United States v. Martin

24-3013 United States v. Martin United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit August Term 2025 Argued: February 13, 2026 Decided: August 21, 2026 No. 24-3013 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. ADELLE ANDERSON, Defendant, CORY MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant. 1  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York No. 20-cr-549, Ann M. Donnelly, Judge. Before: CALABRESI, LIVINGSTON, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Cory Martin appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.), convicting him, after a jury trial, of murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, fraud, and identity theft. On appeal, Martin argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his murder-for-hire convictions, (2) the district court’s jury instructions inadequately explained the consideration element of murder- for-hire, (3) the district court erred in delivering an aiding-and- abetting instruction with respect to the murder-for-hire count, and (4) his other convictions should be vacated due to spillover prejudice. We hold that Martin’s murder-for-hire conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; the jury instructions accurately stated the elements of murder-for-hire; the district court did not plainly err by failing to give an additional clarifying instruction; the district court’s aiding-and-abetting instruction was justified based on the evidence; and there was no error due to spillover prejudice. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of conviction on all counts. Judge Calabresi dissents in a separate opinion. 2  EMILY DEAN (Amy Busa, Andres Palacio, and Tanya Hajjar, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee. JANEANNE MURRAY, Murray Law LLC, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. NATHAN, Circuit Judge: In April 2018, Defendant-Appellant Cory Martin strangled Brandy Odom, dismembered her body with power tools he purchased from Home Depot, and scattered her remains throughout a public park in Brooklyn. Martin did this because his then-girlfriend, Adelle Anderson, had taken out life insurance policies on Odom and promised to give Martin the proceeds once Odom was dead. After the murder was complete, Anderson attempted multiple times to collect on the fraudulent policies, though her efforts were unavailing. Police eventually discovered Odom’s remains, convinced Anderson to cooperate, and prosecuted Martin for, among other crimes, 3 murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Following a jury trial in which Anderson was the Government’s star witness, Martin was convicted on all counts. At trial, Martin argued that Anderson masterminded and executed Odom’s murder, and that she had fabricated whole cloth Martin’s role in the scheme. The jury rejected that theory, concluding that, as required by § 1958, Martin murdered Odom in exchange for Anderson’s promise of insurance proceeds. On appeal, Martin advances a different theory. He argues that murder-for-hire requires an employee-employer relationship and that he and Anderson did not have one. Instead, Martin claims that Anderson acted entirely at his direction, in part because she suffered horrific abuse at his hands. Anderson was therefore either acting under duress, or at most was Martin’s co-conspirator. But she did not “hire” Martin to do anything, and Martin therefore cannot have committed “murder-for-hire.” We reject this argument. The murder-for-hire statute does not require a formal employment relationship; it requires that a murder constituted consideration for a promise to pay something of pecuniary value. The meaning of consideration in this context is the same as at common law, referring to the age-old concept of reciprocal inducement. That is, the killer’s promise to kill must induce the payor’s promise to pay, and the payor’s promise to pay must induce the killer’s promise to kill. We hold that the Government presented sufficient evidence in this case for a reasonable jury to conclude, as it did, that Anderson and Martin’s arrangement met this definition of consideration. 4  We also hold that the district court’s jury instructions accurately stated the elements of murder-for-hire; the district court did not plainly err by failing to give an additional clarifying instruction; the district court’s aiding-and-abetting instruction was justified based on the evidence; and there was no error due to spillover prejudice. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of conviction on all counts. BACKGROUND 1 Cory Martin and Adelle Anderson met in high school in the early 2000s and commenced a decade-long “on and off” relationship during which Martin continuously sexually and physically abused Anderson. App’x at 117–18. Between 2015 and 2017, Anderson took out life insurance policies on various individuals with the express intention that she would give the policy proceeds to Martin if Martin killed the insured individuals. One of those insured individuals was Brandy Odom. Before Martin and Anderson targeted Odom, however, they 1 The following facts are drawn from the evidence presented at Martin’s trial. On review for sufficiency of the evidence, “we are to view the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government,” and “defer to the jury by resolving all inferences from the evidence and issues of credibility in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation modified). “Any lack of corroboration goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its sufficiency, and a challenge to the weight of the evidence is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal.” United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1993). 5 first set their sights on a man named Alex Villard. Anderson and Villard had dated in the mid-2010s and had a child together. But Anderson later left Villard in order to pursue a relationship with Martin. Eventually, Anderson and Martin both came to “want [Villard] to die.” App’x at 127. Martin devised the first insurance scheme in service of that goal. The plan was straightforward: Anderson would take out insurance policies in Villard’s name; Martin would kill Villard; and Anderson would give the insurance proceeds to Martin. The “point” of the scheme was that “[Martin] was not going to get rid of [Villard] who was [Anderson’s] problem and . . . not get paid for it or benefit some way from it.” Id. at 127. Although Anderson took out an insurance policy in Villard’s name in 2016, Martin never went through with Villard’s murder because Anderson “kept getting cold feet[.]” Id. at 129–30. Around the same time, Martin also instructed Anderson to apply for insurance policies on both of Anderson’s children, which she did in 2016 and 2017. But while Anderson actively wanted Martin to kill Villard, at least initially, she did not want Martin to kill her children. Accordingly, in order to pressure Anderson to take out the policies on her children, Martin threatened Anderson and, on at least one occasion, subjected her to violent physical abuse. Anderson ultimately acquiesced and applied for the policies. But she continued to resist Martin’s murderous designs on her children. In order to protect her younger son, Anderson sent him to live with Anderson’s friends in Atlanta for roughly a month and a half, after which Villard secured full custody. Anderson’s older son stopped living with her full time as well, primarily staying with Anderson’s mother and sister 6 instead. At some point, Anderson and Martin’s sights shifted to Odom. Anderson had first befriended Odom while Anderson was living with Villard. Anderson and Odom bonded over their shared occupation— sex work—and Odom moved in with Anderson and Villard for a time. When Anderson later left Villard and moved in with Martin, so did Odom. At first, Anderson and Odom worked together with Martin acting as their pimp. Later, at Martin’s direction, Anderson stopped performing sex work herself and shifted instead to managing Odom’s sex work. In early 2017, Martin suggested to Anderson that Odom should become the target of a new insurance-murder scheme. Anderson agreed and took out the first of two insurance policies in Odom’s name in March of that year. Anderson filled out the application and listed herself as the beneficiary, falsely claiming to be Odom’s sister. Nine months later, Anderson took out another insurance policy in Odom’s name. She again filled out the application herself, listed herself as the beneficiary, and pretended to be Odom’s sister. Anderson’s plan was to transfer all of the insurance proceeds to Martin upon Odom’s death. At trial, Anderson testified that she “did not like” Martin’s plan to kill Odom in exchange for insurance proceeds. Id. at 141. But Anderson also testified to various facts from which the jury could have inferred that she still wanted the murder to occur. For example, Anderson viewed some version of the insurance-murder scheme as inevitable by 2017 and understood killing Odom to be “an easier option” than the other potential targets. Id. Anderson also may have 7 wanted Martin to commit the murder so that the couple could jointly benefit from the insurance proceeds, including by improving their precarious housing situation. Finally, Anderson was informed by one of her sons that he had witnessed Odom performing oral sex on Martin, though Anderson testified that she “did not believe” her son’s story. App’x at 205. Anderson therefore may have wanted Martin to kill Odom out jealousy or a desire for revenge. Anderson also at least once encouraged Martin to “try n do something with that bitch” before the insurance policies in Odom’s name expired. Gov. App’x at 414. Martin strangled Odom to death in April 2018. Following the murder, Martin picked Anderson up from Anderson’s mother’s house, along with Anderson’s infant daughter. The couple went to dinner at Red Lobster. They then purchased cleaning supplies at Walmart and returned to Martin’s house, where Martin proceeded to dismember Odom’s corpse with tools that he had purchased from Home Depot. Martin and Anderson then made two trips together to Canarsie Park, Brooklyn, to dispose of the remains. After initially refusing to cooperate, Anderson reversed course and pled guilty to, among other counts, murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. She testified at Martin’s trial pursuant to a cooperation agreement, and was ultimately sentenced to five years’ probation without any custodial sentence. At her sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged that she was “the victim of sustained and serious sexual, physical, and psychological abuse,” but also emphasized that “there were so many off-ramps here” that Anderson declined to take. Supp. App’x at 25–26. The court specifically 8 observed that Anderson participated in the murder scheme “for over a year,” and that she “did nothing to warn [Odom], even when [Anderson] was safe at [her] family’s house.” Id. at 24. Following a two-week jury trial, where Anderson’s testimony was critical, Martin was convicted of murder-for-hire and murder- for-hire conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), along with various counts of fraud and identity theft related to the fraudulent insurance policies. The court sentenced Martin to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on the § 1958 convictions, concurrent terms of 20 years’ imprisonment on the two fraud counts, and two years’ imprisonment on the identity theft count. Martin timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Scope of Section 1958 Because the meaning and scope of § 1958 impacts each of the grounds for appeal, we address the statutory interpretation question first. “[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). That is the case here. Section 1958 makes it a crime to participate in interstate commerce “with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). At issue here is the meaning of “consideration.” The term “consideration” has a well-settled meaning: “an act or 9 forbearance or the promise of it done or given by one party in return for the act or promise of another.” Consideration, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 484 (1981); see also Consideration, Am. Heritage Dictionary 313 (2d College ed. 1982) (defining consideration as “[p]ayment given in exchange for a service rendered; recompense”). Put differently, consideration means “inducement,” or the “cause, motive, price, or impelling influence which induces” parties to consummate an agreement. Consideration, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). As a leading treatise on contract law explains, “the fundamental and generally accepted idea of consideration” is that “consideration is the exchange or price requested and received by the promisor for its promise.” 3 Williston on Contracts § 7:2 (4th ed. 2026). We hold that consideration has the same meaning in § 1958. “It is a settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Diamond, 45 F.3d 665, 672 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation modified). Of course, § 1958 does not “import all of contract law,” United States v. Gibson, 530 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2008), nor does it require proof of a legally enforceable contract, United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2008). But “[w]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word[.]” Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 733 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). That principle applies even where such a word is “obviously transplanted from another legal source.” George v. 10 McDonough, 596 U.S. 740, 746 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we and every other circuit to discuss the meaning of “consideration” in § 1958 have understood the term in line with “the traditional sense of bargained for exchange, so that there must be a quid-pro-quo (or at least the promise of such) between the parties to the transaction.” Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 99–100 (quotation marks omitted); see also Gibson, 530 F.3d at 610 (“[C]onsideration retains its contract law meaning of a bargained-for exchange of something of value[.]” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1057 (11th Cir. 1998) (same). Section 1958 thus criminalizes “a very limited category of behavior; only those instances in which one party agrees to commit a murder in exchange for another party’s provision (or future promise) of payment.” United States v. Frampton, 382 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). Up to this point, the parties are largely in agreement as to the meaning of consideration in § 1958. Where they part ways, however, involves the nature of the required “exchange.” Id.; see also Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 100. Martin contends that such an “exchange” must be more than a mere transfer, requiring instead something akin to an arm’s length “employment relationship.” Appellant’s Br. at 56–57. In Martin’s view, § 1958 incorporates a “‘for hire’ element,” and therefore must “involve[] a hirer/solicitor and a murderer.” Appellant’s March 11 Letter at 1. To that effect, Martin requested a jury instruction that “consideration” must be “offered by one (the solicitor) in exchange for another’s (the murderer’s) agreement to 11 commit a murder.” App’x at 58. In the Government’s view, the exchange requires only that the payor’s “payment or promise to pay for the intended murder” was what “caused [the killer] to carry out [the] murder.” Gov. Br. at 33. There need be no “employment relationship” or bargaining in the sense of an ordinary commercial transaction. Id. at 34 (quotation marks omitted). Nor is it necessary that the payor solicited the murderer’s participation or initially conceived of the scheme. 2 We agree with the Government that nothing in the text of § 1958 suggests that “consideration” requires arm’s length bargaining or a formal employment relationship. After all, “Congress did not aim § 1958 only at murderous businessmen.” United States v. Phillips, 929 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2019). While the title of the statute refers to “Commission of Murder-for-Hire,” 18 U.S.C. § 1958, “[i]t is well established that the title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of its text,” United States v. Epstein, 620 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Unlike the title, the statutory text refers 2The dissent repeatedly contends that the Government views the statute as requiring only an agreement between the parties rather than an exchange (or promised exchange) of payment for the murder. See post at 1, 3–4 & n.1. We understand the Government’s argument differently. In distinguishing several of our prior cases, the Government emphasizes that Anderson and Martin not only agreed to their exchange in advance of the murder, but also that Anderson’s promise “was necessary for Martin’s renumeration for the murder” and therefore that “Martin did not and could not have committed this crime alone.” Gov. Br. at 33. The Government’s statement that “nothing more is required” simply clarifies that § 1958 does not incorporate a separate “for-hire” or “employment” element. Id. at 34. 12 to “consideration,” which plainly encompasses transactions other than hiring an employee. All that is required is that “the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive or inducement: the consideration induces the making of the promise and the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 cmt. b (1981). “[J]ust as the promisor’s purpose must be to induce an exchange, so the promisee’s purpose must be to take advantage of the proposed exchange.” Farnsworth on Contracts 64 (1982). Thus, while “consideration must not be confounded with motive, . . . it is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise.” O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 293 (1882). “The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise.” Id. at 293–94. We emphasize that no actual, enforceable agreement is required. Rather, “it is the defendant’s intent that controls.” Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 100. “According to the plain language of § 1958, the act of traveling in, or using a facility of, interstate commerce, coupled with the intent that a murder take place in consideration of anything of pecuniary value, is itself a substantive offense[.]” Frampton, 382 F.3d at 217 n.3. “[T]he statutory phrase consideration for a promise or agreement to pay does not create a separate ‘agreement element,’ but rather modifies the type of intent which a defendant must possess, namely, the intent to commit a murder for hire.” United States v. Dvorkin, 799 F.3d 867, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). Thus, if the defendant is 13 the payor, it is irrelevant whether “the would-be murderer is an undercover agent who by definition never intends to commit the crime.” Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 100. Likewise, if the defendant is the murderer, the payor’s subjective motives are irrelevant, except insofar as they illuminate the defendant’s intent. What matters is that the defendant acted on an understanding of his counterpart’s role that satisfies the requirements of § 1958. In sum, if the defendant is the alleged killer, as was the case here, he violates § 1958 if he (1) intends to commit the murder in order to induce payment by another person, and (2) intends for the expected payment to induce his commission of the murder. That is, the payment (or promise to pay) must not be incidental to the murder— it must both induce and be induced by the murder (or promise to murder). B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Applying this interpretation of § 1958 to the facts at hand, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Martin’s murder- for-hire convictions. In assessing sufficiency, we ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 112 (2d Cir. 2008). We “resolv[e] all inferences from the evidence and issues of credibility in favor of the verdict,” and “may not substitute our own determinations of credibility or relative weight of the evidence for that of the jury.” Hardwick, 523 14 F.3d at 100. “If the court concludes that either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, the court must let the jury decide the matter.” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). Thus, “[a]lthough we review a claim of insufficient evidence de novo, a defendant challenging his verdict on sufficiency grounds bears a heavy burden.” Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 100 (cleaned up). The evidence here was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Martin murdered Odom as consideration for Anderson’s promise to pay him insurance proceeds. As we have already explained, it is Martin’s state of mind that matters, not Anderson’s. And it does not matter whether Martin or Anderson initially conceived of the plot. Section 1958 requires only that Martin viewed his participation as a reciprocal exchange for Anderson’s promise to pay. That is, Martin understood his promise to commit the murder as inducement for Anderson’s promise to pay, and understood Anderson’s promise to pay as inducement for his promise to commit the murder. The Government presented evidence that, from the outset, Martin understood the scheme in exactly this way. Starting with the plot to kill Alex Villard, Anderson testified that “the point of filling out life insurance paperwork” was that “[Martin] was not going to get rid of [Villard] who was my problem and [Martin] not get paid for it or benefit some way from it.” App’x at 127. The later scheme to kill Odom was structured in the same way, and the jury could reasonably have inferred that the promise of insurance proceeds served the same purpose. The Government also presented evidence—text messages 15 between Martin and Anderson—in which Anderson actively used the prospect of insurance proceeds to incentivize Martin to commit the murder. While not overwhelming, this evidence satisfies the Government’s burden on sufficiency review. Martin has several responses, none of which persuades us. First, Martin argues that his promise to commit the murder did not induce Anderson’s promise to pay because Anderson’s promise to pay was the result of coercion and abuse. Put differently, Martin argues on appeal that he forced Anderson to participate, and that her participation therefore cannot have constituted “consideration” for anything. 3 In making this argument, Martin relies heavily on Anderson’s trial testimony regarding her sexual, emotional, and physical abuse at Martin’s hands. See, e.g., App’x at 118–20, 123, 131– 33, 141. As a threshold matter, we reiterate that Anderson’s motives are not an element of a violation of § 1958. But her motives are relevant to Martin’s understanding of Anderson’s role in the scheme. We disagree with Martin that the jury was required to conclude from this trial record that Anderson participated in the scheme under 3 At trial, the Government also presented evidence that Martin had attempted to recruit a third-party, Samson Alabi, to commit the murder in exchange for $25,000. On appeal, however, the Government abandons any argument that Martin’s discussions with Alabi—in which Martin was the solicitor rather than the would-be murderer—were an independently sufficient basis for the jury’s verdict as to § 1958. We therefore deem the argument abandoned and do not address Alabi’s role in the murder scheme in this Opinion. See United States v. Prawl, 149 F.4th 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2025). 16 duress. “The assessment of witness credibility lies solely within the province of the jury, and the jury is free to believe part and disbelieve part of any witness’s testimony.” United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 2009). The jury was therefore free to reject Anderson’s allegations of abuse, as Martin’s trial counsel strenuously argued it should do on cross-examination and in closing. Moreover, even if the jury did credit Anderson’s general account of abuse, Anderson never testified that Martin forced her to participate in the specific scheme to kill Odom. That contrasts with her testimony that Martin forced Anderson to take out a life insurance policy on one of her own children by “t[ying] [her] up in the basement for three days” and abusing her “until [she] agreed to do it.” App’x at 141. Assuming that Anderson was abused, the jury still need not have concluded that she participated under duress. As the Government argued at trial, Anderson was “terrified” of Martin but was also someone who “would stand by [Martin] through unthinkable things.” Id. at 263. That is, she was both a victim of abuse and a “full-throated participant” in the murder scheme. Id. Similarly, as the trial court noted at Anderson’s sentencing, Anderson retained a degree of agency throughout the scheme. Starting with Villard, Anderson exercised control over Martin’s choice of victim, forcing Martin to back down multiple times by “getting cold feet.” App’x at 130. And Anderson participated in the plot to murder Odom for over a year, despite “so many off-ramps” and opportunities for Anderson to withdraw, report Martin, or warn Odom. Supp. App’x at 25. 4 4 The dissent draws the opposite lesson from Anderson’s sentencing, 17  Moreover, the Government presented the jury with multiple explanations for Anderson’s participation other than coercion. Namely, the Government introduced—and the defense emphasized—evidence suggesting that Anderson had independent motives for wanting Martin to kill Odom. From those motives, the jury could have inferred that Martin saw Anderson’s promise to pay as inducement to commit a murder that Anderson wanted to occur. One such motive was pecuniary gain. At the time, Anderson and Martin were struggling financially, their house was under foreclosure, and their utilities had been cut off. Anderson thus might have hoped that she would reap quality-of-life benefits if she could induce Martin to commit the murder and use some of the insurance proceeds to find the couple a more stable living situation. The fact that Anderson would have shared in the benefits of the scheme does not negate the possibility that she intended to compensate Martin for his role as the killer. Another motive supported by the record involves Anderson’s sense that Martin believed she owed him recompense for perceived wrongs in the past. For example, Anderson testified that she planned arguing that no “judge would sentence Anderson to probation if the judge thought the facts were anything like what the majority describes them to be.” Post at 5–6. But it was precisely the prospect of such sentencing leniency that gave Anderson a motive to downplay her own agency and culpability in her testimony at Martin’s trial. It would have been reasonable for the jury, accurately perceiving Anderson’s motives, to discredit her testimony about abuse. In any event, the jury in Martin’s case was not obligated to view Anderson’s role in the scheme the same way as the judge did at Anderson’s own sentencing. 18 to give Odom’s life-insurance proceeds to Martin so that “[Martin] could stop saying that [Anderson] owed him for everything that [Martin] claims [Anderson] did to him over [Anderson’s] lifetime.” App’x at 144. Thus, the record supports a conclusion that Anderson wanted Martin to kill Odom so that Anderson could obtain the money she felt she needed to expunge her perceived debts. In this view, Anderson’s offer to pay Martin the insurance proceeds would have served two, simultaneous roles: inducement to commit the murder and repayment of Anderson’s debts. A third motive supported by the record is simple jealousy. On cross-examination, defense counsel probed Anderson on her relationship with Odom, eliciting testimony that one of Anderson’s sons witnessed Odom having sex with Martin and then told Anderson about it. In closing, defense counsel argued that “[Martin] started having sex with [Odom],” that Odom and Anderson “fought” over Martin, that Anderson “grew to dislike” Odom, and that “by the time of [Odom’s] murder, [Anderson] hated her.” Gov. App’x at 146. Counsel then emphasized: “[T]hat’s motive.” Id. The jury could have reasonably credited the theory that Anderson hated Odom, which fit neatly with Anderson’s text message to Martin encouraging him to “do something with that bitch this week.” Id.at 414. Based on these apparent motives, the jury could have inferred that Martin did not understand Anderson to be acting as his minion or to be completely under his control. Instead, the jury could have concluded that Martin viewed her as an active “accomplice,” App’x at 263, who induced his participation just as much as he induced hers. Martin next argues that viewing Anderson as having induced 19 his participation contradicts the Government’s representations at trial that Anderson was a victim of abuse. But that mischaracterizes the Government’s position. While the Government did argue that Martin “was at the heart of this insurance murder plot” and that the plot “all started with” Martin, App’x at 245, it did so largely to counter Martin’s own theory that “every step of this life insurance scheme and the murder of Brandi Odom started with [Anderson] and ended with [Anderson],” Gov App’x at 145. The Government never suggested that Anderson acted under duress. Nor could it have, as it was simultaneously prosecuting Anderson for her own violation of § 1958. To the contrary, the Government repeatedly emphasized Anderson’s culpability, arguing that despite her abuse, Anderson “yessed [Martin], and in doing that she knew . . . this incentivized [Martin] to go through with it because of the possibility of a payout.” App’x at 265. The Government was also clear that “[i]t doesn’t matter at all who masterminded this[,] . . . if [Martin] thought of it first, [or] if [] Anderson thought of it first.” Id. at 266. In any event, the parties’ characterizations of the case are not evidence, and what matters instead is whether the evidence presented to the jury could have persuaded a reasonable juror of Martin’s guilt. Here, it did. In addition to arguing that Anderson acted out of coercion, Martin also contends that because the Government described Anderson’s promise to transfer the insurance proceeds as a gift rather than a payment, the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of consideration. Martin points to the Government’s argument that “Adelle Anderson told you that she agreed to give all the policy proceeds to the defendant for him to control just like she 20 had with the money she made in sex work and just like the money Brandy made in sex work.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4 (quoting App’x at 256)). But the fact that the Government used the word “give” instead of “pay[]” to describe Anderson’s promise does not mean that the promise was entirely gratuitous or unconditional. Id. at 3. Instead, the evidence supported the jury’s rational conclusion that Anderson made the promise in order to induce Martin to kill Odom. That is what § 1958 requires. Finally, Martin argues that the interpretation of § 1958 described above would mean that any murder conspiracy involving money will also be murder-for-hire. Not so. Indeed, had the jury here concluded that Martin directed the entire scheme and was not induced to act by Anderson’s promise, he would have committed only a conspiracy to murder and not murder-for-hire. The fact that the jury interpreted the evidence differently in this case does not mean that the two crimes will always be coextensive. Nor can we second guess the jury’s verdict on appeal simply because we would have weighed the evidence differently. See Autuori, 212 F.3d at 114. In sum, the jury reasonably concluded based on the totality of the evidence that Martin’s promise to murder induced Anderson’s promise to pay and that Anderson’s promise to pay induced Martin’s promise to murder. That is, the jury found that “there was a mutual agreement, understanding, or promise that something of value would be exchanged for committing the murder.” App’x at 281; see also Frampton, 382 F.3d at 218. Martin’s sufficiency challenge therefore fails. 21  C. Jury Instructions Martin separately argues that we must reverse because the district court’s jury charge was deficient. “Jury instructions are erroneous if they mislead the jury or do not adequately inform the jury of the law, and error is prejudicial where the appellant can show that the error, in light of the charge as a whole, improperly influenced the jury’s verdict.” Moore v. Rubin, 160 F.4th 271, 296 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). We “examine the jury charge in its entirety, rather than scrutinize it strand-by-strand,” and have emphasized “that a trial court has discretion in the style and wording of jury instructions, so long as the instructions do not mislead the jury as to the proper legal standard.” Id. (cleaned up). Martin raises two objections on appeal. First, he argues that the jury charge failed to “clarify that ‘consideration’ as used in the murder-for-hire statute mean[s] a quid pro quo exchange and not simply an expectation or a desire for money.” Appellant’s Br. at 54. Second, he argues that the charge improperly included an aiding-and- abetting instruction. Id. at 61. We disagree. 1. Definition of Consideration Prior to the charge conference, Martin proposed language explaining that “the consideration requirement is interpreted in the traditional sense of bargained for exchange, so that there must be a quid-pro-quo (or at least the promise of such) between the parties to 22 the transaction.” App’x at 58 (citation modified). 5 At the charge conference, Martin’s counsel objected to “the lack of language concerning the consideration requirement” in the court’s provisional jury instructions, and requested the inclusion of “language indicating that there must be a quid pro quo or a bargained-for exchange.” Id. 5 Martin’s proposed jury charge on the consideration element read: The third element that the government must prove is that the murder was intended to be committed as consideration for the receipt of anything of value. This requires that the government prove that there was a mutual agreement, understanding or promise that something of value would be exchanged for committing the murder. “Anything of value” means, for example, money, negotiable instruments, real estate, jewelry, forgiveness of debt, or anything else that the primary significance of which is economic advantage. It is not necessary for the government to prove that anything of value was in fact exchanged or delivered. The consideration requirement is interpreted in the traditional sense of bargained for exchange, so that there must be a “quid-pro-quo (or at least the promise of such) between the parties to the transaction. The federal murder-for-hire statute requires the government to prove that the accused intended for a murder to be committed as consideration for something of pecuniary value. Moreover, the mere fact that the consideration offered by one (the solicitor) in exchange for another’s (the murderer’s) agreement to commit a murder could inure to the economic benefit of the latter is insufficient. There must be evidence to establish that at the time the agreement was formed, the consideration was something the primary significance of which lay in its economic advantage. App’x at 58–59. 23 at 241. The court acknowledged Martin’s arguments but declined to adopt his proposed language. 6 Because Martin’s objection to the omission of his proposed language was adequately preserved, we review that objection de novo. Refusing that language was not erroneous, both because the district court’s given charge was accurate and because Martin’s requested language was not additive. The given charge described “consideration” as requiring that “before the murder there was a 6 The district court’s jury charge on the consideration element read: The third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant intended that the murder be committed as consideration for the receipt of anything of pecuniary value. This element requires that