USA V.

25-380-cr USA v. Scaccia UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 2 at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 3 on the 20th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. 4 5 Present: 6 7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 8 EUNICE C. LEE, 9 BETH ROBINSON, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 14 15 Appellee, 16 17 v. No. 25-380-cr 18 19 SHANE ANTHONY SCACCIA, 20 21 Defendant-Appellant. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 For Defendant-Appellant: JANEANNE MURRAY, 25 Murray Law LLC, 26 New York, NY. 27 & 28 MATTHEW R. LEMBKE, 29 Cerulli, Massare & Lembke, 30 Rochester, NY. 31  1 For Appellee: BRETT A. HARVEY, Assistant 2 United States Attorney, for 3 MICHAEL DIGIACOMO, 4 United States Attorney for 5 the Western District of New 6 York, Rochester, NY. 7 8 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New 9 York (Siragusa, J.). 10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 11 DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 12 Defendant-Appellant Shane Anthony Scaccia appeals from the February 6, 2025 judgment 13 of the District Court. The judgment was entered following his guilty plea to one count of dealing 14 firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D), 15 three counts related to the possession and transfer of machineguns in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 16 922(o)(1) and 924(a)(2), and one count related to the possession of machineguns in violation of 18 17 U.S.C. §§ 922(o)(1) and 924(a)(2). On appeal, Scaccia argues that the District Court 18 miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines, erred in failing to dismiss the charges against him, and 19 improperly imposed special conditions of supervised release relating to the monitoring and 20 surveillance of his internet-capable devices. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 21 underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 22 I. Sentencing Guidelines Calculation 23 Scaccia argues that the District Court improperly counted a youthful offender adjudication 24 towards his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. “When a defendant challenges 25 the calculation of his Guidelines range, we review the district court’s interpretation of the 26 Sentencing Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Cooke, 143 F.4th 164, 167 (2d Cir. 2025) 2  1 (citation modified). This case presents a wrinkle because Scaccia is no longer in federal custody 2 and we must assess whether his challenge is now moot. “Although a defendant’s release from 3 prison will not necessarily moot his sentencing challenges if he remains under supervision at the 4 time of his appeal, such challenges remain live only if there is more than a remote and speculative 5 possibility that the district court could or would impose a reduced term of supervised release were 6 we to remand the matter.” United States v. Simmons, 150 F.4th 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation 7 modified). Because the record does not support any likelihood that, on remand, the District Court 8 would reduce his term of supervised release, we conclude that his challenge is moot. The offense 9 conduct was serious as Scaccia sold trigger control group travel reducers (“TCGTRs”) and drop- 10 in auto sears (“DIAS”), equipment designed to convert semi-automatic weapons into machineguns. 11 See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). Further, Scaccia arranged to sell hundreds of these devices to customers 12 throughout the United States by using email accounts, social media, and third-party online payment 13 accounts. The severity of the offense conduct, coupled with Scaccia’s sophisticated means of 14 concealing his illicit business, lead us to conclude that the District Court would not impose a 15 reduced term of supervised release if we were to remand. Simmons, 150 F.4th at 134–35. Thus, 16 Scaccia’s sentencing challenge is moot. 17 II. Probable Cause and the Motion to Dismiss 18 Scaccia argues that the District Court should have dismissed the counts involving the 19 TCGTRs and DIASs for lack of probable cause, or later when he attempted to withdraw his guilty 3  1 plea, 1 because they are not machineguns within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). 2 More 2 specifically, he claims that the DIASs he sold were missing a spring, a crucial component that 3 completes the conversion of a semi-automatic weapon into a fully automatic weapon. Since the 4 conversion kits were incomplete, Scaccia argues, the DIASs were not machineguns. Scaccia 5 does not offer any basis to conclude that the TCGTRs he sold are not machineguns within the 6 meaning of the statute. 7 Scaccia waived his argument that the devices are not machineguns within the meaning of 8 the statute by entering an unconditional guilty plea to all five counts, thus conceding that they were 9 machineguns. We have said that “[a] knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all 10 nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 (2d 11 Cir. 1996). Scaccia does not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. 12 Rather, his challenge “goes to the merits of the prosecution, not to the jurisdiction of the court.” 13 Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Scaccia’s arguments fail. 14 III. Special Condition of Supervised Release 15 Finally, Scaccia argues that the District Court erred by imposing a special condition that 16 he participate in, what he terms, intrusive and overbroad computer monitoring without a sufficient 17 individualized assessment. Because Scaccia did not object to the special condition at sentencing, 1 Scaccia contends that his motion challenging the sufficiency of the indictment was styled as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to counts two through five of the indictment. 2 Section 5845(b) provides that “[t]he term ‘machinegun’ means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.” 4  1 we review for plain error. See United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 343 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). To 2 meet this standard, Scaccia must show “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather 3 than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights; and (4) 4 the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 5 United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation modified). 6 Scaccia has not shown plain error here. “District courts possess broad discretion in 7 imposing conditions of supervised release” and may impose them if they are reasonably related to 8 the factors set forth in United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(b)(1). United States v. Betts, 9 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). At Scaccia’s sentencing, the District Court referred to these 10 factors when it imposed the special condition, including the need to deter others and the need to 11 protect the public. Moreover, before the District Court imposed the condition, the Probation 12 Officer described the way Scaccia used his 3-D printer and online business to produce and 13 distribute the unlawful auto sears. Because Scaccia used sophisticated digital means to solicit 14 buyers, receive payments, and evade detection, we cannot conclude on this record that the district 15 court’s individualized assessment was plainly erroneous. We are likewise satisfied that on plain 16 error review, the scope of the special condition is not so overbroad as to amount to “clear or 17 obvious” error, if it is error at all. Moore, 975 F.3d at 90. The condition here authorizes human 18 (rather than computer) search of Scaccia’s devices only upon receipt of electronic transmission of 19 impermissible or suspicious activity by the monitoring application. Cf. United States v. Browder, 20 866 F.3d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 2017) (upholding monitoring condition where third-party monitoring 21 organization notifies the Probation Office only if it detects contraband). And, “if other 22 information is inadvertently gathered . . . those monitoring compliance should remain 5 1 conscientiously unaware of that data.” United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004). 2 Absent further record regarding the operation of the monitoring application or its triggers for 3 suspicious activity, and recognizing these constraints, we cannot conclude that the condition 4 constitutes plain error. 5 We have considered Scaccia’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 6 merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 7 8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6