Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-3286 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATTHEW J. FRAZIER, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. No. 23-cr-00001-DRL-SJF-1 — Damon R. Leichty, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED OCTOBER 27, 2025 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 2, 2026 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In December 2024, Matthew Frazier was convicted in federal court of possession of child pornog- raphy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, and, in January 2025, he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment along with seven years’ supervised release. He raises two challenges to that conviction and sentence on ap- peal—that the district court erred in failing to order a second 2 No. 24-3286 competency hearing, and that it erred in imposing, as a con- dition of supervised release, the requirement that he maintain full-time employment. Frazier’s history includes a prior conviction in state court. In July 2019, Frazier was charged in Indiana state court with possession of child pornography, and in December of that year the state court determined that he was not competent to stand trial and committed him to the Indiana Division of Mental Health. He was eventually found competent follow- ing treatment, and in April 2021, he pled guilty to child ex- ploitation and possessing child pornography and was sen- tenced to seven years’ imprisonment and six years of proba- tion. Frazier began that probation in October 2021, and subse- quently, authorities received information that Frazier was ac- cessing pornography websites in violation of his probation, and that an account potentially affiliated with him was access- ing child pornography. In June 2022, a search of his residence revealed evidence of criminal activity including images and videos of child exploitation material. Frazier was subse- quently indicted federally for possessing images of child ex- ploitation material involving a minor under 12 years old, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. Defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation based on counsel’s concerns with Fra- zier’s ability to assist in the preparation for his defense and based on Frazier’s previous incompetency finding, disability determination, and mental health history Frazier then underwent a two-week forensic evaluation by two psychologists. Frazier told them he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation, and was taking a number of No. 24-3286 3 different medications. He was experiencing “ongoing audi- tory and visual hallucinations” including seeing and hearing dead people he did not recognize and whose voices said “hi.” Although the psychologists noted that he experienced symp- toms including auditory and visual hallucinations to varying degrees on an ongoing basis, they also noted that the symp- toms appeared to be adequately managed with psychotropic medications at that time. They diagnosed him with Major De- pressive Disorder but “not necessarily schizophrenia or intel- lectual disability given inconsistencies with those diagnoses.” The psychologists concluded that he also demonstrated a fac- tual understanding of the nature and consequences of court proceedings. The evaluation concluded, in June 2023, that his symptoms had resulted in impairment in functioning in sev- eral areas of his life, but that he was competent to stand trial. At the competency hearing on June 14, 2023, defense counsel did not contest that report or present any evidence contradict- ing it. The court held that Frazier was competent to stand trial. Just over a year later, in April 2024, Frazier appeared in the district court to waive his right to a jury trial. In his testi- mony, he indicated to the court that he still sees and hears things that are not there and stated that he presently saw roughly 100 people in the courtroom that had passed away and could hear voices that told him to do bad things and to hurt people. Although his defense counsel did not seek a new competency hearing, Frazier now argues on appeal that based on those statements by Frazier concerning the auditory and visual hallucinations, the court should have sua sponte or- dered a new competency examination. Considering the hear- ing as a whole and the court’s questioning of Frazier, as well as the initial report and conclusion from the earlier compe- tency hearing in the case, the court did not abuse its discretion 4 No. 24-3286 in determining that the evidence did not call into question his competency. It is well-established that “where the evidence calls into question a defendant’s competency, the trial court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s competency abridges the consti- tutional right to a fair trial.” Yang v. United States, 114 F.4th 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2024). “’[E]vidence of a defendant's irra- tional behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in deter- mining whether further inquiry is required ....’” Id., quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). The focus of the competency inquiry is on whether Frazier had “sufficient pre- sent ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de- gree of rational understanding—and whether he has a ra- tional as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Yang, 114 F.4th at 907 (internal quotation marks omitted); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Here, Frazier argues that evidence of a deteriorating con- dition at the time of the hearing on his waiver of a jury trial was such that the district court should have ordered a compe- tency hearing sua sponte. He does not argue that there was a basis to question his competency at the trial itself, or at any other stage of proceedings. We examine, therefore, only the circumstances before the judge at the hearing on his waiver of his right to a jury trial. We review the district court’s failure to sua sponte hold a competency hearing for abuse of discre- tion. United States v. Truett, 109 F.4th 996, 1000 (7th Cir. 2024). Particularly given that deferential standard of review, there is no reversible error as to the competency issue here. Although defense counsel had requested a competency examination a year earlier, defense counsel did not seek No. 24-3286 5 another competency evaluation at the time of the waiver of the jury trial. Even absent that request, however, the district court judge’s discussions with Frazier reflected his awareness of the importance of ensuring competence. The judge was thorough in determining whether Frazier had a rational un- derstanding of the proceedings and whether his medical con- dition impacted that ability. And the judge’s determination was made against the backdrop of the psychological evalua- tion done just a year earlier in which he was found competent. Prior to accepting Frazier’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, the judge directly asked Frazier about the current state of his mental health, and Frazier responded that it was “the same. I hear things and see things. I have schizophrenia. It’s still not changed, sir.” The judge then proceeded to review the medications that Frazier was taking, and Frazier explained that some of his medications had changed, but under both the old medicine and the new he heard voices and saw dead peo- ple. After Frazier explained that he currently could see and hear dead people in the courtroom, the judge asked questions as to Frazier’s ability to identify the real persons in the court- room, individually addressing each person physically present there. Frazier’s answers demonstrated that he could identify the real persons in the courtroom and distinguish them from the persons he knew to be not real. He expressed some con- cerns with blocking out the voices to hear the judge. The judge made clear to Frazier that Frazier should ask him to restate or to explain at any time if Frazier encountered such a problem. The judge was also careful in questioning Frazier as to his waiver of his right to the jury trial, and repeatedly had Frazier explain in his own words his understanding of his legal rights and the impact of his waiver. For instance, after asking Frazier 6 No. 24-3286 if he understood that he was entitled to a trial by jury, the judge then asked Frazier what he understood a jury to be, to which Frazier responded, “a jury is, like, 12 people, and they judge whether I’m guilty or innocent,” and asked him whether he understood what it meant to say a jury would have to agree “unanimously,” to which Frazier responded “[a]ll together.” At the conclusion of the colloquy, the judge asked whether Frazier had any questions that lingered and whether he had additional questions for his counsel, and Fra- zier indicated that he did have some questions at that time. The judge paused the proceedings to allow Frazier to consult with his counsel, and when proceedings were recommenced, Frazier affirmed that his questions had been addressed, that he understood his right to a trial by a jury, and that it was still his wish to waive that right to a jury trial. The court directly then addressed defense counsel, who had requested the competency hearing the year prior, and asked: “Do you have any doubt in your mind as to whether Mr. Frazier is waiving his right to a jury trial in a knowing and voluntary way? And yes, I ask that question in a specific way.” Defense counsel answered that Frazier’s decision-mak- ing was at about the same level as when he was determined to be competent. Defense counsel noted that he always had reservations about the quality of Frazier’s decision-making, noting that Frazier had been in special education for his entire academic career and in eighth grade had tested at a second grade reading level. He stated, however, that he thought Fra- zier did, in fact, understand the right to a jury trial, and that Frazier had expressed on several occasions the desire not to have a jury trial. He also explained the strategic legal rationale for such a decision and the ways in which it could be benefi- cial in the circumstances of the case. No. 24-3286 7 The judge then directly asked defense counsel whether an- ything had come to his attention that would suggest that Fra- zier was not competent to waive a right to jury trial, and de- fense counsel responded “No.” The same question was asked of the AUSA who also responded “No.” The AUSA pointed to the earlier competency determination, and its conclusion that although his symptoms had resulted in impairment in functioning in several areas of Frazier’s life, the symptoms did not appear to be impacting Frazier’s ability to understand and rationally apply facts related to the legal process in his case. In short, Frazier reported that he experienced “ongoing auditory and visual hallucinations” which had been present as well when he was deemed competent, with the difference that the voices were now urging him to engage in bad conduct and indicated that he was able to distinguish the hallucina- tions from the real persons. His attorney, who had sought the first competency hearing, believed Frazier’s decision-making to be at the same level as it was when the prior competency determination was made a year earlier, believed him to be competent, and believed that he understood what he was waiving. Frazier himself indicated his mental health was the same as it had been. And the court questioned Frazier in a manner that included having Frazier explain some of the legal concepts in his own words to ensure he was not simply rotely responding to suggestive questions. The court also explored the legal rationale for the waiver decision. Therefore, the evi- dence before the court indicated that Frazier had “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” as well as a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Mental illness is not the same as lack of competency, 8 No. 24-3286 and there was no evidence of a change in his mental illness that called into question the continued validity of the prior competency determination that assessed the impact of that mental illness. On the record before us, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a competency hearing. The only remaining issue is whether the court erred in im- posing the following term of supervised release: You must be lawfully employed full-time (at least 30 hours per week). If you are not em- ployed full-time, you must try to find full-time employment under the supervision of the pro- bation officer. If you become unemployed, or change your employer, position, or location of employment, you must tell the probation officer within 72 hours of the change. If after 90 days you do not find employment, you must com- plete at least 10 hours of community service per week until employed or participate in a job skills training program approved and directed by your probation officer. No objection was made in the district court, and the govern- ment does not argue that the objection was waived as op- posed to forfeited. Accordingly, we can reverse only for plain error. United States v. Gibbs, 130 F.4th 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2025). To meet that standard, Frazier must demonstrate an er- ror, that is plain, and that affects his substantial rights, and if that burden is met, then we can make a discretionary deter- mination as to whether to reverse by considering whether that error affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2024). Frazier argues that the plain error standard is No. 24-3286 9 met because the imposition of that condition is inconsistent with the district court’s explicit recognition at sentencing that Frazier was unable to maintain employment due to his disa- bility. The court in imposing the condition incorporated the Presentence Report (PSR), which stated the reasons for impos- ing the condition and identified the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) upon which the determination was made. See United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that to adopt the PSR is to make fact findings, and that the proce- dural requirement to consider the § 3553(a) factors in impos- ing and communicating discretionary conditions is met in the adoption of the PSR that supplies that reasoning). The PSR noted that one of the potential aggravating factors was that Frazier had very little work history and appeared to have lim- ited structure in his life. The district court noted at sentencing the dangers of idle time for Frazier, and the importance of su- pervision given how quickly he reoffended. As to the specific condition challenged here, the court adopted the reasoning of the PSR, which noted that lawful employment was associated with pro-social activities which reduce the risk of recidivism and which provide for rehabilitation. Frazier does not argue that those reasons for imposition of the release condition are inapplicable or that they are not properly grounded in the § 3553(a) factors. His sole argument is that the imposition of that release condition is inconsistent with the court’s recognition at sentencing that Frazier was not capable of full-time work. The supervised release condition itself, however, provides options for circumstances in which the defendant is unable to meet the employment requirement. Frazier never argues that 10 No. 24-3286 the court could not believe him capable of 10 hours of com- munity service, and even that level of engagement would ad- dress the court’s concern with social engagement and struc- ture. Moreover, although the court recognized that Frazier was not then capable of maintaining full-time employment, Frazier’s argument presumes that Frazier would be equally incapable of employment upon release from his imprison- ment 10 years later. Frazier contends that there is not a shred of evidence supporting the government’s view that Frazier would be better off after a decade in federal prison. Frazier’s argument depends upon an equally-tenuous contrary as- sumption—that ten years from now medical science will pro- vide no more effective treatment for Frazier’s condition than is currently available, and that ten years of consistent treat- ment of his mental health condition will yield no significant benefits. But we need not consider whether a court could im- pose a supervised release condition based on the possibility that by the time the person is released his health condition will have improved or can be better treated. Here, Frazier has not argued that in his current condition he could not fulfill the alternative of community service or participation in job train- ing. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error in imposing a condition that, at a minimum, requires that he en- gage in that limited participation in structured activities. If upon his release it becomes clear that Frazier cannot fulfill even those requirements, then, as the district court made clear to Frazier at the sentencing hearing, Frazier could seek to have those conditions modified. The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED