. D.27 at 17–18. And “but for” those “coerc[ive]” tactics he would not have “given any statements to law enforcement.” Id. at 18. But the interrogating officer denied making any such promises, and Reed offers no evidence to dispute the officer’s testimony. In contrast, the officer made clear during the interview that they could make no guarantees that Reed would not be prosecuted. And Reed also doesn’t rebut the district court’s finding that he reinitiated contact with officers on his own and signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. The district court’s factual findings weren’t clearly erroneous and the officers’ conduct wasn’t objectively coercive. So the district court correctly denied Reed’s motion to suppress. 6 No. 25-1693, United States v. Reed Lastly, Reed contends that the government violated Brady by withholding and editing video evidence. To prove a Brady violation based on withheld evidence, Reed “must show: (1) the government withheld evidence from [him], either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence favored [him], either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; and (3) the evidence was material, such that its nondisclosure prejudiced [him].” Salter v. City of Detroit, 133 F.4th 527, 536 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). He hasn’t made that showing. First, the government didn’t withhold any evidence. The government gave all video evidence to Reed, at the latest, three weeks before the trial court’s motion hearing on the subject. And at that motion hearing, the judge told Reed that he could review the footage in more depth and reinitiate another hearing afterwards if he wanted to. And that the court could “accommodate” that hearing. But rather than request a hearing, Reed pleaded guilty. Second, Reed has not shown any prejudice.2 A defendant asserting a Brady violation based on delayed disclosure must show the court “what he would have done differently had he been given more time” to review any evidence. United States v. Fields, 763 F.3d. 443, 459 (6th Cir. 2014). But it has been over a year and a half since Reed received all the videos and he has identified nothing exculpatory about them whatsoever. Nor has he turned up any evidence suggesting that the videos were edited. So his conclusory allegations and speculations are insufficient to prove a Brady violation. See Hughbanks v. Hudson, 2 F.4th 527, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2021). Without more than guesswork to go off, Reed’s argument goes nowhere. For these reasons the judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED. 2 Indeed, Reed’s counsel admits that he has not even reviewed the batches of video evidence. See D.27 at 20–21. 7