United States v. Manoo

25-1175 (L) United States v. Manoo United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit August Term 2026 Submitted: October 14, 2026 Decided: November 6, 2026 Nos. 25-1175 (L), 25-1185 (CON) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MELKUAN SCOTT, a.k.a. MEL, a.k.a. YOUNG GOD, a.k.a. YOUNG, a.k.a. YG, ARTHUR STANLEY, a.k.a. WIGS, a.k.a. P, a.k.a. PENO, JEFF ANTOINE, a.k.a. LITTLE HOMIE, RASHAWN DUBOSE, a.k.a. CHUBBS, a.k.a. TREV, GREGORY THOMAS, a.k.a. QUANNY, a.k.a. JIM, TYSHAWN MCDADE, a.k.a. S DOT, a.k.a. S DIDDY, RICARDO HOWE, a.k.a. DINO, a.k.a. TYSON, NEHELIAH BARNETT, a.k.a. NELLY, a.k.a. NEY, a.k.a. NEAGMIAH, a.k.a. NEHEMIAH, RAYMOND RIVERA, a.k.a. WHITE BOY, KYRIN-ROBERT JACKSON, a.k.a. KY, GABRIEL HORACE WILLIAMS-BEY, a.k.a. MONEY, a.k.a. MUGGA, a.k.a. G MONEY, TAFARIE GREEN, a.k.a. FARIE, IRIS PEREZ, AFESHA MANOO, a.k.a. FESHA, a.k.a. FEE, HORACE STARKS, JR., a.k.a. HEAD, a.k.a. LITTLE HEAD, JAMIE COLEMAN, a.k.a. CITY, ARNOLD THOMPSON, a.k.a. B, JERROD HALL, a.k.a. SLIME, RAQUIM SMITH, a.k.a. BUD, a.k.a. BUTTER, a.k.a. RAKIM, JAMAL HOWELL, a.k.a. SQUIZZY, RASHAWN HILL, JASON WATSON, a.k.a. NOGGIN, SHAQILLE BROWN, a.k.a. SHAQ, MICHAEL  MORRISON, a.k.a. NAZZIE, Defendants, AKEEM MANOO, a.k.a. KEEME, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Nos. 3:14-cr-81, 3:24-cr-31, Vernon D. Oliver, Judge. Before: LEVAL, SULLIVAN, and BIANCO, Circuit Judges. Akeem Manoo appeals both the sixty-eight-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (the “Narcotics Sentence”), and the sixteen-month consecutive sentence simultaneously imposed following his admission to violating the terms of his supervised release on a prior conviction based on the same underlying conduct (the “Violation Sentence”). In particular, he argues that the district court procedurally and substantively erred in imposing a combined sentence of eighty-four months’ imprisonment. We conclude that the Narcotics Sentence and the Violation Sentence are both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The sentences are procedurally reasonable because the district court adequately justified its decisions to impose a consecutive sentence and to deny Manoo’s request for a downward variance as to the Narcotics Sentence. And the sentences are substantively reasonable because, given the seriousness of Manoo’s conduct and his criminal history, it cannot be said that his within-Guidelines Narcotics Sentence and his below-Guidelines Violation Sentence were shockingly high or unsupportable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. AFFIRMED. 2  Allison M. Near, Emily C. Kaas-Mansfield, Jacobs & Dow LLC, New Haven, CT. Brendan Keefe, Elena Lalli Coronado, Assistant United States Attorneys, for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT. PER CURIAM: Akeem Manoo appeals both the sixty-eight-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (the “Narcotics Sentence”), and the sixteen-month consecutive sentence simultaneously imposed following his admission to violating the terms of his supervised release on a prior conviction based on the same underlying conduct (the “Violation Sentence”). In particular, he argues that the district court procedurally and substantively erred in imposing a combined sentence of eighty-four months’ imprisonment. We conclude that the Narcotics Sentence and the Violation Sentence are both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The sentences are procedurally reasonable because the district court adequately justified its decisions to impose a consecutive sentence and to deny Manoo’s request for a downward variance as to the Narcotics Sentence. And the sentences are substantively reasonable because, 3 given the seriousness of Manoo’s conduct and his criminal history, it cannot be said that his within-Guidelines Narcotics Sentence and his below-Guidelines Violation Sentence were shockingly high or unsupportable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. I. BACKGROUND In 2015, Manoo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute over 280 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, for which he was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. On May 11, 2023, shortly after his release from custody, Manoo was arrested while in possession of approximately 499.6 grams of cocaine. He later pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and admitted that the offense constituted a violation of the conditions of his supervised release. During the combined sentencing proceeding, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months’ imprisonment for the narcotics offense and a range of thirty-seven to forty-six months’ imprisonment for the supervised release violation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court imposed a sixty-eight-month sentence for the narcotics offense and a sixteen- 4 month consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation. Manoo appealed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a district court’s sentencing decision for procedural and substantive reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” 1 United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentencing court makes a procedural error if it “fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the [section] 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1The parties dispute whether Manoo adequately preserved his arguments and whether an abuse- of-discretion or plain-error standard should apply. We need not decide this question because we reject Manoo’s challenges even under the more defendant-friendly abuse-of-discretion standard. 5  III. DISCUSSION Manoo first argues that his sentences are procedurally unreasonable because the district court provided “simply no explanation” justifying its decision to impose a consecutive sentence. Manoo Br. at 13. According to Manoo, “it [was] not even clear from the record whether the [d]istrict [c]ourt understood that it had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences.” Id. at 14. We disagree. For starters, the Guidelines explicitly recommend that a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release run “consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (2024) (policy statement). The district court expressly stated during the combined sentencing hearing that it “consider[ed] any pertinent policy statements” in fashioning a consecutive sentence, App’x at 211, and the parties’ plea agreement and sentencing submissions made clear that the district court had “discretion to determine whether the sentence on the supervised release violation should be served concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutive to the sentence to be imposed on the offense charged in the Indictment.” Id. at 43; see also id. at 98, 126, 132, 137. In short, there is no reason 6 to believe that the district court misunderstood its discretion to impose concurrent or partially concurrent sentences. And because the court “decide[d] simply to apply the Guidelines to [Manoo’s] case,” it was “not necessarily require[d]” to provide a “lengthy explanation” justifying its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Moreover, the district court more than adequately explained why a consecutive sentence was justified in light of the sentencing objectives for supervised release violations. It began by explaining that the “primary goal of a revocation sentence” is to “sanction . . . the defendant’s breach of trust.” App’x at 211–12; see United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A sentence for a violation of supervised release should primarily sanction the defendant’s breach of trust, not the conduct constituting the violation itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And while the district court opined that the “breach of trust” rationale was “not entirely persuasive” as a basis for imposing a Guidelines sentence of thirty-seven to forty-six months for the violation of supervised release, it still found that a below-Guidelines consecutive sentence of sixteen months’ imprisonment was necessary to “sanction [Manoo] for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.” App’x at 211. The 7 district court also gave “substantial thought and attention to the appropriate sentence” and “considered the writings, the filings, the letters, the criminal history of [Manoo], and the appropriate purposes of sentencing as reflected in the statute” in reaching its decision. Id. at 212; see Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 196 (2025) (holding that “when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release . . . a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing,” including “incapacitation”). This record reveals that the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence. Manoo next contends that the district court procedurally erred because it did not explain its decision to deny his request for a downward variance in light of the section 3553(a) factors. He argued below that several factors supported a downward variance, such as his rehabilitative efforts, acceptance of responsibility, drug addiction, and emotional state at the time of the offense. According to Manoo, the district court “disregarded and ignored the[se] well-articulated and well-founded grounds for a downward variance.” Manoo Br. at 18. But though the district court denied Manoo’s request for a downward variance as to the Narcotics Sentence, it did grant a downward variance as to the Violation Sentence. The court thoroughly explained its reasoning for both 8 decisions, highlighting several “specific[]” facts bearing on its analysis. App’x at 212. With respect to the Narcotics Sentence, the district court regarded Manoo’s “criminal history” as an aggravating factor, pointing to his 2009 conviction for possession of a firearm without a permit and 2011 convictions for criminal possession of a firearm and possession of narcotics. Id. The court also noted other aggravating factors, including the “time between [Manoo’s] release and the new conduct” and his “disciplinary history” while he was in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Corrections and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 213. The district court nevertheless recognized several mitigating factors, including Manoo’s completion of various prison programs, the “number of people . . . who love and support” him, his employment history, and his childhood trauma. Id. In all, the court explained that these aggravating and mitigating factors “paint[ed] a complex history,” leading it to conclude that the Guidelines provided “good guidance” as to the narcotics offense but “d[id] not give good guidance” as to the supervised release violation. Id. at 213–14. Based on that evaluation, the district court denied the downward variance as to the Narcotics Sentence due to “the particular facts and circumstances of this case in light of the relevant [section] 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 214. But it granted the downward 9 variance for the Violation Sentence after considering “the appropriate [section] 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 217. On this record, we conclude that the district court adequately explained its decision to vary downward only as to Manoo’s Violation Sentence. Finally, as his last challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentences, Manoo asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing, without justification, a combined above-Guidelines sentence of eighty-four months’ imprisonment. But although Manoo insists that we “should review his sentence[s] in the aggregate,” Manoo Br. at 19, the law is clear that the sentence for a violation of supervised release is distinct from the sentence imposed for a new conviction arising from that same conduct, see United States v. Fernandez, 152 F.4th 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2025) (“Any sanctions . . . that result from a violation of the conditions of supervised release are considered sanctions for the defendant’s breach of trust [and] not for the particular conduct triggering the revocation as if that conduct were being sentenced as new federal criminal conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); U.S.S.G. § 7 Part B Introductory Commentary (“Where a defendant is convicted of a criminal charge that also is a basis of the violation,” “[t]he Commission has concluded that the determination of the appropriate 10 sentence on any new criminal conviction should be a separate determination.”); see, e.g., United States v. Major, No. 23-6166, 2024 WL 1404577, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2024) (declining to view a fifty-one-month sentence on a felony conviction and a twelve-month consecutive sentence on a supervised release violation as a combined sentence of sixty-three months’ imprisonment). We therefore consider only whether the district court adequately explained its decision to impose a sixty- eight-month within-Guidelines sentence as to the narcotics offense and a sixteen- month below-Guidelines sentence as to the supervised release violation. 2 As discussed above, it did. A district court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of [a] particular sentence,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), but it “need not engage in a prolonged discussion of its reasoning,” United States v. Robinson, 799 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2015), or “address every argument the defendant has made,” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, the district court’s explanation for the sentences imposed was sufficient. Having “balanced” various 2Manoo’s argument that the aggregate sentence of eighty-four months constituted an “above- Guidelines sentence,” Manoo Br. at 19, also turns on an arithmetic sleight of hand because it considers only the Guidelines range for the underlying narcotics offense (fifty-seven to seventy- one months) and not the aggregate range of the violation and narcotics offense (together, 94 to 117 months). 11 aggravating and mitigating factors, App’x at 213, the court explained that the sentences imposed “taken separately” and “collectively” were “sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the sentencing purpose[s] set forth in [section] 3553(a), including the need to afford adequate deterrence of the defendant, protect the public from further crimes, and provide the needed care and treatment, mental health, [and] substance abuse,” id. at 218. The district court carefully articulated why the Guidelines provided “good guidance” with respect to the Narcotics Sentence but why a sentence of sixteen months – well below the advisory Guidelines range of thirty-seven to forty-six months – was warranted for the Violation Sentence. See id. at 214, 218. On this record, we conclude that the district court clearly explained in open court its reasons for imposing both the Narcotics Sentence and the Violation Sentence. Accordingly, we find no procedural error warranting resentencing. Manoo also contends that the sentences imposed by the district court were substantively unreasonable. According to Manoo, his “total effective sentence” of eighty-four months’ imprisonment “was greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing” because this was a “non-violent drug case,” he 12 “immediately took responsibility,” and he cited “a plethora of mitigating evidence.” Manoo Br. at 25–26. We are unconvinced. A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). A defendant arguing substantive unreasonableness “bears a heavy burden because [appellate] review of a sentence for substantive reasonableness is particularly deferential.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012). “[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v. Alcius, 952 F.3d 83, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing either the Narcotics Sentence or the Violation Sentence. The record reflects that the court expressly considered the mitigating factors presented in counsel’s sentencing submission and the Probation Office’s presentence investigation report and balanced those factors against several aggravating circumstances. See App’x at 212 (“This [c]ourt has given substantial thought and attention to the appropriate sentence in this case, has considered the writings, the filings, the letters, the 13 criminal history of Mr. Manoo, and the appropriate purposes of sentencing as reflected in the statute.”). That Manoo may ultimately disagree with the district court’s weighing of these factors is of no moment; we have long recognized that defendants – and appellate courts – may not “second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [sentencing] judge accorded to a given factor or to a specific argument made pursuant to that factor.” United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the seriousness of Manoo’s conduct and his criminal history, we conclude that his within-Guidelines Narcotics Sentence and his below-Guidelines Violation Sentence were neither “shockingly high” nor “unsupportable as a matter of law.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123. Accordingly, Manoo’s substantive reasonableness challenge also fails. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 14