Full Opinion

25-2477-cr United States v. Saunders UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., GERARD E. LYNCH, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. 25-2477-cr JOSHUA SAUNDERS, AKA JOSHUA W. SAUNDERS, AKA WISH, Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________ FOR APPELLEE: JOY LURINSKY (Kayla C. Bensing, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ROBERT P. LARUSSO, The LaRusso Law Firm, PLLC, Garden City, New York. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Diane Gujarati, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court, entered on September 25, 2025, is AFFIRMED. Defendant-Appellant Joshua Saunders appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm, after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Following our remand to the district court for resentencing, the district court sentenced Saunders principally to 120 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Saunders challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the 120-month sentence. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. BACKGROUND At the initial sentencing in 2023, the district court found that Saunders was eligible for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“ACCA”), based upon its determination that he had three prior convictions for violent felonies that he committed on different occasions. With that finding, Saunders was sentenced to ACCA’s mandatory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment, which was a variance from the advisory range of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). 2 On appeal, we concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), which was decided after Saunders’s sentencing, the district court erred in making the ACCA determination on its own because, under Erlinger, “a defendant is entitled to have a unanimous jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions for ACCA purposes.” United States v. Saunders, 23-6735-cr, 2024 WL 4533359, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2024) (summary order). We nevertheless affirmed the conviction, “conclud[ing] that the district court’s error was harmless because the record makes clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would find that Saunders committed the three prior violent offenses on separate occasions.” Id. at *3. After we issued that summary order, but before the mandate was issued, Saunders moved to vacate the judgment and remand the case, with the government’s consent, on the ground that one of the three felonies that formed the basis for his ACCA eligibility was not a crime of violence, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). This Court granted the motion, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for resentencing. On September 25, 2025, Saunders was resentenced. The district court concluded that Saunders was not subject to an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, and thus, his Guidelines range was 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment, with an effective range of 120 months given the statutory maximum for the offense. The district court sentenced Saunders principally to 120 months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION We generally “review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). However, we apply plain error review to procedural reasonableness 3 challenges not raised before the district court. See United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2013). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that: “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the [defendant]’s substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 96 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). I. Procedural Reasonableness Saunders argues that the district court procedurally erred at the resentencing by failing to properly consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because Saunders did not raise this objection before the district court, “our review on appeal is restricted to plain error.” United States v. Wagner-Dano, 679 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2012). As set forth below, we identify no procedural error, plain or otherwise. “A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the [Section] 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “we presume that the sentencing judge has considered all relevant [Section] 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.” United States v. Smith, 982 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Here, the record demonstrates that, at the resentencing, the district court properly considered the Section 3553(a) factors. As a threshold matter, the district court explicitly noted that it had “considered each of the factors set forth in [Section 3553(a)]” and summarized those 4 factors. App’x at 266–67. The district court then applied those factors to this case in detail, explaining, inter alia, that: (1) “the offense [] Saunders committed, being a felon in possession of a firearm, is a serious offense”; (2) “Saunders made serious, brazen efforts to obstruct justice in connection with this case” by making “efforts to secure false letters in an attempt to manipulate the court to release him on bail”; (3) “Saunders has an extensive and serious criminal history,” which included “the commission of violent felonies,” and was a member of a gang; (4) “[t]he need for deterrence is strong here, both general deterrence and specific deterrence,” and “[i]t is particularly important that the sentence imposed serve the purpose of deterring [] Saunders from committing crimes in the future” because “[e]vidently, his prior sentences did not deter him from committing another serious offense”; (5) “[t]here is a strong need to protect the public from further crimes of the [d]efendant”; and (6) “the sentence must promote respect for the law, particularly given the nature of the obstruction efforts.” Id. at 268–69; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). In analyzing these factors, the district court also explicitly noted that it had considered Saunders’s arguments in mitigation, including, inter alia, his personal history, physical and mental health, conditions of confinement and medical treatment at the Metropolitan Detention Center, and his efforts at rehabilitation. With respect to his personal history, the district court specifically stated that it had taken into account, as it did at the initial sentencing, Saunders’s “serious struggles and challenges starting from a very young age,” including being “the victim of both physical and emotional abuse.” App’x at 269. As to rehabilitation, the district court noted that “the record reflects that [Saunders] has goals for himself and seems to want to change his life for the better,” and also acknowledged its consideration of his additional rehabilitation efforts since the initial sentencing. Id. at 270. 5 Saunders fails to point to any Section 3553(a) factor that the district court failed to consider. Instead, Saunders suggests that the district court procedurally erred because it had noted at the initial sentencing that Saunders had “significant mitigating factors” warranting a substantial variance, App’x at 165, and thus, “it was unreasonable and inexplicable for the [district court], at the [] resentencing, to disregard its prior determination regarding the weight to attribute to the mitigating factors and refuse to assign a proportional variance from the [G]uidelines range for the same ‘significant mitigating circumstances,’” Appellant’s Br. at 39– 40. In particular, Saunders notes that “considering the original variance was 23 percent of the advisory [G]uidelines range of 235 to 293 [months], a similar 23 percent of the 120-month sentence would result in a variance of 27.6 months from the [G]uidelines sentence of 120 months.” Id. at 41. This argument is without merit. Although the initial sentence was a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range and the resentencing involved a lower Guidelines range, the district court was not required at the de novo resentencing to impose a new sentence that contained a variance that was proportional to the one imposed at the initial sentencing. 1 See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507–08 (2011) (“[B]ecause the Court of Appeals . . . remanded for de novo resentencing, we conclude that [the district court] was not bound by the law of the case doctrine to apply the same 40-percent departure that had been applied at [the defendant’s] prior sentencing.”); see also United States v. Platt, 715 F. App’x 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (“[Defendant]’s argument regarding the district court’s failure to impose a variance of equal proportion to the variance in the original sentence is clearly unavailing under 1 Saunders does not contend that the resentencing involved a limited remand, rather than a de novo resentencing. 6 the reasoning of Gall.”) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47–48 (2007)). Instead, de novo resentencing requires the district court to “formulat[e] anew the appropriate sentence” for the offense “under the individualized assessment required by [Section] 3553(a),” which includes consideration of a new Guidelines range. Kaziu v. United States, 108 F. 4th 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2024). That is exactly what the district court did here. Indeed, the district court noted that it was not varying downward from the new Guidelines range, notwithstanding its decision to do so at the initial sentencing, because of its above-referenced balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors: As the parties will recall, at the original sentencing, I found that a downward variance to 180 months was warranted. And that was, of course, a variance from the Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months of imprisonment that I had found to be the applicable advisory Guidelines range. Today, I have found that the applicable advisory Guidelines sentence is 120 months, which, of course, is significantly below the range I had found at the time of the original sentencing. So today, what I have found is that the applicable advisory Guidelines sentence is 120 months. A sentence below the advisory Guidelines sentence of 120 months would not be sufficient to serve the applicable sentencing purposes. I reach that conclusion after having considered all of the [Section 3553(a)] factors I am required to consider. App’x at 271. In sum, we find no procedural error in the imposition of the 120-month sentence. II. Substantive Reasonableness Saunders also argues that the 120-month sentence was substantively unreasonable because “a reasonable and fair sentence should have resulted in a lesser sentence after considering all the [Section] 3553(a) factors, including those mitigating circumstances presented by the [d]efendant.” Appellant’s Br. at 44. We disagree. In applying the abuse of discretion standard to substantive reasonableness challenges, “we do not consider what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor [at sentencing]. Rather, we consider whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear 7 the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). A sentence is therefore substantively unreasonable only if “affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, although there is no presumption that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable, “in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). As noted above, in imposing the 120-month sentence, the district court relied upon, inter alia, the seriousness of Saunders’s possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, his obstruction of justice during the prosecution, his extensive criminal history (including crimes of violence), as well as the need for specific and general deterrence. On this record, those factors “can bear the weight assigned [to them] under the totality of [the] circumstances,” even when balanced against the mitigating factors identified by the district court. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191. In an attempt to demonstrate substantive unreasonableness, Saunders again relies upon the lack of any variance by the district court from the Guidelines range of 120 months at the resentencing, even though it had varied substantially from the higher Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months at the initial sentencing when imposing the 180-month sentence. However, it was well within “the range of permissible decisions” for the district court to determine that, notwithstanding the lower Guidelines range at the resentencing, a sentence below 120 months would not adequately reflect a balancing of all the Section 3553(a) factors. Id. Thus, contrary to Saunders’s assertion, the district court did not err in failing to give him “credit” for his 8 mitigating circumstances at the resentencing. Appellant’s Br. at 39. Instead, it reasonably determined that, although those mitigating circumstances supported a 180-month sentence at the initial sentencing, they were insufficient to warrant a sentence below 120 months when balanced against the other Section 3553(a) factors at the resentencing. In essence, Saunders argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court failed “to properly weigh the mitigating factors at resentencing.” Id. at 44. However, his “mere disagreement with the district court’s weighing of certain Section 3553(a) factors does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Pollok, 139 F.4th 126, 146 (2d Cir. 2025). In short, because the sentence was not “shockingly high . . . or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law,” Park, 758 F.3d at 200, we conclude that the sentence was substantively reasonable. * * * We have considered Saunders’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 9