United States v. Adel Daoud
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-2370
JudgeSt.Eve
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ADEL DAOUD,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 1:12-cr-00723, 1:13-cr-00703 & 1:15-cr-00487 —
Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 30, 2026 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and ST. EVE,
Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Adel Daoud committed three violent
crimes in the name of religious extremism. First, Daoud
attempted to detonate a bomb that would have killed
hundreds of innocent people. Fortunately, the “bomb” was
fake, and the product of an FBI sting operation. Second,
Daoud solicited the murder of the FBI agent who served as
2 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
Daoud’s right-hand man in planning the attack. Third, after
two-and-a-half years in custody, Daoud attempted to murder
an inmate in his sleep with handmade weapons because the
victim once drew a picture of the Prophet Muhammad.
Daoud entered an Alford plea as to all three crimes. After we
found his initial sentence of 16 total years substantively
unreasonable, Daoud sought to withdraw that plea, which the
district court denied. After taking issue with two separate
counsels, Daoud eventually invoked his right to self-
representation at sentencing, which the district court granted.
Ultimately, the district court re-sentenced Daoud to 27 years’
imprisonment. He now appeals, but we affirm the district
court across the board.
I. Background
The record in this case sets forth Adel Daoud’s path into
the criminal justice system. See United States v. Daoud, 980 F.3d
581, 584–90 (7th Cir. 2020). Daoud first caught the FBI’s atten-
tion when he was 18 years old. Law enforcement discovered
Daoud’s online activity in which he sought out and promoted
violent jihadist materials and declared his desire to take re-
venge against the United States. FBI agents began corre-
sponding with Daoud, posing as fellow jihadists from around
the world.
After extensive conversation, Daoud began to work
closely with one agent who posed as an operational terrorist
named “Mudafar.” Daoud began planning a terror attack
with Mudafar, eventually settling on Chicago’s Cactus Bar &
Grill as “the perfect place” for their attack. When the time
came to execute the plan, Daoud said he wanted to have “di-
rect action” and asked if he could detonate the bomb that
Mudafar built. Daoud said that the presence of 200 people at
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 3
the scene of the attack was “like the lottery.” He pressed the
detonate button and the FBI immediately arrested him.
Daoud’s next two crimes took place while in custody.
Shortly after arriving at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
(MCC) in Chicago, Daoud sought to have the FBI agent who
posed as Mudafar murdered. Daoud’s cellmate saw an oppor-
tunity. He worked with federal authorities to record Daoud’s
solicitations for Mudafar’s murder, receiving $15,000 for his
efforts. The cellmate showed Daoud a picture of the agent,
purportedly secured by his associates on the outside but ac-
tually provided by authorities, and told Daoud to make a call
authorizing the murder, which Daoud did.
About two-and-a-half years into custody, in May 2015,
Daoud attacked another inmate in his sleep with sharpened
toothbrushes, including one with a razor blade attached. He
attacked his cellmate because, six months prior, that inmate
had drawn a picture of the Prophet Muhammad.
After the assault, Daoud’s counsel moved for a compe-
tency hearing. The district court found Daoud incompetent to
stand trial due to schizophrenia and other mental health dis-
orders in August 2016. The proceedings paused until March
2018, when the district court found Daoud, then stabilized
with medication, competent to stand trial. At this point, two
different judges had Daoud’s three separate cases. Daoud was
set to go to trial on the first two crimes that November, but on
the eve of jury selection, the district court granted Daoud’s
request to plead guilty while maintaining his innocence—col-
loquially known as an Alford plea—to all ten counts spawning
from his three crimes. The advisory Guidelines range pro-
vided for life imprisonment. The district court sentenced him
to 16 years.
4 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
We reversed that decision as substantively unreasonable
and directed the district court to re-sentence Daoud. See
Daoud, 980 F.3d at 596. Daoud’s combined case went to a third
district judge. Before the second sentencing, the district court
transferred his case to a fourth, an administrative necessity 1
that Daoud thinks strengthens his argument on appeal. Before
we address that contention, however, a bit more on the post-
remand proceedings:
Roughly six months after our decision, Daoud began sub-
mitting strange filings to the district court. He claimed that his
attorney had set up the 2016 incompetency finding to mask a
criminal enterprise in which the attorney profited from both
Daoud’s family and his fees as court-appointed counsel. That
attorney, who had represented Daoud for the better part of a
decade, moved to withdraw based on irreconcilable differ-
ences while expressing concerns about Daoud’s mental health
status to the court. Judge Lee verified the falsity of the accu-
sations and appointed independent counsel to discuss with
Daoud the decision to fire his longtime attorney. The inde-
pendent counsel confirmed that after several meetings with
Daoud, she did not doubt his competency. In January 2022,
Judge Lee brought the MCC staff into court to confirm that
Daoud had consistently taken his medication at the time of
his request to part ways with his attorney, and the staff con-
firmed as such. Judge Lee granted Daoud’s request to part
ways with his old attorney and appointed the independent
1 On September 8, 2022, the Executive Committee of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois reassigned Daoud’s case to the Honorable Matthew F. Ken-
nelly after the initial recipient on remand, the Honorable John Z. Lee, was
confirmed as a Circuit Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 5
counsel to step in as Daoud’s new attorney with instructions
to file a request for a competency hearing if one was war-
ranted. She never did.
Daoud quickly took issue with his new attorney. She
lasted less than a year, but in that time, she filed a motion to
withdraw Daoud’s Alford plea. Judge Kennelly, who had
taken over the case in September 2022, denied that motion.
Meanwhile, Daoud continued to file motions on his own be-
half and decided to again fire his attorney. This time, he in-
voked his right to self-representation under the Sixth Amend-
ment. In December 2022, Judge Kennelly granted the request
after performing the requisite colloquy with Daoud but kept
Daoud’s attorney as standby counsel. Daoud represented
himself in his initial sentencing hearings held throughout the
summer of 2023, at which point Judge Kennelly urged Daoud
to consider a mental evaluation for mitigation purposes.
The sentencing proceedings sat on hold while Daoud filed
a litany of motions, all of which the district court denied or
dismissed. Daoud also participated in the recommended
mental evaluation but told Judge Kennelly in June 2024 that
after conferring with standby counsel, he had decided not to
submit the contents of the report as mitigation evidence.
On July 19, 2024, Judge Kennelly sentenced Daoud to 27
years and a lifetime of supervised release. Daoud’s arguments
at sentencing primarily focused on the entrapment defense
that he waived in exchange for his plea, as well as continued
advocacy as to why Judge Kennelly should let him withdraw
his plea. Judge Kennelly reviewed the sordid details of
Daoud’s “tremendously serious crimes” while simultane-
ously acknowledging Daoud’s relative youth and vulnerabil-
ity. He observed that Daoud’s “relatively bizarre beliefs”
6 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
might indicate the possibility of “something more going on
there than just awkwardness.” Even so, the court said it could
not rely on speculation, and that Daoud was “perfectly within
his rights” to refuse to offer the results of the psychiatric ex-
amination.
Daoud appealed. He contends that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the
Alford plea and that his waiver of the right to counsel at sen-
tencing was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Finally,
he argues that his 27-year sentence was substantively unrea-
sonable. We affirm the district court.
II. Request to Withdraw Alford Plea
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to with-
draw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2021). A district court can
elect to grant such a motion where a defendant has shown “a
fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We have recognized three broad justifi-
cations that could meet that standard: “(1) the defendant is
innocent, (2) the defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel, and (3) the plea was not knowing and voluntary.”
United States v. Kamkarian, 79 F.4th 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2023). We
uphold factual findings as to whether a defendant had a “fair
and just” reason to withdraw a plea unless they are clearly
erroneous. United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.
2015).
On appeal, as below, Daoud argues both that his pro-
claimed innocence and alleged involuntariness justify his
withdrawal of his Alford plea.
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 7
Daoud’s legal innocence arguments do not support with-
drawing his plea. We have never held that a claim of legal in-
nocence can justify the withdrawal of a plea made under the
Alford framework. That is for good reason. The very definition
of an Alford plea allows a defendant to maintain his pro-
claimed legal innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970); Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 520 n.3 (7th Cir.
2017). If that assertion satisfied the “fair and just” standard, it
would amount to a rule where a defendant who entered an
Alford plea could withdraw his plea at will. But that is not the
law, as a defendant has “no absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea before sentencing.” Collins, 796 F.3d at 834; United
States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 998 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (“By def-
inition, defendants who make Alford pleas do not deny their
legal innocence. This does not mean they can withdraw these
pleas willy-nilly.”).
Even if an exception to this logic exists, we would not find
it here. Daoud insists his theory of legal innocence would be
borne out if only he were permitted to go to trial on an entrap-
ment defense as to the first two cases, along with a broader
mental health defense. While we leave motions to withdraw
to the sound discretion of the district court, we have found
that discretion abused where a defendant was unaware of an
available entrapment defense clear on the face of the record.
United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1993). This
record, however, overwhelmingly demonstrates that Daoud
knew of his potential entrapment and mental health defenses
at the time he entered his Alford plea. United States v. Bryant,
557 F.3d 489, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Silva, 122
F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1997).
8 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
Indeed, Daoud made his awareness of these potential de-
fenses clear on three separate occasions: during his oral mo-
tion for an Alford plea, in his subsequent written motion for
an Alford plea, and again during the change of plea hearing
itself. From the beginning, Daoud and his counsel empha-
sized that it was a strategic decision not to go to trial on the
entrapment and mental state defenses. Indeed, it is easy to see
the attraction of an Alford plea for a defendant who maintains
his legal innocence but thinks that his attempted defenses at
trial would not overcome the likelihood that a jury would find
him guilty regardless. Hicks, 871 F.3d at 520 n.3. Daoud’s oral
and written motions for an Alford plea demonstrated this
thought process. He acknowledged the government’s “exten-
sive evidence,” including the ability to “parade” the bomb in
front of the jury, as well as factual admissions inherent in any
entrapment defense. He also made clear that he had no inter-
est in the possibility of being “locked up forever on a mental
defense.” To find that Daoud’s motion to withdraw his plea
rested on a newly available defense would defy credulity.
Groll, 992 F.2d at 758.
Nor are we persuaded by Daoud’s contentions about vol-
untariness. Daoud claims that changed circumstances be-
tween his plea deal and his second sentencing rendered his
plea involuntary. At oral argument, counsel admitted that this
argument “indirectly” rests on the fact that we remanded to a
new judge for resentencing, though Daoud also points to his
new counsel, improved mental health status, and the “dis-
rupted” nature of his arrangement with the government as
additional evolutions that together rendered his plea involun-
tary.
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 9
Daoud waived any argument that hinges on us remanding
this case to a different judge. “Waiver of a right extinguishes
any error and precludes appellate review, whereas forfeiture
of a right is reviewed for plain error.” United States v. Waldrip,
859 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Brodie,
507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007)). Daoud told the district court
explicitly that he was not raising an argument about the
downstream impacts of the remand. “There is no clearer ex-
ample of an intentional relinquishment of a known right than
this.” Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 449.
Even if we entertained the merits of Daoud’s argument,
the district court correctly observed that re-assignment to a
new judge is never a valid reason to withdraw a plea. Indeed,
“defendants can claim no right to be sentenced by a particular
judge.” United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir.
1977). Nor is there a constitutional right to a specific sentence.
A defendant’s only entitlement is “to have his sentence cor-
rectly determined in accordance with the applicable law and
based upon reliable evidence.” United States v. Urrego-Linares,
879 F.2d 1234, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted);
see United States v. Nelson, 774 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2014).
It is the solemn duty and sole province of a district court
judge—any district court judge—to ensure that entitlement is
met.
Daoud’s reliance on United States v. Cook does not save his
argument. 668 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1982). Cook arose from the
general premise that “[p]lea agreements essentially are con-
tracts between government and defendant.” United States v.
Underwood, 174 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1999). In Cook, we
agreed with the defendant that the government violated that
contract because the government promised not to make any
10 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
recommendations as to Cook’s potential punishment and not
to offer anything in aggravation, only for the government to
make its case file—containing aggravating facts—available to
the probation officer for inclusion in the presentence report.
Cook, 668 F.2d at 318. (We did so while observing that we had
substantial doubt as to whether the government could law-
fully withhold such information in the first place.)
In Daoud’s eyes, his plea experienced comparable disrup-
tion when we found his initial sentence substantively unrea-
sonable. This strained comparison ignores that Daoud had no
plea agreement with the government, which objected to his
request for an Alford plea from the start. In other words, he
did not have a contract and the government promised him
nothing. And the change-of-plea hearing confirmed Daoud’s
awareness of the potential sentences he could face, including
life in prison. While Daoud may have underestimated his sen-
tence, “that—we have recognized—is not a fair and just rea-
son to withdraw a guilty plea.” United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d
906, 918 (7th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). 2
At bottom, the “changed circumstances” in Daoud’s case
reflect the natural course of criminal litigation that stretches
more than a decade long. The district court thus did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Daoud’s motion to withdraw his
Alford plea.
2 Daoud makes two other undeveloped arguments as to voluntari-
ness: that he would be less stressed about going to trial in 2022 than his
defense counsel thought he would be in 2018, and that it was the govern-
ment, and not Daoud, who appealed the original sentence. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding these contentions unworthy
of analysis.
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 11
III. Waiver of Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment right to representation in a criminal
case generally includes a defendant’s right to represent him-
self, so long as he makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
choice to forego counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975). Daoud invoked that right prior to his sentencing, and
the district court granted it after conducting a thorough in-
quiry. On appeal, Daoud, now represented by counsel, con-
tends that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
right to an attorney.
We review a district court’s legal determination that a de-
fendant waived his right to counsel de novo and its underly-
ing factual findings for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 980
F.3d 570, 576 (7th Cir. 2020).
A. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver
“Whether a defendant is competent to waive counsel turns
on ‘whether he has the ability to understand the proceed-
ings.’” Jean-Paul v. Douma, 809 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (cit-
ing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993)). The dis-
trict court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that this
threshold has been met. United States v. James, 487 F.3d 518,
527 (7th Cir. 2007). To determine whether a defendant has
knowingly waived the right to counsel, we consider four fac-
tors: (1) “the extent of the district court’s formal inquiry into
the defendant’s waiver of counsel, if any”; (2) “other evidence
in the record showing the defendant understood the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation”; (3) “the defend-
ant’s background and experience”; and (4) “the context of the
choice to proceed pro se.” United States v. Jones, 65 F.4th 926,
929 (7th Cir. 2023). Daoud argues that the first factor was so
12 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
deficient that the overall assessment could not constitute a
valid waiver. We disagree.
1. Formal Hearing
In what has commonly become known as a Faretta collo-
quy, courts use “a thorough and formal inquiry in which the
court asks the necessary questions and imparts the necessary
information” to probe this question. United States v. Clark, 774
F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Faretta, of course, addressed the waiver of counsel in a crimi-
nal trial, and the “Supreme Court has never held that waivers
of counsel at any stage of the proceedings other than trial re-
quire such a give-and-take between the accused and someone
trying to educate him about counsel’s benefits.” Speights v.
Frank, 361 F.3d 962, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2004); see Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77 (2004) (holding that a full-blown Faretta colloquy
is not necessary where the accused wants to plead guilty with-
out legal assistance). But because the Sixth Amendment right
to self-representation applies at sentencing, a Faretta inquiry
is appropriate. United States v. Mancillas, 880 F.3d 297, 301 (7th
Cir. 2018); United States v. Harrington, 814 F.3d 896, 900–01 (7th
Cir. 2016); cf. James, 487 F.3d at 527.
District courts have broad discretion to frame a Faretta col-
loquy in accordance with the stage of the proceeding and the
vulnerability of the defendant. Douma, 809 F.3d at 359; see also
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88. This discretion goes to both the substance
and scope of the Faretta colloquy. While a post-conviction re-
quest to eschew counsel may indicate that the defendant is
“already well aware of the charges and their severity,” Har-
rington, 814 F.3d at 900, the assistance of an attorney at sen-
tencing would nonetheless prove particularly helpful “in
marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 13
circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defend-
ant to present his case.” McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 4 (1968)
(internal citation omitted). That particular dynamic will shape
the district court’s Faretta colloquy in the face of a defendant’s
post-conviction, pre-sentencing invocation of the right to self-
representation.
We have never prescribed magic words for what the
Faretta colloquy requires at any stage of the proceeding.
United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 473, 486 (7th Cir.
2021). Daoud effectively asks that we reverse that longstand-
ing practice and impose a specific script. We decline to do so.
District courts have discretion to determine how to best shape
the inquiry to the specific circumstances of the case. United
States v. Underwood, 88 F.4th 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2023). “[A] re-
viewing court’s ‘attention ultimately is directed not at what
was said or not said to the defendant but whether that defend-
ant in fact understood the risks and made a knowing and in-
telligent waiver.’” United States v. Salley, 166 F.4th 680, 685
(7th Cir. 2026) (citing United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579, 585
(7th Cir. 2003)).
The record makes clear that the district court engaged in a
thorough and formal inquiry that properly balanced the req-
uisite warnings with respect for Daoud’s clear wishes. Under-
wood, 88 F.4th at 709. Judge Kennelly customized his colloquy
to the nature of a sentencing proceeding: he explained to
Daoud that much like his first sentencing, he should antici-
pate a multi-day hearing in which witnesses would be ques-
tioned and cross-examined—a task that a lawyer would be
much better suited to do. Recognizing Daoud’s desire to
speak for himself, Judge Kennelly also explained to Daoud
that he would have the opportunity to speak on his own
14 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
behalf, “unfiltered by a lawyer,” even if he retained his ap-
pointed counsel. Judge Kennelly further offered Daoud the
chance to submit his own written sentencing memorandum
to the court, separate from counsel’s submission, if Daoud
kept his attorney. Daoud, however, rejected the offer.
On appeal, Daoud contends that the district court should
have pushed harder on Daoud’s reasons for wanting to pro-
ceed pro se. Even if our caselaw required such a specific probe
(and it does not), Judge Kennelly met the mark here. His col-
loquy with the defendant reflects a specific recognition of
Daoud’s desire to drop the “middleman” and take matters
into his own hands. Daoud also expressed distrust of his cur-
rent lawyer in part because the court had held a scheduling
status hearing that Daoud had not known about in advance.
Judge Kennelly responded to that concern by patiently walk-
ing through the case docket to explain how courts use sched-
uling meetings and placeholder dates, and how none of this
indicated that his counsel was working against him. But
again, this was not enough for Daoud, who acknowledged the
risks and decided to proceed anyway.
It is the district court’s responsibility to engage in a collo-
quy with the defendant. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860
F.2d 706, 735–36 (7th Cir. 1988). Daoud had an attorney with
whom he could discuss his decision at the time he filed his
motion. Here, the court itself made the risks clear, and the de-
fendant nonetheless knowingly and voluntarily invoked his
waiver. We look at the defendant’s awareness of the challenge
of proceeding pro se, not how good he will be at doing so,
when we evaluate whether the district court properly permit-
ted the defendant to exercise that right. Underwood, 88 F.4th at
709. Once a competent defendant timely invokes his waiver,
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 15
“a trial court may not deny it.” Salley, 166 F.4th at 684 (citing
United States v. Banks, 828 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2016)). Judge
Kennelly’s additional decision to convert Daoud’s appointed
counsel into standby counsel, though not required, only un-
derscores the thoroughness of his admonitions. See Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d at 740 (observing that the “appointment of
standby counsel is a well-recognized safeguard when a de-
fendant elects to proceed pro se”).
The record contradicts Daoud’s assertion that the district
court did not check whether Daoud knew his request for self-
representation was only for sentencing, not trial. Judge Ken-
nelly made clear to Daoud that his only opportunity to go to
trial would be if, on appeal, we reversed the district court’s
denial of Daoud’s motion to withdraw his Alford plea, and
that the only proceeding still ahead of Daoud at the district
court was his sentencing.
The bulk of Daoud’s argument on appeal goes to his men-
tal health status. Specifically, Daoud takes issue with the fact
that his mental health did not feature sufficiently in the Faretta
colloquy. He also wishes that the district court had asked him
outright if he was taking his medication at the time.
We have never held that a specific inquiry into a defend-
ant’s background is a required element of this colloquy so
long as the context as a whole meets the constitutional stand-
ards. See Harrington, 814 F.3d at 900. We have affirmed a find-
ing of waiver, for example, where a district court did not spe-
cifically address a defendant’s negative mental health history
in its Faretta colloquy because the district court found the de-
fendant “lucid and responsive” at the time of the waiver. Kidd
v. Lemke, 734 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2013).
16 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
The defense tries to distinguish Kidd on the grounds that
the severity of Daoud’s negative mental health history—spe-
cifically, the district court’s earlier finding that he was incom-
petent to stand trial—demands a different result. We are not
persuaded. The district court found Daoud competent to
stand trial years prior to his invocation of the waiver. When
Judge Kennelly took over the case, the record already in-
cluded years’ worth of documentation as to Daoud’s mental
health history, his age and education, and his experience in
the court system. That includes the hearing in which Judge
Lee brought in the MCC medical staff to testify as to Daoud’s
medication routine and compliance. Daoud’s counsel—pre-
sent at the MCC hearing—never requested a competency
hearing from the court, including after the court appointed
her as standby counsel. Further, despite the fact that Daoud
had a mental health evaluation completed for sentencing mit-
igation, he declined to submit the contents of that report to
the court, even after consulting with his standby counsel. The
robustness of a record such as Daoud’s certainly informs the
“post-trial timing” of the request. See Harrington, 814 F.3d at
900.
Daoud’s appellate briefing also reflects a conspicuous dis-
connect regarding his mental health. While simultaneously
claiming that the district court erred in not probing his com-
petence in the December 2022 Faretta colloquy, Daoud asserts
that his mental health was so strong in 2022 that the district
court should have permitted him to withdraw his Alford plea
and go to trial. Recognizing that his counsel’s initial request
for the Alford plea had indicated that the stresses of trial might
produce a setback in his client’s mental health journey, Daoud
now contends that by October 2022, “the conditions which
contributed to his instability—lack of competency, lack of
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 17
medication, long periods of segregation and isolation, his in-
ability to receive family visits or practice his religion—had
been remedied and were no longer such that trial would not
be a viable option for him.” In other words, Daoud wields his
competency in opposite directions on appeal even though the
district court held a hearing on the waiver issue and the with-
drawal request simultaneously. Neither maneuver is compel-
ling.
It may be prudent for a district court who knows a defend-
ant is taking mental health medication to confirm his compli-
ance with the medication in light of a request to proceed pro
se. But that is a context-specific question best left to the district
judge, who has a front row seat to the defendant’s behaviors
and tendencies throughout the proceeding. Cf. United States v.
Stenson, 167 F.4th 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2026) (declining to require,
as a rule, a question about mental health medication in the
context of a plea colloquy). We see no reason to impose such
a general requirement, nor do we find one specifically com-
pelled by this factual record.
2. Other Factors
A review of the record to assess the remaining factors
leaves no doubt that Daoud knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel. See Johnson, 980 F.3d at 577 (not-
ing that “failure to conduct a full inquiry is not necessarily
fatal”).
First, the record demonstrates that Daoud elected to rep-
resent himself with “eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (inter-
nal citation omitted). Warned that self-representation would
be a “colossally stupid decision,” Daoud explicitly stated that
“instead of being mad at the lawyer because the lawyer is not
18 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
doing what I want them to do, I would rather do it myself and
I will feel fine with that even if I win or lose. If I lose, I lost. It
wasn’t because someone else didn’t do what I asked them to
do.” In acknowledging the risks, Daoud made clear he under-
stood them. These admissions “weigh heavily on the side of
finding a waiver.” Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 736.
Second, Daoud’s reliance on counsel for roughly a dec-
ade’s worth of proceedings reinforces that he was well aware
of the benefits of having an attorney. See United States v. Offutt,
122 F.4th 268, 280 (7th Cir. 2024); Underwood, 88 F.4th at 711.
“[A]cquaintance with the criminal justice system weighs in fa-
vor of finding a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.”
Offutt, 122 F.4th at 281. Daoud also explicitly told the district
court that he consulted with standby counsel as to whether or
not to submit the mental health report in mitigation at sen-
tencing (and declined to do so). This, along with his active
participation in motions practice, “indicates an appreciation
for the task he took on when he elected to represent himself.”
Underwood, 88 F.4th at 710.
Finally, Daoud already had experienced one full sentenc-
ing hearing on the very same convictions at issue here. And
in acknowledging the risks, Daoud made clear he was making
a strategic choice to take matters into his own hands, even
though he stated that he knew he might fail. “A defendant
who waives his right to counsel for strategic reasons tends to
do so knowingly.” Harrington, 814 F.3d at 900. These factors,
in addition to the Faretta colloquy, show that Daoud made a
valid and clear choice “to represent himself ‘with eyes open.’”
Jones, 65 F.4th at 929 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).
Once Daoud invoked his right to self-representation,
Judge Kennelly had to “explain and emphasize the perils and
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 19
pitfalls” of doing so. Jones, 65 F.4th at 929 (internal citation
omitted). He thoroughly did that. But once he did not change
Daoud’s mind, the district court had to respect that right. We
affirm the decision below.
IV. Daoud’s Sentence
Daoud next argues that his sentence of 324 months impris-
onment and lifetime supervised release was substantively un-
reasonable. 3 A sentence is substantively reasonable “‘if the
district court gives meaningful consideration to the factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines, and arrives at a sentence that is objec-
tively reasonable in light of the statutory factors and the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case.’” United States v. Patel, 921
F.3d 663, 672 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Rosen, 726
F.3d 1017, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013)). We review the substantive rea-
sonableness of a sentence imposed for an abuse of discretion,
cognizant of the fact that “there is a nearly irrebuttable pre-
sumption that a below-range sentence is reasonable.” United
States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2016).
The below-Guidelines sentence of 324 months was sub-
stantively reasonable. The district court carefully explained
the sentence it imposed and thoroughly described the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Seymour, 94 F.4th 679, 688
3 Daoud puts forth that all his arguments go to the sentence’s substan-
tive unreasonableness. Nonetheless, his argument that the district court
failed to consider his extensive history of mental health issues in its assess-
ment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors sounds like a claim of
procedural error, which we review de novo. United States v. Rubio, 182
F.4th 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2026). No matter: under every possible standard of
review, this argument fails.
20 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
(7th Cir. 2024). Judge Kennelly offered a thorough review of
the defendant’s status as a young adult at the time he com-
missioned his first crime, as well as the indicia of impression-
ability he displayed over the years. In doing so, he gave ade-
quate consideration to Daoud’s history and characteristics
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “[W]e do not require a district
court to make specific findings concerning the § 3553(a) fac-
tors so long as it is clear he considered them and we are able
to review the sentence, which it did and we are.” United States
v. Dachman, 743 F.3d 254, 262 (7th Cir. 2014).
Most of Daoud’s arguments as to substantive reasonable-
ness are a regurgitation of his arguments reprising his lack of
skill as a professional criminal defense attorney. Invoking the
right to self-representation, though, “usually increases the
likelihood of a[n] … outcome unfavorable to the defendant.”
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
Daoud next puts forth a primer on adolescent brain devel-
opment, tracing the Supreme Court’s doctrinal development
regarding excessive punishment and juvenile offenders.
Daoud does not acknowledge that he was, in fact, a legal adult
at the time he pressed the button that he thought would kill
hundreds of people. At the time of the first crime, Daoud was
“a little short of 19 years old.” Further, Judge Kennelly quite
explicitly acknowledged Daoud’s relative youth and impres-
sionability during his sentencing. He balanced those consid-
erations with Daoud’s repeated efforts to murder people in
the name of religious extremism and his documented danger
of recidivism. The resulting below-guidelines sentence was
not one made in error.
Daoud likely waived any argument with regard to mental
health mitigation. In determining waiver, “the important
Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370 21
concern is whether a defendant chose, as a matter of strategy,
not to present an argument.” Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 449 (citing
United States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016)). The
district court urged Daoud to consider a mental health assess-
ment to put forth in mitigation; Daoud did so, but then de-
cided—in consultation with standby counsel—not to present
the report to the court. At minimum, Daoud forfeited the ar-
gument by “negligently fail[ing] to raise an argument at the
district court.” Waldrip, 859 F.3d at 450.
Judge Kennelly stated on the record that he would have
considered mental health mitigation, had Daoud presented it,
but that he could not do so. Indeed, Daoud acknowledges that
his decision tied the judge’s hands. A defendant’s own ob-
struction cannot govern that analysis where his strategic
choices invited the sentence he received. The truth is that the
“deficiencies of which [Daoud] now complains were products
of his self-representation.” See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d
585, 598 (7th Cir. 2006); cf. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8 (“[A]
defendant who exercises his right to appear pro se ‘cannot
thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense
amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.’”) (ci-
tation modified). And if we view this challenge as a substan-
tive one that contests the relative weight the district court
gave to its mitigation considerations, see United States v.
Melega, 173 F.4th 907, 914 (7th Cir. 2026), there is no record
upon which one could reasonably conclude the district court
went outside of the “broad bounds of reasonableness.” United
States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 2012).
V. Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Daoud’s motion to withdraw his Alford plea. Likewise, the
22 Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 & 24-2370
district court acted well within its discretion to deliver Daoud
a below-Guidelines sentence. Daoud knew the risks of pro-
ceeding to sentencing pro se, so his knowing and informed
decision to waive counsel stands. Daoud’s sentence is af-
firmed.