Full Opinion

25-1742-cr United States of America v. Jones UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. 1 2 PRESENT: STEVEN J. MENASHI, 3 MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, 4 MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ, 5 Circuit Judges. 6 ____________________________________________ 7 United States of America, 8 9 Appellee, 10 11 v. No. 25-1742-cr 12 13 Corderro Jones, 14 15 Defendant-Appellant. 16 ____________________________________________ 1 For Appellee: YUANCHUNG LEE, Federal Defenders of 2 New York Inc. Appeals Bureau, New York, 3 New York. 4 5 For Defendant-Appellant: JUSTIN L. BROOKE (Michael D. Maimin, on the 6 brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for 7 Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the 8 Southern District of New York, New York, 9 New York. 10 11 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 12 District of New York (Seibel, J.). 13 Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and 14 DECREED that the July 14, 2025, judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 15 In March 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 16 New York sentenced Corderro Jones to fifty-one months of incarceration, to be 17 followed by three years of supervised release. Upon release, Jones committed a 18 series of domestic-violence offenses involving multiple victims. Jones 19 subsequently pleaded guilty to an offense relating to one of those victims in New 20 York state court and was sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment. After completing 21 his state sentence, Jones was taken into federal custody and charged with violating 22 the conditions of his supervised release. After Jones pleaded guilty to certain of 2 1 the specifications in his revocation petition, the District Court revoked his 2 supervised release and sentenced him to eighteen months’ incarceration, which it 3 intended to be served “consecutive” to his state sentence. App’x at 105. On 4 appeal, Jones argues that the District Court erred by failing to explain why his 5 federal sentence should not have been adjusted to account for his state sentence, 6 which by the time of his federal sentencing had already been discharged. We 7 disagree. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 8 procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to 9 affirm. 10 Jones did not object before the District Court on the ground that it failed to 11 explain the sentence, and we therefore review for plain error. United States v. 12 Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2007). “There are four prongs of plain error 13 analysis: (1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain, meaning it must be 14 clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error must have 15 affected the appellant’s substantial rights in that it affected the outcome of the 16 proceedings; and (4) if these other three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals 17 has the discretion to remedy the error if the error seriously affects the fairness, 3 1 integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ortiz, 100 2 F.4th 112, 120 n.3 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 In general, a district court must “state in open court the reasons for its 4 imposition of the particular sentence[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Although 5 explanation of a revocation sentence is still required, “less rigorous specificity” is 6 necessary when “a court sentences a defendant for violation of supervised 7 release.” United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2015). In this case, 8 however, the district court imposed a revocation sentence outside the advisory 9 Guidelines range. When it imposes such a sentence, “the sentencing court must 10 state ‘the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that 11 described’” in the Guidelines. United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 12 2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)). 13 The District Court did not err, let alone plainly err, in explaining Jones’ 14 sentence. Indeed, Jones concedes that it was impossible for the District Court to 15 impose any sentence that would run concurrently with his state sentence, as he 16 had already completed it. To the extent that a sentence “does not necessarily 17 reflect the exercise of discretion by the district judge,” “little explanation is 18 necessary to enable review.” United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 26 (2d Cir. 2019); 4 1 see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (context informs amount of detail 2 required in sentencing). 3 Moreover, to the extent that Jones argues that the district court should have 4 imposed a shorter sentence to account for his completed state sentence, the District 5 Court thoroughly analyzed the relevant sentencing factors in determining the 6 appropriate sentence. Jones provides no support for the conclusion that the 7 District Court’s comprehensive discussion of an appropriate sentence did not take 8 into account the consecutive nature of Jones’ federal sentencing. Rather, the 9 District Court expressly considered that neither Jones’ state imprisonment nor his 10 subsequent federal detention pending resolution of the revocation petition was 11 sufficient to rehabilitate him. App’x at 89 (In response to Jones’ claim that the 12 state sentence and federal detention rehabilitated him, the District Court noted 13 that “[f]ourteen months is a long time to think, but 51 months is a lot longer, and 14 the necessary changes were not made in that time.”). The District Court stated 15 that it “considered the Guidelines,” and that an above Guidelines sentence was 16 necessary because the District Court “almost never see[s] somebody who, 17 unfortunately, gives me less reason to believe he’s going to be law-abiding” in 18 light of his recidivist criminal history. Id. at 97. The District Court did not fail 5 1 to state its reasons for the sentence, and it certainly did not fail to do so in a clear 2 or obvious way. 3 We have considered Jones’ remaining arguments, which we conclude are 4 without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 5 District Court. 6 FOR THE COURT: 7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6