United States v. Soto
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket24-647 (L)
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
24-647 (L)
United States v. Soto
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
Present:
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 24-647 (Lead)
24-1521 (Con)
24-2030 (Con)
BRANDON SOTO, AKA Stacks; DWIGHT REID, AKA
Dick Wolf; AHMED WALKER, AKA Ammo,
Defendants-Appellants.*
__________________________________________
FOR APPELLEE UNITED STATES: DAVID R. FELTON (Courtney Heavey, Shiva
Logarajah, Kathryn Wheelock, Olga
Zverovich, Assistant United States Attorneys
on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney,
for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New York,
NY.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.
FOR APPELLANT BRANDON SOTO: Gwen M. Schoenfeld, Law Office of Gwen M.
Schoenfeld, LLC, New York, N.Y.
FOR APPELLANT DWIGHT REID: ELIZABETH M. JOHNSON, Law Offices of
Elizabeth M. Jonson, New York, N.Y.
FOR APPELLANT AHMED WALKER: JAY S. OVSIOVITCH, Federal Public
Defender’s Office for the Western District of
New York, Rochester, N.Y.
Appeals from judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Halpern, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgments of the district court as to Soto and Reid are AFFIRMED. We
AFFIRM the judgment of conviction as to Walker and DISMISS Walker’s appeal of his sentence.
Defendant Brandon Soto appeals from a February 23, 2024 judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York sentencing him principally to a term of 420
months in prison and a three-year term of supervised release. Defendant Dwight Reid appeals
from a May 22, 2024 judgment sentencing him principally to 420 months in prison. And
Defendant Ahmed Walker appeals from a July 19, 2024 judgment sentencing him principally to
235 months in prison. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and issues on
appeal and discuss them only as necessary to explain our decision.
We review sentences for “reasonableness, a particularly deferential form of abuse-of-
discretion review that we apply both to the procedures used to arrive at the sentence (procedural
reasonableness) and to the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness).” United States v.
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). When the argument has been
preserved, “we review the District Court’s factual findings relevant to a sentencing determination
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for clear error. In order to vacate such findings, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and nevertheless find to be impermissible the factual determinations
based upon that favorably-viewed evidence.” United States v. Gasperini, 894 F.3d 482, 485 (2d
Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). And we consider a sentence substantively unreasonable only if it is
“shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States
v. Muzio, 966 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2020).
Defendant Soto pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d), transferring a handgun to a juvenile in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(x)(1)(A)
and 924(a)(6)(B)(ii), and conspiracy to commit arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. At
sentencing, the district court imposed the following special condition of supervised release: “The
defendant shall not associate or interact in any way, including through social media websites, with
any gang members or associates, particularly members and associates of Gorilla Stone, or frequent
neighborhoods (or ‘turf’) known to be controlled by Gorilla Stone.” App’x at 174. On appeal,
Soto challenges that condition as unconstitutionally vague, a violation of due process, and an
impermissible delegation to the probation office.
Conditions of supervised release must “be sufficiently clear to give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”
United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This ensures that conditions of supervised release “inform [the probationer] of what conduct will
result in his being returned to prison.” United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2010).
“Generally, supervised release provisions are read to exclude inadvertent violations.” United
States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 125 n.6 (2d Cir. 2024).
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As the parties agree, those principles mean that the condition that Soto “not associate or
interact in any way” with gang members forbids Soto from interacting only with people known to
him to be gang members. Similarly, the condition that forbids him to “frequent
neighborhoods . . . known to be controlled by Gorilla Stone” is limited to those areas Soto knows
to be controlled by Gorilla Stone. Finally, the “any gang” provision forbids only association with
groups that Soto knows to be criminal gangs. Interpreted thus, the condition gives Soto adequate
notice of forbidden conduct, so the terms are not vague.
Defendant Reid was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and narcotics conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced
to two concurrent terms of 420 months in prison. Before trial, the government filed an
information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 informing the district court that Reid had previously been
convicted of two violent felonies—attempted robbery in 1992 and robbery in the first degree in
1997. This increased the mandatory minimum prison sentence for the narcotics-conspiracy
conviction from 120 months to 300 months. On appeal, Reid first argues that the district court
depended on unreliable evidence to impose an enhancement for trafficking narcotics into a prison
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4). Next, he says that his 420-month sentence was a substantively
unreasonable variance over the Guidelines range calculated by the district court. Last, he asks us
to vacate his sentence on the narcotics-conspiracy count because the district court erred in
accepting the prior-felony information. These arguments are meritless.
Our review of a sentencing court’s factual determinations is especially deferential. “The
ability of the district judge—who has seen and heard the witness—to make credibility
determinations is superior to that of the appellate court.” United States v. McCray, 7 F.4th 40,
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48 (2d Cir. 2021) (alteration omitted). So the judge’s “decisions as to what testimony to credit
are entitled to substantial deference.” United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2015).
“A factfinder who determines that a witness has been inaccurate, contradictory and even untruthful
in some respects may nevertheless find the witness entirely credible in the essentials of his
testimony.” United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Applying those principles, we conclude that the enhancement was not erroneous. The
district judge credited the testimony of a co-defendant, Luster, that Reid directed and benefited
from the trafficking of narcotics into the Auburn Correctional Facility. Reid counters that the
jury did not convict him of conspiring to distribute heroin, a charge that was supported at trial only
by Luster’s testimony. But there is no inconsistency between a jury finding that a fact has not
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge finding the same fact proven by a
preponderance of evidence. Reid also claims that Luster’s testimony was “refuted” by a New
York corrections officer, who testified that Reid had never been caught with contraband. The
district court found no inconsistency, because the same officer estimated that up to sixty percent
of contraband was not detected by corrections officers. These decisions about “what testimony
to credit are entitled to substantial deference.” Norman, 776 F.3d at 78.
Next, Reid’s sentence was substantively reasonable. “In the overwhelming majority of
cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would
be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v. Darrah, 132 F.4th 643, 653 (2d
Cir. 2025). Here, the district court calculated that Reid’s base offense level was 40, with a
criminal history category of VI, yielding a Guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison. At
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sentencing, the district court also considered “the implication of the EQUAL Act,” an unpassed
piece of legislation which the district court had “taken into account in [its] analysis under [18
U.S.C. §] 3553(a).” App’x at 310. The district court noted merely that, had that statute passed,
Reid’s Guidelines range would have been 324–405 months. Reid argues that this became his
Guidelines range. He is wrong. The Guidelines range remained 360 months to life in prison.
Reid’s 420-month sentence falls well within that range and is not substantively unreasonable.
Finally, Reid appeals the district court’s calculation of a twenty-five-year mandatory-
minimum for his narcotics-trafficking conviction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 851, 841(b)(1)(A), and
846. He argues that the Section 851 information violated a Department of Justice guidance
memo, and that the factual findings to support it should have been made by a jury. The first
argument is meritless because the “memorandum is merely an internal guideline for exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review,” which “provide[s] no substantive rights to
criminal defendants.” United States v. Strong, 844 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And Reid waived the second argument. “Any challenge to a prior
conviction, not raised by response to the information before an increased sentence is imposed in
reliance thereon, shall be waived unless good cause be shown for failure to make a timely
challenge.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2). The district court warned Reid that he could not raise any
challenge to the Section 851 information on appeal if he did not object to it at sentencing. Reid
affirmed the previous convictions. The Section 851 information does not warrant resentencing
Reid on the narcotics-conspiracy count.
Defendant Walker pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) and narcotics conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The parties stipulated
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that the Guidelines recommended a sentence in the range of 210 to 262 months in prison. In the
plea agreement Walker signed, he agreed “not [to] file a direct appeal . . . of any sentence within
or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range,” “even if the Court employs a Guidelines analysis
different from that stipulated to herein.” App’x at 77. The district court drew his attention to
this provision at the time of his plea, and Walker also agreed to it verbally. At sentencing, the
district court calculated Walker’s Guidelines range using U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, the Guideline for
attempted murder, as expressly contemplated by the written plea agreement, and imposed a term
of 235 months in prison—near the middle of the stipulated Guidelines range. On appeal, Walker
challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that his plea was not knowing
and voluntary under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 because he denied participating in the
attempted murder and did not understand that he could be sentenced based on conduct that he
denied.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must “determine that the defendant
understands . . . the nature of each charge to which [he] is pleading,” as well as “any maximum
possible” or “mandatory minimum penalty.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). “Rule 11 sets forth
requirements for a plea allocution and is designed to ensure that a defendant’s plea of guilty is a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
United States v. Delvalle, 94 F.4th 262, 266 (2d Cir. 2024).
The district court satisfied those requirements. It correctly informed Walker of the
statutory maximum and mandatory minimum, confirmed that his plea was voluntary, and
explained the appeal waiver to him. Walker does not dispute this, but argues that his plea was
not knowing and voluntary because he did not know that he could be sentenced for conduct he
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denied. This argument is unavailing. While Walker denied participating in the attempted
murder at his plea allocution, he admitted to two predicate acts that provided a factual basis for his
plea. He knew his potential punishment under the criminal statute under which he plead guilty.
And the plea agreement accurately calculated the advisory Guidelines range that was adopted by
the district court. 1 In light of the plain language of the plea agreement, the district court did not
violate Rule 11 by failing to verbally advise Walker at his plea hearing that he could be sentenced
for his role in Gorilla Stone’s other criminal activities.
Walker’s appeal waiver precludes the remaining aspects of his appeal. Waivers of
appellate rights are “presumptively enforceable” if they are made “knowingly, voluntarily, and
competently,” United States v. Riggi, 649 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2011), and the final sentence is
“within the range contemplated in the plea agreement,” United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d
315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000). We enforce plea waivers unless they involve “the kind of egregious
error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute,” not “standard-fare errors in misapplying
sentencing law.” Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713, 727 (2026).
Walker’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily with a sound factual basis. His
sentence of 235 months fell within the stipulated Guidelines range. And he argues only that the
district court erred in applying the Guidelines to his case and considering related racketeering acts
in imposing his sentence. Such errors in the “calculation of a Sentencing Guidelines range” are
1
We rejected a similar Rule 11 challenge to a guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) in United
States v. Williams, 827 F. App’x 136 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). The defendant allocuted to two
marijuana sales and claimed his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the district court did not
“specifically explain[] to him before he pled guilty that his alleged involvement in other racketeering
acts . . . could also be considered in determining his sentenc[e].” Id. at 138. We concluded that “the
district court was not obligated under Rule 11 to explain that Williams could be held responsible at
sentencing for additional criminal conduct . . . even though such conduct was not part of his allocution.”
Id. at 139.
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merely “standard-fare,” because they do not “discredit the judiciary’s commitment to law.” Id.
Walker’s plea agreement forecloses his appeal to the extent it challenges his sentence.
* * *
We have considered the defendants’ remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. We therefore AFFIRM the sentences of Soto and Reid. We AFFIRM the judgment of
conviction as to Walker and DISMISS Walker’s appeal of his sentence. 2
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
2
It is further ordered that the government’s pending motion to dismiss Walker’s appeal is DENIED
as moot.
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