United States v. Dontrell Shondale Wilson
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-1959
JudgeEric L. Clay; Eric E. Murphy
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0474n.06
No. 25-1959
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Nov 20, 2026
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
Plaintiffs-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
DONTRELL SHONDALE WILSON, ) MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellant. )
) OPINION
Before: CLAY, MURPHY, and FLOWERS, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Dontrell Wilson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a
felon and received a prison sentence of 188 months. As a term of his eventual supervised release,
the district court ordered Wilson to allow a probation officer to search his electronic devices if
reasonable suspicion existed that he violated any of the conditions of his supervised release. The
court also ordered Wilson to pay a $500 fine. Wilson did not object to this supervised-release
condition or monetary fine at sentencing. Yet he now claims that the court committed plain error
by imposing both. To the contrary, the condition reasonably relates to Wilson’s offense and
criminal history because he possessed the gun while dealing drugs and committed other offenses
while under government supervision. And the court reasonably found that Wilson could pay the
nominal fine by working in prison. So he has not shown a plain error. We affirm.
No. 25-1959, United States v. Wilson
I
In August 2024, the Michigan State Police received a tip that someone with the nickname
“Nasty” was selling methamphetamine in Benton Harbor, Michigan. A confidential informant
identified “Nasty” as Wilson, who was on parole for previous state offenses. Over the next few
months, the informant engaged in several controlled buys from Wilson. Officers eventually
searched both the home that Wilson routinely frequented and the home at which he had been
approved to live as part of his parole. They uncovered handguns, ammunition, cocaine base,
methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, a cellphone, and other items common in the drug trade.
Ultimately, the government charged Wilson with a single count of possessing a firearm as
a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Wilson pleaded guilty. Because he qualified as an armed
career criminal, he had a mandatory-minimum prison sentence of 15 years. See id. § 924(e). The
district court calculated his guidelines range as 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. It sentenced
Wilson to 188 months in prison.
Apart from the prison term, the court imposed other conditions. It ordered Wilson to serve
five years of supervised release because of his “pretty unrelenting history of criminal activity to
date.” Sent. Tr., R.57, PageID 223. Before sentencing, the court provided Wilson and his counsel
with an order that contained a “few” special conditions of supervised release in addition to the
usual ones. Id., PageID 224. Among other things, the order required Wilson to “submit” his
computers, cellphones, and other “electronic communications or data storage devices or media” to
a probation officer’s search if the officer had “reasonable suspicion” that he violated other
supervised-release conditions. Order, R.49, PageID 180–81. At sentencing, the court confirmed
that Wilson and his counsel had “both read and signed” this order. Sent. Tr., R.57, PageID 224.
Lastly, the court imposed “a nominal fine of $500” without interest. Id., PageID 226.
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II
On appeal, Wilson challenges both the supervised-release condition requiring him to
subject his electronic devices to searches and the $500 fine. But he admits that he did not object
to either at sentencing. We thus must review his two claims for plain error. See United States v.
Jackson, 154 F.4th 422, 431 (6th Cir. 2025). To “climb” the “tall” plain-error “hill,” Wilson must
show (among other things) that the district court committed an obvious error. Id. (quoting United
States v. Tellez, 86 F.4th 1148, 1154 (6th Cir. 2023)). He falls far short of that demanding standard.
Electronics Searches. Wilson first describes the special condition requiring him to consent
to searches of his electronic devices as both “procedurally” unreasonable (because the district court
failed to adequately explain it) and “substantively” unreasonable (because the condition does not
reasonably relate to his felon-in-possession offense). United States v. Doyle, 711 F.3d 729, 732–
33 (6th Cir. 2013). He is wrong on both fronts.
Start with procedural reasonableness. Our precedent generally requires a district court to
announce its punishments, including any conditions of supervised release, at sentencing. See
United States v. Hayden, 102 F.4th 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2024). And the district court must adequately
explain the “rationale” for imposing any special supervised-release conditions. United States v.
Matthews, 155 F.4th 845, 854 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 572
(6th Cir. 2012)). Yet a district court need not read every word of every supervised-release
condition “from the bench at sentencing.” Hayden, 102 F.4th at 374. Rather, the court may
incorporate any generally recommended standard conditions “by explicit oral reference” to them
if those conditions can be found “either in a districtwide general order or in the presentence
investigation report.” Id.; see United States v. Pasley, 2024 WL 2862562, at *3 (6th Cir. June 6,
2024). And the court’s general discussion of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) can
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also adequately reveal the reasons for its supervised-release conditions. See Matthews, 155 F.4th
at 854; see also United States v. Booker, 994 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 2021).
The district court did not commit a plain error when applying these rules to Wilson. True,
the court did not orally announce (word for word) its special condition requiring Wilson to consent
to the probation officer’s searches of his electronic devices. Before sentencing, however, the court
gave Wilson and his counsel an order with this condition listed. At sentencing, the court next
ensured that Wilson and his counsel had “read and signed” this order. Sent. Tr., R.57, PageID
224. It then incorporated the condition into Wilson’s sentence “by explicit oral reference” to that
order—as our decision in Hayden would seem to allow. 102 F.4th at 374.
Admittedly, Hayden authorized this incorporation-by-reference procedure only for the
standard conditions recommended for all defendants. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2); Pasley, 2024
WL 2862562, at *3. And it added that a district court “must always orally pronounce” any special
condition—at least if the court did “not previously” make the condition “available to [the]
defendant” ahead of sentencing. Hayden, 102 F.4th at 372. So it is not obvious that Hayden would
permit the incorporation-by-reference procedure for special conditions like the one at issue. At
the same time, the district court here “previously” made this special condition available to Wilson
ahead of his sentencing. See id. So it is also not obvious that Hayden would prohibit the procedure.
In short, the district court’s procedure sits in a gray area of our current precedent. And he points
to no statute, rule, or other source of law that clearly adopts his view of the issue. Wilson thus
cannot show that the procedure is obviously wrong—as he must under plain-error review. See
United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015).
Nor did the district court commit a plain error in the way that it disclosed its “reasons” for
this supervised-release condition. Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572 (quoting United States v. Carter, 463
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F.3d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 2006)). As a specific matter, the court pointed to the “rationale” in
Wilson’s “presentence report” when identifying its reasons. Sent. Tr., R.57, PageID 224. That
report proposed the condition because the searches would “reduce the probability of recidivism”
(Wilson had a lengthy record) and because of “the nature and circumstances” of Wilson’s offense
(he had possessed a gun while engaged in the drug trade). Rep., R.41, PageID 138.
As a general matter, the court reiterated these recidivism and drug-dealing concerns when
discussing the § 3553(a) factors during Wilson’s sentencing. See Matthews, 155 F.4th at 854–55.
As for recidivism, the court explained that Wilson had led “a criminal life-style beginning at age
13[.]” Sent. Tr., R.57, PageID 220. He had committed many “serious” offenses, ranging from
“drug dealing,” to “assault with a dangerous weapon,” to fleeing from the police. Id. Equally
concerning, he had an “abominable” history of committing new offenses while still under
supervision for old ones. Id. As for drug dealing, the court recognized the increased dangers of
gun possession by someone who “is selling drugs.” Id., PageID 220–21. All told, we must make
only a “slight inference” to conclude that the court imposed this condition because of the risk that
Wilson would restart his drug dealing (a crime that often relies on electronic communications)
while on supervised release. Matthews, 155 F.4th at 854 (quoting Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572); see
Booker, 994 F.3d at 598–99. At the least, the court could reasonably believe that it said enough.
So we see no plain error in the way that it announced this condition.
Turn to substantive reasonableness. Courts may impose a special condition that they find
“appropriate” if the condition satisfies three criteria. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). First, the condition
must be “reasonably related” to various sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.
§ 3583(d)(1). Second, the condition must “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary” to achieve the various goals of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and
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rehabilitation). Id. § 3583(d)(2). Third, the condition must comport with “any pertinent policy
statements” from the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3583(d)(3).
Wilson challenges only the first factor, claiming that the search condition does not
reasonably relate to his felon-in-possession conviction. This argument faces two problems on
plain-error review. Problem One: The district court could conclude that the “nature and
circumstances of [Wilson’s] offense” justified the condition. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3583(d)(1).
Perhaps “[n]othing about the possession of the firearm” alone “suggests a need to monitor”
Wilson’s electronics. United States v. Gaynor, 530 F. App’x 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2013). But the
background facts of a felon-in-possession offense can still show the need for a condition. So, for
example, a district court might impose a curfew as a condition of supervised release if the police
found the defendant with a gun in the middle of the night. See United States v. Whitfield, 464
F. App’x 525, 528 (6th Cir. 2012). And a court might impose a ban on driving as a condition of
supervised release if the police found the defendant transporting an “illegal arsenal” to threaten a
victim. United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 838 (6th Cir. 2001). Likewise, Wilson committed
this offense while engaged in a drug business, so the offense’s “circumstances” show the need for
it. Gaynor, 530 F. App’x at 540. Drug dealers commonly use electronic devices to sell drugs.
That is why the police confiscated a cellphone during their search of Wilson’s homes. And any
“electronic devices” that Wilson uses in the future while on supervised release might also “contain
evidence” revealing whether he has renewed his “drug dealing” ways. United States v. Ray, 2024
WL 712363, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2024).
Problem Two: A special condition need only relate to one of the specific sentencing factors
in § 3583(d)(1). See United States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 235–36 (6th Cir. 2018). So even if a
condition does not relate to the offense of conviction, a court might still impose the condition if it
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relates to the defendant’s “history and characteristics[.]” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3583(d)(1); see
United States v. Gholston, 2024 WL 4977139, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024); see also United States
v. Childress, 874 F.3d 523, 527 n.2 (6th Cir. 2017). And Wilson’s extensive “criminal record”—
including his record of committing new crimes while under government supervision—
independently justifies this search condition. Ray, 2024 WL 712363, at *3; see United States v.
White, 2025 WL 213738, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2025); Gholston, 2024 WL 4977139, at *4.
$500 Fine. Wilson also argues that the district court wrongly imposed the $500 fine
because he has no means to pay it. But he has again shown no obvious error. See United States v.
Jeffries, 820 F. App’x 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2020).
Courts must consider several factors when deciding on the propriety of a fine. See 18
U.S.C. § 3572(a); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d). These factors include, among other things, the defendant’s
“financial resources” and the burdens on dependent family members. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1), (2).
Courts should generally impose a fine “except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to
pay and is not likely to become able to pay[.]” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). As this language suggests,
the defendant has the burden to prove an inability to pay. See United States v. Healy, 553 F. App’x
560, 570 (6th Cir. 2014). We also treat the district court’s conclusion that a defendant can pay a
fine as a factual finding subject to clear-error review. See id. at 564, 571.
Wilson does not dispute that his statutory maximum fine was $250,000 and that his
guidelines range was $30,000 to $250,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3)
(2025). Even so, the district court found that he lacked the “ability to pay” these amounts and
varied below them. Sent. Tr., R.57, PageID 226. When accounting for Wilson’s eight children, it
lowered the fine to $500 and waived the accrual of interest. The court believed Wilson would
have the “opportunity” to pay $500 over time while working in prison or on supervised release.
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Id. Given the fine’s nominal nature and Wilson’s good health, that finding was a “plausible” view
of the record. United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022).
Wilson responds by pointing to other facts. For example, he notes that he had appointed
counsel, could not afford a bond pending his trial, had no financial assets, and owed $3,000 in
child support. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2 cmt. 3. Yet the district court accounted for this contrary
evidence when reducing his fine to a nominal amount. And the evidence does nothing to render
the court’s finding that he could pay this amount clearly erroneous. Indeed, Wilson does not even
try to explain “why he could not pay the fine slowly” using compensation from prison work.
United States v. Sydnor, 762 F. App’x 284, 287 (6th Cir. 2019).
We affirm.
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