Full Opinion

25-664-cr(L) United States v. Griffin UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNY CHIN, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, -v- 25-664-cr(L), 25-1541-cr(CON) ROBERT DYCKMAN, Defendant, GLENN GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FOR APPELLEE: DAVID R. FELTON, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael D. Maimin, James McMahon, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for James M. McDonald, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JEFFREY C. HOFFMAN (Marky A. Suazo, Gabriel Altman, on the brief), Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP, New York, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Briccetti, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Defendant-Appellant Glenn Griffin appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered on June 12, 2025, following a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. In their plea agreement, Griffin and the government stipulated that the losses resulting from his two offenses totaled $2,400,000 and that the stipulated Guidelines range was 37 to 46 months' imprisonment. The district court (Briccetti, J.) sentenced Griffin principally to 24 months' imprisonment, followed by three years' supervised release, and imposed $2.4 million in restitution, a $50,000 fine, forfeiture of $220,000, and a $200 special assessment. In his opening appellate brief, filed October 15, 2025, Griffin brought two challenges: one challenging the validity of his guilty plea and the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw that plea, and another challenging his sentence. The challenge to his plea was based on Griffin's claim of ineffective 2 assistance from the attorney representing him through the time of his plea ("prior counsel"). Griffin challenged his sentence on the ground that his plea was involuntary and that prior counsel had "pressured [Griffin] into accepting" that loss level. Appellant's Br. at 50. On August 26, 2026, as he neared the end of his prison term, Griffin moved to withdraw his first challenge "related to the District Court's acceptance of his guilty plea," and to argue only "the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, including the District Court's loss-amount finding." Dkt. No. 79.1. Griffin's motion was supported by his sworn declaration stating, inter alia, that he understood that if his withdrawal motion were granted he w[ould] not be able to raise the Plea-Withdrawal Issues, or any argument that [his] appellate waiver does not bar review of [his] sentence on the ground that [his] plea was involuntary or the product of ineffective assistance of counsel, in any future proceeding in this Appeal or in any future appeal. Dkt. 79.4. Griffin's motion was unopposed and was granted. Notably, Griffin's briefed challenge to his sentence is premised principally on his contention that his plea was invalid. With the plea-invalidity contention abandoned, we hold that the appeal waiver in Griffin's plea agreement is enforceable and bars his sentencing challenge. As we have long recognized, "a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal a sentence within an agreed upon guideline range is enforceable." United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998). "In no 3 circumstance . . . may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal . . . then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement, for to permit such a defendant to escape the fairly bargained-for consequences of her agreement with the government would render the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement meaningless." United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)) (citation modified). As Griffin withdrew his challenges to the voluntariness of the guilty plea, he is bound by the terms of the plea agreement, which include his obligation to forfeit "a total sum of money equal to $220,000," App'x at 102, to "make restitution in the total amount of $2,400,000," id., as well as "not to appeal or bring a collateral challenge [to] any restitution amount equal to or less than $2,400,000" or to "any fine that is less than or equal to $150,000," id. at 106. Of course, "a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court." United States v. Buissereth, 638 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2011). Yet nothing in the record suggests a "violation of a fundamental right," United States v. Riggi, 649 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2011), or any other egregious sentencing error that would render enforcement of the appeal waiver a "miscarriage of justice," Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713, 716 (2026). District courts retain broad discretion over the procedures used to resolve disputed sentencing facts, see United States v. Dralle, 175 F.4th 374, 383 (2d Cir. 2026), and 4 although the district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the loss amount finding, Griffin had ample opportunity to "rebut the government's overall theory of victim losses" through his sentencing submissions and at the sentencing hearing, United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 194 (2d Cir. 2013). Moreover, the district court's loss determination was supported not only by the plea agreement, but also by the presentence report, the victim impact statement, and the record as a whole. See United States v. Granik, 386 F.3d 404, 412 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Under our precedents, a stipulation in a plea agreement, although not binding, may be relied upon in finding facts relevant to sentencing."). To the extent Griffin seeks to challenge the plea agreement's stipulated monetary penalties based on ineffective assistance of counsel while preserving the agreed-upon prison sentence, that request is denied. "We have . . . frequently noted the dangers of piecemeal non-enforcement of plea agreements," id., as well as the risk that failing to enforce such agreements would render the "covenant not to appeal . . . meaningless," id. (quoting United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 97-98 (2d Cir.1997)). For Griffin to receive the benefit of a reduced sentence while evading the agreed-upon monetary impositions would defeat the purpose of the plea agreement: "virtually every provision of a plea agreement . . . is a bargaining chip," and if concessions made by defendants are not enforceable, then the government has "no reason" to take part in the exchange. Id. 5 * * * We have considered Griffin's remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Griffin's motion for a remand is DENIED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 6